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INTERESTS': DECIDING FOR LEGALLY
INCOMPETENTPA TIENTS
ABSTRACT OF THESIS
'Best interests' is a panacea within medico-legal decisions for incapacitated patients.
Its scope is extensive and its range of application situationally diverse, yet the
meaning of best interests remains relatively obscure. To clarify its character this
thesis deconstructs best interests by critically examining current law regarding
treatment decisions for incompetent patients (Chapters 1 and 2). The conceptual
implications of using 'interests' are then considered through exploration of
philosophical approaches to sources of interests (Chapter 3). Certain important
distinctions are raised and the notion of an 'interest network' is mooted. The
possibilities for reconstruction of best interests are considered in Chapters 4 and 5.
The importance of autonomy, including competence construction and patient
perspective in alternative decision-making mechanisms, is considered. The meaning
of welfare, together with quality of life and personhood are also explored in the
context of incapacitated persons. Reconstruction then begins in earnest. 'Respect' is
proffered as the most suitable ethic for governing 'best interests'. A new synthesis of
respect is developed through Chapters 6,7 and 8. It is argued (Chapter 6) that we
should admit a wider range of interests, recognise the importance of relationship, and
differentiate between input and decision-making authority. A 'whole life, over time'
approach is proffered in Chapter 7, including a reclassification of incompetence, and
a process for ascertaining interests outlined. The final chapter embraces ethical
issues, conflict resolution and criteria for justified decision-making. Discussion
concludes by developing a normative framework to legally represent the improved
respect synthesis within 'best interests'.
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Medical treatment of legally incompetent patients is problematic. A paradox exists
such that these patients may need treatment, but are unable to provide consent to it.
Absent consent, proceeding to treat could constitute an assault, whereas refraining
from treating fails to meet the patient's clinical needs and may undermine his/her
health and quality of life. Moreover, patients who are unable to make their own
decision about treatment need our support, care and compassion as fellow human
beings. Well-being is part of what makes human life valuable, and it is
understandable that we should seek to restore or enhance it in a patient that is
incapacitated. Treatment decisions are therefore needed to protect and promote these
patients' interests.
'Best interests' is the mechanism that has evolved to resolve the lacuna of consent
regarding incompetent patients. With its roots in welfare it has grown and adapted to
bridge the gap that occurs where incapacity robs patients of the ability to determine
treatment decisions for themselves. In recent years its application has developed in
response to the progression of medical science and legal provisions such as the
Human Rights Act (1998). The case law on best interests in medico-legal decision¬
making is now extensive and its range of application diverse. The outcome of these
decisions impacts the lives (and sometimes deaths) of individuals concerned, with
concomitant emotive repercussions for individuals and families alike - sometimes in
tragic circumstances. 'Best interests' is at the sharp end of resolving these treatment
dilemmas. Yet, despite its extensive use in onerous medico-legal decisions, the
character of best interests remains elusive. Its meaning and function are often
obscured, now tangled in a mass of decisions concerning minors and adults regarding
withdrawal/withholding of life-sustaining treatment, surgical sterilisation, obstetric
intervention, refusal of treatment by incapacitated patients, diagnostic testing, bone
marrow donation, transplant surgery, dialysis, and most recently the surgical
separation of conjoined twins.
This thesis seeks to elucidate best interests, initially by deconstructing its historical
and jurisdictional origins (in Chapter 1). Its progression to, and development in, the
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medical law context is addressed in Chapter 2 through identification of consistent
themes regarding: gateways (giving access to the best interests mechanism), function
(in terms of decision purpose, and role of interests), and content (accorded to
influential factors of best interests). This initial deconstruction starts to reveal the
current character of best interests, and critical evaluation of existing decisions also
enables deficits in its current construction to be established. While much of the value
of best interests lies in its flexibility and beneficent motivation, it is presently found
to be failing to fulfill its potential for protecting the interests of incapacitated
patients. This deconstruction acts as a useful guide to the need for, and structure of, a
more valuable reconstruction of best interests.
Conceptual aspects of 'interests' are explored in Chapter 3 as a means of better
understanding the scope for attributing interests to incapacitated patients and to
identifying the range of potential interests. Important distinctions are raised as a
means of enhancing clarity, and the idea of an interest network for individual patients
is developed.1 The relevance of other interested parties is also considered, and a
connected concept of interests established.
From this improved understanding of what best interests currently comprises, and
what we might mean by 'interests', the possibilities for reconstructing 'best interests'
can then be considered through appropriate appeals to value. These refer to the
purposive aspects - what we seek to protect, achieve or promote - through best
interests. Chapter 4 evaluates the relevance of autonomy, initially by examining
competence construction to establish the location of decision-making authority. A
role for autonomy regarding incapacitated patients is established - even in proxy
decisions - through the notion of individuality. Alternative decision-making
mechanisms are also considered as a means to identifying valuable autonomy-based
aspects in decision-making. Chapter 5 then evaluates welfare through the traditional
assessment standard of 'quality of life', finding the value of life to be more than
biological, and considers the relevance and impact of personhood in attributing
moral status and interests to incapacitated patients.
1 The concept of an interest network originates from the work of J. Feinberg, Harm to Others, The
moral limits of the criminal law, Volume one (1984) Oxford University Press Inc., New York, 55-61.
2 The notion of 'biographical' life is seen in the work of J. Rachels, The End of Life, Euthanasia and
Morality (1986) Oxford U.P., Oxford.
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The strengths of both autonomy and welfare are then employed as a synthesis as
reconstruction of best interests becomes the focus in Chapters 6,7 and 8. 'Respect' is
proffered as a better overarching aim of decision-making for incapacitated patients,
because it embraces both existing values and allows for development of additional
elements oriented specifically towards those with incapacity. These new elements
include attribution of a wider range of interests then are currently permitted, and an
exploration is made of the relevance of 'relationship' to incapacitated patients. This
approach seeks to take account of - and respect - patients more fully as individuals,
despite their incapacity. In Chapter 7 this approach is supported further by adopting
a notion of 'whole life, over time' as a means to enabling a proxy decision-maker to
become truly 'informed' about the individual upon whose behalf s/he acts. The
focus remains firmly with incompetent patients in proffering a reclassification of
/«competence that allows for incorporation of temporal aspects, identified earlier, in
order to enable incapacitated patients to participate as fully as possible in their
treatment decisions. The final chapter argues that decision proxies should act
'responsibly in the name of common humanity', which is considered initially in
terms of ethical aspects of conflict resolution and justifiable decision-making. These
conclusions are then translated into a legal framework to represent this synthesis of
respect within a decision process that better respects and protects the interests of





1 Chapter 1 - Positioning a panacea
1.1 A panacea
Making medical treatment decisions for others is a risky venture; we fear getting it
'wrong'. But, incapacitated individuals sometimes need treatment, requiring that
others decide for them. Medicine and law strive to shoulder this responsibility, in the
face of seemingly irreconcilable choices about life and death and contentious quality
of life judgments. Constant developments in medical technology increase
complexity. The legal and ethical mechanism traditionally employed in the U.K. to
resolve these onerous decisions is 'best interests'.
1.1.1 All things to all (incompetent) patients?
The best interests principle has become a panacea for incompetent patient (IcP)
decision-making. It is increasingly used in expanding range of treatment situations,
including, inter alia: withholdingVwithdrawal2 of life-sustaining treatment from
infants and from adults in persistent vegetative state (p.v.s.) ; physical treatment of a
mentally ill adult4; sterilisation of intellectually disabled patients5; bone marrow
testing of an intellectually and physically disabled adult6; treatment of mature
•7 ... . 8
minors ; and obstetric intervention regarding adult females . The scope of best
interests is extensive and its range of application diverse. Situations of application
'
Eg: Re J (A minor) (Wardship: medical treatment) [1990] 3 All ER 930; Re J (A minor)(Wardship:
medical treatment) [1992] 9 BMLR 10; Re T (A minor)(Wardship: medical treatment) [1997] 1 All
ER 906.
2
Eg: Re C (A minor)(Wardship: medical treatment) [1989] 2 All ER 782; Re C (A baby) [1996] 2
FLR 43; Re C (A minor)(Medical treatment) [1998] 1 FLR 384.
3
Eg: Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821; Frenchay Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1994] 1
WLR 601.
4
Eg: Re C (Adult: Refusal of treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290.
5
Eg: Re F, sub nom F v West Berkshire HA [1989] 2 All ER 545; Re W (Mental patient)
(Sterilisation) [1993] 1 FLR 381; Re S (Medical treatment: adult sterilisation) [1998] 1 FLR 944; Re
SL (Adult patient) (Medical treatment) [2000] 2 FCR 452.
6
Re Y (Mental incapacity: Bone marrow transplant) [1996] 2 FLR 787.
7
Eg: Re R (A minor)(Wardship: medical treatment) [1991] 4 All ER 177; Re W (A minor)(Medical
treatment [1992] 4 All ER 627.
8
Eg: Re S (Adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 671; Re MB (Medical treatment)
1997 2 FLR 426; St George's Healthcare NHS Trust v S (No. 2), sub nom R v Collins & others ex p S
(No. 2) [1998] 2 FLR 728.
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have little in common other than the patients' legal incompetence; making its
potential for further application in treatment decisions considerable.9
Treatment decisions for IcPs revolve around intense issues such as life, death, bodily
integrity, reproduction, privacy, personal relationship and human dignity. Resolving
these weighty issues affords best interests a potent role. However, its significance
parallels its role in family law where it is widely used in decisions on adoption,
custody and care of children.10 Indeed, diversity and flexibility may be its greatest
strength. Flexibility is apparent in the broad spectrum of admissible factors, already
including, inter alia: views of patients,11 parents,12 medical professionals13 and the
court14; evaluation of welfare15 and quality of life16; ethical values of self
17 • • 18
determination and sanctity of life ; various interests ; benefits and burdens of
treatment19; relevance of risk of harm20; and need for post-operative familial
support.21 This flexibility enables courts (and medical professionals22) to adapt best
interests as a decision mechanism. In effect, best interests is an instrumental tool
9
However, the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 omits any reference to 'best interests',
preferring the purpose of treatment to be safeguarding or promoting a patient's physical or mental
health (s47). This is, however, similar to the interpreted meaning of 'best interests' in the English
case Re F, above.
10 The origins of best interests in relation to family law are considered below, paragraph 1.3.
"
E.g. Re C (Adult: refusal of treatment) [1994] above.
12
E.g. Re T [1997] above.
13
E.g.: re doctors/professional bodies, see Swindon & Marlborough NHS Trust v S [1995] Med. L.
Rev. 84; re nurses/carers, see Re C (A minor)(Wardship: medical treatment) [1989] 2 All ER 782.
14
E.g. South Glamorgan County Council v W and B [1993] 1 FLR 574.
15
E.g. Re J (A minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1990] 3 All ER 930.
16
E.g. Re B (A minor)(Wardship: medical treatment) [1981] 1 WLR 1421.
17 Re T (Adult: Refusal of treatment) [1992] 3 WLR 782; St George's Hospital case, above.
18
E.g.: in bodily integrity, see Re LC (Medical treatment: sterilisation) [1997] 2 FLR 258; in chance
of a future life, see Re S (A minor)(Medical treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 376; in emotional, psychological
and social benefits, see Re Y (Mental incapacity: bone marrow transplant) [1996] 2 FLR 787.
19
E.g. Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, above.
20 Re F [1989] above; Re W [1992], above; Re S (Medical treatment: adult sterilisation) [1998] 1 FLR
944; Re X (Adult sterilisation) [1998] 2 FLR 1124.
21 Re T [1997] above.
22 In Re F [1989] above, Lord Brandon's equiparation of lawfulness with best interests (p551) and the
House of Lords' application of the Bolam test (Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee
[1957] 2 All ER 118) at pages 549, 559, 561, 567 and 571, places many treatment decisions for
incompetent patients in the hands of medical professionals. However, the views of Dame Butler-Sloss
(P) in Re SL [2000] above, now raise doubts about wholesale medical application of the Bolam
standard. Furthermore, certain incompetent patient decisions must still be brought before the English
courts, including: non-therapeutic sterilisation; bone marrow harvesting; decisions involving wards,
and contested decisions involving minors. Relatedly, in Scotland, certain treatments may have special
provisions attached (Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, s48).
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capable of fashioning a variety of outcomes, dependent on individual needs and
circumstances.
Acceptance of best interests, by courts and healthcare professionals (HCPs), also
stems from the principle's beneficent motivation; seeking the course of action most
beneficial to the patient. We seek valuably to protect the patient from unnecessary
harm and to improve his/her current situation. This underlying beneficence,
combined with inherent flexibility, seems to enable best interests to be all things to
all incompetent patients. However, this author submits that this capacity is not
fulfilled under current formulations of best interests. I submit that the best interests
formula can fulfil this potential, and it is the overarching aim of this thesis to
demonstrate how this can be so.
1.2 Background perspective
1.2.1 The nature of the best interests problem
Fundamentally, the need for a mechanism for treatment decisions regarding IcPs is
bound up in the law of trespass to the person. Ifmedical treatment proceeds without
appropriate consent it could constitute a battery, potential creating tortious and/or
criminal liability. English and Commonwealth cases clearly limit tortious trespass to
situations lacking any consent to medical intervention.24 The power of consent is in
'mak[ing] the touching legally innocuous'.25
This power depends on validity, which requires it to be freely given by a legally
competent patient, and not contrary to public policy.26 However, IcPs cannot meet
23 Best interests is adopted in England and Wales, and previous Scottish decisions include: Lawrence,
pet'r (1996) SCLR 538; and Law Hospital NHS Trust v Lord Advocate [1996] SLT 26, 848 & 869.
Its use is now omitted from the recent legislation on incapacitated adults. Best interests has also been
used by the Irish Supreme Court, see In the Matter of a Ward of Court [1995] 2 ILRM 401. However,
best interests is not unequivocally accepted: in the USA 'substituted judgment' is adopted, see Re
Quinlan 355 A2d 647. Substituted judgment seeks to determine what the patient would choose (if
able) and is considered in Chapter 4, below.
24
See, for example, Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432, and Reibl v Hughes (1980) 114 DLR (3d) 1,
respectively. Any consent in contrast to consent that merely is vitiated by insufficient information
disclosure (which concerns negligence rather than trespass, see ibid).
25 Per J.K. Mason, R.A. McCall Smith and G.T. Laurie, Law and Medical Ethics (2002)
Butterworths/Reed Elsevier (UK) Ltd, London, paragraph 10.7, citing: Attorney-General's Reference
(No. 6 Of 1980) [1981] 2 All ER 1057; and, in Scotland, Smart v HM Advocate [1975] SLT 65.
26 Certain behaviours are deemed contrary to public policy and amount to criminal trespass despite
consent, see R. v Brown (Anthony) [1994] AC 212. In the medical context, active euthanasia would
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these criteria due to fundamental lack of competence. This places HCPs in an
untenable position; the patient needs treatment but cannot provide requisite consent,
yet treating without consent might constitute battery. Further, it leaves the IcP in a
state of limbo: needing treatment, which cannot be given unless some means is found
to treat without transgressing the law.
Historically, this paradox could have been overcome by judicial exercise of parens
patriae. But its loss in England and Wales leaves a lacuna whereby no one is now
able to consent to medical treatment on an incompetent adult's behalf.
29
Unsurprisingly, therefore, most IcP treatment decisions are post-1975, and appear
to be increasing in number.30 A burgeoning ethical role for autonomy in healthcare
has witnessed a correlative importance in the role of consent generally.31
Additionally, developments in medical technology raise further conceptual problems;
ability to sustain life artificially (and consequent redefinition of death) creating new
categories of incompetent patients.32 Ongoing refinement of medical techniques,
diagnosis and knowledge also change potential duration and quality of life, in turn,
altering expectations of patients and families and fuelling battles over treatment
choice. Best interests represents one possible means of resolving ensuing battles,
particularly as it seeks to locate the 'best' response to a patient's identified clinical
needs, and is associated with the established legal justificatory concept 'necessity'.
constitute unlawful homicide despite a patient's informed consent, because it is regarded contrary to
public interest.
27 In some cases undue influence by a third party vitiates consent by undermining the patient's exercise
of choice, see Re T (Adult: Refusal of treatment) [1992] 3 WLR 782.
28 The jurisdiction was lost by legislative accident resulting from combined effects of the Mental
Health Act (1959) and revocation by warrant under the Sign Manual (see Mason et at, above,
paragraphs 10.31-10.32); G.T. Laurie, Parens patriae jurisdiction in the medico-legal context: The
vagaries of judicial activism (1999) ELR 3, 95; and J Seymour, Parens patriae and wardship powers:
Their nature and origins (1994) 14 OILS 159). Use of the jurisdiction survived in: Scotland (see Law
Hospital [1996] above); Ireland (see In the matter of a Ward, above); Canada (see Re Eve (1986)
31DLR (4th) 1); and Australia (see Secretary, Department of Health & Community Services (NT) v
JWB and SMB (1992) 66 ALJR 300).
29 One of the earliest being Re D (A minor)(Wardship: sterilisation) [1976] 1 All ER 326.
30
Developments are discussed in Chapter 2, below. This is understandable, given strengthening
human rights (Human Rights Act 1998), heightened public scmtiny of medicine, and increased
willingness to litigate.
31 See the seminal statement of Cardozo J: in Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital 105 NE
92 (NY 1914). Also, Lord Donaldson in Re T [1992] above, 786.
32 See the House of Lords' decision in Bland, above, particularly the views of Lords Goff, Lowry and
Browne-Wilkinson (pp 865(g), 877(e-f) and 878(a), respectively). See also, Butler-Sloss LJ in the
earlier CA decision, ibid 842(j).
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1.2.2 Background issues
Best interests operates against two background issues, necessity and lawfulness.
'Necessity' may justify an otherwise-unlawful action, recognised in tort, and in
criminal law.34 Thus, the law acknowledges beneficent behaviour that responds to
perceived need.35 In the medical context the role of necessity is regarded as
justificatory, and not limited purely to emergency treatment. However, necessity
will only justify action that is needed and reasonable,
'acting in the best interests of the assisted person'.
While inconsistency exists regarding the roles of necessity and best interests,39 Lord
Goff s view posits 'necessity' as a justificatory principle to which best interests may
appeal, (rather than an element of best interests).40 Hence, necessity is the backdrop
against which best interests is played out.
The second background element 'lawfulness' concerns the decision process. We
tend to assume that the court's role is to make decisions about whether, and which,
treatment should be given to an IcP. However, in some circumstances the court is
limited merely to declaring whether a particular treatment action would be 'lawful'.
In treatment decisions for minors courts retain considerable responsibility through
the extensive judicial powers of wardship,41 substantiated further by statute.42
Clearly, the court's decision can be characterised, therefore, as an active 'treatment
decision', reflected in: breadth of judicial consideration, willingness to weigh
3j
E.g.: Esso Petroleum Ltd v Southport Corpn. [1956] AC 218; Home Brewery pic v William Davis
& Co (Leicester) Ltd [1987] QB 339.
34
Inherently in private defence (of self, another or property): Gladstone Williams (1984) 78 Cr App
Rep 276; Beckford v R [1987] 3 All ER 425; Sears v Broome [1986] Crim LR 461. See also Re A
(Conjoined twins: medical treatment) [2001] 1 FLR 1.
35 For discussion of the contrast between English and Scots law on self defence, see J. Casey, Self
defence, R v Martin and Scots law, [2000] SLT 25, 195.
36 Per Lord Goff in Re F, above, 564(f): ' [i]t is this criterion of a need which points to the principle of
necessity as providing justification'.
37 See ibid 565(c-f).
38 Ibid 566(a).
39 Neill LJ (CA) in Re F, [1989] 2 FLR 378, 404(b), sees necessity as an element of best interests,
asking '[w]hat action does the patient's health and welfare require?' In contrast, Lord Goff regards
best interests as an aspect of necessity, above, 565(c-f).
40 Ibid.
41
Exemplified by Lord Donaldson MR in Re R [1991] above 186(g-h).
42 The Children Act (1989) provides for specific issue, or prohibited steps orders, to be made without
resort to full wardship.
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relevant factors,43 admittance of a range of views,44 address of quality of life,45
specific reference to court responsibility,46 and consideration of non-clinical issues 47
However, even regarding minors, consent is formally distinguished from the
4.8
treatment decision. So, while these decisions bear all the hallmarks of a treatment
decision, formal characterisation as consent is simultaneously denied. In relation to
incompetent adults, absence of parens patriae limits courts formally to purely
declaratory jurisdiction of lawfulness, equating 'lawful' treatment with best
interests 49 That is, treatment:
'to save their lives or to ensure improvement or prevent deterioration in their
physical or mental health'.50
The significance is that type of jurisdiction predisposes best interests to particular
types of formulation that confuse the purpose of best interests.51 Further, it may
distort best interests assessment,52 creating linguistic ambiguity within single cases,
attenuating perspective and inappropriately curtailing range of interests. However,
some blurring of the distinction is occurring. And some recent developments more
closely mirror proactive decision-making dominant in minors' cases.54 By blurring
definitional boundaries the courts could be progressing, and although lack of
43
E.g. Re J [1990] above; Re E (A minor)(Wardship: medical treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386.
44
Eg: Re E, ibid, (patient's view); Re T [1997] above, (parent's view); Re C (A minor)(Medical
treatment) [1998] above (clinician's view); Re C (A minor)(Medical treatment) [1989] above (views
of nursing staff).
45 Re C [1998], ibid 782; Re B [1981] above; Re J [1990] above; Re C [1989] above.
46 Re S (A minor)(Medical treatment) [1993] above; Re C (A baby) [1996] above.
47 Re T [1997] above, however, where certain dicta seem to indicate that this is not a treatment
decision. But these comments may really seek to avoid compelling doctors to treat contrary to clinical
judgment, see also in Re W [1992] above, 637(g-h).
48 See Lord Donaldson MR who characterises consent as a 'threshold requirement', while decision
whether to treat is one of clinical judgment: Re R [1991] above, 187(h). Confirmed in A NHS Trust v
D [2000] 2 FCR 577.
49 See Lord Brandon in Re F, above, 55l(h-j). There have been high-profile requests for reinstatement
of appropriate jurisdiction, see Bland (above): Lords Lowry p875(j), and Goff, 864(g-h).
50 Per Lord Brandon, Re F, ibid, 551(c-d).
51
Perhaps seeking what is not in, rather than in, a patient's best interests, see my earlier paper: A.J.
Fenwick, Applying best interests to persistent vegetative state - a principled distortion? J. Med. Eth.
[1998] 24, 86, 87, attached below as appendix 8.
52 Ibid.
53
Indeed, in Re F [1989] above, 557(h-j), Lord Brandon suggested that 'whichever of the two forms of
procedure...were to be used, the nature of the inquiry which would have to be made by the court, and
of the reasoned decision...would be substantially the same'. Further, references in adult IcP cases to
weighing, (Re F, ibid, 569(c-d); Re LC (Medical treatment: sterilisation), above, 261 (C, E and F-G)),
and dignity interests (Bland, above, 870(f-g)) suggest that - informally - courts are considering more
than pure lawfulness.
54 See further, Chapter 2.
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jurisdiction remains a formal problem it may become a superficial one in practice.
This view is confirmed by subsequent cases - relatively few of which expressly refer
to necessity, focusing instead on best interests as the active decision-making
principle.55 Nonetheless, this blurring could also add to confusion surrounding the
content of best interests, how it should be determined, which factors are admissible
and the roles of parties involved.
1.3 Origins - non-medical landmarks for 'best interests'
Judicial involvement in medical treatment decisions is a relatively recent
phenomenon. Jurisdiction forges some links, but additional connections are
ascertainable from landmark cases, representing significant points in the journey of
best interests, from the traditions of custody to application in the medical context.56
1.3.1 Early markers:'welfare'
'Welfare', now an important feature in protective jurisdiction and best interests, was
not always so. An Act in 183 9,57 makes no mention of welfare, being concerned
purely with mothers' rights regarding custody and access. Even by 1873 there was
still no mention of welfare.58 However, this legislation did highlight 'benefit',59
focusing on impact upon child subjects rather than parental rights. The 1886 Act
expressly made child welfare the central issue and strengthened judicial discretionary
powers. By the time this Act was partially repealed, in 1925, the legislature was
willing to embrace the importance ofwelfare:
55
However, 'need for treatment' is still significant, but perhaps in a redefined (negative) form: futility
may negate any need to continue treatment; also absence of risk ofpregnancy in non-therapeutic
sterilisation may make treatment unnecessary (see A.J. Fenwick, Re S (Medical treatment: Adult
sterilisation) Retrenching on Risk - revising the lawful boundaries of sterilisation [1999] CFLQ 11(3)
313 attached hereto as appendix 10. See also the views of Dame Butler-Sloss (P) on necessity in Re F
(Adult: court's jurisdiction) [2000] 55 BMLR 81.
56 These cases are identified by working backwards from citations in modem treatment decisions,
through decisions about minors in the twentieth century, to their source in custody.
57 An Act to amend the Law relating to the Custody of Infants, 1839, 2 & 3 Vict. C54, also known as
Sergeant Talfourd's Act.
58An Act to amend the Law as to Custody of Infants, 1873, 36 Vict. Ch 12.
59
Ibid, s2: 'no Court shall enforce any such agreement if the Court shall be of opinion that it will not
be for the benefit of the infant'.
60
Guardianship of Infants Act 1886, 49 & 50 Vict. Ch 27, see particularly s 3(3), 5 and 6.
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'Where...the custody or upbringing of an infant...is in question, the court, in
deciding that question, shall regard the welfare of the infant as the first and
paramount consideration'. 61
These legislative developments emphasised the move away from property towards
protection that had been initiated in wardship during the nineteenth century. A series
ft7
of landmark cases in the twentieth century enhanced the role of welfare, giving
increasing recognition to minors' interests and protective jurisdiction.63
Of course, early source cases reflected an absence of any 'welfare principle', but its
roots are visible. In Wellesley v The Duke of Beaufort, concerning custody and
property of minors,64 although argument before the Court referred to its authority
regarding welfare,65 it was unmentioned in Eldon LC's judgment. This is
understandable, given the need to exercise parens patriae through application of
property at that time.66 The House of Lords (dismissing the father's appeal on
jurisdiction)67 emphasised the court's protective role founded in trust, morality and
care, confirming the earlier views of the Lord Chancellor. The direct influence of
this is visible in early medical treatment decisions. Both Re D (A minor)(Wardship:
sterilisation),68 and Re B (A minor)(Wardship: sterilisation),69 cite Lord Eldon LC's
views regarding
'the obvious necessity that the law should place somewhere the care of
individuals who cannot take care of themselves'.70
Heilbron J reiterated, in Re D,71 Eldon LC's observations on the protective nature of
jurisdiction in harm prevention.
The House of Lords, in the Wellesley appeal, also referred to applying property for
72 • ... •the minors' 'benefit'. They emphasised this further in Guardianship of the Marquis
61
Guardianship of Infants Act 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5 Ch 45, s 1
62
See, for example, Re X (A minor)(Wardship: restriction on publication) [1975] 1 All ER 697; J v C
[1969] 1 All ER 788; Official Solicitor v K [1963] 3 All ER 191; Re Thain. Thain v Taylor [1926] All
ER, Rep. 384.
63 Recent legislative provisions continue to embody welfare: it remains the governing principle in the
Children Act (1989), see sl( 1). See also Guardianship ofMinors Act (1971), si.
64
(1827) 2 Russ 1, in ER 38, 236.
65 Ibid, 239.
66
Ibid, 243, per Eldon LC: 'It is not...from any want of jurisdiction that it does not act, but from a
want of any means to exercise its jurisdiction'.
67
Wellesley v Wellesley (1828) 4 ER 1078, 2 Bli N.S. 124, reprinted [1824-34] All ER Rep 189.
68
[1976] 1 All ER 326, 332(f-g).
69




of Bute,73 an appeal from the Court of Session regarding custody, domicile and
education of a ward. Discussing judicial protective duty, the Lord Chancellor
regarded benefit as the test of its proper exercise.74 This burgeoning recognition of
impact on the minor evolved into 'welfare' in Re Goldsworthy,75 mirroring the
legislative drive in the late nineteenth century.76 Lord Coleridge CJ focused on
safety and welfare,77 while Pollock B initiated tentative associations between welfare
no
and interest(s).
1.3.2 'Best interests' - a new notion?
Shortly before developments of 'welfare', a novel concept began to emerge in
custody cases. In Warde v Warde, Cottenham LC, considered it the Court's role:
79
'to adopt that course which seems best for the interests of the children',
(emphasis added).
At this stage, best interests appeared less conceptual than linguistic; expressing the
judicial role of arbiter.80 In 1861, together with focus on 'welfare' and 'benefit',
'best interests' received mention by the House of Lords.81 It was introduced as an
express conceptual argument in Jones's case (1890),82 regarding a dispute between a
child's mother and his carer (Dr Barnardo) about religious upbringing. The Court of
Appeal preferred that the mother's wishes be followed unless there was some 'good
Ol





Macq. Appeal Cases 1861-65, vol. 4, 1.
74
Ibid, 60. 'Benefit' has endured in the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, and the
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, European Treaty Series/164, 4.IV, 1997, Article 6.1,
see R. Beattie, Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 [2002] Scottish Partnership for Palliative
Care, Edinburgh, 1.
75
QBD (1876) vol. II, 75.
76 Initiated by 'benefit' in the Custody of Infants Act 1873, and culminating in 'welfare' in the
Guardianship of Infants Act 1886.
77




(1849) 2 Ph. 786, available in ER Vol. 41, 1147.
80 Ibid, 1149.
81
In Guardianship of the Marquis of Bute, above, Lord Chelmsford criticised jurisdictional disputes
between Scottish and English courts and suggested 'cordially co-operating to advance the best
interests of the infant', ibid 72.
82 Also known as The Queen v Barnardo [1891] 1 QB 194.
83 Per Lord Esher MR, ibid, 207-208.
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'[t]he wishes of the mother...at most, are only an element to be considered in
04
deciding what is for the child's best interest',
is strikingly similar to that of the local authority and guardian ad litem in Re T (A
or
minor)(Wardship: medical treatment). There - unusually in the present day - the
Court ofAppeal again favoured the mother's view.
Best interests swiftly found its way into a Privy Council judgment in Smart v
o/r
Smart, a Canadian custody appeal that heavily emphasised the welfare of children
and families.87 Moreover, recognition of expanded judicial authority since
OO OQ
Wellesley, and support for the earlier view of Lord Cottenham in Warde v Warde,
effectively endorsed an association between best interests and protective jurisdiction.
Further impetus from mercantile law raised tentative connections between necessity,
duty, best interests and reasonableness.90 This approach proved directly influential in
Re F [1989], employed by Lord Goff to derive the fundamentals of'necessity'.91 He
concluded that where these necessity criteria were fulfilled interference would not be
Q9
unlawful. Thus, central themes of protection, welfare and duty, which emerged
through incorporation of best interests in the nineteenth century, have endured to its
93modern day use. Indeed, traditional terminology still resonates. In Re Thain,
welfare constituted
'the first and paramount consideration'.94
This has been reiterated in the twenty-first century,95 and Re Thain displays other
terms that have become paradigmatic in best interests, such as 'well-being' and the
need to 'attach weight' to relevant issues.96
Post-Thain, Lord Jamieson expressly adopted best interests in the Scottish custody
Q7




[1997] above, see 911(h).
86
[1892] AC 425.
87 See ibid, 432, 435, 436.
88
Ibid, 433; Wellesley v Duke of Beaufort, above.
89 Above.
90 See Australian Steam Navigation Co v Morse (1872) LR 4 PC 222, per Sir Montague Smith, p230.
91 See Re F [1989] above, 565(j).
92 Ibid 566(c).
93 Also known as Thain v Taylor [1926] All ER Rep. 384.
94
Ibid, per Lord Hanworth MR, 387.
95 For a recent example, see Re MM (Medical treatment) [2000] 1 FLR 224, 234(A).
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colleague Lord Mackay raised the issue of 'weighing' within paramountcy,98 an issue
that has attained an equally significant role in the expansion of best interests between
1950 and 1975.
1.3.3 Expansive developments
The importance of 'weighing' factors to derive best interests, alluded to in Re Thain
and M'Lean v M'Lean, was developed by the Privy Council in the Canadian custody
appeal McKee v McKee." Welfare was, by now, considered the paramount
consideration to which 'all others yield'.100 Hence, all circumstances potentially
relevant to welfare were to be taken into account and weighed.101 In addition, this
approach illustrates that the range of relevant factors was open to development, and
resolution of conflict between those factors was reserved to the court.
In Official Solicitor v K,102 the House of Lords began to bridge the gap from custody
to medicine, exercising wardship jurisdiction over disclosure of confidential
psychiatric reports in relation to the care and custody of two minors. The Court
looked to the infants' welfare as the decision purpose in resolving conflict between
the interests of minors and those of parents.103 In addition, Lord Jenkins
acknowledged that wide judicial discretion was needed to determine best interests,104
and Lord Evershed alluded to harm avoidance.105 The decision represents a
significant expansion: its context was new; terminology ('balancing' and 'harm')
innovative; and their Lordships recharacterised 'welfare' as the beneficent goal that
legal principle must serve.
Application of these principles was tested in the House of Lords in J v C.106 This
complex custody case represents a landmark consolidation of principle. The Spanish
parents of an 11-year-old boy, born and fostered in England, contested the
96
Above, 386(H) and 387(H), respectively.
97
[1947] SLT, Reports, 36, 42.
98
Ibid, 41.
"[1951] 1 All ER 942.
100




[1963] 3 All ER 191.






[1969] 1 All ER 788.
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appropriateness of paramountcy of welfare as the dominant principle. Dismissing
the appeal, the Law Lords comprehensively reviewed authorities over the past
century, and resoundingly concluded welfare to be paramount. Lord MacDermott
construed its scope widely (from the 1925 Act, si) to:
'mean more than that the child's welfare is to be treated as the top item in a
list...[rather it] connote[s] a process whereby, when all relevant facts,
relationships, claims and wishes of parents, risks, choices and other
circumstances are taken into account and weighed, the course to be followed
will be that which is most in the interests of the child's welfare'.107
This indirectly summarises the task for best interests, as the governing principle, to
serve the end objective; welfare. It also characterises determination as a process.
This idea is developed as this thesis progresses. J v C also set the tone for parental
views, within best interests, as a factor but being not determinative.108
1.3.4 Limiting developments?
S v S; W v Official Solicitor,109 propelled best interests into the realms of medical
procedure, concerning the blood testing ofminors to establish paternity. Prima facie,
the views of the Law Lords varied and were suggestive of limitations on the
protective nature of best interests.110 However, these views can arguably be
interpreted as holding that the court's duty is to protect best interests, but not
necessarily to promote them, especially not in the light of other important interests.
Further, the Court looked to the minor's long-term interests,111 and refined best
interests by distinguishing positive benefits from action not contrary to his/her
112interests. The case clearly evinced best interests' controversial nature and
openness to varying interpretation.
In Re X (A minor)(Wardship: restriction on publication) resolution of direct conflict
between the interests of a 14-year-old girl and the public interest in press freedom
107
Ibid, 820(I)-821(A).
108 See ibid, 835(C-D). This is still reflected injudicial powers to overrule parents, and parental views
yielding to consent by a Gillick-competent minor, considered below, Chapter 2. Around the same time
the scope of competence of the Scottish courts in custody/access hearings was extended to include
persons other than parents, see S v S (1967) SC, 46 and Syme v Cunningham [1973] SLT, Notes, 40.
109
[1970] 3 All ER 107.




resulted in a limitation on protective jurisdiction.113 The case concerned publication
of a book about X's father, the content of which was potentially psychologically
damaging to her. Despite acknowledging the unlimited nature of wardship
jurisdiction and the court's general protective role the Lords Justice declined to
exercise (and extend) jurisdiction,114 suggesting practical limitations lay in the
impossibility of protecting a ward against all potential harms.115
By this stage, terminology had become established - 'welfare', 'harm', 'interests' and
'balancing'. However, Re X indicated that paramountcy of a vulnerable person's
welfare was not absolute and protection may be restricted where interests conflict.
Medical treatment decisions would, subsequently, severely test this approach to
conflict resolution. These cases are discussed in more depth in Chapter 2. However,
the point to note at this juncture is that the stage was set by the courts for
considerable conceptual confusion in the way in which the best interests test would
come to be used in that context. It is one of the objectives of this thesis to explore
and to clarify this state of confusion, and in order to do so we must begin by
considering the moral dilemmas that underpin this entire area.
1.4 Moral dilemmas
Although courts recognise the relevance of moral issues to incompetent patient
decisions, they vary in their willingness to address them.116 However, moral issues
are involved on several levels: the everyday; the definitive; and the philosophical.
1.4.1 Everyday conflict of reasons
In layman's terms, IcP decisions are dilemmas because they involve difficult moral
issues that conflict with one another, each based on plausible reasoning. For
example, in deciding about continuing life-sustaining treatment for a severely
113
[1975] 1 All ER 697.
114 Alternative jurisdiction, under Guardianship of Minors Act (1971) si, was dismissed because this
case did not involve custody (ibid, 707(c-e)).
115
Ibid, 706(h).
116 In Bland, above, Sir Thomas Bingham MR and Hoffman LJ (CA) embraced the decision's moral
significance, incorporating sanctity of life, autonomy and dignity. Hoffman LJ (p852) also
acknowledged that inherent conflict between ethical principles might require choice and compromise.
However, the Law Lords were less inclined to address moral aspects, Lord Browne-Wilkinson
limiting judicial responsibility for resolution (p878-879), and Lord Mustill confining himself to legal
rather than ethical aspects (p885).
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disabled infant, we are caught in a conflict of not depriving the child of life, yet not
causing him/her pain or poor quality of life. Realistically, we cannot avoid both
harms; we have a dilemma of choice. Further, these are moral dilemmas because of
the nature of the issues involved: life, death, pain, bodily integrity, respect, social
interaction and living. These issues embody the human experience, compelling us to
make sense of that experience. In essence, we feel morally obliged, simultaneously,
to follow two courses of action, yet are unable to do so because they are mutually
exclusive, having irreconcilable outcomes.
1.4.2 Defining dilemma - Carson
In discussing risk-taking in healthcare generally, Carson distinguishes between 'risks'
and 'dilemmas':
'[r]isk-taking is...choosing to act to achieve beneficial results in an
awareness that harms might result. Risk-taking...o«/y...include[s] those
occasions when one option is to do nothing and that option will not cause
any harm. However...a dilemma is...defined as those occasions of risk-
taking when action must be taken because inaction, the status quo, is causing
harm'.117
IcP decisions fulfil the 'dilemma' criterion because, in any IcP situation, action must
be taken because the status quo causes harm: a severely ill neonate may already be in
pain; an infant may die without a transplant; a mature minor may die without a
transfusion; a mother in labour may lose her life or the baby's life without a
caesarean section; an intellectually disabled woman might suffer a traumatic
pregnancy without effective contraception; or a p.v.s. patient will continue to suffer
bodily invasion and intermittent infection during continued treatment. Thus, harm
ensuing from inaction compels us to make some sort of decision about how to
proceed. Aliter, we are deciding but by default.
1.4.3 Philosophical moral quandaries - Benn
Further understanding of moral dilemmas can be gained outwith the medico-legal
environment. Benn's work on freedom includes an illuminating consideration of
conflict resolution,118 focusing on the nature of 'quandaries'.119 For present purposes
117 D. Carson, Risk-taking policies [1988] J. Soc. Welf. Law, 328, 329.
118 A Theory of Freedom (1988) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
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its value lies in exposition of hard cases and conflicting reasons. This helps us to
understand the difficulties facing decision-makers and to acknowledge the
'imperfection' of decisions made. Benn's views on ranking highlights the problems
of prioritising values and weighing alternative options. Moreover, it is used here to
explore these issues in relation to treatment choice, and to demonstrate the current
bias which is inherent in the decision-making process.
Benn's approach to moral quandaries bears striking similarity to Carson's definition:
'if one cannot avoid action of some sort...then whatever one decides to do,
one will simply have to disregard all the reasons against doing that and for
120
doing something else instead and so one cannot avoid doing wrong'.
Applied to IcP decisions, this helps to deconstruct the complexities; good
medical/non-medical reasons may exist both for and against available treatment
options. For example, sterilising an intellectually disabled adult female may benefit
her by: (1) avoiding traumatic pregnancy and relinquishing a child; and (2) allowing
her more sexual/social freedom. Yet, there is also potential harm through: (3)
denying her reproductive capacity; (4) risk of sexually transmitted disease; and (5)
increased danger of any sexual assault upon her going unnoticed. It is not clear if
any of these varied reasons override others, yet a decision is required because
continued inaction could deny the benefits (1) and (2). Thus, the decision-maker
cannot avoid some 'wrong-doing'; not sterilising loses benefits (1) and (2), whereas,
sterilising the patient potentially incurs harms (3), (4) and (5).121 Any choice must
incur one or the other.
Benn's outline of quandaries takes us further, allowing us to deconstruct the
difficulties into component parts. IcP decisions involve multiple, conflicting 'good
reasons' for competing treatment actions, some choice of action is required which
involves 'ordering' reasons (but it is not obvious which reasons should dominate) and
it is impossible ultimately to support Ml reasons. This is the essence of the task
facing 'best interests'. But, if all actions will be 'wrong' in some sense, how can these
quandaries be addressed? Benn offers ranking, where we
119 Benn prefers 'quandaries' to 'dilemmas', perceiving dilemmas to be 'logical' whereas quandaries
maybe less capable ofbeing 'logical', ibid 4.
120 Ibid 3.
121
Relatedly, other contraceptive methods also carry other long-term health risks.
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'recognize the force of the opposing arguments as reasons for action...but
can see no way of reconciling them...[w]e resort to words like "weighing"
and "balancing" in our efforts to rank the arguments'.122
i
# m
'Best interests' may represent Benn's scales, but lack of patient interests (as in
p.v.s.) can render nothing to place in them. Additionally, variety of dis/advantages
of treatment options may make direct comparison impossible, and plurality means
that no clear value preference emerges to tip the scales one way or another. Thus, in
IcP decisions it can be hard 'to cash the metaphors out'.124 Unsurprisingly, wide
variance and confusion can result.
1.4.4 Benn - conflicting commitments
Conflict is key in IcP decisions. We can apply Benn's general graphical approach to
conflict resolution to specific IcP situations as a means of exposing underlying
conflicts (rather than resolving them). This allows us to contrast starkly the
underlying moral issues, thereby clarifying the nature of the dilemma. The reader is
referred to Appendix One.
Benn characterises moral quandaries as a conflict of role commitments.125 Each role
is 'informed...by a characteristic value or principle' which guides its action,
represented on the x and y-axis. He then positions action options by ranking each
according to its fulfilment of each role commitment, based on clear beliefs about
each role.126 Ranking requires consideration of how well the option fulfils the
relevant commitment, and how 'salient' that role to the overall situation.127 Implicit
in ranking is 'trade-off;128 that is, acknowledging that we must 'surrender one
_ . . 1?Q
commitment m favour of another in some consistent way'. Benn employs Pareto's
Theory of Indifference Curves to compare plotted options on a diagram. Essentially,
the infinite number of points on each curve are equivalent (i.e. indifferent) in overall









values. The gradient of curves is determined by trade-off rate between the two axes,
which represents how much commitment to one value diminishes, in committing
more strongly to the other.
If we apply this to a situation of sterilisation of an intellectually disabled adult
130
female, the two conflicting values might be termed 'patient autonomy' and 'patient
welfare', represented on the x and y-axis, respectively. Autonomy-oriented factors
concern the patient's reproductive interest, bodily integrity and sexual freedom.
Welfare protects the incapax from harm of pregnancy or sexual assault, and enhances
quality of life through sexual relationship. Conflict arises because the more we
commit to protecting her from pregnancy (by sterilising) the less we can commit to
protect her bodily integrity. Alternatively, preventing pregnancy promotes welfare
(enhancing quality of life through relationship), but increases risk (i.e. reduces our
commitment) to her reproductive interest. The mechanics of this application are
explained in Appendix One.
In essence, Benn's approach illuminates IcP situations by explaining why some
options are counter-intuitive and other options equally plausible but opposing one
another. However, his approach has limits. Although Benn posits it as a resolution
theory, its practical capacity for resolution is questionable: plotting is too imprecise
mathematically, yet too value-laden as a philosophical tool.131 This is exacerbated
by complexity of values to which a decision-maker feels committed, and complexity
also makes ranking options difficult.132 Weaknesses would be exacerbated in
resolving IcP decisions, where values such as autonomy and welfare are highly
complex and lack consensus about significance and content.
129 Ibid. However, trade-off is not possible in all IcP situations, where substitution of either value may
seem morally impossible. Benn's 'irrationality of intersecting preference thresholds' aids
understanding of these dilemmas, below.
130 See Appendix One, based on Benn's Figure 2, Chapter 3.
131 Gradient ratio cannot be derived mathematically, because it is contingent upon a (potentially
subjective) value judgment by the decision-maker about relationship and substitutability of the two
roles.
132
E.g. where a role-commitment is multi-faceted an option may display commitment to some facets
but not others.
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1.4.5 Benn - irrationality of threshold choices
The difficulties intensify when a case involves a "threshold value", 'below which no
option would be acceptable'.133 The failure of any action to fulfil requisite minimum
threshold(s) renders rational choice impossible. Benn divides these situations into
'incomplete structures' and 'threshold values in two dimensions'. The 'incomplete
structure' (where no available option can be countenanced by the decision-maker,
because they fail to meet one threshold) is applied in Appendix Two regarding
withdrawal of treatment from p.v.s. patients.
This situation contrasts with 'thresholds in two dimensions', where action is
countenanced but meets only one threshold.134 Any action will be 'wrong', in failing
to fulfil the minimum threshold level of opposing role commitment, involving
• ITS
'choosing the lesser of two evils'. Both situations attempt to trade-off role
commitments in intolerable areas. However, the 'incompleteness' in Appendix Two
arises from the indifference of the p.v.s. state - no decision can realistically improve,
or worsen, the situation. Neither option is 'right', nor clearly 'wrong'. Whereas, in
Appendix Three -a case involving withdrawal of treatment from a sentient neonate -
both options cause harm, but a decision is required because present inaction is also
causing harm. Thus, the decision-maker is forced to 'make the best of a bad job' and
seek the next-best solution.136
1.4.6 Best interests - panacea for a moral precipice
The main purpose here in applying Benn's work to IcP situations is only illustrative.
It highlights the conflict inherent in these decisions, requires us to identify possible
underlying values and to recognise their inverse relationship. It signifies the
importance of evaluating treatment options consistently, and explains why some
• ... 1T7
treatment options seem intuitively untenable. Benn's theory brings focus to the
central problem in resolving IcP decisions: the decision-maker's commitment to
juxtaposed values, and the difficulty of ranking options due to conflict.
133 See Benn, above, 56. Benn terms this 'irrationality of intersecting preference thresholds', ibid 56-
59.
134 An adaptation of Benn's Figure 5 is shown in Appendix Three.
135
Benn, above, 59.
136 See ibid 59-64.
137 I.e. because they lack any significant role commitment.
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Derivation of 'best' (or 'next-best') in IcP decisions clearly involves the decision¬
maker in commitment to conflicting moral values. In trying to resolve this duality -
to 'do the right thing' - s/he is forced to fall below his/her minimum threshold and go
beyond personal (and societal) moral limits. This is why decisions for incompetent
patients are hard cases. Best interests is much vaunted as a panacea for resolving
these moral and legal battles but, in seeking to adapt to these acute dilemmas and
'make the best of a bad job', best interests has been forced to metamorphose. This
has resulted in varying formulations of best interests. This is not to deny that there is
much value in a best interests analysis. Indeed, it is the central purpose of this thesis
to defend such an analysis based on a more realistic conceptualisation of what is at
stake and what can be achieved. It is submitted that the search for an optimal
outcome in all cases is misconceived. That is, that when we talk about 'best'
interests our focus should not be on seeking to achieve an unachievable optimal
outcome for the subject (patient), but rather we should be concerned with ensuring
our full engagement with the decision-making process, taking account of all relevant
factors, and making the 'best' of the very difficult situation which lies before us.
This chapter has outlined the legal origins of the best interests test wherein the seeds
of confusion were already sown, and it has offered an example of how the underlying
moral pressures on best interests could well lead to such an outcome. To understand
the current formulation of the test we must next identify its medico-legal evolution




Chapter 2 - Developments and battles
To enable us to understand best interests, we must deconstruct its use in treatment
decisions in order to clarify its components and purpose. Three distinct phases of
evolution have taken place: early markers; development markers; and recent
redefinition.
2.1 Early markers
Although early medico-legal markers are sporadic, they represent significant
indicators of things to come, highlighting issues that have proven persistently
difficult for best interests.
2.1.1 Re D (a minor)(wardship: sterilisation)1
Re D concerned proposed contraceptive sterilisation of an 11-year-old girl with
Soto's syndrome. D's mental function was not severely impaired and she was
expected to develop capacity to marry, but her inability to care for herself or children
would persist. While D's mother and consultant paediatrician supported sterilisation,
other professionals challenged that view.
This was the first contraceptive sterilisation decision heard by the High Court and
Heilbron J drew from Wellesley (1827) regarding the protective role of wardship.2
In exercising this protective function he emphasised welfare and best interests, and
acknowledged sterilisation as
'deprivation of a basic human right'.4
The judgment's prophetic quality is seen in its exceptional conclusion (that
sterilisation was not in D's best interests); such a refusal would not recur for some 17
years.5
1




Above, 333(f). Use of the adjunctive 'and' suggests the two are not necessarily synonymous. Rather,
'welfare' is the weightiest factor, contributing to the (broader) notion of 'best interests'.
4
Ibid, 332(h). While courts have since shied away from rights terminology in sterilisation decisions
(e.g. Re B (A minor)(Wardship: sterilisation) [1987] 2 All ER 206; Re P (A minor)(Wardship:
sterilisation) [1989] 1 FLR 182; Re F [1989] above; Re W (Mental patient) (Sterilisation) [1993] 1
FLR 381; Re S [1998] above), the Human Rights Act 1998 brings terminology full circle; Heilbron
J's judgment was ahead of its time in this sense.
5 In Re LC (Medical treatment: sterilisation) [1997] 2 FLR 258.
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Although a seminal case, Re D embodied several important aspects of best interests
in its new context, including: relevance of policy and human rights implications; the
importance of patient capacity;6 scope for patient interests to vary over time;
respective roles of 'necessity' and clinical opinion; and the close relationship between
best interests and welfare.
2.1.2 Re B (a minor)(wardship: medical treatment)7
Within a few years, best interests was tested in a more dramatic life/death context.
Re B concerned a baby born with Down's syndrome, complicated by a potentially
fatal intestinal blockage that required surgery, whereupon life expectancy might be
20-30 years. B's parents withheld consent and the local authority sought
authorisation of surgery under wardship. The first instance decision, respecting
parental views, was overturned on appeal, where the test emphasised the minor's 'best
interests'. The Court of Appeal's short judgment bears significant markers in the
progression of best interests. By accepting the genuineness of parental views, yet
adopting a different evaluation of the minor's best interests, the Court effectively
acknowledged the complexity of this test. This complexity may give rise to distinct
perspectives (parental, judicial, medical, or indeed the subject's own views) of the
same individual's best interests. On this basis, best interests is more than merely
medical or familial, set within the bigger picture of determining overall, individual
best interests. Templeman LJ embodied responsibility in a new test, deciding:
'whether the life of this child is demonstrably going to be so awful that in
effect the child must be condemned to die, or whether the life of this child is
still so imponderable that it would be wrong for her to be condemned to
die'.8
Ultimately the operation was deemed to be in B's best interests. This new test
imported quality of life as a central issue in withdrawal of treatment decisions. The
absence of precedent indicates the novelty of the quality of life context at that time.
And, while the tests may change, the issues endure.9
6
[1976] above, 335(c-d). Incompetence represents a gateway to engaging best interests.
7





During the last 20 years rapid diversification has occurred in the volume and range of
medico-legal best interests decisions. Here, landmark cases have been selected for
the insight each provides to development of best interests spanning an expansive
phase through 1989-1996.10 In order to analyse these cases meaningfully and
effectively we must deconstruct best interests to identify a series of generic elements.
This leads to the identification of three groupings; judicial statements generally
pertain to the 'function', 'content' or 'gateways' of best interests.
• Function comprises two aspects: (1) roles ofparties concerned, namely
the judicial position on respective roles of patient, family/parents, HCPs,
and the court influences who makes a treatment decision. Roles are
influenced by jurisdiction, professional ethics, public policy, and
recognition of a patient's relationships; and (2) decision purpose, namely
the focal point for deriving best interests. Purpose is strongly influenced
by roles. For example, if ultimate responsibility is reserved to the court
then the judicial process of deciding constitutes 'determination' of best
interests. Whereas, ifmedical opinion is accorded greater significance the
court's decision is more akin to 'definition', the purpose shifting to medical
liability;
• Content of best interests reflects the 'interests' in best interests,
comprising factors considered and including welfare, dignity, quality of
life, and human rights', each importing particular concepts. These issues
are placed in the scales, to be weighed by those responsible (under
function (1)), deciding with function (2) in mind. Purpose (function (2)),
creates variance in content of best interests within different contexts;
• Gateways to best interests represent access points through which a
decision enters the realms of best interests. Regarding adults the principal
gateway is legal incompetence', best interests is invoked as a decision¬
making mechanism when a patient cannot self-determine. This represents
9
Templeman LJ left open the possibility that in different circumstances a 'court might be driven to a
different conclusion', ibid 1424(C).
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an ethical gateway (beneficence and non-maleficence) based on the
patient's need for treatment. Certain decisions may include other specific
gateways (such as 'risk of harm'). A more controversial gateway is
'personhood', concerning attribution of moral status.11 These gateways
connect moral dilemmas and legal protection. Further practical gateways
may also be employed regarding bringing a patient's case for decision.
Although gateways form a preliminary consideration in treatment
decisions, they are considered here as the final group because significant
developments relating to them have occurred later than those relating to
function and content.
Developments are considered by evaluating how important cases contributed to these
groups to establish how best interests has evolved.12
2.2.1 Development of Function
2.2.1.1 Re C (A minor)(Wardship: medical treatment)13
Baby C was born severely brain damaged and terminally ill. As a 16-week-old
ward, the court was required to decide whether treatment should be withdrawn, given
the hopeless prognosis and eventual 'inevitability' of infection or illness. At first
instance, the High Court directed that C be treated so as to end her life peacefully.
On appeal, at the instigation of the Official Solicitor, withdrawal of treatment was
authorised.
Both purpose and role are closely associated in this case, drawing on Heilbron J's
assessment in Re D.14 As to role, Lord Donaldson MR rejected a 'normalisation'
approach, rather emphasising the need to treat according to circumstance,15 and
effectively making the court an adjudicator in differences of professional opinion.
However, the Court's approach to purpose is ambivalent. The Court sought to
10 Some redefinition has taken place since, however expansion is still occurring, see paragraph 2.3
below.
11 See Chapter 5, below.
12 Some cases are considered under more than one grouping.
13





minimise C's 'pain, suffering and distress', while ensuring her 'greatest dignity',16 but
declined to specify which treatments (e.g. antibiotics/tube-assisted feeding) should be
withheld if necessary, preferring to authorise treatment within the parameters of
expert medical opinion. While this approach retains flexibility by allowing
responsiveness to a patient's needs in prevailing circumstances it also represents a
power shift towards the medical profession, potentially alienating parental opinion,
and limiting judicial protective responsibilities under wardship.
2.2.1.2 Re F, sub nom F v West Berkshire HA & Another (Mental Health
Commission intervening)17
A landmark of enduring significance regarding adult IcPs occurred around the same
time. Re F concerned contraceptive sterilisation of a seriously mentally disabled 36-
year-old female patient, involved in a sexual relationship with a male patient resident
at the same mental hospital. The consequences of any resultant pregnancy were
deemed 'disastrous' for F, and alternative contraceptive measures were medically
unsuitable due to concomitant health risks.
Heard by both the Court of Appeal and House of Lords the case bore significant
precedential value. Declaring sterilisation lawful, both courts reached certain mutual
conclusions regarding irrelevance of the Mental Health Act 1983 in relation to
1 8
physical treatments, implicit policy issues and common law context being
'necessity', and lawfulness being based in the patient's 'best interests'. However,
beyond this, judicial opinion diverges regarding both function and content.19
16 Ibid, 787(d).
17
[1989] 2 All ER 545.
18 See Lord Brandon (HL) ibid, 5500) and 553-554, and Neill LJ (CA) [1989] 2 FLR 376, 398. The
issue of force-feeding has been contested since in R v Ashworth HA ex p Brady [2000] Lloyd's Rep.
Med. 355, and R (on application of Wilkinson) v the Responsible Medical Officer, Broadmoor
Hospital and others, 65 [2001] BMLR 15. In the latter case, the Court of Appeal rejected a super-
Wednesbury approach (whereby the court reviews but does not substitute itself as authorised decision¬
maker, ibid, paragraphs 17-18 and 27) regarding patients contesting their competence, in favour of
judicial responsibility for assessing patient capacity and whether forcible administration of treatment
would infringe the HRA 1998.
19 Content is addressed below, paragraph 2.2.2.
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The Court of Appeal unanimously viewed judicial role to be approbatory on grounds
20 • ■ 21of public policy. In contrast, the House of Lords rejected this approach,
preferring declaration. However, despite formal limits, emphasis on 'desirability' of
judicial involvement,22 relevance of court opinion to best interests,23 'pragmatic'
conflation of declaration and approval,24 and Lord Griffiths' formal dissent indicate
tensions in their Lordships' position. But, unanimous invocation of the Bolam
standard in the House of Lords, dealt a severe blow to any approbatory approach in
contrast to the Court ofAppeal's earlier resounding rejection of it.26
The position adopted on respective roles is closely associated with the
characterisation of 'necessity' in meeting decision purpose. The Court of Appeal
effectively considered necessity of treatment as a component factor of best interests
(i.e. content), enabling them to demand treatment be necessary in the view of the
'general body' of specialist medical opinion. Whereas, the Law Lords effectively
construed need for a decision in the sense of a background purpose, leaving little
room for judicial opinion on appropriateness of treatment. This represents the first
conflation of best interests and the Bolam standard.
2.2.1.3 Minors - the Re J cases
97
Re J (a minor)(wardship: medical treatment), (hereinafter Re J #1), concerned a
premature baby suffering severe, permanent brain damage, anticipated substantial
disability and uncertain life expectancy; J was not terminally ill. The Court of
Appeal concluded that ventilation could be withheld in J's best interests. Two years
98
later a separate case, Re J (a minor)(wardship: medical treatment) (herein Re J #2),
also reached the Court of Appeal, concerning future ventilation (and/or life-saving
measures) of a 16-month-old minor for whom accidental injury had caused severe
20 Above (CA), 392(D), 404(E), and 413(G) per Butler-Sloss LJ analogising with provisions regarding
property of incompetent adults under RSC Ord. 80 and requesting development of a new rule.
21 See above (HL), 556(g), 548(e), 571(e-f) and 569(c). This rejection was probably correct in view of
jurisdictional limits, but contrast Re F (Adult: Court's jurisdiction) [2000] 55 BMLR 81.
22 Ibid 548(f) and 552(a).




26 As 'insufficiently stringent' in treatment decisions for IcPs, per Neill LJ (CA) above, 403-404. See
also 414(B-C).
27
[1990] 3 All ER 930.
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microcephaly, cerebral palsy, epilepsy and cortical blindness. Life expectancy was
short. Both decisions developed the boundaries of function.
Re J #1 has significance regarding role and purpose. Lord Donaldson initially
9Q
outlined the respective roles of doctors, parents and the court, acknowledging
treatment choice as
'a joint decision of the doctors and the court or parents'.30
Use of the adjunctive 'or' indicates that the parents' views would not prevail against
the court's,31 and the latter's role was approbatory and ultimate.32 In terms of
purpose the minor's best interests were (rightly) the focus, rejecting public interest
or dominance of parental views. Further, it seemed that assessment of those best
interests might be from the child's (assumed) perspective.33 However, Lord
Donaldson MR was keen to build flexibility into the decision to allow for future
change in circumstance, and declined to restrict clinical judgment.34 Thus, although
formal approbatory power resided with the court, the weighty significance of clinical
judgment perhaps facilitated a purpose too of protecting clinical judgment, which
soon influenced role.
Although Re J #2 is unremarkable in terms of the best interests' content, it laid down
a significant functional (role) marker by centring on whether doctors could be
compelled, under judicial determination of best interests, to treat a minor contrary to
clinical judgment. The case involved a divergence of opinion between: (1) the HCPs
and the father (unanimously supporting withholding future reventilation); and (2) J's
mother, and (initially) the local authority (both of whom sought that all available
treatment be provided). The Court of Appeal drew support from Re J #1,35 to
28




31 Indeed Taylor LJ expressed this, ibid, 943(b-c).




Expressly relying, at pi6, on Lord Donaldson MR's views [1990] above, 934(g-h) that '[n]o-one can
dictate the treatment to be given to the child, neither Court, parents nor doctors' and, at 939(e), that
restricting doctors' freedom to later favour more active intervention would be 'inimical' to a child's
interests.
30
conclude that doctors could not be obliged to treat contrary to their clinical
judgment.36 Lord Donaldson MR concluded that
'[cjonsent by itself creates no obligation to treat...No doctor can be required
to treat a child, whether by the court in exercise of its wardship jurisdiction,
by the parents, by the child or anyone else. The decision whether to treat is
dependent upon an exercise of his own professional judgment'.37
Thus, while Bolam formed no part of the judgment, pragmatically medical opinion
held sway in this case regarding minors as it had done regarding adults. Certainly,
medical expertise is crucially important, but cases regarding adults have since
highlighted its insufficiencies as the wholly determinative role (see below). Further,
while clarification of respective roles is welcome, this functional aspect has been
allowed to obscure purpose and in particular the importance of the subject's
individual interests. Implicit judicial endorsement of an association between clinical
judgment and quality of life also bore implications for content; affecting the type of
interest imported and weighed in the balancing process. Rather, best interests
decisions should take account of a wide range of interests beyond the purely medical
whenever relevant (see further below).
2.2.1.4 Mature minors: Re R (A minor)(Wardship: medical treatment)38 and
Re W (A minor)(Medical treatment)39
Re R and Re W represented new territory for best interests, concerning mature
minors with definite views about their own treatment that were refusing medical
intervention. Any decision had to be made in the light of the Flouse of Lords
exposition of consent in Gillick.40 Additionally, the Children Act (1989) required
consideration to be given to the child's wishes and feelings.41 Inevitably, any
resolution would test the boundaries of respective roles. The two judgments are
addressed together here because they developed the same issues regarding differing
age groups. R was a 15-year-old ward suffering mental health problems, including
hallucinations and some violent behaviour. During rational and lucid periods R
36 All three Lords Justice declined to compromise clinical judgment: [1992] above, 19-21.
'7
Ibid, 18, citing from Re R [1991] above.
38
[1991] 4 All ER 177.
39
[1992] 3 WLR 758.




objected to taking anti-psychotic medication. The local authority sought leave for
the adolescent psychiatric unit treating R to administer medication (including anti¬
psychotic drugs) despite her refusal. At first instance the order was granted in view
ofR's lack of capacity. An appeal was dismissed on the different ground that a court
could override a minor's refusal (Gillick-competent or not) if in the minor's welfare
interests so to do.
Re W concerned treatment of a 16-year-old girl for anorexia nervosa. Due to
deterioration in her condition the residential adolescent unit sought her transfer to a
specialist hospital, but W declined. The local authority applied (under si00(3),
Children Act (1989)) requesting that the court exercise its inherent jurisdiction to
authorise treatment. The High Court granted leave to transfer W. W then appealed,
during which her condition worsened and an emergency order was made enabling
transfer. The appeal was eventually dismissed, holding that a minor's views could
not veto court consent; the court could override them where the minor's best interests
demanded. These cases pitched the minors' capacity to refuse against the court's
power of consent. The cases focus on role as a means to achieving the purpose of
best protecting the minor. Relevant roles can be considered as: judicial, 'keyholder',
and clinical.
In Re R, the Court of Appeal unanimously construed judicial role in wardship
widely,42 being 'wider than that of parents',43 and regarding a minor's refusal as
effecting no practical limit upon it.44 Lord Donaldson's obiter comments on the
Family Law Reform Act 1969 (FLRA 1969), also suggested parental consent could
remain effective despite a 16/17 year old's refusal. Despite receiving heavy
criticism,45 this was reaffirmed in Re W, where the unlimited scope of inherent
jurisdiction allowed narrow construction of the FLRA (1969) as 'enabling'.46 Indeed,
Nolan LJ posited 'inescapable responsibility' for decision-making with the court, in
effect framing the decision purpose as being:
42
Above, 186(g-j), 189(c-g) and 192 (g).
43 Per Lord Donaldson MR, ibid, 186(g-j).
44
A lacuna existed because legal provision had been made for minors under 16 years (Re R), adult
IcPs (Re F), and consent (but not refusal) by 16/17 year olds (Family Law Reform Act 1969, s8).
45
E.g. A. Bainham, The judge and the competent minor (1992) 108 LQR 194; R. Thornton, Multiple
keyholders - wardship and consent to medical treatment (1992) CLJ 34.
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'to ensure so far as it can that children survive to attain [majority]'.47
Together with Gillick, this reserved final decision to the court regarding minors less
than 18 years, predisposing decisions towards treating wherever prognosis is sound.
40
Judicial interpretation of Lord Scarman's seminal statement in Gillick,
characterised consent in Re R as
'a key which unlocks a door'.49
That is, it permits, but cannot compel, treatment. Further, Lord Donaldson
differentiated between 'determination' and 'consent', construing the former as broader
and equating it with refusal.50 This distinction's purpose is wholly enabling: once a
minor is Gillick-competent, the parents may not effectively refuse as the child's
consent enables treatment; conversely, if a Gillick-competent minor refuses, parents
or a court can still consent enabling treatment.
Subsequently, in Re W, Lord Donaldson regretted his keyholder analogy, having
overlooked that
'keys can lock as well as unlock'.51
Instead, he preferred the notion of consent as a 'legal "flak jacket'", only needing to
be supplied by one competent party to protect HCPs.52 This raises the question as to
who the court is protecting; the minor's interests, or the medical professionals
involved? However, the purpose seems to remain one of enabling treatment, Gillick
(or statutory) competence engendering concurrent powers of consent, rather than a
transfer of rights from parent to child. However, despite espousal on the importance
of minors' views,53 the Court ultimately reserved its judicial discretion to override
them on the basis ofwelfare.
46 I.e. the statute (which aimed to protect HCPs from trespass litigation) enabled 16/17 year olds to
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Ibid, 767(D), 772(E), 776(E-F), and 781(D-E). See also Re M (child: refusal ofmedical treatment)
[1999] 2 FCR 577, where the increased sensitivity of the approach has received supportive
commentary: G. Douglas, Fam. Law (1999) 753; and J. Fortin, Children's rights and the developing
law (1998) Butterworths, London, Update 4, Chapter 5.
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In Re R and Re W, following the Re J #1 and #2 approach, clinical role remained;
no one could compel a doctor to treat a child. However, in Re W, the Court of
Appeal distanced itself a little from wholesale support for clinical judgment
(displayed in Re J#2), by reference to judicial discretion when choosing between two
course of action, each supported by responsible medical opinion.54 However, Gillick
competence leaves ample scope for clinical judgment to dominate minors' capacity
for 'full understanding', because:
'[minors'] lack of competence to make an informed decision can be imposed
upon them by the professionals involved'.55
The functional purpose and respective roles in best interests were soon set to
become even more acute in the context of treatment withdrawal from incompetent
adults.
2.2.1.5 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland56
The Bland decision significantly raised the profile of best interests, constituting a
significant further step (regarding medical support of incapacitated adults). The case
concerned the lawfulness of continuing/withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from a
twenty-one year old patient who had been in a persistent vegetative state (p.v.s.) for
three and a half years consequent on a severe chest injury sustained in the
Hillsborough Stadium disaster (1989). His injuries had caused anoxia, irreparably
damaging his brain cortex, with no prospect of recovery or improvement. Airedale
NHS Trust sought, with the support of Anthony's family, a judicial declaration that
withdrawing naso-gastric feeding and life-prolonging treatment would be lawful.
The Official Solicitor appealed the decision to the House of Lords. Courts
throughout declared lawfulness, but their reasoning varied considerably, particularly
between the two appellate courts. At first instance it was acknowledged that:
'[t]his case clearly raises serious moral, medical and ethical issues'.57
54 Above, 770(G-H), see also 777(B-C), 780(E) and 781(H). This transpired to be necessary in the
conjoined twins case [2001] above.
55 C. McCafferty, Won't consent? Can't consent! Refusal ofmedical treatment (1999) Fam. Law 335.
56
[1993] 1 All ER 821.
57 Per Stephen Brown P, ibid, 826(a-b).
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Indeed, it directly impacts the function and content of best interests, and casts a
penumbral shadow over certain gateway elements. This impact is considered,
therefore, under all three headings herein.
The two appellate courts concurred on some purposive aspects of the case. Butler-
Sloss and Hoffman LJJ finding common ground with Lords Goff and Browne-
Wilkinson in distinguishing between (unlawfully) causing the patient's death, and
(lawful) non-prolongation of life. However, unlike earlier cases on withholding
treatment from minors (e.g. Re C [1989]), in p.v.s. death was not imminent, rather
becoming so only as a result ofwithdrawing/withholding treatment. In p.v.s. it is
difficult to see how.'not prolonging' differs substantially from 'ending'.59 Motivation
for the distinction accrues from their Lordships' acceptance of the traditional legal
context of acts and omissions,60 categorising withdrawal of treatment as an
'omission', and averting problems of criminal liability. Although the distinction
might have been a means to an end,61 it risks deluding us about the decision's true
purpose (to end the patient's life) and has implications for content and how we view
a patient's interests.
Both appellate courts acknowledged the relevance of underlying values such as self-
determination and sanctity of life.62 However, their divergent responses
foreshadowed fundamental functional differences regarding role. While the Court of
Appeal willingly shouldered responsibility for moral and ethical questions raised,63
the House of Lords considered it for the legislature's address.64 Up to this point,
courts were willing and able in minors' cases to take an active role in the decision,
framing purpose as paramountcy of welfare,65 whereas, regarding adult IcPs, the
House of Lords had focused on medical purpose, deferring to HCPs as the prime
58
Ibid, 848(j), 856-857; and 869(c), 894, and 883(b-c), respectively.
59 The Law Lords' distinction has raised accusations of semantics. See my earlier article (1998),
above, attached as Appendix 8. Also, G.M. Craig, On withholding nutrition in the terminally ill: has
palliative medicine gone too far? J. Med. Eth. (1994) 20, 139, 141. J.K. Mason and G.T. Laurie, The
management of the persistent vegetative state in the British Isles, Juridical Review (1996) 4, 263, 280
emphasise designation of 'cause of death' as a factor.
60
[1993] above, 867-868, and 881-883.
61
Indeed, its suitability in the p.v.s context was doubted by Lord Mustill, ibid, 885(j).
62 Ibid: 835-836, 842-843, 845(d), and 851 (b)-852(j) (CA); and 861(g-j) and 865-866 (HL).
63
Ibid, 835(g), 852(f).
64 Ibid, 878(b-c), and 889(a-c).
65 Re B [1981], Re C [1989] and Re J [1990] above.
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assessors.66 In Bland, however, although the decision as to withdrawal of treatment
had situational parity with individualistic, quality of life (per Re J #1),
jurisdictionally, the case paralleled the more generalised formulation of Re F. This
duality gave rise to fundamental differences in appellate opinion. The Court of
Appeal's apparent acceptance of both lines of authority (that is, Re J and Re F) as
relevant,67 influenced content and led the court to recognise Anthony Bland's
continuing possession of relevant interests despite permanent insentience. In
contrast, their Lordships preferred Re F, and rejected endurance of interests. This
discord resulted in the Court of Appeal perceiving its role as balancing relevant
interests, while the House of Lords identified nothing to balance.
Where a need to balance is identified, it is a small step to admit a judicial role that is
functionally determinative of best interests.68 In this light, the Court of Appeal
majority rejected any overriding role for Bolam.69 Whereas, the majority of the Law
Lords elevated the role of Bolam,70 finding no duty to continue treatment,71 and
made medical reasonableness determinative.72 Only Lord Mustill expressly
cautioned (obiter) that
'the decision is ethical, not medical, and...there is no reason in logic why on
such a decision the opinions of doctors should be decisive'.73
This author has criticised use of Bolam in this context as excessively medicalising
best interests assessment.74 While reliance on medical evidence is obviously
necessary, allowing it to play a comprehensive determinative role insupportably
abrogates judicial responsibility, and risks courts merely 'rubber-stamping' medical
decisions.75
66 In Re F [1989], above.
67
Above, 844(f-g), 857(d-e), and 857(g).
68 Reflected in Butler-Sloss LJ's view of judicial involvement as an important safeguard, ibid, 849(f).
69 Hoffman LJ, ibid 858(b-f) limited Bolam to evidential input. See also Butler-Sloss LJ, 845(c).
70





74 See A.J. Fenwick [1998] above, 90.
75 A danger that seemed to manifest in the haste of judicial decision in Frenchay Healthcare NHS
Trust v S [1994] 1 WLR 601, where diagnosis was less certain and no opportunity was created for
independent reports to be obtained.
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2.2.1.6 Law Hospital NHS Trust v The Lord Advocate76
The Law Hospital decision formally adopted Bland, but raised certain functional
differences. The case concerned a forty-three year old female patient who had been
in p.v.s. for three years with no prospect of improvement. The patient's family
supported the application for declarator. The Court of Session (Inner House)
unanimously adopted best interests as the relevant test, 7 considering that, as no
benefit would be gained from continued treatment, it would not be in the patient's
78
interests.
Given the Inner House's unanimous recognition of the availability ofparens patriae
"7Q
in Scotland, we might have expected a dynamic, determinative judgment. However,
it is unclear whether the function of the court is to determine or define best interests.
Lord President Hope emphasised the acceptability of best interests under both
• .... so
wardship and declaratory jurisdictions, assuming both applications to comprise the
81
'same test'. However, in the derivation of best interests at that stage the two tests
were not functionally synonymous. While the purpose in both situations might have
been expressed as deciding in the patient's best interests, the relative roles and
authority to achieve this differed under the two approaches. The lack of clarity about
whether the court should perform a balancing function may not be crucial where
'futility' clearly justifies withdrawal, but becomes more important the closer we
move to addressing quality of life decisions. Further, it does little to clarify the use
of best interests in non-futility cases where balancing may be fundamental to
decision-making.
This confusion as to approach is exacerbated by the Court's ambivalence towards
Bolam. Grubb suggests that the Inner House really regarded the House of Lords as
having determined Anthony Bland's best interests themselves, considering - but not
deferring to - medical opinion.82 If correct, this raises two concerns. First, this
approach compounds tensions inherent in Bland, because absence of elucidation as to
76
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77 Ibid, 858, 861,863, and 866.
78 Ibid, 859(E), 861(F) and 866(G-H).
79






function and role fit under parens patriae means the Court of Session perpetuated the
acceptability of formally defining one thing and informally determining something
else. Second, while Grubb rightly suggests that the Inner House was willing to
determine best interests,83 functional disparity between the House of Lords' and the
Inner House extends into role. That is,
• medical role, despite following Bland, surprisingly little mention is made
of Bolam. Perhaps this dearth of reference accrues from its irrelevance
to an approbatory jurisdiction, but this sits uneasily with simultaneous
wholesale adoption of Bland;85
• judicial role, consistent with availability of parens patriae the Inner
House accepted that withdrawing treatment from IcPs was a matter for the
court,86 and jurisdictionally the Court had power to demand its own
07
determination of treatment withdrawal. However, Lord Hope did not
envisage court application being necessary in every case, leaving
responsibility for deciding whether to apply with HCPs.88 This results in a
curious position; the Inner House's approach being unnecessarily narrow
given its extensive jurisdiction, and the House of Lords informally
requiring p.v.s. cases to be heard judicially - despite lacking formal
OQ
jurisdiction to so demand;
• patient 'role', as the patient is insensate, this comprises the question of
admitting a subjective viewpoint. Lord Hope's leading judgment showed
willingness to encompass a patient's express views,90 but the majority




Only Lord Hope refers to Bolam, above 859(F-I), in the context of futility.
85 The Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 attempts to clarify medical role, but its practical
success in achieving this remains to be established.
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Above, 852(J-K), 863(F-H), 863(L), 866(F) and 866(L).
87
However, the Inner House recognised its civil limits of jurisdiction by avoiding encroaching on the
Lord Advocate's entitlement to prosecute irrespective of declarator by the Court of Session.
88
Ibid, 860(D). This remains open to appeal by 'interested others' under the recent Act (s50), or for
inclusion within designated treatments requiring safeguards (s48(2)).
89 The requirement of court involvement in England and Wales continues by virtue of the Official
Solicitor's Practice Note 1 May 2001, adopted as 'valuable guidance' by Dame Butler-Sloss (P) 14




approach is implicitly objective (like Bland). Lord Clyde held a minority
view giving precedence to subjectivity, framing the question as whether
'it is or is not just and proper to grant the authorisation in the circumstances
as viewed from the position of the patient'.91
This approach more reflects the Court of Appeal's view in Re J #1 and,
prima facie, resembles substituted judgment. But it is more sophisticated:
reference to the 'justness of granting authorisation' means that Lord
Clyde's position may be an assessment of circumstances from both an
objective and subjective perspective. His linguistic contrast is significant;
drawing emphasis away from professional liability, to focus (rightly in
terms of proxy decision-making) on the well-being of the IcP. Lord
Clyde's approach reminds the decision-maker to tread carefully, for, s/he
acts on behalf of another adult. However, the majority approach in Law
Hospital seems to be a functional opportunity lost; with suitable
jurisdiction available it had offered landmark potential to clarify the
various roles involved.92
2.2.1.7 Re Y (Mental Incapacity: bone marrow transplant)93
An increasingly expansionist role is seen in the case of Re Y. Re Y concerned a 25-
year-old female, severely mentally and physically handicapped from birth. Y's 36-
year-old sister (the plaintiff) suffered from a pre-leukaemic bone marrow disorder.
The plaintiffs deteriorating condition required a bone marrow transplant for her
survival. Y was the only sibling likely to match as a donor, but Y's disabilities
precluded her consenting to blood testing and/or donation. The plaintiff requested a
declaration of lawfulness under the court's inherent jurisdiction.94 This case, and
others such as Re S (medical treatment: adult sterilisation),95 highlighted growing
application of best interests across varied treatment contexts, including those of a
91
Ibid, 863(1-J).
92 This has been left, ultimately, to be developed by the legislators in the Adults with Incapacity
(Scotland) Act 2000.
93
[1996] 2 FLR 787.
94 Under RSC Ord. 15, rl6.
95
[1998] 1 FLR 944.
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non-curative nature. Connell J was required to resolve any potential conflict of
interests, between the plaintiffs need for a donor and the defendant's need for
protection from invasive surgery, in a functionally consistent way. This involved
both purpose and role.
Re Y was distinguishable from Re F on the basis of purpose; the procedure was not
aimed at improving/preventing deterioration of Y's physical/mental health. Rather,
the benefit was to the health of Y's sister, but Connell J seemed swayed by the
family's plight as a whole.96 Prior to this case, donation by adult IcPs had never been
ruled out despite its anticipated 'special category' status. And, despite the attractions
of substituted judgment (that might find ifY could understand her sister's needs, then
she (Y) would want to be a donor),97 Connell J was bound by precedent to reject it.
Having established best interests as the relevant test, the donation situation had to be
squared with the traditional purpose of benefiting the IcP. In addressing this he
added a gloss to the test, such that benefit to another (i.e. a recipient donee) is
irrelevant unless, as a result (of acting as donor), the procedure is in the donor's best
interests. In other words, some (indirect) positive benefit must accrue to the
incompetent adult.
This reformulated purpose also required redefinition of 'benefit'; for, how can a
procedure that is not diagnostic, prophylactic, or curative possibly 'benefit' an IcP?
Connell J, drawing on the American case, Curran v Bosze,98 expanded the range of
'benefits' to include psychological benefit based in relationship 99 While there was
very limited evidence of a sufficiently close relationship between Y and her plaintiff
sister,100 Connell J based benefit to Y on the desirability of maintaining existing
relationships within the whole family, the procedure thereby being
'to her [Y's] emotional, psychological and social benefit'.101
96
Referring to the urgency of the plaintiffs need, her young daughter's status as an only grandchild,
and the potential impact on the already-poor health of Y's mother, [1996] above, 789-791.
97 See ibid, 791 (F-G).
98
(1990) 566Ne2d 1319. Cited in the instant case, 791(G)-792(F).
99 See also Strunk v Strunk (1969) 445SW2d 145, where a close relationship had warranted donation





This extends purpose considerably; almost any procedure could aim to achieve at
least one such benefit. Implications of this for content are discussed below. But,
shifting purpose into emotional and social realms begins to alter roles - the remit
being no longer purely medical.
Connell J's requirement that future cases involving bone marrow harvesting on adult
incompetents should be 'ventilated' in court,102 seems a welcome extension of
judicial role. Although this terminology ('ventilation') avoids directly confronting
either the approbatory/declaratory roles, it effectively creates a bridge between
formal jurisdictional limits, and informal acknowledgment of a judicial need actively
to determine best interests. Medical evidence still has an important informative role
to play. Yet, ironically, in some respects valuable medical opinion is not maximised;
Feenan rightly criticises the absence of professional assessment of Y's psychological
development and the anticipated psychological impact of reduced contact between Y
and her mother.103 Thus, considerable further role clarification was (and is) still
warranted.
2.2.2 Development of Content
Throughout this expansive period, the content of best interests had also witnessed
marked development.
2.2.2.1 Re C (A minor)(Wardship: medical treatment)104
The Court of Appeal's decision raises a number of content developments. Lord
Donaldson MR clearly made C's 'well-being, welfare and interests' paramount,105
consolidating the close association between best interests and welfare. However, the
selectivity of his reliance on precedent is also apparent. While emphasising
paramountcy from Re B,106 a factual distinction was drawn between Re B and this
102 Above, 794(E-F).
103 D. Feenan, A good harvest? Re Y (Mental incapacity: bone marrow transplant) CFLQ (1997) 9(3)
305, 309.
104




[1981] above, cited ibid, 786(j).
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case, permitting differing outcomes without inconsistency of principle. Pace Re B,
C's best interests were the guiding principle, but C's situation was more severe:
• 107'the quality of...[C's]...life will be demonstrably awful and intolerable'.
Hence, C's situation comprised the exceptional scenario, previously left open by
Templeman J in Re B. Certainly, in assessing quality of life Re C confirms that
physical pain is a significant element,108 but not the only factor. The Court's clear
objective was to minimise pain, suffering and distress while maximising dignity,
protecting C's interests in physical welfare, and bodily integrity, respectively. But,
this indicates that, whatever formal content is accorded to best interests, pragmatic
protection of those interests often depends upon function.109
2.2.2.2 Re J (a minor)(wardship: medical treatment)110
Re J #1 entered the gap between the moribund status of Re C [1989] and the
potential longevity of Re B [1981], Re J #1 was the first judicial decision to
withhold treatment from a non-terminal minor.111 The Court of Appeal adopted a
112 • • •basic test of paramountcy, and framed the requisite balancing exercise as a
'critical equation'.113 This 'non-mathematical' formulation started from a strong
presumption favouring prolonging life, which was rebuttable by resulting factors
such as pain, suffering and poor quality of life. This approach, in effect, combines
the formulations of Re B and Re C. However, Lord Donaldson then diverted away
from Re B's quality of life terminology,114 seemingly preferring the Canadian
approach of substituted judgment as illustrated in Superintendent of Family and
Child Service v Dawson.115 This approach has never taken hold in the United
Kingdom but its normative appeal in IcP decisions is considered further in Chapter 4.
In addition, the Court of Appeal took the unprecedented step of allowing withholding
10/
Ibid, 787(b-c).
108 See also Mason, McCall Smith and Laurie, Law and Medical Ethics (2002) paragraphs 16.34 and
16.39.
109 The initial order authorising 'treating] the minor to die' was amended to read 'allowing her life to
come to an end peacefully and with dignity', above, 787(f-g).
110
[1990] 3 All ER 930.
111 Because in Re B [1981], above, the court had opted to treat.
112
Above, per Balcombe LJ, 942(h), in accordance with both Re B (1981) and Re C (1989).
113 Ibid 938(e).
114 I.e. that quality of life would be 'demonstrably awful'.
115
(1983) 145 DR (3d) 610.
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of treatment in an otherwise non-terminal situation, albeit on the dubious basis of the
act/omission distinction. This terminology proved catalytic in later developmental
cases such as Bland. However, welfare was becoming an intense focal point
regarding mature minors.
2.2.2.3 Mature minors: Re R (A minor)(Wardship: medical treatment)116
and Re W (A minor)(Medical treatment)117
110
While welfare was merely hinted at in Re R, it featured prominently in Re W,
where Lord Donaldson limited the extent of a minor's developing autonomy:
'good parenting involves giving minors as much rope as they can handle
without an unacceptable risk that they will hang themselves'.119
In so doing, he closely associated best interests with welfare and prudence, the latter
meaning:
'avoiding taking risks which, if they eventuate, may have irreparable
consequences or which are disproportionate to the benefits which could
accrue from taking them'.120
Thus, the minor's wishes may be incorporated as an element of best interests until
they operate against the decision's functional protective goal. Although Balcombe
LJ included autonomy more explicitly:
'[i]t will normally be in the best interests of a child of sufficient age and
121
understanding to make an informed decision that the court should respect',
this was tempered by judicial power to override the minor's views. However,
Balcombe LJ declined to define the point at which that should occur.122
Nolan LJ made the most transparent exposition of welfare, citing sl(l) of the
Children Act (1989) to evince paramountcy, then construing it in the light of si (3), to
include: ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child; his/her needs; effects of
changing circumstances; background characteristics, risk of harm, and capacity of
116
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others to meet his/her needs. This certainly aids clarification of relevant factors.
However, the point at which protective intervention (and therefore the overriding of a
mature minor's views) becomes justified was couched only as avoiding 'serious and
imminent risk' of 'grave and irreversible harm'.124 We see here how both 'best
interests' and 'welfare' can be used in broad, vaguely justificatory ways. Hence,
while 'welfare' has valuable scope to include personal (non-medical) interests, it can
also cover a multitude of interpretations of best interests in any one case. The
content accorded depends on function and perspective. In relation to mature minors,
it seems that purpose (preserving life until the age of (competent) majority))
dominates content. This is exemplified in the curious absence of reference to
'balancing'.125 This raises doubts about how, or indeed whether, balancing is
performed regarding mature minors. Clearly, by deciding to override, some balance
point is judicially perceived to have been passed. But judicial reluctance to define
the decision process renders weighing invisible. We can only conclude that
resolution revolves around arcane judicial discretion, aimed at ensuring the minor's
survival to adulthood.126
2.2.2.4 Re F127
A mandate for treatment was also occurring regarding adult IcPs, but with more
specific, narrowly medical content. This variance in content reflects the varying
functional approaches to minors and adults. The Court of Appeal found justification
for sterilising F based on treatment of adult IcPs being in the public interest, provided
1 98
that treatment is necessary (and suitably safeguarded). While the House of Lords,
accepted the significance of public interest to a degree,129 their Lordships framed
130
necessity as a need for others to take decisions and/or care for the IcP. By raising




Only Nolan LJ cited Thorpe J's view at first instance, regarding the need to 'balance...the




[1989] 2 All ER 545.
128
[1989] 2 FLR 378, 401-403, and 409-410.
129
Above, 551 (d-e), and 561(d-e).
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Law Lords' reframed necessity as purposive, rather than as a component element of
best interests.
This opened up best interests to development of new content. Lord Brandon seized
this opportunity, considering that treatment would be in best interests:
'if, but only if, it is carried out in order either to save their lives or to ensure
131
improvement or prevent deterioration in their physical or mental health'.
This broad formulation of content has become the seminal exposition of best
interests in adult IcP decisions. The judgment was clearly not intended to be
restricted to sterilisation decisions and the Lords had sidestepped the broad 'welfare'
approach (favoured by the Court of Appeal). In contrast to welfare's ability to
embrace both medical and non-medical interests, this new construction invited purely
medical factors to dominate the best interests of adult IcPs, particularly in invoking
Bolam as the relevant standard. As has already been stated the effect of the Lords'
attributed content was such that, if a responsible body of skilled medical opinion
considered that treatment aimed to save the patient's life, or improve or maintain
his/her health, then treatment would be in the IcP's 'best interests'. Unlimited
contextual relevance created a licence lawfully to treat.
2.2.2.5 Bland132
The differing approaches of the Court of Appeal and House of Lords in Bland
regarding function are also apposite in relation to content. The Court of Appeal
attempted to reconcile two distinct lines of authority, recognising (from Re F) that:
(1) lawfulness of treating adult IcPs turned upon best interests; and (2) Bolam
1
generally governed the duty to treat thereby, and simultaneously (importing from
Re J#l): (3) the need to balance issues; and (4) the relevance of underlying values
analogous to the life/death context of Bland.134
130
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134 Ibid, 857(g). Indeed, Butler-Sloss LJ explicitly applied Re J#l, ibid 846(a-b).
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However, reconciling these two approaches was never really viable because of the
jurisdictional limitations outlined above. Perhaps mindful of these dangers, the Law
Lords preferred a straight application of Re F; Re J #1 was effectively distinguished
due to Anthony Bland's insensate state.135 However, the real motivation for this
finding was content-oriented; the total absence of any prospective benefits meant that
no weighing was needed in p.v.s. and continued treatment would be futile.136 In
other words, the best interests scales contained nothing, therefore no balancing
function was required. This contrasted with a sensate (minor) patient, whose quality
of life is influenced by factors such as pain, hazards, and invasiveness of treatment,
which give content to the weighing process.
Interests and the need for balancing are closely associated; generally conflict within
a patient's interests creates the need to reconcile or balance them. Interests and
balancing represent content and function, respectively. Possession of interests
becomes a gateway criterion to decide in an adult patient's best interests. The Bland
decision reflects the type of interest that courts are willing to recognise, namely only
experiential interests (see further Chapter 3). Again, on this issue the two appellate
courts were discordant. The Court of Appeal recognised non-medical interests such
• 1 ^7
as bodily integrity and how others remember the patient. Relatedly, Hoffman LJ
considered Bland had
'a recognisable interest in the manner of his life and death which help the
court to apply the principles of self-determination and the value of the
individual'.138
Thus, Hoffman LJ recognised a type of interest beyond a patient's current, conscious
experience. In contrast, the House of Lords acknowledged no significant interest,
Lord Browne-Wilkinson rejecting Butler-Sloss LJ's incorporation of intangible
factors as unduly reflecting a judge's (subjective) moral view.139 Lord Keith
considered Bland 'indifferent' to his own continued life or death,140 and this
135
Ibid, 861(a), sentience (to pain) being one traditional criterion for moral status. Sentience and
personhood are considered below, Chapter 5.
136 See particularly Lord Goff, ibid, 870(a) and (d-e).
137 Ibid, 840(b-c).
138
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attenuated approach to interests reaches its climax in Lord Mustill's conclusion that
Anthony Bland
'has no best interests of any kind'.141
The irony of these differing approaches is that, in the p.v.s. context, 'best interests'
takes no account of a patient's previously existing personality. It is impossible to
reconcile this with the artificial viewpoint that may be imputed regarding a severely
disabled baby who has never actually possessed competence, opinions, or beliefs (Re
J#l). Arguably, however, the House of Lords was wrong. Having no current or
future interest in living does not automatically equate to "no interests". Certain
interests deriving from a p.v.s. patient's previous personality are surely still
attributable, such as religious beliefs, previous views about this type of situation,
concerns about family and friends, and perhaps even beneficence (e.g. a strong
personal belief in organ donation). We can only form a truer picture of the whole
individual by looking at this rounder view of 'interests',142 which would provide a
firmer basis for determining 'best' interests. This argument is developed as this thesis
progresses.143
Fundamentally, the Bland judgment fails on content, formally promoting a narrow
medicalised conception of 'interests', and leaving no room for personal (non-medical)
interests.
In terms of content Bland is divisive; formally separating the meaning of tests
applicable to minor and adult IcPs. However, the issue of patient interests was to
persist, coming under further scrutiny in Re Y.
2.2.2.6 Re Y (Mental Incapacity: bone marrow transplant)144
Although best interests had scope for a wide range of benefits, its diversity had fallen
victim to the long shadow cast by Bolam and consequent emphasis on medical
141
Ibid, 894(f). However, Lord Mustill did acknowledge that 'glimmerings of awareness may give the
patient an interest which cannot be regarded as null', making legal/ethical issues 'altogether more
difficult', 896(d). But this caveat has gone unheeded with recent extension to non-p.v.s. cases, see
further below.
142 In the Matter of a Ward ofCourt [1995] 2 ILRM 401, 463-465 applied 15 'factors' to best interests,
including life history, previously expressed views; family/carer's view; privacy, dignity, autonomy;
and the 'common good' in protecting life.




interests. Re Y, redeveloped the approach to adult IcPs, referring to psychological,
emotional and social benefits. Additionally, Connell J opted to weigh these
benefits against any detriments to Y,145 drawing authority from very limited
reference to judicial 'balancing' in Re F.146 In Re Y a broader set of factors,
including familial relationship, psychological benefit, and avoidance of
consequential harm were evaluated.
However, the obvious difficulties of finding a donation to be positively in a donor's
best interests forced development of, what is effectively, a negative construction of
best interests. In Bland continued intervention was not in his best interests (i.e. the
overriding concern was to avoid harm). In Y, Connell J suggested that not
intervening would be against Y's interests and this itself would be a harm. This, in
conjunction with a perceived (albeit minimal) psychological benefit, led to the
conclusion that intervention was in Y's interests. Hence, by adjusting content the
decision's purpose is transposed into 'protecting' the IcP from (an albeit remote)
indirect harm. The superficially compelling appeal to harm prevention becomes
dominant where opposing detriments weigh lightly. But, this weighting can be
skewed by poor risk assessment. Feenan highlights the incomplete assessment of
risks inherent in bone marrow procedures in re Y.147 Relatedly, Mumford suggests
assessment should include the potential psychological impact upon the (incapax)
donor of an unsuccessful transplant.148 Thus, a court should be equally willing to
consider harmful consequences flowing both from proceeding and not proceeding.
Inclusion of additional factors must be addressed consistently, whether harms or
benefits.
Re Y's incorporation of interests beyond the purely medical received a mixed
reception from commentators. Some welcomed inclusion of emotional and social
well-being,149 while others warned that wider interpretation might risk manipulation
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149 See R. Bailey-Harris, Re Y (Mental incapacity: bone marrow transplant), Fam. Law 27 (1997) 91,
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150 See Mumford, above, 139.
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arise where the interests of others are admitted.151 While Re Y contains a somewhat
artificial construction of psychological benefit, and expansion of benefit may have
been a means to another's end, it is equally plausible that the decision simply
acknowledges that others' interests may be relevant to an IcP's interests (see Chapter
3). This may better reflect the reality of relationship; IcPs do not exist in isolation
from environment, or their social and emotional needs. As Feenan suggests, Re Y
• • • • 152
may positively 'honour relationship'.
Although this important step was taken on rather flimsy evidence in Re Y,153 it has
not opened the floodgates to profligate claims by others upon IcPs. Connell J limited
its precedential relevance to the context of non-regenerative tissue,154 and required
benefit to the IcP.155 Furthermore, Grubb highlights that implicit limits arise through
need for close relationship, excluding IcPs whose
'mental disability or...age prevented them from forming such a
relationship'.156
The decision did expand best interests' boundaries to encompass types of interest
previously rejected. In this sense, Re Y hints at the growing need for redefinition
(which is considered presently). However, one remaining area had been developed
through this period ofbest interests: gateways.
2.2.3 Development of Gateways
2.2.3.1 Re T (Adult: Refusal of treatment)157
Re T concerned a twenty-year-old female patient in premature labour who consented
to proposed Caesarean section but refused any blood transfusion, following a
conversation with her mother (a practising Jehovah's Witness (JW)). She signed an
unexplained, unread form to this effect. Following surgery, which delivered a
151 Such admission was rejected a short while earlier by the Court of Session in Law Hospital, above,
866(H), cf. Lord Clyde (obiter) 863(F-J).
152 Above 306.
153 Ibid, 306-308. Also, Feenan suggests that 'only a 40 per cent chance of [the plaintiffs] survival for
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stillborn baby, T's deteriorating condition required transfusion, and her father and
boyfriend sought a court order declaring transfusion lawful. This declaration,
granted at first instance and upheld on appeal, was made because T's mother unduly
influenced her refusal.
The starting point for all three appeal judges was that a competent adult patient has a
1
legal right to refuse treatment, irrespective ofhis/her reasons:
'[a]n adult patient who...suffers from no mental incapacity has an absolute
right to choose whether to consent to medical treatment, to refuse it or to
choose one rather than another of the treatments being offered...This right of
choice is not limited to decisions which others might regard as sensible. It
exists notwithstanding that the reasons for making the choice are rational,
irrational, unknown or even non-existent'.159
Prima facie, therefore, the gateway to best interests is firmly closed regarding
competent patients. However, certain pragmatic limitations exist. The right of
refusal is contingent on patient competence. Further:
'the presumption of capacity to decide, which stems from the fact that the
patient is an adult, is rebuttable'.160
Clearly, it is right that if a person is incompetent, they need our protection and we
should decide on their behalf. However, this earmarked competence for future
contention.161
Incapacity may rebut the presumption. His Lordship acknowledged that both long-
term, and temporary factors such as unconsciousness, confusion, shock, severe
fatigue, pain or drugs,162 might rebut the presumption. Further, capacity should be
'commensurate with the gravity of the decision...The more serious the
decision, the greater the capacity required'.163
This gradation broadens scope for finding patients 'incompetent'. The Court
identified two further factors capable of vitiating patient choice: undue influence by
157
[1992] 3 WLR 782.
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159 Per Lord Donaldson MR, ibid, 786, drawing cross-contextually from Sidaway v Board of
Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 871.
160
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another,164 and insufficient scope in a patient's refusal.165 Both vitiating factors
(undue influence and limited scope) may operate irrespective of capacity. Hence,
they do not question a patient's ability to refuse, but rather his/her actual exercise of
that right.
The net effect of finding a patient incompetent, through incapacity or vitiation, is
resort to best interests.166 In Re T, once access to best interests was established, the
Court of Appeal followed the Re F approach, employing necessity to justify
intervention.167 While Re T contributed little to content or function of best
interests,168 it focused attention on circumstances that bring the best interests
mechanism into play. Incompetence acts as a gateway to best interests. The
resulting legal position is arguably asymmetrical in practice. The effect of
presuming competence is that all patients are regarded competent, until s/he refuses.
Only once a patient refuses are doubts raised about competence, and/or validity.
Thus, Re T opened an expanse of potential application for best interests regarding
patients who might be termed 'questionably competent'.
It was clear that best interests really had no situational limits, its influence by now
extended well beyond the early sterilisation and ventilation decisions. Lord
Donaldson (obiter) left open a further gateway regarding a possible qualification on
the pregnant women's right of refusal when carrying a viable foetus. This has
proven situationally prophetic, and is considered under redefinition.169 However,
different rules were developing regarding capacity ofmature minors.
164 See ibid Staughton LJ, ibid 804(G) and 799(F-G).
165 Ibid 799(G); 803(E); 804-805. Where the patient's (competent) refusal does not fit actual
circumstances, refusal is invalid. This is potentially exclusive because of the difficulty of foreseeing
medical circumstances, and the dependency of a patient's knowledge upon information disclosure by
HCPs.
166 See ibid, 796(H).
167
Ibid, 800(G) and 804(B-D).
168 One noteworthy functional point was made by Lord Donaldson, clearly distinguishing between
cases involving medical treatment of teenagers and those involving adults, ibid, 786(G). This left open
the way for continued separate development of those two categories.
169
Below, paragraph 2.3.1. Recent legislative changes in Scotland place responsibility for capacity
assessment with HCPs.
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2.2.3.2 Mature minors: legislation, Re R170 and Re W171
It has already been established that both under statute and at common law, mature
minors in England and Wales do not have a right to refuse medical treatment. In
Scotland, the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act (1991) enables 16 and 17-year-
old minors (under no incapacity) to enter any transaction.172 Minors under 16 years
may also consent to surgical, medical or dental procedures or treatment if they show
requisite capability to understand.173 In Houston, applicant, concerning a 15-year-
old, SheriffMcGowan interpreted (obiter) s2(4),174 effectively regarding consent and
refusal by minors in Scotland as symmetrical;175 that is, a patient capable of validly
consenting to treatment is also capable of validly refusing it. However, as s2(4) is an
exception to the general rule (against minors under 16 years entering transactions), it
seems likely that the Scottish courts would retain overriding authority in the face of
refusal by a competent minor under 16 years.
Lord Donaldson, in Re R, considered that consent need only be obtained from one
competent keyholder, and that keyholders' powers existed concurrently. The
position of parents and the court as keyholders is considered under function, above.
The Court's limitations on minors as keyholders opened the gateway to best
interests.176 Mature minors' capacity is made one-dimensional, aimed only at
consent. In Re W, Balcombe LJ recognised certain illogicality in this asymmetry of
abilities.177 However, Mason and McCall Smith do not perceive it inappropriate
because the serious consequences of refusal warrant a need for
1 7R
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178 Mason et at (2002) above paragraph 10.47. R. Huxtable counters this view on the basis that in
medical decisions most lay people function 'from a position of limited understanding', and asks
whether this mean we must always defer to medical professionals regarding best interests: Re M
(Medical treatment: consent) Time to remove the 'flak jacket'? CFLQ [2000] 12(1) 83, 85.
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Admittedly, if a decision's implications are seriously detrimental, we should not be
afraid to ensure that any refusal is well informed. However, Huxtable suggests the
resulting position to be a
'distinction in the law based merely on status, [which]...does not usually
1 -7Q
inform medical law'.
Whatever the merits of asymmetry, this status-based approach currently dominates
treatment decisions regarding mature minors through its effect on gateway; access to
best interests does not depend on a mature minor's capacity. Where a mature minor
consents, the gate to judicial determination of best interests remains closed (the
minor has handed access to HCPs). Hence, only medical best interests are given
effect unless someone objects to treatment. Whereas, refusal by a mature minor
automatically throws opens the gate, allowing parental consent, or judicial
determination of best interests. In summary, gateway in relation to mature minors is
medicalised.
2.2.3.3 Bland180
The House of Lords in Bland considered that the patient's (current and foreseeable)
absence of cognitive capacity negated any preservation of his personal interests.181
In contrast, Hoffman LJ (CA) suggested:
'[i]t is demeaning to the human spirit to say that, being unconscious, he can
have no interest in his personal privacy and dignity'.182
Nonetheless, the ruling in the House of Lords suggests that logically we might expect
'nil interests' to close the gate on using best interests. Strictly speaking, the Lords'
approach should mean that as a p.v.s. patient has no (weighable) interests and, by
corollary, access to best interests ceases because - by definition - 'best interests' is
based on interests. Having declared 'no interests', 'best' then surely becomes




181 See ibid, 861(a-b) and 873(b-c).
182 Ibid, 854(b).
183 This point is first raised in my paper [1998] above, Appendix 8 hereto. And is developed in my
response letter: Best interests in persistent vegetative state, J. Med. Eth. [1999] 25, 59, attached as
Appendix 9.
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lack of decision-making mechanism. The resulting lacuna perhaps caused the Lords
to adopt a mirrored, negative construction of best interests (that prolonging treatment
1 84
would not be in the patient's best interests), in order to re-establish access to best
interests. This could countenance a gamut of dubious solutions in other contexts that
are 'not in' a patient's interests,185 and has created tenuous distinctions whereby
patients in non-p.v.s. states (e.g. low cognitive awareness) are determined on the
basis of Re J#1 - despite being in a state closer to Bland's.186 Arguably, back-door
negative constructions are unnecessary. We could construe interests differently -
accepting less tangible and non-experiential interests - enabling a decision still to be
... . i07
made in an insentient patient's best interests.
By this stage of development, distinct formulations of best interests were visible in
two dimensions:
• contrasting (a) minors with (b) incompetent adults; and
• differentiating (c) sentient patients from (d) the insentient (irrespective of
age).
In view of the effect of the Bland decision upon gateways, we can now substitute a
third dimension, for (c) and (d):
• contrasting (e) patients with interests, from (f) patients who have lost all
relevant interests, which influences factors considered in the decision,
functional roles attributed and the format of best interests equation
adopted.
By the end of this highly expansive phase of jurisprudential development best
interests had evolved into a principle of piecemeal formulation; its content and
function varying contextually. Most formulations were heavily medicalised,
excluding a person's wider (non-medical) interests and minimising account of
184
Ibid, 869.
185 A more neutral mid-point also exists: an action may be not against a patient's overall interests,
conferring neither benefit nor detriment. This distinction was raised by R. Gillon in his editorial,
Persistent vegetative state, withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration, and the patient's best
interests, J. Med. Eth. (1998) 24, 75, regarding the author's paper [1998] above. The author's response
is noted [1999] above.
186 See also, below, paragraph 2.3.4.2.
187 This argument is developed in Chapters 3 and 6-8, below.
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previously-competent p.v.s. patients' personalities, yet some form of patient
perspective was being incorporated into best interests assessments of young
minors and intellectually disabled donors (neither of whom had ever been
legally competent). In sum, use of the best interests principle was becoming
disparate, questionably sound and unpredictable. Redefinition was overdue by
the late 1990s.
2.3 Recent redefinition
Recent decisions have begun to redefine some aspects of best interests. In certain
areas, such as sterilisation, restriction has occurred. However, the tide generally
remains expansive. Redefinition impacts all three elements already identified:
function, content and gateway. However, in addition to capacity, distinctly new
aspects of redefinition are identifiable: relationship; risk assessment; and human
rights. Each is considered in turn.
2.3.1 Capacity and legal competence
Competence has already been shown to be the gateway giving access to best interests
regarding adults. Where a patient's competence is unclear, through fluctuating
mental state, intellectual disability or environmental stress (herein termed 'grey areas'
of competence) assessment of capacity is axiomatic, but had sometimes been
overlooked thus far. However, three cases heightened the profile of in/capacity as a
prerequisite to best interests: Re C, Re MB, and St George's.
2.3.1.1 Re C (Adult: refusal of treatment)188
C, a 68-year-old male patient suffering from chronic paranoid schizophrenia, was
diagnosed with a gangrenous, ulcerated foot requiring below-knee amputation. C
189refused emphatically. But, without amputation C's chances of survival were
estimated at 15%. C agreed to more conservative surgery, which was successfully
carried out. However, as the hospital authority declined to give an undertaking to C's
lawyer respecting C's refusal in the event of future need for amputation, C sought a
188
[1994] 1 WLR 290.
189 See ibid, 291(F).
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restraining injunction under the court's inherent jurisdiction. The High Court's
declaration is a rare occasion of judicial support for refusal by a less-than-fully-
competent patient. Importantly, Thorpe J redefined the test for competence,
founding his support for C's refusal on Re T.190 The central issue was whether C fell
within Lord Donaldson's previous qualification on right of refusal, that
'an adult patient may be deprived of his capacity to decide by long-term
mental incapacity'.191
If so, the gateway would open to use of best interests. By starting from a
presumption of capacity - despite C's schizophrenia - Thorpe J did not automatically
equiparate mental illness with inability to make a treatment decision. Although
1 Q9
Thorpe J rejected a (low-level) 'minimal competence test', he defined the question
as whether C could
'understand the nature, purpose and effects of the [treatment]'.193
This understanding he perceived in three-stages:
'first, comprehending and retaining treatment information, second, believing
it and, third, weighing it in the balance to arrive at choice'.194
This test governs capacity of adults over 16 years,195 but has had a mixed reception
being criticised variously as: vague and difficult to assess;196 capable of demanding
high levels of comprehension and ability to choose;197 and setting a higher requisite
standard than for consent.198 Additionally, while capacity to consent focuses on
ability, Thorpe J's construction regarding refusal seems to concern actual
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192 I.e. 'capacity to understand in broad terms the nature and effect of the proposed treatment', above,
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E.g. Re C (Detention: medical treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 180. However, even if'competent' on this
test, a court may still override a minor's refusal (Re W, above).
196 Mason et al (2002) above, paragraph 10.57.
197 See I. Kennedy and A. Grubb (eds.), Principles ofMedical Law (1998) Oxford U.P., Oxford, 140-
147.
198 See M. Gunn, The meaning of incapacity, Med. L. Rev. 2 [1994] 8, 10-11, who criticises the
information processing aspects of the test.
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'has understood and retained [information]...in his own way believes it,
and...has arrived at a clear choice'.199
This creates some uncertainty about when the gate to best interests is shut by patient
competence.200 However, Thorpe J made three positive redefinitions:
• by associating capacity with the decision task, Thorpe J permitted a
patient to be competent regarding certain aspects of life, while
incompetent regarding others. Furthermore, mental illness does not
automatically open the gateway to best interests by precluding
competence. C's delusions did not negate his capacity;201 C's ability to
exercise his capacity remained sufficiently unimpaired;
• functionally this case shows the importance of choosing wherever
medical evidence conflicts. Thorpe J preferred the view of psychiatric
witnesses (finding no direct link between C's refusal and his delusions), to
that of C's regular doctor.203 This conflict shows the inherent weakness of
Bolam as both views could accord with 'a responsible body of medical
opinion'. Thorpe J actively evaluated C's capacity, considering C's oral
evidence, and finding him
'ordinarily engaged and concerned',204 [and that C's] 'answers...seemed
measured and generally sensible...[with]...no sign of inappropriate emotional
expression'.205
While this evaluation can be criticised as importing rationality
(referencing 'sensible' answers and 'emotion'), it adds a useful dimension,
demedicalising assessment and ensuring airing of relevant evidence;206
199
Above, 295(E). M.A. Jones and K. Keywood contrast ability and actual understanding, see
Assessing the patient's competence to consent to medical treatment, Med. Law Int. (1996) 2, 107, 113-
117, particularly 116.
200 Normative aspects of competence construction are considered below, Chapter 4.
201 Above, 394(C)-395(F).
202 In contrast to Re T, where T's exercise had been unduly influenced.
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evidence about C's understanding of consequences, see 293(F).
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• Thorpe J's implicitly acknowledged underlying values in accepting Dr
Eastman's evidence regarding the relationship between preservation of
life, autonomy and capacity.207
This case redefined capacity by substantiating the need for incompetence to be
proven as a prerequisite gateway to best interests. It upheld a requirement for
assessment and the right of IcPs to be heard. Sadly, subsequent cases display less
openness: relatively few patients have since been declared competent under the
90R
three-stage test, and a spate of cases in 1996 found pregnant women 'incompetent'
on questionable grounds.209 While these decisions overshadowed Re C's
redefmitional quality, the Court of Appeal eventually employed it to redress the
balance in Re MB.
2.3.1.2 Re MB (Medical treatment)210
MB, aged 23, was 40 weeks pregnant carrying a baby in breech position, which
created a 50% risk to the unborn child, but little physical danger to her. MB agreed
to Caesarean section, but her fear of needles meant she refused venepuncture for
blood samples or anaesthesia.211 Attempted anaesthesia by mask was unsuccessful,
MB withdrawing her consent in the operating theatre. By now, labour had started
and MB was declining to discuss intervention. The hospital obtained a declaration of
lawfulness to proceed using necessary reasonable force. MB's appeal was dismissed
207
Ibid, 292(G).
208 Cases declaring patients competent include: Re JT (Adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1998] 1
FLR 48 where refusal of dialysis by a learning-disabled woman was accepted (but dialysis requires
ongoing co-operation and JT's objections would have made imposition difficult in practice).
Relatedly, impracticality warranted non-imposition of dialysis based on an incompetent patient's best
interests in Re D (Medical treatment: mentally disabled patient) [1998] 2 FLR 22. Sometimes the
MHA 1963 is used as an alternative means to treat: Riverside Mental Health NHS Trust v Fox [1994]
1 FLR 614; Re KB (Adult)(Mental patient: medical treatment) (1994) 19 BMLR 144; B v Croydon
HA [1995] 1 All ER 683 -despite B's capacity under the Re C test, s63 of the MHA 1983 still enabled
treatment. Most recently, for endorsement of Re C, see Re AK (Medical treatment: consent) [2001 ] 1
FLR 129.
209 See Tameside & Glossop Acute Services v CH [1996] 1 FLR 762. A patient's mental history was
(inappropriately) raised as an issue in Norfolk & Norwich Healthcare NHS Trust v W [1996] 2 FLR
613. See also Rochdale Healthcare (NHS) Trust v C [1997] 1 FCR 274 and Re L (Patient: Non¬
consensual treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 837.
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[1997] 2 FLR 426.
211 Staff at the antenatal clinic knew ofMB's phobia at 33 weeks ofpregnancy.
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the same night (reasons reserved), after which MB agreed to co-operate and a
successful Caesarean delivery took place.
212The dominance of MB's 'abnormal mental condition' of needle phobia', was
J 1 -3 t .
considered to preclude her ability to choose. Prima facie, this accords with earlier
decisions, finding enforced Caesareans lawful and denying the competence of
pregnant women. However Re MB struck an initial blow for patient autonomy in
obstetrics by closing the gap left open by Lord Donaldson's obiter view in Re T,
effectively overturning an earlier decision that overruled a competent woman's
refusal of intervention on religious grounds.214
Re MB stemmed an expanding tide of declarations based on increasingly perfunctory
considerations of patient competence. By applying the Re C three-stage test,215 the
Court at least allowed scope for a pregnant woman to be found 'competent'. To some
extent the test was refined, because the beliefelement is not expressly included in the
Re MB formulation. Nonetheless, Butler-Sloss LJ's reference to phobia stifling
belief,216 effectively elides the second and third stages into a single stage of use.
Additional procedural safeguards were posited. Express inclusion of these
provided an important judicial defence of patient autonomy. However, while
guideline (1) indicates that patient capacity must be at issue, guideline (8) requires
evidence regarding competence only
'ifcompetence is in issue' (emphasis added).217
The Court also endorsed the view of the Royal College of Obstetricians and
Gynaecologists (RCOG), that:
'it is inappropriate, and unlikely to be helpful or necessary, to invoke judicial
intervention to overrule an informed and competent woman's refusal...even
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Despite this, weaknesses persist. While Butler-Sloss LJ limited rationality to an
• •910
evidential role, its 'symptomatic' significance inevitably leaves scope for
backward-chaining reasoning to flow from it to evince incompetence. The validity
of referencing rationality depends heavily on the framework and safeguards within
which it is considered. This inconsistency is exacerbated by paragraph (6) of the
judgment's conclusions on capacity:
'careful scrutiny of the evidence is necessary because fear of an operation
may be a rational reason for refusal to undergo it. Fear may also, however,
paralyse the will and thus destroy...capacity'.220
Fovargue and Miola identify the resultant position being that:
'patients are allowed to be fearful of operations, but not too fearful as this
221
may eliminate their ability to consent to the operation'.
If correct, one wonders what interpretation a court might make of a patient refusing
treatment but expressing no fear. Would total absence of fear be construed simply to
infer lack of understanding and incapacity? Essentially, this is about rationality; fear
222is okay within rational limits. This position flies in the face of Re T. The bizarre
resulting position is that
'it is better for [the patient] to refuse to give a reason for her lack of consent,
and then there will be no attempt to deem her incapable to provide such
consent'.223
Re MB leaves uncertainty about the relevance of rationality, fear and panic within
competence. We can say, with certainty, that in some circumstances these factors
indicate incompetence (opening the way to best interests), while in others these
factors remain within a competent patient's right of refusal. But, which situations
give rise to which circumstance is unclear. The Court of Appeal's ready acceptance
of psychiatric evidence that MB's fear 'dominated all' raises concerns. Michalowski
considers it
219 Above, 437(C), defining irrationality as a 'decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic
or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be
decided it could have arrived at it', ibid 437(B).
220 Ibid, 437(G-H).
221 S. Fovargue and J. Miola, Policing pregnancy: implications of the A.G.'s Reference (No. 3 of
1994), Med. L. Rev. 6 [1998] 265, 283.
222
Certainly, the C-test left scope for rationality, but Re MB seems to shift it, testing a patient's
relative weight attribution (of issues) against a rationality scale; if actual choices fail the scale (i.e. are
irrational), then this indicates inability to decide.
223 S. Fovargue and J. Miola, above, 283.
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'deplorable that the court expressed its conclusion that the patient was
incompetent without any careful application of the legal standards so
224
meticulously outlined'.
Its failure to put theory into practice has led to accusations of lip-service
autonomy.225 Further, the Court's broad definition includes scope for factors such as
confusion, shock, fatigue and pain to 'completely erode capacity'. As Brazier
suggests,
'[i]ncompetence is so defined that few women in labour could hand on heart
declare themselves competent'.226
It may be that Re MB was simply the 'wrong' case in which to test these issues.
MB's strongly phobic reaction may mean this particular case was rightly decided.
But, this does not eradicate the niggling doubt that the Court did not practise what it
preaches, and that the gateway to best interests remains ajar due to factors present in
almost all medical treatment decisions.
In terms of role, dearth of reference to Bolam, and express procedural requirement
for court involvement, created a determinative (rather than definitive) judicial role.
Indeed, Butler-Sloss LJ suggested that, in terms of scope, best interests
227'have to be treated on similar principles to the welfare of a child'.
But, this is inconsistent with the Court's citation of Re F. The Court's conflation of
the two is criticised by Michalowski:
'this woman based her life on autonomous values and decisions which should
998
be respected when making a treatment decision on her behalf.
As Butler-Sloss LJ provided no further material to resolve the confusion we may
only speculate about the significance of this equiparation. Perhaps, in haste to escape
the clutches of Bolam, the Court stumbled over its linguistics and authorities. But,
with hindsight, this seems to have been the start of the Court of Appeal's more
proactive role in best interests decisions for adult IcPs.
224
Above, 119.
225 See: S. Michalowski, ibid, 120; Fovargue and Miola, 'the assertion of the autonomy of a pregnant
woman has a hollow ring to if, above 283; and I. Kennedy, above, 323, '[p]aternalism...is the
trumping principle'.





The Court's approach in Re MB was purpose oriented, distinguishing between her
consent to Caesarean (regarding which MB was 'competent'), and her decision to
refuse anaesthesia (where she was 'incompetent' due to phobia). Combined with a
goal ofMB's desire for her child to be bom alive, it was easy to conclude that
'[i]t must be in the best interests of a woman carrying a full-term child whom
she wants to be bom alive and healthy that such a result should if possible be
achieved'.229
By adding a dash of harm prevention (regarding potential psychiatric damage
consequent on loss/handicap of the child),230 the Court's case for intervention
became more compelling. Despite saying relatively little about best interests these
comments exposed the decision to further criticism of insufficient weighing,231 and -
given the minimal physical danger to MB232 - possible protection of foetal interests
by the back door.233 However, judicial re-evaluation ofMB's best interests regarding
the Caesarean might have been a disservice to her autonomy; she had already made a
choice about the surgery itself, only the anaesthetic was at issue.234 But, we cannot
be too careful regarding use of reasonable force. The harsh realities of force raise
doubts about enforced Caesarean ever being in a woman's 'best interests'. Plomer,
discussing an unreported American case, outlines the real scope for invasion and
abuse:
'[t]he woman who refused consent...was handcuffed. Her ankles were
attached to her bed with leather straps to prevent her moving and she was
taken into the operating theatre screaming for help and biting through her
intravenous tubing in an attempt to get free. Her husband later committed
suicide'.235
This kind of invasion should not be justifiable by reference to best interests, and this
stark example reminds us why IcP decisions must be made with honest,
compassionate and full consideration of issues, under the spotlight of public scrutiny.
Re MB lay on the cusp of best interests' expansion and redefinition. It is a





231 See Michalowski, above, 121-122.
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233 See Fovargue and Miola, above, 290.
234 See Michalowski, above, 122.
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underlying battle inherent in all IcP decisions; preservation of autonomy (such as it
is), in the face of conflicting welfare choices. Although, it may have done little to
dispel the views ofWiddett and Thomson (pre-Re MB) that
'women are afforded less respect than men in terms of self-determination,
bodily integrity and autonomy'.236
The Court also attempted a refinement of content, by declining (obiter) to accord
interests to the unborn child in the context of caesarean section.237 The Court
founded its view on lack of jurisdiction,238 and its own line in Re F (In
utero)(Wardship).239 This effectively overruled the earlier position of Re S,240
distinguished the criminal law decision of A.G. Reference (No. 3) of 1994,241 and
civil and criminal statutes.242
In addition to all of the above, Butler-Sloss LJ indicated that
'[bjest interests are not limited to best medical interests',243
and supported this procedurally, by requiring that information on a patient's
circumstances and background be made available.244 Fovargue and Miola criticise
this as
'providing] the judiciary with a free hand to decide whether a woman with a
history of drug and alcohol problems should be able to make decisions
concerning her own body in the latter stages of pregnancy'.245
However, given previous criticism for excessive medical deference, any shift away
from Bolam required development of relevant interests beyond the purely medical
and is to be welcomed. Admittedly, however, the Court of Appeal's motivation for
235 A. Plomer, Judicially enforced caesareans and the sanctity of life, Anglo-American Law Review
(1997)26(2)235,262.
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admitting non-medical interests may have been teleological (finding a psychological
benefit to MB in a successful birth).246
2.3.1.3 St George's Healthcare Trust v S; sub nom R v Collins and others,
ex parte S247
This case (hereinafter St George's) concerned a 28-year-old woman who was 36
weeks pregnant when she registered with a NHS doctors' practice. She had sought
no antenatal care, and pre-eclampsia was immediately diagnosed. Despite advice
regarding risk to her and the baby's health, S refused treatment (including induced
delivery), saying she wanted a natural birth. A social worker applied successfully
under s2, MHA 1983 for S's admittance to a psychiatric hospital for assessment.
There, the GP's diagnosis of depression was confirmed and S was transferred, against
her will, to St George's hospital for obstetric treatment. S continued to refuse
treatment, and was indifferent to the potentially fatal consequences of non-treatment.
She provided articulate written reasons for her views and psychiatric evidence
recorded that S's capacity appeared intact, fully understanding reasons for treatment
and consequences of refusal. Although S took legal advice, her lawyers were not
consulted during the hospital's successful ex parte application for High Court
declaration to proceed without S's consent. S continued to object and, in light of
legal advice, offered no resistance to sedation, but expressly refused to sign a consent
form prior to undergoing safe delivery by Caesarean. Once the s2 detention ended, S
discharged herself contrary to medical advice and sought judicial review of her
admission, transfer, detention and treatment and appealed the High Court's
declaration. The Court of Appeal found S had been unlawfully transferred and
detained, that the Caesarean amounted to trespass and the declaration would provide
no defence to damages against St George's hospital.
Prima facie, this is not a case about best interests, but the decision follows and
extends the provisions of Re MB, making important redefinitions in areas apposite to
IcP decision-making, including: autonomy, competence, procedure, and foetal
interests.
246
Above, 439(B-C). As Michalowski caveats any such benefits should require establishment
regarding the individual concerned (rather than presumed), above 121.
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The Court's starting point was autonomy, which founds a competent patient's right
248of refusal, and it warned against any incremental erosion of competent individuals'
personal liberty.249 This 'salutary warning' set the tenor of the whole judgment,250
leading to narrow construction of mental health legislation,251 and concluding that
foetal interests may not prevail against those of a competent mother. Thus it reaches
beyond Re MB, seeking to translate the theory of autonomy into practice.
While giving little express consideration to competence the Court chose between
252
conflicting psychiatric notes on S's detainment, and was strongly influenced by S's
9ST
'highly articulate' written record of her views. The Court concluded that she
'knew perfectly well what she was doing: without resort to any
presumptions, and however the question is tested, there is no sufficient
evidence from which to conclude that her competence...was in question'.254
Further, the Court considered that irrationality would not amount to incompetence
under the Act; inferring existence of a mental disorder merely from a patient's
9 S 5
unusual attitude would constitute 'prohibited reasoning'. In other words,
presuming mental illness merely because no-normal-mother-could-possibly-think-
like-that is inappropriate. Additionally, the Court concluded that mere irrationality
did not warrant detention under the Act,256 treatment for pregnancy, alone, was not
treatment for mental disorder, 57 hence detention could not restrict self-determination
9 SR • 9 SQ
unless a patient is deprived of capacity, (in accordance with Re JT).
44/
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application for admission under s2, see ibid, 749(D-E), 749(G-H), 751(D-E), and 752(D).
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[1998] above. The current position in Scotland is governed by the Adults with Incapacity
(Scotland) Act 2000. Therein, 'incapable' is defined in terms of acting, making, communicating or
understanding decisions, or retaining memory of them, due to mental disorder or physical disability
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This redefines the interaction of legislation and common law competence in the
obstetrics context. The Court's separation of: (1) treatment for pregnancy; and (2)
treatment for mental disorder,260 is effectively analogous to a 'but for' causation test.
We could ask: would an application for admission/detention be sought but for the
patient's physical condition? A negative response would suggest failure to separate
mental and physical issues (i.e. an application made for the wrong reasons).261
Indeed, even in the present, deficiencies in competency assessment persist from the
St George's case:
• the focus on mental health legislation, and S being competent, renders the
Court's views on common law competence obiter. This is compounded by
the failure to expressly overrule the Rochdale and Tameside decisions,
leaving ambiguity.262 Additional vagueness, about how the Court of
Appeal progressed from evidence of capacity to conclusion of competence
means that temporary factors, such as 'fatigue, shock, pain or drugs',263
may leave the door open to finding pregnant women whose refusal is less
articulate to be 'incompetent'.
• the Court may also have adopted (by reference to Re C),264 Re T's
associated 'risk-related standard' of competence. Maclean suggests that
such a standard
'confuses the importance of getting a decision right with the competence
required to do so'.265
(regarding communication) (s 1 (b)). Arguably, this definition is too wide as any of these elements will
suffice, and an individual who is not mentally impaired could rightly feel unjustifiably undermined if
his/her physical disability negates competence. Even the statute's qualification regarding
communication by human/mechanical assistance does not safeguard a presumption of competence
sufficiently, as too little onus is placed on efforts to enable patients. No explanation is made of the
nature of 'understanding' or 'making decisions'. Furthermore, assessment and certification of
incapacity rests with the responsible medical practitioner (s47(l)), and current provisions allow for
certification to be future-oriented applying up to a year from date of certification. Despite rights of
appeal, these provisions regarding definition and assessment of capacity seem insufficiently stringent




Proposed reform of the MHA 1983 retains a treatment distinction, concerning only 'treatment for
mental disorder' (paragraph 2(5)). On this basis other treatments for incapacitated adults sadly remain
limited to Governmental policy statements, discussed below, paragraph 2.4.2.
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On this basis, the autonomy of less-obviously-competent pregnant patients might still
be undermined, as lacking capacity commensurate with a decision's grave
consequences. In St George's the Court of Appeal expanded on Re MB, extending
its advice beyond the obstetric context, to apply to any case of surgical or invasive
treatment involving capacity, and binding HCPs and health institutions generally.266
The guidelines advocate:267 early identification and assessment regarding
competence (guidelines (iv) and (v)); legal representation of patients ((vi)(vii)); inter
partes hearings (vii); and availability of all accurate information, including reasons
for treatment, risks, alternatives, and reasons for patient refusal (if available),
enabling the court to make informed conclusions about patient capacity and best
interests' (viii).268 Yet, lacunae persist. Guidelines (iii)-(v) leave competence
assessment with HCPs; judicial assessment arises only where 'serious doubt' exists
about competence and there are 'serious or complex issues' (guideline (v)).269
Moreover, G.P.s may assess competence, independent psychiatric assessment being
warranted only in
'serious or complex cases involving difficult issues about the future health
and well-being or even of the life of the patient'.270
This risks patients being treated differently, not on the basis of differences in
competence, but on anticipated decision consequences.
2.3.1.4 Conclusion on capacity
We can conclude this section by identifying a number of persisting problems with
capacity. Ambiguities in competence construction regarding adults include:
• whether capacity concerns ability or actual understanding and
processing;271
265 A.R. Maclean, Caesarean sections, competence and the illusion of autonomy, Web JCLI [1999] 1,
5.
266
Application is outlined in guidelines (i)-(iii).
267 Above, 758-760.
268 The importance of early applications to court, legal representation and hospital protocols has also
been emphasised regarding termination of pregnancy in an IcP. Contrary to the patient's request, the
High Court refused to declare a termination lawful as continued pregnancy was deemed less
detrimental to the patient's interests, Re SS (medical treatment: late termination) [2002] 1 FLR 445.
269 See also A.R. Maclean, above, 5.
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• prima facie, competence seems task-specific, concerning particular
treatment decisions. However, allusion to past mental history suggests
979
that general competence may be informally influential;
• the requisite level of understanding is unclear. In the cases of Re C and St
George's, the court accepted the earlier proposition (ofRe T) that requisite
degree of capacity must be commensurate with the gravity of harmful
consequences. This risk-related consequentialist approach permits the
threshold to shift situationally, creating uncertainty about just how much
capacity is 'enough';
• while no formal asymmetry exists between capacity to consent and refuse
treatment,274 in practice asymmetry creeps in because competence is often
raised when a patient refuses treatment - making capacity to refuse more
demanding that to consent;
• variation exists regarding who makes the competence assessment.275
Inevitably this creates variance in perceptions of capacity in different
cases, particularly as no guidance is issued about how one reasons from
single evidences of incapacity to a conclusion of incompetence;
• any formal role for rationality in competence is denied.276 However, it has
creeping influence in practice. Objective irrationality about consequences
may be deemed inability to process information. And, inability to decide
sensibly may infer incapacity for comprehension.277 Thus, while
270 Guideline (v), ibid.
271 The Re C test intimates ability (to comprehend, retain, believe and weigh information), but Thorpe
J then examined whether C had so done - suggesting actuality.
272 See Re MB, above, where the patient could address the decision task on surgery, but not on
anaesthesia.
273
E.g. in Norfolk & Norwich Healthcare (NHS) Trust v W, above, one of the grounds for finding a
patient incompetent was that her decision was more difficult because of (past) mental history, even
though she had no mental problems at the time.
274 I.e. Re T allows refusal for irrational, or no reasons; in theory, reasons for consent/refusal need not
be objectively sound.
275 The court made the assessment in Re C and St George's, but in the latter advocated assessment by
HCPs in clearer cases, or those where health issues are not serious/complex. This permits assessment
to vary based on anticipated consequences rather than issues of competence.
276
By the Re T 'right of refusal' principle, and as 'prohibited reasoning' in St George's case. Indeed,
in Re JT [1998] above, even the patient's (irrational) unfounded belief that she would receive an organ
transplant did not dent her competence.
277
E.g. Re X (Adult sterilisation) [1998] 2 FLR 1124.
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irrationality, alone, does not constitute incompetence, it may be regarded
heavily symptomatic of it.278 In practice, the difference is difficult to
discern;
• any role for temporary factors is obscure. Fatigue, pain, confusion and
• 97Q
emotional stress are accepted potentially to undermine capacity. The
impact of such factors must be strong enough to negate a patient's ability
980
to decide, but these factors are often present in situations of ill-health
anyway;
• where a patient's capacity is fluctuating, there is an inclination to regard
281him/her 'incompetent', despite possible periods of lucid competence, or
989
seemingly well-oriented awareness of the situation. This suggests
capacity must be durable and is lost easily even to temporary inhibiting
factors.
Although application of tests for minors' competence is clearly delineated by age,
minors' competence is trivialised:
• Gillick-competence appears, prima facie, task specific. However, the
'gloss' derived from subsequent interpretations of Gillick-competence (as
a developmental concept) suggest requisite capacity to be more
generalised;283
• the developmental nature of Gillick-competence precludes acceptance of
284
temporally-fluctuating capacity;
• the requisite capacity level is high, demanding ability to understand
'fully';285
278 See Re MB, above.
279 See Re T [1992], above, (obiter), Norfolk and Norwich NHS Trust v W, above, Re L (Patient: non¬
consensual treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 837, and Rochdale Healthcare (NHS) Trust v C, above.
280 Re MB, above.
281 See Re D (Medical treatment: mentally disabled patient) [1998] 2 FLR 22.
282 The Official Solicitor found the patient in the Tameside case to be so aware, yet evidence of
incapacity was judicially deemed 'overwhelming'.
283 See Re R [1991], above.
284 See Re L (Medical treatment: Gillick competence) [1998] 2 FLR 810, applying the gloss added to
Gillick competence in Re R, above.
285 See Re E (A minor)(Wardship: medical treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386.
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• asymmetry (between consent and refusal) is plainly accepted; the content
of common law and statute, and the interaction of roles between minors,
parents and courts is wholly enabling;
• asymmetry requires significantly more capacity to refuse treatment than to
786
consent. In England and Wales the competence threshold for minors
shifts with his/her decision outcome, refusal raising the level and consent
lowering it;
• it appears acceptable to withhold information from minors,287 despite this
necessarily inhibiting a patient's ability to show 'full' understanding.
Whatever the competence of minors, no matter how much capacity a minor exhibits
s/he may never be 'competent enough' to refuse treatment because:
• no right of refusal (rational or irrational) is accorded to competent
288
minors;
• treatment decisions for minors are consequence-driven; the impetus is to
enable the minor to reach the age of majority, when s/he is then able to
decide for him/herself.289 So, pro-treatment outcome takes interim
precedence over minors' competency;
• a minor's view is relevant to, but not determinative of, the treatment
decision.290 In effect, capacity is not the issue, because a court may decide
on the basis of best interests - irrespective of a minor's 'competence',
which the court should take into account, but is often accorded only lip
service consideration, as teleological reasons drive the decision. This
illustrates the important association between best interests and promotion
of particular values and perspectives.
286 In Scotland it seems that the capacity required of minors to consent and to refuse treatment is
symmetrical, see Houston, above.
287 See Re L [1998] above, where information about the process of death was withheld from a 14-
year-old patient despite her maturity.
288 In contrast with that accorded to adults by Re T [1992] above.
289 See Re W [1992] above, 781(G-H).
290 See Re C (Detention: medical treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 180, and the effect of Re E [1993] above,
where the minor's wishes were deemed relevant, but ultimately departed from.
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2.3.2 Relationship
Relationship is the functional representation of a dual interest: the patient's interest
in other people and the interests of others in the patient. Functional because its
non/recognition is part of a decision-maker's determinative role, and is often geared
towards decision purpose. Relationships, which can take many forms: parent/child,
siblings, maternal/foetal, and emotional affinity, are not the prerogative of the
competent. Yet, relationship has not always been a focus in IcP decision-making,
perhaps to escape the historical parental dominance regarding children, and to
circumvent fears of undue influence. Judicial references to relationship have crept in
9Q1 9Q9
indirectly, or for specific purposive goals (such as evincing risk, or allowing
9Q "3
donation). Arguably, in Re Y, relationship was the central foundation - without it
her best interests could have been determined to very different outcome.294 Feenan
welcomes this 'honouring' of relationship,295 because
'[it] gets closer to the experience and interests of the individual'.296
Two recent cases fuel the importance of relationship, which is set to develop under
human rights provisions (see below).
2.3.2.1 St George's Healthcare Trust v S; sub nom R v Collins and others,
ex parte S297
Much of the substance of this decision has been discussed above. However, the
Court effectively drew a distinction between competent and incompetent women in
the relevance of maternal/foetal relationship to (a) respect for the autonomy of the
former, and (b) the assessment of the best interests of the latter, and did nothing to
displace the disproportionate importance of the role of that relationship in the
context of incompetent women which had been laid down in a number of previous
291
E.g. reference to familial distress, in Bland, above, 870(g).
292 In Re F [1989], F's relationship was acknowledged to infer risk of pregnancy, but ignored in terms
of the possibility of F's partner taking responsibility for contraception. On the latter issue see D.
Carson, The sexuality ofpeople with learning difficulties (1989) J. Soc. Welf. Law 355, 363-364.
293 Re Y, above.
294
See, for example, USA cases where benefit has been insufficient: In re guardianship of Pescinski
(1975) 226NW2d 180; Re Richardson (1973) 284 So2d 185; and Curran v Bosze (1990) 566NE2d








cases.298 The status of foetal interests has relevance for this thesis regarding
personhood,299 impact of relationship on best interests determination, and analogy
with conflict resolution in other IcP contexts.300 The Court accepted that, while a
foetus could not be dismissed simply as 'nothing',301 neither did it constitute a
'person'.302 But, drawing upon aspects of the criminal case A-G Reference (No. 3 of
1994),303 the Court did not deem the foetus merely to be a part of the mother.304 This
precluded the mother's refusal from concerning only herself.305 Rejecting other
arguments based on sanctity of life, potentiality, and relative harms regarding mother
and foetus, the Court justified the dominance of maternal rights through self-
determination.307
Faced with a catch-22 situation, where denial of foetal interests could be criticised as
unrealistic yet their recognition could inappropriately justify paternalism towards the
mother, the Court opted for a middle road. They acknowledged moral relevance of
foetal interests, but preferred to give legal protection to maternal autonomy. The
Court supported its autonomy-oriented view with case law evincing absence of locus
"3f\0
standi pre-natally, and making the obiter view in Re MB part of the ratio here:
'[t]he foetus up to the moment of birth does not have any separate interests
capable of being taken into account...in respect of a Caesarean section
operation. The law does not have the jurisdiction to protect the interests of
the unborn child even at the point of birth'.309
298
E.g. the Norfolk & Norwich case, above, the Tameside case, above, (both of which may be doubted
but have not been overruled), Re L [1997] above; Re MB, above.
299
Chapter 5, below.









306 Ibid, 742(C-E), based on USA cases.
307 See ibid, 742(F), cf. the views of Fovargue and Miola, above, 288, who consider the Court's
'personalisation' of the foetus as 'something' could lead to attribution of foetal interests, ultimately
undermining maternal autonomy.
308
Above, 742-746, citing: Re MB, above; Paton v British Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees &
Another [1979] QB 276; C v S [1988] QB 135; Re F (In utero) [1988] 2 FLR 307; the majority view
in Winnipeg Child and Family Services v G [1997] Lexis 92; and aspects of A-G's Reference (No. 3
of 1994), above.
309
[1997] above, 436-437, cited 743(F). Foetal interests are considered further, below, Chapter 5.
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However, the Court's approach does engender concern. While protecting maternal
autonomy is a policy choice,310 discussion of policy issues is very limited, leaving
any change to the remit of Parliament. Stauch criticises Re MB for similar failure to
express policy.311 Also, judicial denial of any conflict of interests inappropriately
attenuates the nature of 'conflict' to
'deciding on one form of treatment which risked one of their lives in order to
save the other'.312
The net impact of St George's case in terms of relationship is that:
• where a competent woman refuses treatment, although the maternal/foetal
relationship is acknowledged contextually, that relationship is subject to
the woman's right of self-determination;
• in contrast, where a woman is found incompetent - and resort made to
best interests - relationship seems to become centrally important enabling
intervention.
While procedural and capacity guidelines may help to distinguish the 'competent'
from the 'incompetent', the effect of that distinction supports an impression that
judicial use of relationship in IcP decisions is teleological. Thus, the outcome is
the main focus, and best interests - seen, at least in part, in terms of the
in/significance of relationship - is the justificatory means of getting there. For
example, sterilisation decisions relating to incapax persons emphasise actual
relationships,313 or vulnerability to sexual relationships,314 as connoting requisite risk
T1 S
of pregnancy. Allusion is often also made to relationships with family and
parental concerns.316 Stark contrast is identifiable in overt judicial reliance on an
IcP's in/direct relationships justifying non-therapeutic intervention in Re Y.317 Even
310 Just as the earlier High Court decision in Re S [1992] above, made a policy choice to opposite
effect.




E.g. Re F [1989] above.
314
E.g. through community-based residency: Re W (Mental patient)(Sterilisation) [1993] 1 FLR 381;
Re HG (Specific issue order: sterilisation) [1993] 1 FLR 587.
315
However, see the redefinition of Re S (Medical treatment: adult sterilisation) [1998] 1 FLR 944,
below, paragraph 2.3.3.1.
316
E.g. Re W [1993] above, 383(C), Re HG above, 592(D).
317Above.
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an IcP's relationship with HCPs can be influential where a patient's co-operation is
important to treatment; lack of therapeutic relationship with staff may warrant no
318
intervention.
In contrast, in p.v.s. where 'futility' is the justification for the withdrawal,
relationship is effectively denied by absence of relevant patient interests, focusing
attention away from familial impact other than en passant suffering of the patient's
"3 1 Q 39f)
family and patient 'dignity'. In Re G, the courts were forced to address the
issue more directly as G's wife agreed with medical opinion (to withdraw), but G's
mother disagreed. The High Court held that, while doctors must take account of the
views of relatives, the latter's opposition cannot act as a veto. In other words,
relationships may be a factor in determining best interests, but only to the extent they
help to justify decision purpose.
Regarding minors, dominance of the parent/child relationship is denied wherever
parental view contradicts medical opinion, variously by focusing firmly on the
child's needs,321 or characterising parental view as just one factor,322 as a rebuttable
presumption,323 having 'little foundation in reality',324 or in combination.325 In
relation to mature minors, the parent/child relationship is construed as enabling,
being recognised where the parent consents, but denied where the parent refuses to
consent.326 In either event, the mature minor's relationship with the court is deemed
377
most significant - enabling overruling.
398
Prima facie, the one exception is Re T (a minor), as the only parent/child case
where relationship was so significant it allowed the parental view to prevail against
medical opinion.
318 Re D [1998] above. However, in a similar context, contrast Re JT, above, where the patient was
found competent and her refusal abided by.
319 In Bland, above.
320
[1995] 3 Med. L.R. 80.
321
E.g. Re B [1981] above; Re R [1992] above.
322 The effect of Johnson J's weighing in Re O (A minor) [1993] 19 BMLR 148.
323 Re C (HIV test) [1999] 2 FLR 1004, 1020(E)-1021(F).
324
E.g. Re S (A minor)(Medical treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 376, 380(F); see also Royal Wolverhampton
Hospitals NHS Trust v B [2000] 1 FLR 953.
325
E.g. Re C (a minor)(medical treatment) [1998] 1 FLR 384.
326 Re R [1991] and Re W [1993] above.
327 Re W, ibid.
328
[1997] 1 All ER 906.
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2.3.2.2 Re T (a minor)329
This case concerned an eighteen-month infant, born with biliary atresia (a life-
threatening liver defect). Having undergone unsuccessful corrective surgery, a liver
transplant was C's (the minor's) only hope of extending his life beyond an
anticipated two-and-a-half years. Although complex, chances of transplant success
were good with prognosis for a 'normal' life. C's parents refused to consent, and
appealed an order by Connell J authorising surgery. The case was complicated by
the father's employment overseas (where transplant surgery was unavailable), as C
and his mother joined him there periodically. Both of C's parents were trained HCPs,
experienced in care of sick young children. Unexpectedly, given earlier
precedents,330 the Court ofAppeal supported parental refusal.
As surgery would make this far from a 'no-hope' situation, the Court's decision
employed a redefinition of purpose:
'to prolong life...is not the sole objective of the court and to require it at the
expense of other considerations may not be in the child's best interests'.331
This enabled independent and complete view of evidence beyond the purely
TT9 • ...
clinical. Further, the Court accepted a responsible role for weighing these issues:
'the starting point - and the finishing point too - must always be the judge's
own independent assessment of the balance of advantage or disadvantage of
the particular medical step under consideration'.
However, strong emphasis was placed on C's relationship with his mother. Butler-
Sloss LJ considered mother and child to be
'one for the purpose of this unusual case...The welfare of this child depends
upon his mother'.334
This is remarkable, given that generally courts are keen to differentiate between




Particularly: Re B [1981]; Re C [1989]; Re J [1990]; and Re W (mental patient)(sterilisation)
[1993] all above.
",J| Per Butler-Sloss LJ, above, 916(b-c). Also: Waite LJ considered welfare should be 'appraised in
all its aspects', 917(f-g); and Roch LJ, '[n]or are such decisions to be taken solely with medical factors
in mind', 919(c).
332 A. Grubb describes the Court's approach as 'refreshing', Med. L. Rev. 4 [1997] 315, 318.
333






the court consented (contrary to parental wishes) to blood transfusion for a young
child suffering T-cell leukaemia, even though chance of success was 50:50 (i.e. less
than that in Re T) and resulting familial stress was dismissed as unrealistic.336
The principal reason proffered for recognising relationship was that the level of
-5-37
parental commitment, post-operatively, would affect clinical efficacy of treatment.
. . . . . . . . TTR
This reasoning has been criticised in view of the distinction made ofRe B. Doubts
are also raised about the validity of basing a child's best interests on the demands
his/her care places upon others. Grubb queries whether
'a parent's lack of devotion and support can neutralise the child's interests in
living'.339
If so, the effect of the Court of Appeal's redefinition through relationship
subordinates a minor's best (medical) interests to parental best interests. This is
exacerbated by the issues the Court considered, characterising C's dependency by
reference to: the mother's ability to cope; the need for C to reside in England,340
and/or C's father to leave his post abroad;341 financial implications;342 and
jurisdictional difficulties of enforcement.343 Davies suggests that this means
'undue reliance is once more being placed on parental consent...under the
guise of declaring that the lack of confidence of the parent in the treatment
proposed means that the medical prospects of its success are diminished'.344
However, a decision cannot be entirely divorced from practical care difficulties as
quality of life is not a purely health-based issue, and young children are dependent
on parents (and parental circumstances). Simply adopting a limited medical view
brings us no closer to accurate assessment of an individual's best interests.
336 The parental view of a minor's welfare was also considered to be rebuttable with regard to testing
of a baby for HIV in Re C (HIV test) above.
337Above, 915-916.
338
[1981] above, where the Court committed B's parents to lengthy care responsibilities. See: M. Fox
and J. McHale, In whose best interests? MLR 60 (1997) 700, 703; J. Loughrey, Medical treatment -
the status of parental opinion, (1998) Fam. Law 28, 146, 148; S. Michalowski, Is it in the best interests
of a child to have a life-saving liver transplantation? Re T (Wardship: medical treatment), CFLQ 9(2)
[1997] 179, 184.
339 Med. L. Rev. 5 [1997] 315, 318.
340 Above, 915(a).




344 M. Davies, Selective non-treatment of the newborn - in whose best interests? In whose judgment?
NILQ (1998) 49(1), 82, 88. However, the court did reject a reasonable parent test, above, 913(j).
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The key to understanding redefinition in Re T lies in judicial motivation for playing
the relationship card. Recognition of relationship is often employed to justify an end
goal. In part, this goal may have concerned conflict:
'construing the mother and child as one permitted the Court of Appeal to
minimise the potential conflict between the interests of the woman and
child'.345
But, as the parents were medical professionals, Fox and McHale rightly suggest this
may have 'blurred' any knowledge disparity between them and the doctors
concerned.346
In truth, the Court's purpose may have been to choose between professional medical
opinion (as in previous minors cases), and accepting the mother/child relationship
was a means to admitting an essentially professional view.347 As Mason et al
suggest, given reluctance to compel doctors to treat contrary to clinical judgment,
*[i]t may not.. .be a decision taken against the stream'.348
Although subsequent cases confirm the importance of considering parental views,349
preference for clinical judgment is also affirmed. Hence, despite parents requesting
treatment, the courts will not compel doctors to treat against their clinical judgment
regarding future-oriented withdrawal of ventilation.350 The Court of Appeal also
declined to make a parentally requested anticipatory order regarding a seriously
"5 c 1
disabled 12 year-old in the absence of specific treatment circumstances. Further,
where communication breaks down between parents and HCPs, the court is willing
to act as an adjudicator in the minor's best interests. Indeed, this judicial role
seems to be increasingly necessary. In Re MM,353 Black J expressly considered the
risks and benefits of potential treatment options,354 including longer-term impact,355
M. Fox and J. McHale, above, 706.
346 See ibid, 707. See also A. Grubb, above, 319.
347 Waite LJ refers to the injurious implications of a coercive order against the mother's medical and
maternal judgment, above, 917(h).
348
(2002) above, paragraph 16.55.
349
E.g. Re MM (Medical treatment) [2000] 1 FLR 224, 234.
350 Even though the parents' argument emphasises the infant's emotional relationship with them: A
NHS Service Trust v D [2000] 2 FCR 577; and Royal Wolverhampton Hospitals NHS Trust v B,
above.
351 R v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust ex p Glass [1999] 2 FLR 905, Lord Woolf MR suggesting
that while legal principle is clear, anticipatory application ofprinciple is very difficult, ibid, 911.




and parental anxieties.356 And, it reached its pitch in a clear need for judicial choice
regarding treatment options in the conjoined twins case.357
However, relationship has also been considered judicially where the views of two
parents were opposed. In Re J (Specific issue orders: child's religious upbringing
and circumcision),358 the Court of Appeal determined that it was not in J's best
interests to be circumcised (for religious reasons rather than necessity) contrary to
the wishes of his 'primary carer'. Thorpe LJ emphasised Ward J's earlier focus on
J's (secular) day-to-day upbringing and home environment, and endorsing the
consent requirement (of both parents) for such procedures under s2(7) Children Act
(1989).360
2.3.2.3 Conclusions on relationship
The purpose of this section has been to reveal a stark reality that persists in IcP
decisions, namely, that the patient cannot be the sole focus of our attention. Indeed,
all individuals' lives are filled with meaningful relationships that cannot be ignored
in any decision-making process. Moreover, an IcP's life is also filled with parties
who each have a potentially significant interest in the outcome of any decision. To
date, this reality has only been recognised sporadically by the courts. We shall see in
chapter 6 how it can be better integrated into the overall decision-making process as
part of this thesis.
2.3.3 Risk assessment
Decisions about medical treatment for IcPs require us to risk our judgment on their
behalf, and to assess risks associated with relevant factors and treatment options. Re





[2001] above. Considered below, paragraph 2.3.4.3.
358
[2001] 1 FLR 571.
359 Ibid, 574(C-D).
360
Ibid, 576(D). See also Dame Butler-Sloss (P), ibid, 577. The significance of relationship is also
considered in the non-medical context of best interests application regarding minors in Scotland. In
Reid v Cardno [2000] GWD 1026, a declarator supported contact between child and father (and
extended family) based in the minor's best interests where the mother vehemently opposed it.
361
[1998] 1 FLR 944.
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from previous expansion.362 In incapaces sterilisation, persistent boundary extension
• • 363had incorporated downgrading important risk factors such as sexual activity, and
supervision.364 Legal criteria had also shifted from necessity and welfare365 to vague
evaluations of 'interests overall',366 and consideration of others' interests.367
Procedures were also relaxed regarding therapeutic sterilisations.368 The net effect
was virtually non-existent risk assessment; vulnerability of patients (to non¬
consensual activity) being mistaken for a need to sterilise.369
T70
Disparate risk assessment is evident in other IcP contexts. In Re C, weight of
medical evidence favoured amputation. However, at the time of giving expert
evidence, a consultant forensic psychiatrist (Dr Ghosh) was unaware that less
extensive surgery had already been carried out, thereby averting the 85% risk of
T71
death, and she was unaware that below-knee amputation also carried a (15%)
->72
mortality risk. The Court preferred alternative medical opinion, but this illustrates
the importance of informedness. Poor risk evaluation is also starkly illustrated in
obstetric cases. Even in Re MB the Court of Appeal accepted psychiatric evidence
that she was likely to suffer significant psychological damage from death of the
child, but would not suffer lasting damage from enforced administration of
anaesthetic.373 This view of risk is blinkered because:
• as MB was needle phobic, administering anaesthetic would compel her to
confront her phobia which, by definition, involves an abnormal
psychological fear response and excessive physiological response. Being
compelled involuntarily to confront this phobia surely would result in
362 The author's views on this case have been published earlier: A.J. Fenwick [1999] above, see
Appendix 10, hereto.
363 Re W [1993] above.
364 Re HG [1993] above.
365 Re F [1989] above.
366 Re HG, above.
367 Ibid.
368
(Re E (A minor) (Medical treatment) [1991] 7 BMLR 117, and Re GF (Medical treatment) [1992]
1FLR293.
369





372 Ibid, 294(B) and 293(C-D).
373
Above, 439(C). Indeed, at first instance, the court did not even envisage 'any particular short-term
trauma as a result of the forcible procedure' and that the 'non-consensual nature of the injection would
not be a matter of lasting importance to Miss MB', ibid, 43 l(F-G).
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short-term trauma from these responses, and exacerbate the sense of loss
of control inherent in phobic response;
• Stauch also identifies two further sources of harm in enforced Caesarean
section: (1) enforcement may damage the woman's 'general sense of
herself as an autonomous agent'; and (2) the 'attendant physical harm' of
surgical intervention.374 Relatedly, Thomson suggests evidence of
'increased incidence of post-natal depression and ambivalence towards the
77S
child', accompanied by 'feelings of anger, isolation, humiliation and
self-blame'.376 Physical risks flowing from Caesarean section, include:
777 • • 77R 77Q
increased incidence of maternal death; infection; haemorrhage;
increased pain and damage to other organs;380 and increased need for
-301 m 787
repeat Caesareans, limiting the number of advisable pregnancies.
These risks are significant and sound assessment of best interests requires all risks of
long-term damage to be considered and weighed against opposing risks (such as
long-term psychological damage of unsuccessful delivery). Revision of risk
assessment as a gateway to best interests was long overdue when Re S stepped into
the breach.
2.3.3.1 Re S (Medical treatment: adult sterilisation)383
Re S concerned a 22-year-old intellectually disabled woman, who was not sexually
active. Sexual assault was the only source of risk. Johnson J considered S's daily
routine, supervisor/client ratio, tactile behaviour, respite care supervision, and
374 Above, 83.
375 M. Thomson, After Re S, Med L Rev 2 [1994] 127, 135. Higher incidence of post-natal depression
is also noted by A. Morris and S. Nott, The law's engagement with pregnancy, Chapter 3 in
Bridgeman and Millns, Law and Body Politics (1995), 55, 60.
376 Ibid, 135, citing from: G Douglas, Law, fertility and reproduction (1991) Sweet & Maxwell, 56;
and P Gilfix, Electronic fetal monitoring: physician liability and informed consent, (1984) 10
American Journal of Law and Medicine, 31, 34.
377 M. Thomson, ibid, 135. Also Stauch, above, 83 n39.
378 Thomson, ibid, 135 n57, (citing from D. Knox and C. Karagianis, Caesarean births: high rates,
impassioned debate, Boston Globe Magazine, 21.10.84, 10, 58 n209): the rate of infection in




Stauch, above, p83 n39.
381
Thomson, above, 135.




general need for supervision. Johnson J found parity with Re LC, based on
responsible parental supervision minimising any risk of pregnancy.384 Johnson J
required an
'identifiable rather than speculative [risk]'.385
The final paragraph of the judgment reserves responsibility for the sterilisation
decision to the court.
Essentially, risk was the only available judicial means to redefinition. For, once any
risk of pregnancy was identified, lawfulness of sterilisation was based on the Bolam
standard. In this author's earlier article, the approach of Carson is highlighted
regarding lack of distinction between consequence and likelihood,386 and emphasis
on harm rather than benefit.387 On this view, previous (expansive) sterilisation cases
display poor risk assessment, confusing risk (of pregnancy) with consequent
trauma. This consequence-driven approach results in sterilisation seeming
'necessary' in the patient's best interests. Johnson J's retrenchment deconstructed
risk, allowing consideration of an intermediate harm (risk of pregnancy), permitting
a more accurate perspective and evaluation to take place. Further, the decision
accepted the significance of risk agent. This broadened the range of relevant risk
factors, drew attention to likelihood and resurrected risk as an important gateway
criterion to best interests in sterilisation cases.388
However, some potentially relevant factors are still absent. A one-sided perspective
. . ... too
persists, with statistical risks, painful side effects, and psychological impact of
surgical sterilisation being trivialised. And, IcPs' personal inviolability may still be
overlooked regarding surgery and sexual assault. Carson also identifies the risk of
sexually transmitted disease,390 which surely should be considered if we aim to
384 The High Court had earlier refused authorisation in Re LC (Medical treatment: sterilisation) [1997]
2 FLR 258 (decided in 1993) partly because levels of care and supervision 'would effectively
eliminate the risk of sexual abuse to L', ibid, 260(F).
385
Ibid, 949(E).




However, see discussion ofmale sterilisation, below.
389 See A. Hill, Alert over female sterilisation, Scotland on Sunday, 14.2.99, p7, cols 1-7, with




protect, yet has received minimal consideration thus far.391 Lack of risk assessment
regarding other non-medical interests such as sexuality, privacy, bodily integrity and
social development also still permits medical concerns to dominate best interests
evaluation.392 A broader perspective on interests is warranted; 'best interests' surely
suggests evaluation of an IcP's procreative welfare in full sight of all factors and
circumstances.
In Re X (Adult sterilisation),393 the 'risk' criterion applied again, but to different
effect; X's interest in sexual activity creating a sufficiently 'real risk'. Holman J
addressed a series of questions about X's capacity, risk of pregnancy, risk of
consequent harm, and risks associated with alternative contraception. However, once
a 'real risk' was identified, judicial focus turned to Re F's lawful acceptability of a
responsible body ofmedical opinion.394
However, more reframing took place in Re A (Male sterilisation),395 regarding a 28-
year-old male patient with Down's syndrome, whose intellectual impairment was
borderline significant/severe. A regularly attended a day centre, was sexually aware
and had been involved in sexual incidents with women. He was fertile, but had no
understanding of causal connection between intercourse and pregnancy, and was
unable to use contraceptives. Although currently resident with - and closely
supervised by - his mother, he would be entering Local Authority care. In view of
this anticipatory change, A's mother argued A would have greater opportunity for
sexual relationship and sterilisation (by vasectomy) would improve his quality of life
by enabling relationship. Psychiatric evidence was divided; one consultant regarded
sterilisation as contributing to A's freedom, while a second disagreed, considering
actual risk of intercourse to be very small, and unlikely to occur while under his
mother's supervision. Sumner J decided sterilisation would not be in A's best
391 The only case believed to consider these issues is Re A (Male sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549,
discussed below.
392 See also N. Cica's distinction between 'medical' and 'social' interests, Sterilising the intellectually
disabled: the approach of the High court of Australia in Department of Health v JWB and SMB 1
Med. L. Rev. [1993] 186, 195. Therapeutic sterilisation remains distinct; Re ZM and OS
(Sterilisation: patient's best interests) [2000] 1 FLR 523.
393
[1998] 2 FLR 1124.
394
[1989] above, 567(A) and 571(H). In contrast, in Re S [1998] above, no reliance on Bolam was
apparent. See commentary by A. Grubb, Incompetent adult (sterilisation): best interests and the risk




interests, not adding significantly to his quality of life. The Court of Appeal upheld
396this position on evaluation of interests and quality of life rather than risk,
considering the first instance decision
'to concentrate too much on the evaluation of risks...some of which seem to
me at best hypothetical. A risk is no more than a possibility of loss and
should have no more emphasis in the exercise than the evaluation of the
possibility of gain'.397
This effectively regards risk as embodied within the general assessment of best
interests (rather than as a prerequisite gateway to determination).
Dame Butler-Sloss (P) also focused on interests, reiterating her view in Re MB that
'best interests encompasses medical, emotional and all other welfare
issues',398
and reserving responsibility to the Court. Furthermore, she warned against
sterilisation for convenience of carers, and denied any relevance to third party or
public interest (the need to protect A's prospective partners being understandable, but
irrelevant hereto).399 In effect, this denies any significant role for 'relationship'.
Although non-sterilisation of an IcP is welcome in the absence of realistic, imminent
harm from inaction,400 concerns arise about consistency of application. Certainly,
A's sexual awareness, history of sexual involvement, and degree of opportunity (at
the day centre) make this case differ from Re LC and Re S. But, A's case is more
closely analogous to Re X where, in contrast, risk was identified and sterilisation
declared lawful.401 Hence, judicial willingness to sterilise X, while refraining from
396
Surgery must be 'not negligent' and 'necessary' in the patient's best interests, see High Court's
approval of the Official Solicitor's Practice Direction reported at [2002] 1 All ER 794, citing Re A,
ibid 796.
397 Per Thoipe LJ, ibid, 561(A). However, the Court indicated that when A went into L.A. care then a
re-application might be appropriate, aiming to protect A's freedom and quality of life. This leaves






Indeed, MENCAP suggested '[i]t would be quite wrong to impose medical treatment on him and
unethical to take away his freedom', reported by S. Hall, Woman loses fight to have son sterilised,
Guardian 21.12.99, p5, cols 6-8.
401 X was sexually aware, had been involved in sexual incidents and was under general parental
supervision, but had some opportunity for relationship in attending an adult training centre. Familial
relationships in the two cases are employed to particular ends; the mother/son relationship in Re A is
characterised as supervisory (a risk-inhibitor), while in Re X the concerns of her parents are
emphasised, together with their support for sterilisation (a risk-enhancer).
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sterilising A, raises doubts about consistent application of principle regarding male
and female IcPs, exacerbated by Dame Butler-Sloss' (P) observation that
'[a]n application on behalf of a man for sterilisation is not the equivalent of
an application in respect of a woman'402
However, the President prefers balancing on a case-by-case basis,403 considering here
that
'there is no direct consequence for a man of sexual intercourse other than the
possibility of sexually transmitted diseases' 404
Certainly, any harm of pregnancy to a male IcP is indirect and vicarious, while
pregnancy for a female IcP can cause direct, traumatic physical and mental harm.
This consequentialist ethic means that regarding male sterilisation the only relevant
harm is the ultimate harm (pregnancy), and this is effectively too remote to be
relevant to his interests. On this basis, it seems that consequential trauma (or lack of
it in the male context) may still be the real influence on decisions whether to sterilise.
Arguably, this approach perpetuates outdated social constructs that place
responsibility for contraception on women:
'[i]t would...be likely that the woman concerned would be the object of
protection rather than A'.405
Male sterilisation really concerns the extent to which interests of others should affect
an IcP's best interests.406 However, the risk of A causing pregnancy does seem more
than 'speculative'.
Certainly, while risk is an important gateway to best interests, it should not become a
barometer for best interests; consideration of patient interests should still allow for
sterilisation to be declined if other factors counter it. The Court of Appeal's refusal
to sterilise A, on the basis no-risk-now-but-perhaps-try-later, may do him no favours
by curtailing his quality of life in the interim.407 Furthermore, if this really was a
decision about A's interests being unaffected by any pregnancy, then increased risk
402 Re A, above, 557(D-E).
403 Ibid.
404
Ibid, 557(E). Dame Butler-Sloss (P) considered any psychological consequences were unlikely to
impinge on an incapacitated man, and any detrimental restriction on freedom should be considered
case-by-case, ibid 557(F-G).
405 Per Dame Butler-Sloss (P), ibid, 558(B).
406 The validity of third party interests is considered below, Chapter 3.
407
And, it may bring harm to female partners who would bear the consequences.
at a future date should make little difference. This suggests that some account might
be taken of the interests of any future partner of A. This is telling, given that the
court expressly denied this possibility in its own judgement. One is tempted to
conclude - as the previous section has shown - that the Court itself could not wholly
ignore the interests of others in its decision as it related to A.
2.3.3.2 Redefining beyond risk - Re SL (Adult patient: sterilisation)408
The courts' traditional approach basing best interests on medical evidence and
opinion is criticised by Plomer, who suggests (citing the RCOG view on obstetric
cases) that such reliance is inherently uncertain, as medical evidence is 'seldom
infallible' and subject to limited accuracy and effectiveness regarding pregnancy.409
Re A had hinted at revision of best interests content, and a shift away from Bolam.
This was developed by the Court of Appeal's decision in Re SL, offering more
radical redefinition; reserving final determination of best interests to the court and
relegating Bolam to an evidential role.
SL was a 29-year-old female with severe learning difficulties resident with her
mother, but a move to a local authority home was anticipated. There, she might be
unsupervised in mixed company and S's mother sought a declaration of lawful
sterilisation, arguing: (1) avoidance of risk of pregnancy; (2) therapeutic treatment to
eliminate menstruation which distressed S; and (3) that hysterectomy was favoured
due to S's phobia of hospitals. At first instance, Wall J concluded treatment to be
necessary for contraceptive and therapeutic purposes. However, he left
determination of the method of treatment (surgical sterilisation or Mirena coil) to the
doctors and S's mother. The Official Solicitor appealed that: (a) sterilisation was
against the weight of evidence, and insufficient regard had been paid to the principle
primum non nocere (first, do no harm); and (b) Wall J had wrongly relied on Bolam
to find either treatment option lawful. Butler-Sloss LJ, for the Court of Appeal,
upheld the first ground of appeal in view of the weight of medical evidence
supporting the less invasive (IUD) method, and the need for aproportional response.
408
[2000] 2 FCR 452.
409 A. Plomer, above, 268.
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Although, prima facie, this seems to contrast with earlier decisions (indicating that
therapeutic sterilisation decisions were now unlikely to reach court),410 this case can
be brought into line with Re GF because it failed to meet all of the Re GF criteria.411
Unremarkably, the appellate decision in Re SL followed the weight of medical
evidence,412 and played down the relationship aspect - denying significant weight to
the mother's view, which fits my earlier observations about teleology. However, the
Court's reasoning displays landmark redefinition of three aspects ofbest interests.
In expressly requiring a 'proportional' response,413 Dame Butler-Sloss (P)
emphasised disabled patients' right not to have drastic surgery imposed on them,
unless in his/her best interests 414 This posits sterilisation decisions within personal
inviolability (rather than the previously contentious right of reproduction),415 and
reflects the Australian approaches in JWB and SMB,416 and Re L and M 417 Indeed,
parallels with the Australian approach go beyond the functional purpose of the
decision, to dramatically change respective roles.
While citing Re F regarding applicability of best interests, the Court - to all intents
and purposes - departed from the authorised roles of Re F. Dame Butler-Sloss (P)
clearly reserves determination to the Court,418 locates welfare as the paramount
consideration,419 and diminishes the relevance of Bolam to evidential status.420
Thus, the Court's approach more closely resembles the judicial role regarding minors,
410 See Re E (a minor)(medical treatment) [1991] 7 BMLR 117, and Re GF (medical treatment) [1992]
1 FLR 293.
411
Certainly, in Re SL, the IUD treatment option constituted a 'practicable, less intrusive means',
thereby failing the third Re GF criterion. Furthermore, in Re SL, Thorpe LJ had indicated that cases
on the boundary should be referred for court declaration, above, 469(d).





415 In this regard, Re SL builds on the inviolability aspects regarding risk in Re S [1998] above. The
Court supported the patient's right through the ethical principle primum non nocere.
416
Secretary, Dept. of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (1992) 66 ALJR, 300 where
the majority of the Australian High Court considered sterilisation a 'last resort', justified only when
'alternative and less invasive procedures have all failed or that it is certain that no other procedure or
treatment will work', ibid 315(B-C). Brennan J also referenced proportionality (and purpose) as legal
factors relevant to therapeutic sterilisation, ibid 321(C).
417 Re L and M: Director-General, Dept. of Family Services and Aboriginal & Islander Affairs. (1993)
17 Fam. LR 357, where Warnick J developed guidelines within the JWB parameters, emphasising
proportionality (determinable by reference to medical fact), and the 'last resort' character of
sterilisation.
418





than the declaratory role regarding adult IcPs. Medical opinion is limited to
informing the court whether, or which, treatment options lie within a range of
acceptable, reasonable opinion (i.e. which options are Bolam-competent). Beyond
this, Bolam is made irrelevant. Indeed, Re SL represents the point at which Bolam
breaks down - the availability of more than one treatment option required a choice,
such that:
'judicial decision ought to provide the best answer not a range of alternative
answers'.421
The drift away from Bolam in England and Wales was initiated in the negligence
499
case Bolitho v City and Hackney HA. Although the immediate impact of the Law
Lords' decision therein was uncertain, cases,423 and opinion,424 since seem to have
consolidated the judicial drift. Lord Woolf has recently opined in a non-judicial
context on the causes of this change.425 Inter alia, he notes increasing awareness of
patients' rights,426 commonwealth approaches,427 and recent cases concerning
medical ethics.428 Regarding the latter, he refers to several decisions concerning
incompetent patients.429 He suggests these cases
'provoke heartfelt and real disagreement among members of the medical and
legal professions as well as members of the public', causing the courts 'to
adopt a more proactive approach to resolving conflicts'.430
Hence, it seems that these tense best interests decisions may now be influencing the
traditions of medical negligence, rather than the other way around. Lord Woolf
considers that such case law developments now make courts the 'final arbiters', and
421 Per Butler-Sloss (P), ibid, 464(f). Judicial involvement in sterilisation decisions (re. incompetent
adults or children) remains essential, see O.S. Practice Direction reported and endorsed [2002] above.
422
[1997] 4 All ER 771. However, impetus in other common law countries had occurred earlier, a
useful overview is given by Mason, McCall Smith and Laurie, Medical Law and Ethics [2002]
paragraphs 10.121-10.124.
423 See particularly Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust [1999] 48 BMLR 118.
424 See Mason et al, ibid. Also M. Brazier and J. Miola, Bye-Bye Bolam: A medical litigation
revolution? 8 Med. L. Rev. [2000] 85.
425
Delivering the inaugural Provost's lecture at UCL, London, 17.01.01: Are the courts excessively











have raised public interest intervention.431 The importance of an impartial decision¬
maker and transparency are themes developed in the remainder of this thesis.432
Re SL also encompasses broader ethical, social and moral considerations - beyond
the purely medical.433 The Court ofAppeal's single-handed demedicalisation of best
interests goes to the heart of best interests decisions, taking a broad view and actively
weighing issues. But such dramatic remarcation creates inconsistency as, despite
purported concurrence with the (precedentially more authoritative) Re F approach,
fundamentally the decision departs from it, and is pitted against an authoritative
volume of contrary (medicalised) precedent regarding adult IcPs. Subsequent cases
are sure to test Re SL's authority and it is unclear from where the Court of Appeal
has suddenly derived jurisdiction to determine best interests (given lack ofparens
patriae). Thorpe LJ's reading ofRe F as establishing that
'the declaratory decree, was to be exercised upon the same basis, namely that
relief would be granted if the welfare of the patient required it and equally
refused if the welfare of the patient did not',434
is questionable, particularly as it is not substantiated or explained further. Given that
parens patriae jurisdiction embodied protective welfare jurisdiction regarding adults,
while declaratory jurisdiction concerned protection from liability, revival of the
former under the guise of the latter seems doubtful.435 However, this author does
endorse the sentiments of the Court of Appeal in broadening the range of interests
and demedicalising roles. These changes may be supported further through the
momentum currently being created by human rights provisions.
431 Ibid 13.
432 See Chapters 6-8.
433
Above, 461(d), following the Court's own view in Re A [2000] above. Also highlighted by the
majority in JWB, above, 311(B) (social and psychological consequences of sterilisation). Relatedly,





Policy proposals would rectify the lack of jurisdiction if developed and implemented through a
Court of Protection. These proposals are considered below. However, implementation is not
imminent. Alternative guidelines are formulated in this thesis and proffered in Chapter 8.
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2.3.4 Human rights - mandatory redefinition
The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporates into domestic law the long-standing
European Convention on Human Rights.436 These generalised rights must be
interpreted by UK courts, and citizens will be able to assert their need for protection
of rights before UK courts, rather than resorting to lengthy and expensive appeal
processes in Europe. The implications in terms of IcPs were raised in two cases
decided shortly before the Act came into force in England.
2.3.4.1 Re F (Adult: court's jurisdiction)437
This case concerned detention of an 18-year-old IcP in local authority care, contrary
to her family's wishes. Although medical treatment was not the issue, the Court of
Appeal's judgment contains relevant jurisdictional and human rights elements. The
Court of Appeal unanimously supported Sedley LJ's comments forseeing the
relevance of human rights under Articles 5 and 8.
Article 5 protects individual right to liberty and security of person, subject to the
State's lawful detention of, inter alia, persons of unsound mind. Sedley LJ
considered the State's power, in turn, subject to two constraints that:
• detention must be in accordance with procedures prescribed by law; and
no
• that law must respect the provisions of Article 8.
This essentially ensures individual rights of due process and representation, and pre¬
empts conflict between Articles 5 and 8. Article 8 concerns the right to respect for
private and family life, and limits justifiable State interference to specific grounds
including, inter alia, protection of health, or protection of the rights and freedoms of
others. Sedley LJ made some general observations about the nature of this right,
considering it to be non-proprietary in relation to the parent or child, being a societal
interest as much as an individual interest.439 Further, he construed the right's
principal purpose regarding children being to ensure the child's safety and welfare,
436 The Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the European






limiting individuals to benefits of family life that are 'benign and positive'.440 This
precludes the child/parent role from gaining further weight by way of the Act. He
also noted that
'the tabulated right is not to family life as such but to respect for it'.441
In other words, T's welfare remained 'the single issue',442 and provided due
consideration is given to familial views, it seems likely 'respect' will have been
accorded. Interestingly, this interpretation strays little from the purpose and content
accorded through best interests, framed in protective welfare, and admits relationship
only to facilitate perceived individual welfare.
Although redefinition seems minimal it is possible to foresee potential issues for the
medical treatment context. The Article 5 exception for detention of those of
'unsound mind' seems set to reinforce the importance of competence where patients
refuse treatment. The way is open to patients to
• dispute adherence to legal procedure under which s/he has been detained,
including opportunity for representation;443 or
• dispute that legal procedure's compliance with Articles 5 or 8.444
Further substantiation may be available under Article 6 (right to a fair trial), which
entitles individuals to a fair and public hearing in determining his/her civil rights. On
this basis, the procedural guidelines of Re MB and St George's may begin to carry
more force.
Article 8's express scope for State intervention on grounds of protecting health
(rightly) leaves the way open for IcPs to be treated without contravention of their
human rights. However, 'protection' is potentially broad, as is Sedley LJ's attribution
443 These legal procedures are set for reform in both Scotland (Mental Health (Scotland) Bill, SP Bill
64 (2002)) and England and Wales (Mental Health Bill (2002)). Both retain 'best interests' in some
form (see sl63(2)(c) and 170(b) of the Scottish bill and si 15(3) (implicitly), and si 15(4)(c) regarding
specialist treatments in the English bill). Neither bill says much about best interests, but the Scottish
provisions set out the need to consider patient views (si70(6) and si69(2)) and patient resistance to
certain treatments for mental disorder (si62-164). The English provisions refer only to 'likelihood' of
resistance (si 15(3)), and scope for treatment is subsumed under approved care plans (si 17).
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of content based on 'welfare'.445 Furthermore, his differentiation between 'respect
for' private/family life and (absolute) entitlement to family life, means that Article 8
would be satisfied providing consideration (i.e. respect) has been given to a
decision's effect on family/private life; this right need not dominate the decision.446
Thus, Article 8 cannot be used by families to slam closed the gate to judicial
determination of IcP treatment in his/her best interests. Parental role was considered
in the following case, which moved human rights issue into the IcP context.
2.3.4.2 A National Health Service Trust v D447
This case concerned future ventilation of a 19-month-old boy, ID, born with serious
disabilities including a severe, deteriorating lung condition, congestive heart failure,
hepatic and renal dysfunction and severe developmental delay resulting from brain
abnormalities. His life expectancy was short, and he was admitted repeatedly to
intensive care for respiratory failure and fever. During his last admission to hospital,
the HCPs and ID's parents disagreed about whether to transfer him to an intensive
paediatric unit. As a result, the hospital trust and Official Solicitor sought a
declaration that, in the event of future respiratory and/or cardiac failure, it was in
ID's best interests (and therefore lawful) not to resuscitate him by mechanical
ventilation, and to administer palliative care permitting his life to end peacefully.
The court was required to clarify that this would not infringe ID's human rights.
Medical opinion was unanimous on the appropriateness of treatment. But, ID's
parents strongly opposed the application as premature in view of ID's developmental
progress. Cazalet J granted the declaration, subject to the appropriateness of non-
ventilation remaining given prevailing clinical conditions on any future hospital
readmission.
In reconsidering familiar issues, Cazalet J relied heavily on existing authorities,
particularly Re J,448 construing purpose of withholding ventilation to be non-
444 The need for prompt hearing by M.H. Review tribunal in accordance with Article 5(4) is confirmed
by the CA in R (on the app'cn of C) v M.H. Review Tribunal London and S.W. Region [2001] EWCA
Civ. 1110, where the (usual) lapse of 8 weeks was considered too long.
445 Welfare is considered under Chapter 5.
446
Respect is considered in Chapters 6-8.
447
[2000] 2 FCR 577.
448
[1990] above. Other authorities cited included, inter alia, Re B [1981] above, Re C [1989] above,
and the Canadian case Re Superintendent of Family and Child Service and Dawson (1983) above.
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prolongation (rather than active termination). The role of medical opinion
dominated the decision; Cazalet J considered it 'well-established' that courts will not
compel doctors to treat contrary to clinical judgment, and the declaration gave
responsibility for the clinical decision to the HCP involved at that future decision
time. Meanwhile, the significance of the parent/child relationship was played down,
with parental views of LD's development deemed 'over-optimistic'. The paramount
consideration remained ED's best interests. With regard to content of best interests,
while sanctity of life was acknowledged, the critical equation was endorsed as the
means to balance preservation of life against quality of life.449 ED's best interests
were located in withholding ventilation due to invasiveness and pain of mechanical
ventilation for ID, his poor quality of life (beginning from such a low baseline), short
life span, and weight of medical evidence favouring palliative care.450 Thus, the
function and content of best interests followed a relatively predictable route. The
only remarkable feature (other than human rights) was its determination of future
treatment. Although the parents' lawyer argued that the decision would be premature
and inconsistent with the Glass decision,451 Cazalet J emphasising decisional urgency
in the event of respiratory failure distinguished Glass. Fundamentally, this
distinction turns on role and relationship; the mother's request for treatment
compulsion in Glass differing from the doctors' request to 'discontinue one special
practice' in the instant case.
Despite minimal reference in the judgment to human rights,452 this is where
redefinition occurs. Implicitly, the very inclusion of human rights issues indicated
the future context of IcP treatment decisions; the need for best interests
determination to comply with human rights obligations. Furthermore, by the Trust
and the Official Solicitor seeking reassurance on human rights aspects, it is clear that
courts need to give content to human rights in the medical context.
449 Cazalet J preferred the Dawson approach above (viewing quality of life from the patient's
standpoint) on this issue rather than the 'intolerable' yardstick of Re B [1981] above.
450 This situation was consistent with the 'no-chance' situation outlined in the Royal College of
Paediatric and Child Health guidelines on Withholding Life Saving treatment in Children, A
framework for practice (1997).
451
Above, where it was deemed inappropriate to make a declaration in advance of a particular
problem and circumstance.
452 Articles 2 and 3 are discussed briefly in the judgement's penultimate section.
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Additionally, citing the earlier case of D v UK,453 Cazalet J confirmed that Article 3
(prohibiting torture, inhuman or degrading treatment) includes a right to die with
dignity. This enabled him to frame the declaration as protecting, rather than
derogating from this right. This view seems curious given the earlier dismissal of
any relevance for parental distress at undignified intensive treatment. Yet, where an
IcP is too young for awareness of 'dignity', indignity can surely only be perceived
through the eyes of others. However, this imputation also seems doubtfully
extensive. Grubb questions Cazalet J's reading of D v UK as embracing a right to
die with dignity.454 Mason, McCall Smith and Laurie rightly observe in light of this
case
'a relatively steady - and significant - extension of the conditions which
render non-treatment lawful'.455
Further, they suggest the recent Re C cases may signify a changing emphasis towards
quality of life assessments based on
'the glimmers of a legal recognition of the 'personhood' construct'.456
However, in terms of these infants' relationships with their parents, those authors
draw a pragmatic division between treatment that is futile and that which is medically
futile.457 If warranted, arguably, relationship is currently being overlooked in
assessing quality of life, and as an interest (held between parent and child) in best
interests evaluation. It is these incremental shifts of non/treatment boundaries
regarding IcPs - even in the face of human rights - and the camouflaged relevance of
issues such as relationship that demand overhaul of best interests construction.
Issues such as relationship and personhood require full and frank exploration. This
thesis seeks to achieve this, arguing for a fuller understanding of interests and of
underlying values and constructs.
453
(1997) 24 EHRR 423.
454 A. Grubb, Incompetent patient (child): withholding treatment and human rights, A NHS Trust v D,
Med. L. Rev. 8 [2000] 339, 341, suggesting rather that in D v UK 'inhuman treatment' lay in
unavailability of treatment, lack of accommodation and familial support for an AIDS sufferer if
deported, ibid (see p446 of judgment).
455
(2002) above, paragraph 16.50.
456 Ibid. Referring to Re C (a minor)(medical treatment) [1998] 40 BMLR 31, and Re C (a baby)




Dignity is another such construct. Confusion lies currently in excluding interests of
others, yet emphasising dignity (which is perceived by, or in the context of,
others) 458 Two recent IcP decisions have emphasised dignity. In NHS Trust A v M;
NHS Trust B v H,459 withdrawal of a.n.h. from two patients in p.v.s. was considered
regarding Articles 2 and 3.460 Dame Butler-Sloss (P) considered the act/omission
distinction in Bland to accord with Article 2 because
'[a]n omission to provide treatment.. .will.. .only be incompatible with article
2 where the circumstances.. .impose a positive obligation on the state to take
steps to prolong a patient's life'461
Further, a responsible clinical decision to withhold treatment based on a patient's
best interests would fulfil positive obligation under article 2 462 This approach seems
somewhat contrary to the burgeoning importance accorded earlier to judicial role 463
As Grubb observes:
'satisfying the Bolam test in reaching a 'best interests' determination will be
,. , 464
convention-compliant .
Furthermore, the President's conclusion regarding Article 3 also displays Bolam-like
phraseology, with overtones of beneficence negating infringement and requiring the
patient to be aware of any inhuman or degrading treatment for violation to occur.465
This need for subjective perception is criticised by Mason at al as incorrect in its
interpretation of European jurisprudence.466 On this basis, human rights provisions
seem to lack the patient-oriented influence on best interests that might have been
458
Application of dignity is easier where a patient is competent. The decision Re B (adult: refusal of
medical treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449 confirms that a competent patient may request cessation of
treatment, that mental capacity is the issue (not consequences), and that seriously disabled patients
have this right. Much of the judgment focuses on capacity, reiterating the right of competent patients
to give no reasons for refusal (ibid 456). However, as M. Stauch observes the Court's 'extended and
anxious enquiry into Ms B's reasons' may mean that the competent patient refusing for no reason
'may be a legal oxymoron', Commentary, J. Med. Eth. [2002] 28, 232, 233. However, the need to be
certain about competence was evinced by Re AK (medical treatment: consent) [2001] 1 FLR 129,
where a patient with motor neurone disease was limited to communicating with movement of one
eyelid. These cases contrast with active assistance to end life, which was declined as acceptable by
the ECHR in Pretty v UK [2002] 2 FLR 45.
459





463 In Re F [2000] above, and Re SL [2000] above.
464 See A. Grubb, Commentary, Med. L. Rev. 8 [2000] 342, 346.
465 Ibid 814(d-f).
466
(2002) above, paragraph 17.28.
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anticipated. Rather, best interests continues as a sweeping justificatory reason
endorsing medical perspective regarding IcP treatment.
Indeed, further consideration of human rights in the context of treatment withdrawal
seems unlikely in view of Re G (adult incompetent: withdrawal of treatment)467
There the President declared withdrawal from a female patient with profound
(anoxic) brain damage 'lawful' without reference to human rights. Drawing simply
on the above decision, she concluded that G be allowed to 'die with dignity'.
Judicial reference to family consultation makes it likely that familial views (if they
concur with medical views) are influential. Additionally, 'unreserved' acceptance of
the evidence of only one expert witness raises concern about courts 'rubber-
stamping' medical views.468 Under the O.S. Practice Direction,469 all discontinuance
of a.n.h. from p.v.s. patients must come before the court. However, on a strict
reading this might not apply to non-p.v.s. states and, together with judicial 'rubber-
stamping', this is of concern in view on medical misdiagnosis of p.v.s., and debate
about medical guidelines. The latter was considered in NHS Trust A v H.470
Guidelines by the Royal College of Physicians exclude certain clinical features from
diagnosis of p.v.s., including nystagmus response (rapid, involuntary eye
movements) to ice water testing, 'tracking' moving objects with the eyes, or
responding to 'menace' threat.471 Whereas, an international working party on
vegetative state do include 'tracking' and some response to stimulation within some
types of vegetative state and also some types of profound brain damage.472 In NHS
Trust A v H,473 the latter guidelines were preferred, admitting H's visual tracking and
response to menace as possible p.v.s. (H had suffered a brain haemorrhage eight
years earlier). This allowed Bland, and NHS Trust A v M; NHS Trust B v H, to be
followed. This decision continues the expansion of treatment withdrawal cases
4t"
[2001] 65 BMLR 65.
468 Similar to the Frenchay case, above.
469 Endorsed [2002] above.
470
[2001] 2 FLR501.
471 Published in Journal of the Royal College of Physicians of London, vol. 31(3) (1997), reproduced
in P. Walsh (ed.), The vegetative state: persisting problems in law and regulation (1999), King's
College, London, 71.
472 International Working Party report on the Vegetative State (1996), reproduced in R. Francis and C.




regarding adults based less in diagnosis than in 'futility' (absence of any prospect of
recovery).474 Human rights regarding minors were highlighted dramatically in the
context of surgical separation of conjoined twins.
2.3.4.3 Re A (Conjoined twins: medical treatment)475
The facts of this case were well publicised at the time. A hospital sought judicial
permission to separate conjoined twins joined at the abdomen. Each twin had her
own brain, heart, lungs and limbs, but the weaker twin (Mary) was incapable of
sustaining her own circulation and was dependent on the heart/lung action of her
sister (Jodie). Mary was also severely brain damaged and her capacity to experience
pain not determinable. Without surgical separation, both twins would die within a
few months. If separated, Mary would die immediately, while Jodie may have a
relatively normal life. The twins' parents objected to surgical separation on religious
grounds and because of anticipated difficulties about caring for Jodie in their home
community (Malta) where healthcare was limited. At first instance, Johnson J
authorised separation as being in the best interests of both twins. The Court of
Appeal's further support for surgery has raised wealth of academic consideration.
There has been widespread criticism of the complexity and inconsistency of the
Court's views both within individual judgments and between them.476 Uniacke
rightly suggests that some of this confusion derives from the legacy of Bland,
regarding classification of withdrawal as an 'omission'.477 However, criticism
extends beyond complexity.
In the Court of Appeal, only Robert Walker LJ concurred with the first instance view
of surgery being in the best interests of both twins.478 In contrast, Ward LJ, having
474 In effect, the previous distinct approaches regarding minors and adults have merged into a human
rights/futility approach.
[2001] 1 FLR 1.
476 See: J. Harris, Human beings, persons and conjoined twins: An ethical analysis of the judgment in
Re A, Med. L. Rev. 9 [2001] 221; M. Freeman outlines extensive inconsistencies in Whose life is it
anyway? Med. L. Rev. 9 [2001] 259, 274-275; S. Sheldon and S. Wilkinson, 'On the sharpest homs of
a dilemma': Re A (conjoined twins) Med. L. Rev. 9 [2001] 201, 203; and B. Hewson, Killing off
Mary: was the Court of Appeal right? Med. L. Rev. 9 [2001] 281, 291 and 292 where the similarities
and differences are tabulated.
477 S. Uniacke, Was Mary's death murder? Med. L. Rev. 9 [2001] 208, 209. The deficiencies of the
Bland decision are considered above, and my own earlier papers, above.
478
Above, 118(E) and 119(D). Walker LJ's approach has been adopted since by the Supreme Court
of Queensland regarding conjoined twins: Queensland v Nolan [2001] QSC 174. However, as Grubb
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separated out the questions of (a) consideration of best interests and (b) evaluation of
lawfulness,479 perceived a conflict of interests; Jodie's favouring separation (in view
of her positive prognosis),480 while separation for Mary would bring her no
481
advantage (merely hastening her inevitable death). On this conflict of interests
paramountcy was unhelpful, because the interests of both twins could not be
'paramount'. However, Jodie's interests were found to prevail expressly by Brooke
LJ,482 and implicitly by Ward LJ:
'[g]iven the conflict of duty, I can see no other way of dealing with it than by
choosing the lesser of the two evils and so finding the least detrimental
alternative'.483
In essence, this reflects the moral quandary situation outlined earlier in chapter 1,
employing Benn's 'thresholds in two dimensions'.484 The situation parallels
Appendix 3 hereto, where either choice of action seems untenable (failing to support
the interests of one or other twin), yet we cannot make no decision (as to do so would
4RS
favour Mary's interests by default). Hence, arguably, the only solution is to 'make
the best of a bad job' by choosing a solution we would not (prior to this decision)
have considered acceptable. Harris criticises Ward LJ's approach of 'least
detriment' as inconsistent with the earlier-posited ineliminable value of each life.486
Relatedly, Mason suggests Ward LJ's approach
'started on deontological premises but had to be, effectively, rescued by way
487
of consequentialist ethics'.
While less than ideal, the resort to consequentialism is understandable. The majority
of the Court was, at least, honest enough to recognise a conflict of interests. Had the
issue been surgical intervention on the twins as individual neonates, the cases would
highlights, in his commentary thereon (10 Med. L. Rev. [2002] 100), the requirement (under the
Queensland Criminal Code exception for bona fide and reasonable medical treatment, s282) requires
some 'benefit' (accruing to the weaker twin) be found in surgery and this demands of an approach like
Walker LJ's absence of conflicting interests (above, 101-102).
479 Ibid 35(D-E).
480 Ibid 37-38.
481 Ibid 39(F-H) and 46(G). See also Brooke LJ, ibid 99(D-E).
482 Ibid 99(D-E).
483
Above, 49(C), drawing on Birmingham County Council v H (No. 2) [1993] 1 FLR 883.
484 Above.
485
Indeed, even Walker LJ, who found no conflict of interests acknowledged duality of duty on the
part of HCPs, and that doing nothing was not an option, above 113(H).
486 See J. Harris, above, 228.
487 J.K. Mason, Conjoined twins: a diagnostic conundrum, ELR 5 (2001) 226, 231.
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surely have invited different decisions based on each twin's (differing) best interests.
However, having talked themselves into this (albeit honest) conflict of interests the
Court still had to make a decision. Criticism of the utilitarian approach surely lies in
the fact the Court were making a relative quality of life decision based on each
twin's prospects, yet denying so doing. This is particularly apparent in the Court's
distinction between sanctity and quality of life, and attempt to value not 'life' but
worthwhileness of 'treatment', and/or capacity to exercise right to life. This
distinction is untenable; an individual's value of life is surely dependent in part on
his/her capacity to exercise it. It may still be assessed as value to the subject, but
cannot be divorced from ability to participate in benefits or experience detriments of
living.489 As Harris argues
'we cannot address the question of the best interests of treatment
independently of our assessment of whether or not the continuation of life
that the treatment affords is of value to the subject of that life'.490
In terms of interest attribution, considerable criticism is (rightly) directed at Robert
Walker LJ's minority view that remaining conjoined would deprive the twins of their
bodily integrity and dignity,491 whereas separation would restore it to Mary.492 As
several authors comment, restoration of bodily integrity at the cost of life is a heavy
price.493 Indeed, as Hewson suggests
'the principle of autonomy.. .points to leaving the twins intact, not to
, , 494
separating them .
Furthermore, the Court was willing to authorise invasion ofMary's bodily integrity
by way of surgery. Watt characterises this 'mutilation' as the
'bad means to the good end of saving her twin sister's life'.495
Judicial assessment admitted Jodie as an interest-holder (all three judges
unanimously found surgery in her best interests), while Mary was characterised as
488 Ibid 53-54 and 102(D).
489 Certain interests may be attributable to individuals despite inability to exercise them, see Chapters
3 and 7, below.
490




493 See: H. Watt, Conjoined twins: separation as mutilation, Med. L. Rev. 9 [2001] 237, 239; J. Harris,
above, 226; J.K. Mason, above, 234; and M. Freeman, above, 279.
494 B. Hewson, above, 297.
495
Above, 243 and 245.
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'pitiable' and having no 'best health interests'.496 The prospect of leaving the twins
conjoined never seemed considered as a realistic possibility. Yet, arguably, given
that some hospitals might not have even brought the matter for judicial
determination, the parental wish to leave the twins conjoined was really an
alternative perception of best interests.
Hewson suggests that the resort to judicial intervention is due to a contemporary
society's risk-avoidance.497 However, this thesis argues for better risk assessment;
we cannot achieve this without limiting the roles of others involved to some extent,
to being significant but not determinative factors. While the Court acknowledged the
importance of parental views, it reserved its authority to determine welfare,498
construing welfare as synonymous with best interests,499 (framing the meaning of
welfare as taking account of all relevant interests, needs, risks and benefits and
weighing those to decide).500 The respective roles of court and parent are
contentious. And, it is questionable in this case whether the Court really did weigh
the issues regarding both twins without an agenda of utilitarian preservation of (at
least one) life. While some authors argue in favour of parental autonomy, Freeman
reminds us that best interests is about the child.501 While he acknowledges the views
of Goldstein, Freud, Goldstein and Solnit,502 and of Friedman Ross,503 both based in
the importance and delicate balance of the family unit, he argues that
'there are dangers in putting the intimate family beyond scrutiny' [and]
'[t]here are more important rights to confer upon children than the right to
autonomous parents'.504
This thesis argues for recognition of relationship as a part (sometimes an important
part) of individual interests, but the emphasis is on the individual. S/he owns the
interests, and we should be careful to treat children as individuals worthy of respect
in their own right, even in the context of dependency on parents and others for









502 Best interests of the child (1996) Free Press. See Freeman's discussion, above, 264-267.
503





protection and care. For this reason we should not underestimate the importance of
children's interests as the primary concern under Article 3(1) of the UN Convention
on the Rights of Children, and to the rights of maturing minors to have their views
heard and considered under Article 12(1).505 The Court's decision in the instant case
to overrule the sincere parental view, which could have been an equally justifiable
view of best interests, seems to reinforce judicial drive towards preserving life
wherever possible (unless medical evidence is divided per the mother's views in Re
T (a minor)).506
Much of Re A focuses on criminal law.507 Pressure to avert criminal intention was
intense with regard to interpreting the HRA 1998. The Court's unanimous view of
non-contravention of Article 2 (right to life) was located variously in: the European
• ... . SOR
Commission's decision in Paton v UK, which justified a judicial 'balancing act';
the 'unintentional' nature of resulting death (not being the intended purpose of
surgery);509 and the limited application of Article 2 'intention' to action where death
is the purpose (whereas this case remained governed by existing common law).510
Further, Brooke LJ dismissed contravention of Article 3 because use of general
anaesthetic would negate any inhumane or degrading aspect to surgery, and that any
interference with Mary's Article 8 rights was justifiable as the welfare principle
warranted preference for Jodie's interests.511 The human rights provisions received
scant attention in the judgments and their impact in medical treatment decisions is
already beginning to look minimal.
However the confused judgments of Re A indicate the need for exploration of issues
underlying decisions for IcPs. The disparity highlights the need for better
505 This is supported by Article 14(2) of the same Convention, which casts the parental role as
providing direction in light of the child's evolving capacities. See also J. Loughrey, Medical decision
making and the Human Rights Act 1998, Med. Law (2001) 20, 493, 503 regarding the limitations
placed on Article 8 protection such that it may not jeopardise a child's health and development. The
views of mature minors can be strongly held and insightful in terms of his/her own relationship with
self, see for example Re M (medical treatment: consent) [1999] 2 FLR 1097 where a 15 year-old girl's
refusal of a heart transplant was overruled by Johnson J, despite M's concerns that she would 'feel
different with someone else's heart' and would 'rather die than have the transplant' (see also the
report in the Scotsman 16.7.99, 5 cols 1-4).
506
[1997] above.
507 See Uniacke, above.
508
(1980) 3 EHRR 408. See Ward LJ, above, 61-62.
509 See Brooke LJ ibid 97(D-F).
5,0 See Walker LJ, ibid 117(A-B).
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understanding of concepts involved. In this regard, Sheldon and Wilkinson suggest
that what
'is clear...is the futility of any approach which attempts to make sense of
this decision (and, indeed, health care law in general) without a thorough
S1 9
understanding of its ethical underpinnings'.
The remainder of this thesis explores some of these elements underlying best
interests, such as the notion of interests, autonomy, welfare, respect, and
individuality, as a means to reshaping best interests as a more structured framework
that better protects patients' fundamental stakes in life. Before doing so, however, it
is important to stress why the recent reassessment ofbest interests is insufficient.
2.4 The legacy of critical battles
2.4.1 Why redefinition is not enough
The very need for redefinition indicates the unsatisfactory state of best interests that
had developed by the early 1990s. Recent attempts at redefining best interests -
predominantly by the Court of Appeal - focus on capacity, relationship, risk,
extension of admissible interests and more open address of conflict. Undoubtedly,
these refinements were much needed. However, deconstruction of best interests
case law thus far has revealed persisting lacunae:
• clear jurisdiction is still lacking regarding adults. Although a welfare-
••••513
type jurisdiction is posited in Re F (Adult: court's jurisdiction),
wherefrom it derives its authority is uncertain given earlier loss ofparens
patriae.514 Indeed, even in this case, the declaratory scope is something of
a stop-gap, as per curiam the need for a structured, defined framework to
protect vulnerable IcPs is reiterated;
• roles of respective parties remain questionable: parental views regarding







514 See Re F [1989] above.
515
E.g. Re T [1997] above.
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views of IcPs are insufficiently sought; judicial role regarding adults is
still in a state of flux; and the views of those emotionally closest to IcPs
are ambiguously dismissed yet referenced. Additionally, despite recent
retrenchment from heavy emphasis on medical opinion, decisions such as
Re Y raise undermine the confidence in admitting a role for family
members if the benefit to the patient may be so remote.516 There seems to
remain a drive towards judicial assessment of best interests promoting
517
medical efficacy - even if that is not directly therapeutic to the patient.
While all or any such input from third parties is not necessarily
unwarranted, the point here is that it is at present entirely inconsistent;
• assessment of patient capacity also remains heavily medical, and ample
scope remains for it to be undermined by factors commonly present in the
healthcare context (e.g. pain and environmental stress). Too few
safeguards presently exist to protect patient capacity, despite Re MB/St.
George's guidelines, and patients may still be classed 'incompetent' due
to irrationality or risk-related standards;518
• relationship is used inconsistently, its admission or rejection seeming to
vary with objective.519 Indeed, factual relationship was at its closest in the
conjoined twins case, yet the Court individuated the twins and the only
reference to their relationship was regarding 'parasitic' use of the other's
resources;
• some useful areas of redefinition have occurred, such as broadening the
range of admissible interests, but these are employed to ambivalent
purpose, sometimes benefiting others perhaps more than the IcP, while
denied at other times despite obvious direct benefits to an IcP's quality of
516
[1996] above.
517 Medical impracticably is also imported into best interests, see Re D [1998] above.
518 Re B (Adult: refusal of medical treatment) [2002] above, acts as a caveat to assuming
incompetence, but the existing guidelines still require that only complex capacity decisions be raised
in court.
519
E.g. in Re T, above, mother and child were deemed 'as one', yet in Re MM [2000] above, the
parent/child relationship was deemed less important despite the prospect of similar care difficulties
when the family would return to a remote area of Russia (where the child would be highly dependent
on the parents).
520
E.g. Re Y, above.
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life.521 A clear purposeful objective should be axiomatic in focusing what
best serves an IcP's interests;
• tenuous distinctions flow from redefinition in aspects such as 'risk' in
sterilisation. The contrast between the decisions of the case law suggests
that application of criteria varies with gender, and consequences still
dominate. Hence, while 'risk' may rightly be used to limit (inappropriate)
intervention, an inappropriately limited vision of risk is also being used to
create short-sighted differences of application;
• best interests still lacks definition. Fundamentally, courts employ terms
such as 'interests', 'dignity' and 'bodily integrity' without fully exploring
their meaning. Graduated changes have occurred, shifting withdrawal of
treatment from a 'futility' to a 'quality of life' standard without
mi
elucidating on the meaning or significance thereof. Additionally,
relevance of underlying ethical values of autonomy, welfare and respect
remain obscure. The result is a mandate for approving medical opinion,
vaguely justified on 'best interests'. Yet the observer is little wiser about
how that individual's best interests are comprised. Rather, to be a useful
decision or justificatory tool, best interests should be transparent and
understandable;
• although redefinition seems to reformulate a more autonomy-oriented
model of best interests, the problem remains that best interests come about
because the autonomy model of self-determinative decision-making
breaks down in the face of incapacity. Certainly, best interests has been
overly paternalistic, and a shift to include autonomy elements is welcome.
However, best interests should be a combination of residual autonomy
(identified through past and present patient views) and protection of
his/her welfare. This might be better termed patient-focused decision¬
making and is developed in the remainder of this thesis through an
approach of respecting IcPs\
521
E.g. Re A (male sterilisation), above.
522 Mason et at raise a similar observation (2002) above paragraph 16.50.
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• the HRA (1998) has made relatively little pragmatic difference to
treatment decisions. Article 2 has been sidestepped regarding withdrawal
of treatment and even surgical invasion (in the twins' case) does not
infringe the right to life. Article 3 has been effectively negated where
medical treatment is concerned, and judicial consideration hints more at
fitting human rights into existing law than of altering domestic law to
meet individual rights and interests. Its influence on roles (of parents,
individuals and those emotionally closest) under Article 8, and the
decision process under Article 6, remain to be tested in the treatment
context;523
• although the expansion of certain IcP situations (such as sterilisation) now
has limits, the application of best interests overall continues to expand in
healthcare decisions. Beyond those areas already mentioned are decisions
relating to withdrawal of treatment from non-p.v.s. adults,524 treatment for
f\ C97
anorexia, diagnostic testing, and decisions about transplantation.
Hence, the range of potential battlegrounds continues to develop.
Redefinition merely indicates the pressing need for more thorough
CTO
reformulation of best interests and IcP decision-making.
Use of best interests as a justificatory mechanism across this increasing range is
understandable, reflecting its inherent flexibility. However, its expansion and
development continues without a full exploration of best interests conceptually.
Hence, distinctions are made piecemeal and the content accorded to best interests
becomes increasingly disparate. Obscure decision purpose and inconsistent
attribution of roles create inconsistent application. Under-exposition of influential
values (welfare, quality of life, autonomy, and medical ethics) causes vagueness in
the justificatory role and process of best interests.
523 The normative value of these articles is considered in Chapters 6-8, below.
524
E.g. Re R (adult: medical treatment) [1996] 2 FLR 99, Re D (medical treatment) [1998] 1 FLR
411, Re H (adult: incompetent) [1998] 2 FLR 36 and Re G (adult incompetent: withdrawal of
treatment) [2001] 65 BMLR 65.
525 Re C (Detention: medical treatment) [1997] above.
526 Re C (HIV test) [ 1999] above.
327 Re T [1997] above, and Re M [1999] above.
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Despite development and redefinition, best interests still lacks substance,
consistency, and clarity. This weakens its efficacy, turning it from panacea to
placebo. Piecemeal redefinition creates questionably distinct borderline cases and
redraws only limited, accessible aspects, or risks wider changes lacking substantive
jurisdictional/precedential authority. Meanwhile, contextual expansion continues
apace. Mere redefinition is not enough. Best interests needs to be more radically
reconstructed. If this mechanism is to serve properly the interests of IcPs, we must
be clearer about the nature and validity of decision goals. In its current incarnation
best interests sometimes fails fundamentally to protect the interests of IcPs.
Treatment decisions are about human interests. To determine an individual's best
interests soundly, we must be honest and open about the issues and sub-strata values
informing those human interests. We must better understand what is at stake, on
behalf of whom, and how conflict can be soundly resolved. We must set gateways
that respect IcPs - recognising both (a) their limitations (and need for assistance) and
(b) the individual importance of their participation in decisions about treatment that
impact their life.
2.4.2 The impetus for radical reconstruction
A number of proposals for reconstruction have been mooted over some years in
529
England and Wales. The Law Commission's views were reported in 1995,
expressly favouring a best interests test but including an element of substituted
judgment.530 While best interests was described as meaning more than non-negligent
action towards the incapacitated person,531 further focus is on proposed inclusion of
more autonomy-oriented factors for consideration in best interests evaluation. These
include ascertainable past and present views of the patient (including perception by
appropriate others), patient participation, and minimisation of disruption to patient
freedom.532
528
Especially as redefinition has emanated from a relatively small pool of judges, particularly: Dame
Butler-Sloss (P) in Re T [1996], St George's, Re A [2000], and Re SL [2000], and Thorpe LJ in Re C
[1994] and Re SL [2000] all above.
529 Mental Incapacity (1995) Law Com No. 231, HMSO, London.
530
Ibid, para. 3.25
531 Ibid, para. 3.27.
532 Ibid, para. 3.28-3.37.
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Subsequent consultation, in 1997,533 has now culminated in a policy statement,
which the Government formulated in 1999.534 The policy position picks up three key
principles from earlier consultation (capacity, best interests, and a general authority
to act reasonably), and provides for new Continuing Power of Attorney, appointment
of a manager regarding welfare and/or healthcare issues, and modernises the judicial
framework through a Court of Protection empowered to resolves certain disputes.
Regarding best interests, the Government endorses the Law Commission's views on
relevant factors,536 and identifies two additional factors: foreseeable likelihood of the
patient recovering capacity, and the need to avoid undue influence on patient
views. The general authority to act reasonably would be based also on reasonable
belief that action is in the patient's best interests,538 and that certain decisions may
not be taken on behalf of an IcP. The Court of Protection would have jurisdiction
to approve/refuse treatment,540 and some 'serious' treatment decisions (such as
withdrawal of a.n.h.), or where a patient has made an advance statement, would
require court approval.541
The provision of suitable jurisdiction and clarification of relevant factors would be
valuable changes and are clearly oriented to taking more account of autonomy-based
input to decisions. However, the proposals have remained unactioned, in policy
form, since 1999. And, they say relatively little anyway about best interests. Its
presence is profligate therein, but its meaning (beyond four factors) remains
unexplored, and the document is silent about underlying values or address of
conflict. Rather, disputes would remain subject to judicial resolution. While the
court should rightly remain in this role (initially or on appeal), it is not apparent that
enactment of this policy (if it happens) would furnish much in terms of the IcP
533 Who decides? Making decisions on behalf ofmentally incapacitated adults (1997) Cm 3803.
534
Making decisions (1999) Cm 4465. The Lord Chancellor's Department has also issued a
consultation paper and series of leaflets providing current guidance on: consent and refusal of
treatment, establishing and evidencing best interests, capacity assessment, how decisions are made,
and protection from abuse, inter alia. While this guidance is valuable in the interim it is, of course, no
substitute for reform (Making decisions: Helping people who have difficulty deciding for themselves
(April 2002)).
535










decision process. In short, the policy is a step in the right direction, but does not go
anywhere near far enough. Furthermore, overhaul of best interests is not just about
injecting some autonomy-based elements, it is about understanding both aspects of
best interests (autonomy and welfare), and applying them more constructively to best
protect all of a patient's relevant interests.
A different range of 'best interests' factors is supported by the BMA Guidelines on
Withholding and Withdrawing Life-prolonging Treatment.542 While these include
the views of patients (and any evidence of his/her views available from persons
closest to the patient), of appointed proxies (in Scotland), and parents views
regarding minors, the focus is understandably on more clinical aspects such as
sentience to pain, awareness, likely improvement, and invasiveness of any treatment.
Being posited as indicators of a person's 'overall health benefit' these are important
indicators of a patient's best medical interests. However, this thesis argues that
medical interests are only one element of a person's interests overall. Thus, while
the policy document in England and Wales reflects certain (much-needed)
recognition of residual autonomy, the BMA guidelines represent factors influencing
a patient's medical welfare. Yet, neither satisfactorily embraces both autonomy and
welfare interests in their full breadth (or depth, i.e. how to use them in best interests
determination). Admittedly, as Mason et al suggest:
'[a]s a vague concept, best interests permits of a wide-ranging discretion
even when, as the English proposals would have it, the test is tempered by
'factors' to be taken into account'.543
However, even under the existing Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000
which eschews use of 'best interests', factors in determining whether to intervene are
not dissimilar to the autonomy-oriented English proposals regarding best interests.
The views of the primary carer, guardian, or other persons the Sheriff directs, or
those having an interest in the adult's welfare should be considered.544 Relatedly, the
authority for treatment under s47 frames its scope (and implicit purpose) as
Ibid, para. 3.8.
542
(2001) BMJ Books, London, paragraph 18.1.
543




'what is reasonable in the circumstances...to safeguard or promote the
physical or mental health of the adult'.545
This reflects the meaning attributed to best interests in Re F,546 and is equally broad,
providing ample scope for clinical discretion. The absence of best interests from the
Scottish approach seems perhaps, therefore, to be one of form rather than substance.
Certainly, the legislation has usefully clarified roles and responsibilities of parties
involved in care and treatment of incapacitated adults. However, where
disagreement occurs amongst those involved, ultimate recourse must be made to the
Court of Session. Hence, the protection of vulnerable IcPs may not be as much
improved as it initially appears - rather the procedures have been clarified.
Furthermore, as Laurie and Mason highlight, withdrawal of treatment surely could
not be construed as safeguarding or promoting the patient's health.547 On this basis,
they argue that Law Hospital remains the relevant authority on withdrawal of
CAO
treatment from p.v.s. patients. In this regard best interests therefore presumably
endures even in Scotland.
None of the considered approaches reconstruct best interests (or treatment decisions
for incapacitated adults) satisfactorily. They fail to address the lacunae outlined
above in any comprehensive manner. While they include valuable aspects, they do
not go far enough to constitute a thorough investigation of relevant issues and values,
or to break with existing traditions in finding more dynamic solutions to IcP
decisions. Best interests is retained and preferred herein for its scope for
emphasising impact on the patient's interests; it could represent an important
expression ofpurpose and focus upon the incapacitated patient.
Best interests could be used positively and flexibly, provided it is used carefully and
with understanding of its complexities. Sound reconstruction requires the
development of a strategic framework that admits decision purpose, appropriate
roles, and comprehensive content and provides for ancillary 'gateway' issues such





547 See G.T. Laurie and J.K. Mason, Negative treatment of vulnerable patients: euthanasia by any
other name? [2000] Juridical Rev. 159
548 Ibid, 177.
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responsibilities. In essence, successful reconstruction requires clarification of
decision process (including address of conflict) in determining 'best', and
exposition of 'interests' - the interrelationships of factors and function must be
explored as normative components. This thesis proceeds with further
deconstruction, of 'interests' (Chapter 3), and the influential values of autonomy
(Chapter 4) and welfare (including quality of life and personhood in Chapter 5). This
enables fuller understanding of complexities. Chapters 6 to 8 then reconstruct a
new developmental framework for best interests under the auspices of respect,
through responsible, informed proxy choice.
CHAPTER THREE
INTERESTS AND INTERESTED PARTIES
Chapter 3 - Interests and interested parties
Let us start with a simple distinction. The decision mechanism is 'best interests', but
'best' is separable from 'interests'. 'Interests' may be used descriptively, to represent
important factors in an IcP treatment decision, and/or to justify why those factors are
important to that patient. However, interests may be a catalyst for conflict, such that
an individual's various interests may seem equally justified yet mutually exclusive.
A competent individual may trade-off conflict by reference to his/her underlying
values. Where autonomy is compromised choice falls to responsible others, who
seek the 'best' decision in the IcP's 'interests'. Hence, 'best' concerns the process of
deciding; how we balance opposing factors to derive the optimal course of action. In
short, how we resolve conflict.
Locating 'best' is contentious, being subject to infinite opinions about ranking which
is inevitably value-laden.1 'Best' is the most intractable aspect of best interests; no
ranking satisfies all commentators. Derivation of best is addressed later.2
Deconstruction of 'interests' in this chapter considers what an interest is, and
prerequisites for possession, and highlights underlying values, interest role and
objects. It concludes with a connected interest concept related to interested parties.
3.1 Definition of'interest'
What do we mean by 'interests'? 'Interest' has descriptive meaning enabling us to
know an interest when we see one, and normative significance that acknowledges the
importance of having interests and influencing who may possess them. So, how
might we define an interest? A dictionary definition offers wide interpretation.3
From this wide range, certainly IcPs might have 'concerns' about things
'important' to them, but these broad interpretations need refinement to have real
meaning in this context. Additionally, IcPs can experience a 'state', or 'feeling', of
interest (being 'interested in X'). In effect, 'feeling' could describe the relationship
1
'Ranking' connotes the relative weights, accorded by a decision-maker, to factors and/or interests.
2 See particularly Chapter 8, below.
3 New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, (ed. L Brown) (1993) Clarendon Press, Oxford, vol. 1,
1393, col. 2 describes an interest variously as: a share, concern or right; a (financial) stake; a benefit
or advantage; a thing of concern or importance (to someone); a cause or principle; and a state of
feeling. 'In the interest(s) of is defined as being 'on the side of...out of consideration for, to the
advantage or benefit of.
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between an IcP and his/her interests, but this is limited by the extent to which an IcP
is able to conceptualise feelings. A state may represent the position brought about
through promotion/negation of interests. Thus, an IcP might have an interest in a
state ofgood health or sexual freedom, or maintaining a state of dignity. But, this
does not give meaning to the interest itself.4 The notion of 'benefit' is familiar in the
IcP and best interests context.5 However, benefits (and opposing detriments)
represent the effect of an action upon interests, namely how an action serves an
interest.
Relatedly, Benn suggests that
'[a] person's interests are, in one sense, those things which would be to his
advantage'.6
7
He considers an 'advantage' as being perceived to make an individual 'better-off.
While this is inviting in the healthcare context, because of its obvious association
with 'well-being', there is synonymity between 'advantage' and 'benefit'. Both
essentially pertain to the effect of an action. It is a state of resulting gain or loss. To
be advantageous, an action must yield 'better' results than an alternative. Thus,
'advantage' relates to 'best' rather than 'interests'.
Interests can also be construed in terms of rights and powers. Hohfeld offered an
o
early evaluation of interrelationships between rights, liberties, and powers. A full
evaluation of rights is not warranted here, but recent accounts define rights in ways
relevant to the medico-legal context. Feinberg suggests that
'[t]o have a right is to have a claim to something and against someone'.9
He ultimately concludes rights to be 'valid claims' through their
4 S.I. Benn, above, 266, distinguishes 'states' from 'powers', 'interests', 'rights' and 'objects' in
relation to privacy, and notes that a state may be subject to conditions (i.e. circumstances or events
necessary to bring it about).
5 See chapters 1 and 2, above.
6 S.I. Benn, above, 105.
7 Ibid.
8 W. Hohfeld, Fundamental legal conceptions (1923) Yale U. P. New Haven.
9 J. Feinberg (1974), The rights of animals and unborn generations (in W.T. Blackstone's (ed.),
Philosophy and environmental crisis (1974) Univ. of Georgia Press, Athens, 43). In another context,
around the same time, he develops this in terms of duty: '[ljegal claim-rights are necessarily the
grounds of other people's duties toward the right-holder. A legal right is a claim to performance,
either action or forbearance...It is also a claim against the state to recognition and enforcement', Social
philosophy (1973) Social Philosophy (1973) Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 58.
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'justification] within a system of rules'.10
What relationship exists, between rights and interests? Raz suggests all rights to be
based on interests,11 but caveats that
'[a]n interest is sufficient to base a right on if and only if there is a sound
argument of which the conclusion is that a certain right exists and among its
non-redundant premisses is a statement of some interest of the right-holder,
the other premisses supplying grounds for attributing to it the required
importance, or for holding it to be relevant to a particular person or class of
persons so that they rather than others are obligated to the right-holder'.12
In other words, a right is created only where (i) an interest is asserted, and (ii) that
interest is sufficiently important to constitute a right or it raises a corresponding duty
in identifiable other(s). But, rights and interests are not synonymous.13 Rather, a
right has protection of an interest as its objective.14 The importance of rights is now
consolidated in the Human Rights Act (1998), which protects the fundamental rights
of individuals, and these are attributable to IcPs despite the disempowering effects of
incapacity. The language of rights therefore cannot be avoided, but for present
purposes and as will be argued below an alternative perspective may prove to be
more helpful in our conceptualisation ofwhat we mean by best interests.
Power concerns ability to access and give effect to one's entitlements.15 Lack of
power renders patients vulnerable.16 Although IcPs do not necessarily lose their
interests, nor their entitlement to claim protection of those interests or give waiver
regarding them (i.e. rights), incapacity may rob them of the power to exercise those
rights for themselves. As this power falls to the proxy, an IcP's interests are
vulnerable in direct proportion to degree of power accorded to the proxy. Thus,
power relationships necessarily fall to be considered in the treatment decision
process. However, power itself says nothing about the meaning of interests from the
10
Ibid, 67.
" J. Raz, The morality of freedom (1986) Clarendon, 191.
12 Ibid, 181.
13
Feinberg sees rights as closely affective - but distinct from - interests, Harm to others, above, 34.
14
However, Raz highlights that rights may serve a person's individual interests, yet be against his/her
interests overall, above, 180.
15 See Benn, above, 266.
16 G. Dworkin, writing on proxy representation of incapacitated patients, cites Mill: '[hjuman beings
are only secure from evil at the hands of others in proportion as they have the power of being, and are,
self-protecting', The theory and practice of autonomy (1988) Cambridge U.P., Cambridge, 93, (J.S.
Mill, Considerations on representative government, in H. Pitkin's Representation (1969) Atherton,
New York, 180-1).
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perspective of the IcP. Indeed, as has been shown none of the above concepts
adequately describe the essence of interests. Rather, it is submitted, that an interest
for the purposes of this thesis should be perceived as a 'stake'.
3.1.1 Interests as'stakes'
Feinberg draws on commercial-legal use of'interest',17 and applies it to criminal law,
such that an individual's interests are
'a miscellaneous collection, consisting] of all those things in which one has
a stake'.18
Feinberg additionally construes stakes as
'the amount risked...a person has a stake in X..when he stands to gain or
lose depending on the nature or condition of X'.19
If we apply this to IcPs, a patient could have a stake in: good health; freedom from
unwarranted invasion; quality of life, freedom to choose within the extent of his/her
capacity; and so on. The IcP's 'interests' would encompass a collection of such
stakes.
However, Feinberg's fundamental concern is with prohibition of criminal harm,
making the relationship of 'risk' and 'interests' vital; risk of harm to an individual's
interests warrants prohibition of an action. Certainly, the risk of harm is also
important regarding IcPs, but we can consider this as the impact of a treatment option
on a patient's interests, rather than definitive of the interests themselves. Frey
acknowledges Feinberg's view of 'harm' as
• 70
'an injury to something in which [a person]... has a genuine stake'.
He (Frey) progresses this interpretation of interests to represent an individual's
21'vital concerns in respect ofwhat happens to them and theirs'.
17 J. Feinberg, Harm to others, The moral limits of the criminal law, Vol. 1 (1984) Oxford U.P. Inc.,




19 Ibid 33-34. Relatedly, T. Regan, The moral basis of vegetarianism, Canadian Journal of
Philosophy, Vol. V, No. 2 (1975) 181, employs the word 'interest' to denote a 'certain class of acts or
states which have the common characteristic of 'being for or against' (citing R.B. Perry, Realms of
value (1954) Harvard U.P., Cambridge, Massachusetts, 7).
20 R.G. Frey, Interests and rights, The case against animals (1980) Clarendon Press, Oxford, 146, n5,
citing J. Feinberg (1973) above, 26.
21 R.G. Frey, ibid, 146, n5.
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What constitutes a 'vital' concern is unclear, but Frey argues that such 'vital
concerns' survive entry to coma. Being independent of consciousness, vitality
seems, therefore, to connote fundamental importance to the individual.
Further support for stakes as types of concern is available in Partridge's denial of
77
'posthumous interests'. Discussing Feinberg's view of objective fulfilment of
interests, Partridge suggests that
'while it is true that interests are, or may be, fulfilled by objective events and
circumstances, these objective conditions are "interests" only insofar as they
matter to someone. Take away the personal concern or "stake", say by
death, and what remain are mere pointless happenings and conditions, not
"interests'".23
Objectivity of interests, and capacity for interests to 'survive' are considered below.
For present purposes, Partridge's view evinces that although interests broadly involve
'concerns' or 'stakes', their significance as interests arises through an element of
'individuality' attaching to them.24
If we incorporate Frey's view of interests as vital concerns, and Partridge's
requirement for interest-concerns to be personal to the individual, we can identify
interests as 'stakes' that form a smaller sub-group of concerns. They are elevated to
'stakes' by virtue of one's active, or significant, personal involvement with them. In
essence, a stake is a 'concern-plus'; the 'plus' accruing from the investment,
involvement, or engagement that we make in certain of our concerns. Indeed, this
accords also with the business context from which Feinberg derived stakes.
Commercially, a 'stakeholder' denotes a party whose involvement (in a company,
product or market) arises through his/her financial or labour investment, active
involvement as a seller/buyer, or regulatory influence. This is equally applicable to
human decision-making. Each of us invests time, effort and/or money in our life
objectives and goals - in those concerns that matter most to us, such as relationships,
career, health, or even just in getting by day-to-day. Our investment raises the status
of a concern to a 'stake'. These stakes then influence our decisions about our life's
22 E. Partridge, Posthumous interests and posthumous respect, Ethics, 91 (1980-1981) 243.
23 Ibid, 247.
24 See Partridge, ibid, 264, who also acknowledges his concurrence with Feinberg's view (1974)
above, 61, of an interest concept based 'on the capacity of certain beings to experience "awareness,
expectation, belief, desire, aim and purpose'".
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direction and purpose. Indeed, even in relation to 'public interest' this can be
regarded as those 'stakes' with which a society is concerned or invests through legal
regulation or moral involvement.
Incapacity need not negate stakeholder status. Incompetent patients may still hold
stakes in health, relationships, goals and experiences - despite incapacity.
Interpreting an interest as a stake - a concern in which an IcP has some personal
investment - provides a working notion of'interest'.
As treatment decisions involve fundamental interests (e.g. life, bodily integrity,
dignity) a proxy must exercise power carefully to uphold IcP rights, protect interests,
to waive entitlement only where necessary, and to compel others to fulfil their duties.
However, this goal is attainable only once we recognise the distinction between
interests, rights, and powers. This enables an IcP's interests to be recognised and
protected despite incapacity. For example:
• a p.v.s. patient has an interest (i.e. a stake) in maintaining a dignified
state (it may be a condition that s/he be biologically alive). However,
s/he lacks power to claim promotion of his/her interest. But, s/he does
retains the right to dignified existence, and a proxy can be empowered to
claim on the patient's behalf;
• an incapax patient has an interest in a state of relationship. It may be
an appropriate condition that she be protected from pregnancy. Her legal
incompetence denies her the power to consent, and she cannot claim
protective measures herself. But, she does not lose the right to sexual
freedom, as her ancillary right (to judicial intervention) empowers the
court to promote her interest.
3.1.2 Investments and identity
On a daily basis we invest in our lives. Some investments are sub-conscious
choices, others are conscious. While many choices are positive, not all investments
are; we may invest in things negative/harmful to us in the short or long run through
poor decision-making, or abuse (e.g. drugs, relationships, violence, or illness). Or,
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may invest in things through necessity rather than choice, for example doing a job we
hate in order to support our family. But, of itself, this indicates the importance of
family in our concerns. Each individual's investments are personal indicating what
matters most to that person. However, investment and interest are not synonymous;
interests should not be construed only as things in which we invest. Rather,
investment should encourage us to look further at the significance of that concern; to
determine whether it amounts to a stake, because the personal quality of investments
makes the uniqueness of the person. To an extent they represent individual identity.
A decision about an IcP's treatment should have integrity with his/her investments
and identity. However, individuals change and grow. Thus, Dworkin interprets
integrity as reflecting investment, and as
7 ^
'mark[ing]...conviction, of commitment, not just past choice'.
The interrelationships between identity, integrity, investments and interests are also
apparent in Berm's view that interests are
'not merely objects or objectives to which the subject addresses himself; they
provide the strands of his identity over time, through which he is able to see
continuity ofmeaning and pattern in what he is and does'.26
Identity adds a gloss to the idea of an interest as a stake. It indicates why stakes are
important to individuals. Stakes reflect important concerns in which we invest, these
stakes make up our interests, and our collective interests represent our individual
uniqueness. In this sense, identity may be relevant to the composition and objective
of best interests.
77
An interest cannot be defined unequivocally, because as Frey suggests:
'[rjeliance upon definition in this way obviates the necessity...to cite the
• 28
necessary and sufficient conditions for a being to have interests'.
Rather, 'interest' is used to connote conceptual threads that create the conditions
surrounding the term; the interests concept is a more robust notion reflecting
different parameters in which 'interests' are identified and attributed. Hence, we
25 R. Dworkin, Life's Dominion, An argument about abortion and euthanasia (1993) Harper-Collins,
London, 206.
26 S.I. Benn, above, 106-107. Temporal issues are considered below, Chapter 7.
27
Although philosophers develop conceptual accounts of interests, they decline to simply define: see,
for example, J. Feinberg, Freedom and Fulfillment (1992) Princeton U.P., New Jersey, 4.
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must establish the structure woven around interests, lending it conceptual meaning.
To aid conceptual understanding, the remainder of this chapter considers: when an
interest may arise (gateways); the value and role interests serves (purpose); what we
have interests in (objects); and who may hold interests (subjects).
3.2 Gateways to interests
3.2.1 Needs and desires
3.2.1.1 Why do needs and desires matter?
Where do interests come from? We need to identify sources of interests as a gateway
to interest ownership. Having identified interests as stakes, an obvious source of
concerns-plus is our desires. Desires represent what we want; the positive
experiences, or things, that contribute to our individual notion of a 'good life'.
However, other types of'want' arise from 'needs'.
29
Certainly, interests may arise from desires as reflections of our stakes. Relatedly,
Regan employs 'interests' to connote experiential preferences:
'liking-disliking, loving-hating, hoping-fearing, desiring-avoiding'.30
Tooley's view of rights (protecting interests) is based on capacity to experience
desires:
"'A has a right to X" is roughly synonymous with "A is the sort of thing that
is a subject of experiences and other mental states, A is capable of desiring
X, and if A does desire X, then others are under a prima facie obligation to
T 1
refrain from actions that would deprive him of it'".
Thus, a relationship may exist between desires and interests, and between interests
and experiential capacity (and/or capacity for certain mental states). Additionally,
Frey draws on Feinberg's early work to substantiate a relationship between beliefs,
desires and interests.32 However, desires and value judgment implicitly import
reflectivity:
28 R.G. Frey, above, 53, criticising the syllogism about interest possession from the argument of L.
Nelson, A System of Ethics, trans. N. Guterman (1956) Yale U.P., New Haven, 139.
29 Pace Frey, above.
30 T. Regan, above, 192.
31 M. Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide (1983) Clarendon Press, Oxford, 45.
32 See Frey, above, 55, drawing from J. Feinberg (1974), above.
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'[ijnterests are compounded out of desires and aims, both of which
presuppose something like belief, or cognitive awareness'.33
Importation of requisite mental states invokes a barrier to interest possession, and
raises issues about where to set the threshold. Desire-derived interests can exclude
IcPs. Harris identifies certain defects as diminishing autonomy because they affect
choice, desire and belief.34 Young minors, p.v.s. patients, and severely intellectually
disabled adults could be incapable of forming any significant beliefs (on Frey's
approach) and possessing self-consciousness. Consequently, if desires are the
exclusive generator of interests, pace Frey, this excludes not only inanimate objects
and animals but also many IcPs.
This should be contrasted with interests as they relate to needs. Frey's distinction
concludes that needs do not require consciousness. As reflective capacity is not a
prerequisite to needs, all patients might have needs, irrespective of incapacity. In
contrast, desires being based in belief/cognitive awareness
'presuppose.. .at least rudimentary cognitive equipment'.36
Tooley also advocates a cognition requirement in the context of the right to life:
'having a right to life presupposes that one is capable of desiring to continue
existing as a subject of experiences and other mental states. This in turn
presupposes both that one has the concept of such a continuing entity and
that one believes that one is oneself such an entity. So an entity that lacks
such a consciousness of itself as a continuing subject of mental states does
not have a right to life'.37
Further, Benn acknowledges the effect of this regarding incapable humans:
'[a]s with all theories that understand desires as intentional.. .it requires a
desirer to be able to identify the object of desire by forming a belief about it.
This condition is generally met by human adults; however, it seems
inconsistent with our intuition that infants have desires. While we say of a




34 I.e. defects in self-control, reasoning, information, and stability J. Flarris, The value of life, An
introduction to medical ethics (1985) Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 196-199.
35 See Frey, above, 82.
36 J. Feinberg (1974) above, 52.




Where incapacity severely limits cognitive ability this could undermine desire-based
interest possession. Cognitive capacity spans a wide range, but five useful examples
can be made:
• (A) a self-conscious patient, capable of reflection;
• (B) a 6/7 year old child without mental impairment;
• (C) a severely mentally-impaired patient, with infant-like linguistics and
no reflective capacity;
• (D) a patient in low cognitive awareness, capable of sensing pain but
lacking self-consciousness;
• (E) a permanently unconscious patient, without response to pain stimuli,
but biologically alive.
On Frey's high-level requirement regarding desires, only patient (A) would certainly
meet the threshold, because patients (B)-(E) lack reflective and/or linguistic capacity.
Further, only patients (A) and (B) would meet even his self-consciousness
requirement for possession of 'simple desires'. However, on a purely needs-based
assessment all of the above patients can easily be attributed with interests in any
decision-making process relating to their welfare.
In truth, Frey's desire-based argument is about personhood as a means to delineating
subjects of moral importance. While Frey draws on Feinberg's requirement for
cognition (embodied in a 'conative life'), he omits to address Feinberg's view about
what amount to conations,39 namely:
'conscious wishes, desires, and hopes; or urges and impulses; or unconscious
drives, aims and goals; or latent tendencies, direction of growth, and natural
fulfillments'.40
These mental states lower the entry level for personhood: 'urges and impulses' are
considerably less demanding than 'beliefs', and patients (A), (B) and (C) arguably
could be regarded as having a conative life. However, Feinberg's view is ambivalent,
39 See Frey, above, 45.
40
Feinberg, (1974) above, 49.
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as he later employs his requisite states cumulatively, denying such status to 'human
vegetables', fetuses and newborns.41
Relatedly, Harris bases personhood in 'reflective self-consciousness'.42 On a strict
application only patients (A) and (B) would be 'persons', while patient (C) would
fall within Harris' safety measure that
'the presence of language is definitive evidence that the beings who possess
it are persons'.43
Personhood is problematic regarding IcPs because it excludes the very young, the
insensate, and the severely mentally impaired, with the result that they are not
provided with moral protection. Only Tooley expressly acknowledges the logical
extremes of demanding requisite mental states,44 concluding that adult animals may
have a right to life,45 while a newborn baby has no more right to life than a newborn
kitten, as both lack any concept of a continuing self.46
Once again, the point can be made that on a basic needs-based approach all of these
problems disappear for the IcPs. But, is it necessary to adopt an either/or approach?
That is, while 'needs' may be all encompassing, it does not follow that IcPs have no
'desires' in any of the senses discussed above. Indeed, it is submitted that a dual
approach considering both needs and desires is most appropriate when dealing with
IcPs. This is because most, if not all, IcPs can express some forms of desire in one
way or another - it is a means of input which, as has already been argued, should
equally be weighed in any balance to decide what should be done with, or for, an IcP.
It should be noted that Feinberg distinguishes two different senses of'need':
'[t]o say that A needs X may be to say either: (I) X is necessary to the
achievement of one of A's goals, or to the performance of one of its
functions, or (2) X is good for A; its lack would harm A or be injurious or
detrimental to him'.47
41 See ibid, 60-64. However, Feinberg finds other reasons to treat these beings as having rights,
modifying his position in later work.
42
Harris, above, 18-19
43 Ibid. Harris considers language to mean something more than mere parroting/smiles/growls, ibid,
n20. This would exclude patients (D) and (E).





Feinberg (1974) above, 53.
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However, Feinberg associates only (2), above, (which he labels 'need') with
interests:
'[t]he first sort...is value-neutral...whereas the second kind...commits its
maker to a value judgment about what is good or bad for A in the long run,
that is, about what is in A's interests'.48
It is in this second sense that needs and interests deriving from them are used in this
thesis. The attribution of a value judgment should not only be acknowledged but also
embraced in the decision-making process involving IcPs.
3.2.1.2 Relating interests to needs and desires
In later work,49 Feinberg refines his identification of interests: ulterior interests
concerning ultimate, reflective goals; and welfare interests, which are 'the necessary
means to his more ultimate goals'.50 Feinberg evaluates the relationship between the
two as close but non-mandatory: an individual may have an interest without having
knowledge of it, or s/he may want something contrary to his/her interest.51 Feinberg
concludes that welfare interests are objectively identifiable, irrespective of belief.
This explains why we perceive incapacitated humans still to possess interests.
Patients (A)-(D) (above) could possess 'welfare' interests in health, freedom from
pain, tolerable environment and relationships. Patient (E) might possess an
(objective) welfare interest only in continuance of life (such as it is).53 In contrast,
ulterior goals demand reflectivity and, additionally, relevant wants must be
realistic,54 ends in themselves,55 and 'capable of promotion by human effort'.56 This
accords with having realistic scope for individual investment; investment making it a





See, especially Harm to Others, above, 38-45.
50
Ibid, 37.
51 See ibid, 38.
52
Ibid, 42. These might equally be termed 'commonly human interests'.
53
However, 'surviving' interests are considered below, Chapter 7.
54 I.e. more than an unattainable wish, ibid 42-43.
55 I.e. not mere means to other ends, ibid.
56 I.e. the individual can do something to promote it, ibid, 44.
57 See ibid, 56-61.
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To include IcPs it is submitted that desires should be sufficient, but not
necessary,59 to interest attribution, as 'common' interests may also apply despite
incapacity. A purely desire-based source of interests completely closes the gate on
best interests, whereas purely needs-based interests can render possession of interests
meaningless. Feinberg's delineation of welfare and ulterior interests enables
controlled expansion of interest sources that includes IcPs appropriately as interest¬
holders. Applied to IcPs, ulterior interests may be held in proportion to residual
capacity (as reflective capacity and belief are unnecessary, merely requiring the
'want' as a realistic, promotable end). Furthermore, even in severe incapacity, IcPs
can have welfare interests, requiring no sophisticated mental state.
3.3 Purposive interests
The purpose of interests concerns the objective that we seek when employing
interests.
3.3.1 The goal of interests
Interests operate to achieve valuable ends, that is, ends that are of inherent
value. Understanding these values aids our conceptual understanding of interests by
contextualising it. Two values dominate healthcare choices: autonomy and welfare.
Each is considered later in this thesis.60 Here, it is intended merely to introduce the
relationship between value and interest. In essence, value is used in a justificatory
way in decision-making; a decision-maker may appeal to a particular value to
substantiate the importance of certain interests. Different values may support
different treatment actions. But, as value systems are individualistic, there may be
no definitively 'right' attribution of value, only a 'supportable' one. Because values
lie at a high level of abstraction they gain practical application only through interests.
Our values shape our interests, and our interests serve our values. The relationship is
one of appeal and support. A value supports recognition of an interest by (1)
encouraging us to assess the importance of the value, and (2) requiring consideration
of the extent to which an interest serves that value. Some associations are axiomatic:
an interest in freedom from pain appeals to, and is supported by, quality of life (life
58 I.e. desires can give rise to interests.
59 I.e. that only desires can give rise to interests.
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is manifestly better if pain-free). Alternatively, an interest in bodily integrity serves,
and is supported by, the value of autonomy because bodily integrity concerns control
over one's person.
Beyond these examples, the interest/value relationship is far more complex. One
may appeal to, and derive support from, both values simultaneously. For example,
our interest in continued life serves our existence as autonomous agents and furthers
experiences comprising good quality of life. Moreover, appeal may be indirect,
where an interest in dignity serves our autonomy and quality of life through
perception by family/friends. Indeed, autonomy itself is one facet of good quality of
life. Hence, the value/value, and interest/value, relationships are not discrete, but a
series of complex interrelationships ofmutual support and (sometimes) conflict.
While judicial appeal may presently be made to autonomy and welfare, this thesis
argues that these values are not yet employed to full and proper effect. Vague,
justificatory allusion to value is insufficient. Patient well-being is the overall
decision purpose; treatment choice strives to achieve this end. In view of the
complex interrelationships between values and interests, seeking to promote purely
(subjective) self-determination or (objective) welfare, risks over-simplification and
poor evaluation of contribution to an IcP's overall well-being. As Dworkin suggests
'[tjhere is an intellectual error...whenever autonomy has been defended as
crucial or fundamental...the notion is elevated to a higher status than it
deserves...although it is important to respect the autonomy of others, it is
also important to respect their welfare, or their liberty, or their rationality'.61
In contrast, Feinberg believes that where conflict occurs between self-determination
and (objective) well-being,
'[h]e has a sovereign right to choose in a manner we think, plausibly enough,
to be foolish, provided only that the choices are truly voluntary'.62
However, Feinberg's qualification of 'voluntariness' does not deem incompetent
persons 'voluntary'.63 Further, he places voluntariness on a sliding scale
60
Autonomy in Chapter 4, and welfare in Chapter 5.
61 G. Dworkin, above, 32.
62 J. Feinberg, Harm to self, The moral limits of the criminal law, Vol. 3 (1986) Oxford U.P. Inc., New
York, 61.
63 See ibid, 106.
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commensurate with degree and irrevocability of harm.64 Buchanan and Brock
suggest that these limitations effectively encompass balancing of self-determination
and well-being. 5 Where autonomy is compromised, it invites welfare to step into
the breach. But, this can give rise to excessive paternalism. In truth, every life
combines both autonomy and welfare, and sometimes requires compromise between
the two. Transparency of any compromise is crucial where another person's well-
being is the decision's prime focus. Aliter, a decision stands unjustified and its
purpose unveiled. How then do interests serve a goal of patient well-being?
3.3.2 The role of interests
Interests are a tangible means of assessing a treatment option's impact and the
dis/service of desirable values.
3.3.2.1 Impact assessment
Feinberg makes a detailed analysis of the meaning of 'harm'.66 Relevant to this
context, he suggests 'harm' to be
'the thwarting, setting back, or defeating of an interest'.67
He distinguishes this from 'wronging', which is
'indefensible...conduct [which] violates the other's right'.
However, Feinberg further distinguishes between a state of harm and a harmful act,69
and distinguishes 'harms' from other states which, while unpleasant or undesirable,
he considers do not amount to 'harm'.70 Effectively, this excludes de minimis hurts.
Impact (harm/benefit) is inescapably relevant. It allows decision-makers to
speculate about relative values through concrete evaluation of the consequences of
particular decision on certain identified interests. However, our perception of
64 See ibid, 118-121.
65 A.E. Buchanan and D.W. Brock, Deciding for others, The ethics of surrogate decision making
(1990) Cambridge U.P. 45.
66 See particularly Harm to others, above, 32-35.
67
Ibid, 33. This is gauged by 'whether that interest is in a worse condition than it would otherwise
have been in had the invasion [of the interest] not occurred at all', ibid, 34.
68
Ibid, 34. Feinberg argues that although wronging often invades an interest, it does not necessarily
set it back; an interest-holder may benefit, or a person's interest may be set back without being
wronged because invasion is justifiable or he has consented, ibid 34-35.
69 See Feinberg, Freedom and Fufillment, above, 6: states of harm may accrue from natural (non-
acted) events.
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harm/benefit may influence the types of interest open to harm. As Childress
suggests:
'[t]he object of harm is always an interest...But there are both broad and
narrow definitions of "harm" according to the range of interests involved. In
a narrow definition, harm is viewed as damage to physical and perhaps
mental interests, which are distinguished from other interests. In a broad
definition, various interests are included, such as life, health, property,
familial relations, privacy and liberty. Harm is damage to any of those
interests'.71
Arguably, the relationship between harm (or benefit) and interests is symbiotic; the
range of interests admitted has equal implications for scope of impact. Thus, in IcP
decisions, it is important that we are clear about which interests an IcP may possess
because this shapes our perception of impact, thereby influencing conflict resolution.
Harm and benefit have increased ethical significance in healthcare through non-
maleficence and beneficence, respectively.72 Furthermore, existing judicial
assessments of impact include:
• harmful pain/suffering, coupled with lack of long-term benefit justifying
-7-1
withdrawal of treatment from severely defective neonates, and adults m
i • • 74
low cognitive awareness states;
• harm to a pregnant woman's physical health, and assumed psychological
7S
harm predicated on natal death, justifying enforced Caesarean;
• psychological benefit to a patient's relationship interests justifying
invading her bodily integrity interest, thereby benefiting another;76
70 See Feinberg, Harm to others, above, 45-51.
71 J.F. Childress, Who should decide? Paternalism in health care (1982) Oxford U.P. New York, 108,
citing J. Feinberg. Childress adopts a broad definition.
72 Harm-avoidance has prime importance; primum non nocere ('first do no harm'). However, the
subjects of non-maleficence and beneficence may differ: moral agents may exercise non-maleficence
to all persons (i.e. refrain from harming anyone), but cannot logically accord beneficence to all
persons (i.e. it is not humanly possible to positively benefit everyone). See Beauchamp and Childress,
Principles of biomedical ethics (1994) Oxford U.P. Inc., New York, 262.
73
E.g. Re C (A minor)(Wardship: medical treatment) [1989] 2 All ER 782; Re C (A baby) [1996] 2
FLR 43; Re C (A minor)(Medical treatment) [1998] 1 FLR 384; A National Health Service (NHS)
Tmst v D [2000] 2 FCR 577.
74 Discussed above, Chapter 2.
75
E.g. Norfolk & Norwich Healthcare (NHS) Trust v W [1996] 2 FLR 613.
76
E.g. Re Y [1996] 2 FLR 787.
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• however, benefit to a patient's interest in continued life may not justify
• 77
invading his self-determination interest.
Criticisms already raised indicate that the balance of harm/benefit is not always
sound.78 Moreover, range and possession of interests strongly influences what we
perceive as a decision's purpose, and exerts a direct effect on how we choose to
balance conflicting impact on interest objects. Further, the degree of impact varies at
different stages of an IcP's life, and during different mental states, and some impacts
remain contentious, such as the relevance of impact on persons other than the IcP.
However, prior to further consideration of interests, an important distinction must be
outlined regarding the role of interests.
3.3.2.2 'In', 'against' and 'not in/against' interests
'In interests' denotes impact of an action as beneficial, promoting a patient's
interests and contributing to his/her overall well-being. We can view impact as a
harm-benefit continuum, an action 'in X's interests' lying to the 'benefit' end of the
continuum.79 In contrast, where an action's effect is detrimental to a patient's
interests, diminishing well-being, it is 'against his/her interests'; lying towards the
harmful end of the continuum. In IcP treatment decisions, we clearly seek a course of
action 'in' the patient's interests,80 rather than 'against' them. A further position
warrants distinction: 'neither in nor against' interests is highlighted by Gillon in
relation to best interests, such that:
'[i]t is not in my best interests if Jones rather than Smith wins a prize - but
81
neither is it against my best interests'.
On a theoretical level this distinction represents a point on the continuum where an
action's impact is neutral, having no impact at all on a person's interests. This
distinction appears significant in treatment withdrawal from p.v.s. patients. In Bland,
the House of Lords concluded continued prolongation of life to be 'not in' his
interests; it could not benefit him by enabling recovery, nor harm him (as he was
77




Feinberg outlines a harm-benefit continuum, see Harm to others, above, 137-138, diagrams 1 and 2.
80 This need not preclude withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, however. Arguably, where
maintaining life is futile or harmful to the IcP, and the patient has only a very limited range of
interests, death may be 'in' his/her interests, as it frees the patient from pain/suffering/bodily invasion.
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insensate and unaware). If so, then pvs is an exceptional neutral state, where either
action (withdrawing or continuing treatment) is 'not relevant' to patient well-being.
On this view, death might be what Feinberg would term a 'non-benefit'.83 By
corollary, death could equally be a 'non-harm' so far as a p.v.s. patient is concerned.
Being already in a form of living death, his/her biological death might seem to make
little difference to the patient. However, some value still seemed to be placed on
Anthony Bland's life, in the sense that allowing him to die still required justification.
The Law Lords posited justification less in interests than in the idea of life being of
no further benefit to Bland, and continued intervention amounting to a source of
indignity and harm. While this is correct in terms of impact, the very recognition of
such impact implicitly imports interests. An impact cannot occur unless there are
interests to be so affected. Rather, it is submitted that the impact is better explained
in terms of our valuing 'life' in a wider sense (i.e. more than biological). It is the
loss of experiential life, and the consequent wholly negative impact of continued
biological life on remaining non-experiential interests (such as bodily integrity) that
.... . . 84
provides the justification for allowing Bland to die. However, account should also
be taken of the patient's subjective interests. This argument is developed in Chapters
5 and 7, below.
Thus, at this point, two objections may be raised to the idea of an action being
neither in nor against an IcP's interests. First, nil effect upon interests depends on
the interest concept. Adopting a broad concept would attribute even p.v.s. patients
with some residual interests. Given that a treatment decision concerns an IcP
or
personally, (not third party interests as in Gillon's Smith/Jones example), it is
unlikely to have no effect at all. Second, the addition of the superlative 'best' appears
to commit us to an either/or situation; treatment being either optimal or non-optimal.
On this basis, the theoretical distinction between 'neither in nor against' and 'against'
interests becomes a distinction without difference; both represent non-optimal
81 R. Gillon, [1998], above, 75, in an editorial response to my published paper on p.v.s., above.
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Exceptional because every other IcP, even in low cognitive-awareness states, has (albeit limited)
interests.
83 See Feinberg, Harm to others, above, 139.
84 See also R. Dworkin's view ofBland's experiential interests, discussed below.
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actions. However, if our aim is to achieve the best outcome possible in terms of
engaging in the best possible decisional process - rather than the best outcome in
terms of an aspirational, and often unattainable, optimal decision - then we are no
longer in an either/or situation, but can weigh all factors in the balance, their degree
of influence varying depending on where they fall on the continuum of impact. It is
submitted that this is the better approach, and this process is developed in Chapter 8.
3.3.2.3 Interest sets
Interest sets substantiate the relationship between interests and value. They represent
a collective identity of stakes, grouped according to their role in a person's life.
Grouping interests within a classification illuminates associations between particular
interests, and between interests and interest-holders. The nature of interests may be
87 • • • 88
explored through 'welfare/ulterior', and 'experiential/critical' interests.
3.3.2.3.1 Welfare and ulterior interests
Feinberg's classification of welfare and ulterior interests has been outlined briefly
earlier. He views welfare interests as 'minimal but nonultimate goods'.89 These
include: continuance of life; physical health; integrity and functioning of one's body;
absence of pain and suffering; minimal intellectual acuity; emotional stability;
absence of groundless anxieties; social capacity; minimal income; tolerable
environment and freedom from coercion.90 Thus, 'welfare' interests represent the
basics of life that most of us take for granted. These provide the necessary stability
for development of individualistic desires; they are facilitative.91 Feinberg rightly
Q?
acknowledges that such interests are necessary but not sufficient for a good life.
Yet, their absence fundamentally undermines an individual's capacity for
achievement of 'ulterior' interests, which are:
Both objections are raised in my response letter (re. Gillon's editorial), above [1999] 59.
87 Per Feinberg, above.
88 Per R. Dworkin, below.
89 Harm to others, above, 37.
90 See ibid.
91 See J. Feinberg, ibid.
92 Ibid.
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'a person's more ultimate goals and aspirations...such aims as producing good
novels or works of art, solving a crucial scientific problem...successfully
Q-J
raising a family...achieving [in] sport...[or] ameliorating human suffering'.
Ulterior interests are valued subjectively as contributing to an individual's
conception of a 'good' life. Feinberg's distinction is useful because:
• it supports the view that interests arise from both needs and desires.
Reflective capacity is not a prerequisite to welfare interests, but is crucial
to ulterior interests;
• the groupings account for the fundamental quality of certain interests,
which have both intrinsic and facilitative value (i.e. welfare interests);
• Feinberg's posited relationship between welfare and ulterior interests
reinforces the complex nature of an individual's interests. Indeed,
'[w]hen [welfare interests]...are blocked or damaged, a person is very
seriously harmed indeed, for in that case his more ultimate aspirations are
defeated too'.94
Thus, both interest groups serve a common goal of individual well-being.
But, the role of each group differs: welfare interests being stakes in
participative existence, and ulterior interests serving reflective choice.
Feinberg clearly finds welfare interests under common ownership, being
'of a kind shared by nearly all his fellows, in the necessary means to his
more ultimate goals'.95
Welfare interests (such as health, life, tolerable environment and economic
sufficiency) are important to many people. We can attribute them as objectively
valuable, whereas ulterior interests are highly subjective and a matter of choice for
individual value. Welfare interests could be seen as springing from objectively
identifiable needs, while ulterior interests arise from subjective desires. However,
this is overly simplistic because welfare interests may be desired as well as needed,
and may be subjectively perceived. Pragmatically, the issue is one of possession; it
is more useful to regard welfare interests as commonly owned by persons generally as
93 See Feinberg, ibid, 37.
94 J. Feinberg, ibid.
95 Ibid.
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this does not create spurious classes attributing only needs to IcPs and desire-based
interests to competent individuals.
However, contrasting welfare with ulterior interests shows why incapacity is so
threatening to interests. Incapacity, which may accrue through lack of 'intellectual
acuity', 'emotional instability', compulsive anxiety, or 'coercion',96 interferes with a
patient's integrity and functioning, undermining the stable minimums of welfare
interests. Additionally, illness damages welfare interests themselves by threatening
life, causing pain, damaging relationships, or making for intolerable physical
environment. Incapacity and illness harm a patient's welfare interests and, therefore,
can seriously invade a patient's ulterior interests, eventually diminishing the value of
the patient's autonomy and quality of life. Proxy treatment decisions seek to restore
these values where possible.
But, in many cases conflict occurs within and between interest groups. A series of
examples is useful:
• where a patient suffers severe intellectual impairment, focus may be
limited to improving basic welfare goals, such as reducing pain,
improving environment, and enabling physical functioning, while
minimising harm to bodily integrity;
• in a severe situation, such as low cognitive awareness, all hope of
restoring autonomy value is gone, and welfare interests become yet more
restricted. Our choice may be limited to: (1) withdrawing treatment
(defeating an interest in continued life but promoting an interest in
freedom from pain); or, (2) continuing treatment (which may cause pain
but promotes continued life). Thus, while all welfare interests may be
owned by IcPs, realistically the degree of incapacity may limit a patient's
range of welfare interests;
• in relation to neonates and young minors a temporal aspect is added; the
patient's welfare interests may develop over time. Where incapacity is
severe, and life expectancy short, this development is precluded,
restricting focus to fundamental welfare. However, where a patient is
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curable,97 a conflict arises between his/her immediate welfare interests
and longer-term ulterior interests. Here, the patient's current condition
sets back his/her welfare interest (in health), yet curability means that
his/her long-term ulterior interests need not automatically be thwarted.
Thus, giving treatment may: (1) set back some current and long-term
welfare interests (i.e. freedom from pain and commitment to further
procedures/medication); while, (2) promoting other welfare interests
(particularly continued life that facilitates ulterior interest development).
In contrast, withholding treatment simultaneously: (1) promotes current
welfare interests (in bodily integrity and freedom from pain); while (2)
thwarting a longer-term welfare interests of continued life (thereby
defeating development of ulterior interests). Either action causes
conflict. Ultimate choice turns upon the decision-maker's perceived
combination of value commitments.
An alternative grouping of interests throws a different light on the role of interests.
3.3.2.4 Experiential and critical interests
Dworkin considers the nature of interests in the context of life/death decisions. He
defines experiential interests as things
'we like the experience of doing...the value of these experiences...depends
precisely on the fact that we do find them pleasurable or exciting as
experiences' ,98
These may be basic day-to-day interests, but they are subjective and based in
capacity for sense. This admits a broader range of interest-holders than basing
. . 99
interests in cognition.
In contrast, Dworkin regards critical interests as
'interests that it does make their life genuinely better to satisfy, interests they
would be mistaken, and genuinely worse off, if they did not
96 On Feinberg's view, discussed above.
97
E.g. Re T [1996] 1 All ER 906.
98 R. Dworkin, Life's dominion, An argument about abortion and euthanasia (1993)
HarperCollinsPublishers, 201. Dworkin's examples include watching football, walking, listening to
music, or working, ibid.
99 Animals could possess experiential interests through capacity for pain/pleasure.
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recognize...[t]hey represent critical judgments rather than just experiential
preferences'.100
Critical interests are value-based judgments about what makes life good. In a sense
they are similar to Feinberg's ulterior interests, both concerning aims or (reflective)
valuable ends. However, critical interests need not be profound, nor mandate
reflective lives as more valuable.101 Rather, they concern
1 09
'what is...aspirational, within most lives'.
In other words, what persons generally consider to give meaning to life. Dworkin
believes the distinction explains
'why we think that mind-changing drugs...produce long-lasting pleasure and
contentment [to the user] are not in their victims' interests: we mean they are
not in their critical interests'.103
Thus, he considers that a subject may be mistaken about what is (objectively)
important in life.104 But, he suggests that critical interests
'seem very much to depend on his personality',105
and our view of a 'good' life occurs as
'a direct response to our own specific circumstances of place, culture and
capacity'.106
This offers an important inference: the subjective/objective balance of critical
interests might shift in response, say, to a diminution in capacity. This is endorsed
by Dworkin's ultimate argument favouring decisions regarding IcPs made in sight of
individual integrity}01 Thus, in essence, Dworkin's conceptualisation finds life's
value to consist both in pleasurable experiences and things contributing to life in
a broader, more meaningful way.
Courts presently take account of experiential and critical interests in IcP decisions.
Experiential interests are clearly recognised regarding severely defective neonates by
100
Above, 201-202. Dworkin's examples include relationships, which people believe to be good, and







107 He connects integrity with time, encompassing a patient's subjective view of his critical interests
and a HCP's objective view of them. See ibid, 258-259, fn20.
132
reference to pain and suffering, which may prevail over an (objectively) critical
1 08
interest in continued life. However, experiential interests are also used as a
prerequisite to interest possession. In the p.v.s. context, Dworkin highlights that
'[sjeveral opinions in the House of Lords decision in the Bland case...simply
assumed that only experiential interests can matter...and therefore had no
difficulty in deciding that it could be neither in nor against Anthony Bland's
interests that his life support be discontinued'.109
Critical interests were not considered in the absence of experiential capacity.
Arguably, in p.v.s. an objective critical interest might signify death being in the
patient's interest, because continued life serves neither quality of life nor autonomy.
Alternatively, recognising a subjective critical interest could admit the patient's
former views as relevant. In short, the decision-maker's position on relative
importance of experiential and critical interests depends on the value that s/he seeks
to promote. While Feinberg's classification identifies interest sources, Dworkin's
experiential/critical distinction acknowledges the contribution interests make to an
individual's life, being
'two kinds of reasons people have for wanting their lives to go one way
rather than another'.110
In particular, by according importance to a patient's experiences we can respect
individuality despite lack of reflective capacity.
3.3.2.5 Objective/subjective perceptions of interests
Benn groups interests specifically on an objective/subjective basis. He distinguishes
between
'perceived interests, what...[a person]...believes would make him better of,
from his real interests, the conditions under which he really would be better
off, whether he believes it or not'.111
In essence, perceived interests comprise a subject's own view of his/her interests
(whether welfare or ulterior, experiential or critical). Perception requires capacity for
cognition. In contrast, Benn considers real interests to consist in factual conditions;
108
However, regarding mature minors courts impose a negative treatment experience (by authorising
treatment contrary to patient wishes), because of an (objective) critical interest in continued life






these interests would, in fact, bring advantage/benefit to a person irrespective of
his/her perception. This allows for interest possession even where a subject is
mistaken, or in denial, or unable to perceive his/her interests or any impact on them.
However, surety of advantage can be difficult to ascertain, certainly in application to
treatment decisions where the result is contingent on, say, an operation proceeding
smoothly or a treatment's efficacy. Additionally, overall gain/loss can be difficult to
determine. Thus, even Benn's 'real' interests comprise a set of objective beliefs
about another individual's interests.
The subjective perceptions of a competent patient about his/her interests prevail over
any objective view (no matter how 'real'), due to dominance of the autonomy value.
However, the same is not true for the incompetent patient, where commitment to
perceived interests diminishes with incapacity, which increases patient susceptibility
to mistake or misunderstanding. The present threshold for admission of perceived
interests is high; evinced by the few cases according importance to an IcP's
119
subjective views. Soft paternalism in relation to IcPs tends to warrant invocation
of an (objective) quality of life value where a patient's (subjective) autonomy is
diminished.
However, incapaces may perceive interests in some aspects of their life, but not
others. For example, an incapax may be able to perceive a relationship as
subjectively valuable, but be unable to understand the complex possibility of harm.
This thesis argues that: (1) significance may still be accorded to an IcP's perceptions
if s/he has requisite understanding of the particular aspect in question; and (2)
perceptions and beliefs change over time, an IcP may have had relevant perceptions
previously,113 or may develop them in future.114 On this basis, perceived beliefs are
not an 'all-or-nothing', 'now-or-never' concept. The role of objectivity and
subjectivity vary regarding different aspects of life, and over time. Subjectivity may
have a role regarding 'incompetent' patients.115
111 S.I. Benn, above, 105.
112
E.g. Re C [1994] 1 WLR 290, St George's case [1998] 2 FLR 728. In contrast, numerous IcP cases
endorse an objective (medical) view of IcP interests, see supra Chapter 2.
113
E.g. a p.v.s. patient may have held complex beliefs about his/her life and interests.
114
E.g. a neonate/infant may develop beliefs in time.
115
Developed in Chapters 4 and 6-8.
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In summary, the subjective/objective balance plays an important three-way role: it
reflects value balance; locates decision-making perspective; and influences
subjective input. However, subjective/objective perspective should not dictate
possession of interests. Hence, a distinction should be made between having, taking,
and knowing of an interest.
3.3.2.6 Taking, having and knowing
The distinction between having an interest, knowing of it and taking an interest is
important regarding IcPs. Incapacity may impair cognitive capacity (which
diminishes an IcP's ability to know of an interest), or it may inhibit capacity to
exercise cognition (i.e. take an interest). However, it is submitted, even incapacitated
patients may still be interest-holders (i.e. have interests).
Knowing of an interest accrues from beliefs about possession, and it has already
been argued that some interests are objectively identifiable independent of a patient's
beliefs."6 In essence, an interest may be objectively held (and harmed/benefited),
despite subjective unawareness.
Taking an interest concerns engagement; a person takes an interest if s/he considers
it or exercises it.117 An IcP could have interests (that a proxy should engage with),
despite inability actively to take any interest. Frey, for example, suggests that a
comatose patient may be attributed with a commonly human interest in good health
110
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despite inability to take an interest in it. He rightly concludes that it is
'a mistake always to conflate having an interest with taking an interest, a
distinction which it seems especially important to observe in comatose
cases.. .[where] it does not follow - and I am inclined to think it dangerous to
think otherwise - that she does not have an interest in what happens to
her'.119
Incapacity clearly may disable a patient from taking an interest. However, in proxy
decisions an IcP has an interest in X, which the proxy takes on the patient's behalf, by
recognising, considering and weighing it.







Inability to take an interest may limit the range of interests that an IcP has. A
defective, sentient neonate has interests in freedom from pain and bodily integrity,
but where treatment is futile, and life expectancy short, s/he has no opportunity to
develop ulterior/subjective interests. In other words, because s/he will never be able
to take an interest it becomes unrealistic to attribute possession of such interests.
Thus, while taking and having should not be simply conflated, we must accept that
permanent inability to take interest may preclude attribution.
Frey's view of the 'comatose' individual runs contrary to the current judicial position
on p.v.s., which negates interest possession due to inability to take or know of -
experience - one's interests. On Frey's account, a p.v.s. patient's permanent inability
to take an interest would not preclude possession. This is surely the better view. For
example, if a p.v.s. patient were subjected to sexual assault this should amount to an
invasion of an interest in bodily integrity, despite the patient neither knowing of, or
taking, an interest in bodily integrity because s/he should still have interests meriting
respect and protection through human status or possession prior to entry to p.v.s.
Yet, the current conflation of interest possession and knowledge of, or engagement
with, one's interests would deny any such infringement. Brock and Buchanan also
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acknowledge the distinction in terms of 'surviving interests'. Thus, even in
extreme incapacity, having interests should be independent of taking/knowing of
them. A further distinction must be raised regarding the functionality of interests,
clarifying interests-overall and single-interest terminology.
3.3.2.7 'Interest in' contrasted with 'in interests'
Fundamentally, a distinction should be made between: (1) having an 'interest in'
something, and (2) that which is 'in [someone's] interests'. First, an individual may
have an interest 'in' a particular value or outcome. This is a matter of the object of
the process, that is, what is the interest aimed at protecting? Thus, I might have an
interest in a good quality of life or in autonomous decision-making. This is to be
contrasted with identifying that certain things may be in my interests. Here the focus
is me, that is, I am the subject of attention, and the purpose is to act in my (overall)




certain objects in which I might have an interest. Hence, for clarity this thesis adopts
the following terminology:
• an IcP may have an interest in (singular) a particular object, such as
bodily integrity;
• where several interest objects are relevant, an IcP can cumulatively
possess interests in (plural) them;
• however, both differ from impact; an action may be in the IcP's
interests (overall),121 or against an IcP's interests (overall).122
The objects that a patient has interest(s) in may be objective (i.e. from the 'common'
or 'welfare' groups), or subjective (i.e. ulterior, experiential, or subjectively critical).
Furthermore, either classification (interest[s] in the particular, and in interests
overall) may be perceived subjectively or objectively.
Thus, 'interest(s)' serve a variety of roles. They represent the single interest 'objects'
in which a patient has a stake. These objects may be common to persons generally, or
individualistic. They may also be basic and facilitative, or ulterior goals and
aspirations, and may be mutually supportive or conflicting. In contrast, in (ox
against, or neither in nor against) a patient's interests refers to an action's impact on
a patient's interests overall; whether an action cumulatively improves or impairs
his/her overall well-being. Impact may be perceived subjectively or objectively, but
the latter dominates regarding IcPs.
3.4 Objects of interests
3.4.1 Nature of objects
'Objects' describe those things an IcP has an interest in, that is, the particular things
in which a stake resides.123 Applied to IcPs, objects might include 'dignity', 'freedom
from pain', and 'bodily integrity'. Recognition of an interest object triggers a certain
normative response:
121 I.e. promotes the IcP's interests in an overall sense.
122 I.e. harms the patient's interests overall.
123 See also Benn, above, 267.
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'it signals the sort of behaviour which is appropriate to the object'.124
This might mean in relation to an IcP's dignity that our actions should not subject
him/her to inhuman behaviour, ridicule, or degrading treatment. However, objects
also offer the substance of an IcP's interests and have formed a central judicial focus
thus far, both expressly and implicitly. For example:
• referring to a 'life full of pain' implicitly accepts an IcP's interest in
freedom from pain;
• requirement of judicial sanction recognises the gravity of invading an
IcP's interest in bodily integrity;
• referring to the effect of continued treatment on an IcP's family/nursing
staff alludes to a patient's interest in dignity;
• identifying an IcP's enjoyment of relationships/affection accords
significance to his/her interest in sexual freedom; and,
• reference to futility infers a patient's interest in continued life may have
ceased.
Objects often represent the sub-text of judgments; express reference to factors
alluding, in a vaguely justificatory way, to an IcP's interest objects. Recent
redefinition more willingly includes interest objects expressly. But, it is far from
clear how these objects fit together, or how relative weightings are attributed. In
other words, doubts remain about why - and to what extent - interest objects are
important for an individual patient.
Certainly, relevant objects may include things in which the patient takes a subjective
interest (e.g. religion), or objectively has an interest (e.g. good health), or that arise
from needs (e.g. freedom from pain). Further, objects may be facilitative
(contributing to welfare, thereby facilitating ulterior goals), or ends in themselves





The range of IcP interests is potentially broad, including: health, care; freedom from
pain; bodily integrity; dignity; privacy; reputation; relationships (including well-
being of family/friends); being heard; psychological well-being; and, ultimately,
quality of death. IcPs are people, with likes and dislikes, views and responses,
drives, values and concerns. Admittedly, incapacity may rob them of reflectivity,
and may deprive them of (objectively) 'well-thought-out' reasons. But, nevertheless
many have (or previously had, or may develop) personal, subjective responses. At
present, little space is allowed for IcPs' subjectively valued objects, because the
practical range of interest objects is limited by:
• imposition of reflective capacity as a gateway. At present, a patient is
either (1) 'competent' to decide, whereby subjectivity dominates, or (2)
'incompetent', requiring little account of his/her subjective views. This
dictates non-acceptance of certain interest objects. For example, the
... 1 9 S
interest in privacy may be overlooked regarding IcPs, or the impact of
enforced treatment on psychological health ignored.126 In reality,
incapacity is a matter of degree (even though competency is a threshold)
and the relevance of subjective interest objects should vary with that
degree;
• the way interest function is viewed means that some of the distinctions
outlined are not considered by courts.127 Thus, some interests are not
recognised with objective input only being favoured, or limiting interests
to experiential possession. Further, how we perceive harm may cause
rejection of certain objects, such as an interest in quality of death,128 or
an interest in relationship;
• conflict of objects across the range appears likely to increase with the
breadth of admissible interests. However, the answer lies in
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Indeed, D. Carson argues that little scope is given for incapax patients to develop relationships due
to lack of patient privacy in institutions, The sexuality of people with learning difficulties (1989) J.
Soc. Welf. Law, 355, 360.
126 Discussed above, chapter 2.
127
E.g.: objective/subjective; 'in'/'not in'/'againsf; 'interests in' cf. 'in interests'; and 'having'
contrasted with 'taking/knowing' of an interest.
128
Namely, that people can have a death relatively free from pain/prolonged suffering.
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understanding the role of objects decisions. Where decisions focus on
specific, low-level object conflict, inconsistency occurs and the means
and reasons for resolution are obscured. Conflict at object level really
represents higher-level value conflict, as interest objects serve higher
values. Thus, we could expand the range of relevant interest objects
provided that: we set gateways appropriate to interest possession by
129 1 • •
IcPs; we acknowledge that, while these interest objects give content to
IcP interests, they are representations of interest function, serving
particular values; we are aware of the complex inter-connections of
1 ^0
interest objects; and we are clear about value, resolving our conflicting
role commitments to different values in order to support relative
weightings at object level. Hence, sound resolution of conflict derives
from appeal to value.131
How can objects, purpose and values be usefully represented? One relevant




Feinberg proffers interest networks as a means to identify relative degrees of
ulteriority regarding instrumental wants,132 welfare interests,133 and focal aims.134
His diagrammatic network represents complex interrelationships between the three
1 T5
classifications in 'self-regenerative' fulfilment:
129 Considered further, below, Chapter 4 and paragraph 7.2.
130 I.e. interest groupings, perspective, and impact.
131 See Chapters 4-8, below.
132 Harm to others, above, 55-61, i.e. wants that are 'linked up, either as a means or as necessary
conditions, to the advancement ofmore ulterior goals'.
133 I.e. necessary but barely sufficient interests for 'good life', ibid, 57.
134 I.e. ulterior goals, ibid, 59-60.
135 See ibid, 61, diagram 4.
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'new interests regularly emerging from old ones to be advanced
harmoniously with their progenitors'.136
Feinberg's reference to 'harmonious advancement' alludes to a drive towards what is
in a person's (overall) interests.137 Thus, Feinberg's network (in the context of
criminal prohibition of harm) provides an image of connected interests, some
facilitative, some necessary, and some ultimate ends, which represent a person's
stakes and fuel one another.
The conceptual strength of his network lies in representing the relativity of interests.
It allows us to see the complex interrelationships within an individual's interests,
and exposes the creative and conflicting nature of interests. In application to IcPs, an
interest network could encourage us to stand back from the interest concept, enabling
us to see:
• single interest objects as inherently valuable (in the particular), and in
relation to other interests (as part of the cumulative impetus);
• that some interests are necessary means to others, their value being
mainly facilitative. For example, an interest of an incapax in avoiding
pregnancy (i.e. maintaining good physical and mental health) valuably
facilitates her ulterior interest in relationship. The nature of some
interests is to serve other parts of a patient's interest network. The
decision-maker must be aware of the potential to undermine such
facilitation to those connected parts of the network (this explains why
invasion of fundamental interests, such as withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment or imposing medical intervention against an IcP's will, needs to
be clearly and substantially justified);
• the mutual support and conflict of interests, which may be direct,138 or
1 TQ
indirect. As our interest objects do not exist discretely,




E.g. promoting an IcP's interest in health, yet conflicting with his/her interest in bodily integrity.
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Arising from knock-on effects of invading one interest to secure another. For example, promoting
a mature minor's interest in health may (directly) conflict with his/her bodily integrity, and may
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It is apparent from this application that while conflict does not make interests less
valuable within a network, we must be clear-sighted about the (direct or indirect)
extent of any conflict on the overall impact. Furthermore, an interest network
suggests interests to be dynamic; certain interests generating others, and enabling
interest objects to change over time in response to circumstance. These issues of
conflict resolution and interest ascertainment as a process are developed in due
140
course.
Impact is an important aspect of decision-making regarding interests, concerning the
effect an action has upon an IcP's stakes. Certain impacts may be allied to single
interests, such as promoting, thwarting (i.e. preventing or blocking furtherance),141
setting back (i.e. reversing progress),142 or damaging an interest object. However,
benefit and harm can be used to express cumulative impact on an interest network
overall. Benefit can represent positive advantage to an IcP's interests overall. This is
the prime objective of best interests - to benefit or bring gain to an IcP's cumulative
interests. In this sense, an action that benefits an IcP is in his/her interests overall,
because: (1) it serves existing interests; and (2) it enables his/her future interests to
develop where possible. Harm is damage to, or diminution of, an IcP's overall
interest network, comprising actions against an IcP's interests. An action might
alternatively be impact-neutral, where a patient's overall interest network is neither
benefited nor harmed. This impact would be 'neither in nor against' a patient's
interests, and has been employed in treatment withdrawal from p.v.s. patients.143
However, this impact would virtually never occur if interests were construed as
inclusive and wide-ranging.
Evaluating impact on a network is difficult, requiring assessment of: (1) the
importance of impacts on single interests; (2) connective impact - support or conflict
of single impacts relative to one another; (3) where conflict is irresolvable, impacts
must be set-off (i.e. a negative impact accepted in order to promote another interest);
and (4) a choice made about what best serves decision purpose overall. Assessing




141 See Feinberg, Harm to others, above, 53.
142 Ibid.
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relative importance and overall impact almost invariably involves balancing and
paramountcy - that is, some form of value preferencing. Such preferencing requires
points of reference, and recognition of IcP input and individuality could make a
significant additional contribution to the existing position. However, the welfare of
IcPs is also important, particularly where no IcP input is, has been or will ever be
available. Balancing represents the final part of the decision process and is
considered later.144 It is sufficient here to note that value preference is inevitable in
proxy decisions because conflict requires some choice of compromise to be made.
Some undesirable impact(s) are often the price to be paid for positive gains. A
decision-maker seeks an action most beneficial to a patient's interests, on balance.
But, attributing importance - weighing - is no simple task. For, as Feinberg notes:
'[i]t is impossible to prepare a detailed manual with the exact "weights" of all
human interests'.145
However, some guiding features are identifiable. In the harm context, Feinberg
advocates an initial reference to (1) likelihood of harm occurring,146 and (2) degree
of resultant harm.147 Relatedly, in risk evaluation in healthcare, Carson argues risk
should reference how probable and extensive any harmful consequences of
non/treatment are likely to be for the patient.148 Beyond this Feinberg proffers three
criteria for assessing relative importance: 'vitality' (i.e. how important or 'vital' the
interest in terms of the whole network);149 'degree of reenforcement',150 (i.e. the
more an interest is reinforced by other interests the greater its importance); and the
'inherent moral quality' of the interest. Vitality and reenforcement essentially
identify interrelationships of interest objects within networks.151 Rather, balancing
lies in value, but inherent moral value is always contentious. Relatedly, Benn
143 See discussion of Bland, supra, chapter 2.
144
Balancing builds on the concept of interests adopted and the values that are deemed important.
Relevant values are considered in Chapters 4 and 5. Subsequent chapters then embrace values under
'respect' for IcPs, and balancing within the decision process is developed in Chapter 8.
145 Harm to others, above, 203. Indeed, even if possible to do so certainty would be gained at the
expense of flexibility.
146 See ibid, 204.
147 A 'total thwarting' being more serious than invasion to 'small degree', ibid.
148 D. Carson, Risk-taking policies (1988) J. Soc. & Welf. Law, 328.
149 The greater the harm to the interest network, the more important it is. See Feinberg, above, 204-
205.
150 See ibid, 205.
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considers value in resolving conflicting role commitments. Prima facie, Benn's
diagrammatic representation of roles, locating action options and applying Pareto
curves to identify the 'best' overall action, appears to offer a solution to balancing
through 'trade-off}52 However, because IcP decisions often involve minimum
threshold values, no amount of trading-off may present an acceptable solution. In
hard cases Benn suggests that we must 'make the best of a bad job'.153 And, where
the need for a decision is inescapable,154 yet no option offers satisfactory impact, a
decision-maker must find the next-best option.155 Ultimately, this requires a value
judgment about what is important and how well treatment options fulfil those values.
This might involve according paramountcy to certain interests; choosing which value
should dominate. But, every individual has a different value system - different ideas
about what is important. One decision will rarely please everyone. However, the
alternative of adopting a 'reasonable' or 'rational' position may lack individuality.
Traditionally, in the UK, 'best interests' inclines to objectivity, regarding quality of
life paramount where autonomy is undermined. In the USA substituted judgment
standards prevail, proffering subjective patient views despite incapacity. Choice of
objective (and decision mechanism) is, therefore, a judicial policy preference based
on relative commitment to autonomy or quality of life.
Whether balancing conflict, or according paramountcy, decision-makers are
compelled to appeal to value. The seemingly irresoluble nature of IcP decisions and
gravity of impact encourages seeking of higher abstracted values to help justify our
choice of 'best' impact. Appeals to value are explored in due course.156 However,
interest content (and impact on it) is also influenced by whose input is admitted.
151 This amounts only to mapping (i.e. descriptive identification), which this thesis regards as a part of
the process prior to weighing.
152 Outlined, Chapter 1 above .
153 See S.I. Benn, above, 59-64.
154 I.e. because harm will occur if a decision is not taken.
155
Certainly, this was Ward LJ's approach in the recent conjoined twins decision, above, Chapter 2.
156
Autonomy in Chapter 4, welfare in Chapter 5 and respect in chapters 6-8.
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3.5.2 Interested parties
Whose input to the decision is warranted, and why? Overt emphasis in decisions is
on the incompetent patient as the subject of interests, but redefmitional aspects of
• *157
relationship recognition suggest some admission of relevance of other parties.
The IcP clearly has interests, but his/her input is presently very limited wherever a
finding of incompetence is made. However, the 'incompetent patient' classification
may comprise a broad range of patients and conditions, ranging from mild to severe
and temporary to permanent. It is submitted that incompetence need not negate all
relevance of patient input. For, IcPs are not all equally /«competent. Incapacity
varies in degree and nature, and duration. Thus, some IcPs may be able to give
1 SR
views and information about some aspects of a decision, or at certain times.
In addition, other sources of input include: clinicians', the judiciary-, State or society,
the patient's family, and those persons emotionally closest to the patient (i.e. partner/
spouse/friends). The input of these parties contains a value judgment based on
recognition of relationship. Some are presently more readily admitted than others.
The normative value of such recognition is discussed later.159 However, relevance
here relates to a particular type of interest that can be promoted through relationship
recognition.
Frey considers that an individual's 'vital concerns' may include concerns about the
well-being of 'them and theirs', namely his/her family and those with whom s/he
shares his/her life.160 Further, Feinberg develops a classification of 'self-regarding'
interests (which relate to one's own ulterior interests), and 'other-regarding' interests
(which focus on well-being of others).161 Although both groups are subjective, the
classification evinces that a person's interests in self and others are closely allied.
Feinberg identifies self-regarding interests as: (1) direct (promoting only the
individual's self-regarding ulterior interests); and (2) indirect (promoting only his/her
self-regarding ulterior interests by means of promoting well-being of others).162
157 See supra, Chapter 2. This is also growing relevance in the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act
2000 and proposed English reform, see above, paragraph 2.4.2.
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161 See Harm to others, above, 70-79. J.S. Mill originates the interrelationship of interests between
persons, see On Liberty (1859), reprinted Penguin Books Ltd, London (1974), Chapter IV.
162
Above, 74, diagram 1.
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Clearly, healthcare decisions concern direct self-regarding interests, for example in
acknowledging advance directives and refusal of treatment by competent patients.163
Courts do also occasionally employ indirect self-regard on an IcP's behalf; for
example in Re Y an indirect psychological benefit Y was identified through her
resulting continued familial relationship.164
In contrast, other-regarding interests are
'[a]cts that directly promote the actor's...desires for the well-being of others,
at least partly as an end in itself.165
In essence, we can view other-regarding interests as areas of overlap in the interest
networks of individuals. Other-regarding interests account for human capacities of
compassion; concern for others' well-being for their sakes,166 and because we have an
interest in being compassionate - as it reflects our part in humanity. Other-regarding
interests are difficult to attribute to IcPs because they are subjectively reflective.
Certainly, mature minors or mildly intellectually disabled patients may appreciate the
interests of others, as may any competent patient prior to incapacity. But, the courts
have approached other-regarding interests cautiously. In Re T, the mother's
responsibilities and care commitments were emphasised as part of assessment of C's
interests, and might be framed as an other-regarding interest of C. However, other-
regarding interests are more likely to be about IcPs than owned by them. Feinberg
gives an example akin to Re T in reverse; that a mother has an other-regarding
interest about her infant's well-being, at least partly for the infant's sake.167 In short,
realistic scope for attributing self and other-regarding interests to IcPs may be limited
to previously-competent, or mildly incompetent patients. However, recognising
relationship could permit the interests of others in the patient more openly. In Re Y
the court could have simply acknowledged that Y's sister had an interest in Y's
donation because of the benefit it would bring her (the sister), and to Y's family.
This more realistic interpretation appears to contradict well-established Kantian
views that (human) persons should not be a means to an end. However, suffusing
163
However, arguably no patient's interests are entirely self-regarding, as no person exists in isolation.
164
Arguably, however, the underlying motivation for authorising Y's donation could lie in the interests
of others in Y.
165
Feinberg, Harm to others, above, 74, Diagram 1. This is akin to Frey's concern about the well-
being of others.
166 But not in a purely altruistic sense, Feinberg, ibid, 74 diagram 1, and 75.
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contentious issues regarding interested parties in dubious conceptions of an IcP's
interests (rather than those of others) only clouds best interests. This thesis argues
that the relationships between IcPs and those emotionally close to them are
important. Those emotionally closest to us are concerned about our life and well-
being. Life is full of relationships - for both competent and incompetent persons -
and ignoring them is shortsighted. Rather, we could usefully regard mutual stakes to
arise from them within certain overlapping areas of an IcP's interest network.168
Again, a balance must be struck, admitting input and consideration of all network
areas, and interested parties, yet sifting this information with the interest-holder (IcP)
clearly in sight as owner of his/her network.
3.6 Concluding interests and interested parties: A connected concept
This chapter has sought to deconstruct the interest concept to explore the nature of
interests, the purpose they serve, and to whom they belong. Deconstruction was
needed as decided cases fail to elucidate these issues clearly, often failing to define a
decision's purpose, or how interests serve that purpose, and positing conflicting
interest objects. The interest concept has been shown to be more than mere
definition, being constructed from additional features woven around it. Varying the
features alters the concept, and would create different outcomes on application to IcP
decisions. These surrounding features include:
• gateways, such as reflective capacity and sources from which interests
derive (i.e. needs and desires). This dictates who may possess interests
and when;
• functional issues, including: (1) the goal or purpose of the decision that
interests serve. This value has been construed as patient well-being, and
is discussed further below;169 and (2) the role of interests (i.e. how
interests serve or detract from that purpose). This depends, in part, on
acceptance of certain distinctions, perception of 'harm' and 'benefit', and
the types of interests admitted;
See ibid, 75.
168 See further, Chapter 6.
169 Below, Chapter 5.
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• content represented in interest objects and how those interests relate to
one another; and
• subjects of interests, in terms of attribution of interests and input of
interested parties to the decision.
Acknowledging the connections between elements allows us to understand that
conflict manifest in content, or in interest attribution, may be more symptomatic of
fundamental value conflict. Judicial and medical focus on interest objects has
occluded the importance of value, making justificatory reasoning hard to trace and
conflict resolution unclear. It becomes difficult to ascertain: (1) which interests and
values conflict; (2) how we might set-off that conflict when reconciliation is
impossible; and (3) why that position is justifiable in terms of the patient's interests
overall. Unsurprisingly, a confused image of 'best' and 'interests' has accrued from
IcP decisions thus far.
We must recognise conceptual connections if IcP decision-making is to improve.
Conceptual features - gateway, goal, role, content and subject - are inter-dependent.
Each contributes to a decision, and only by recognising their connectedness can we
develop understandable, traceable, and justified reasons for treatment decisions.
Interest networks have been identified to represent connections between objects, role,
and an IcP's relationships.170 Networking interests can translate the theoretical
interest concept into a manageable framework because it encourages a proxy to take
account of a full range of an individual's interests, to consider how those interests
interact, and to focus on impact in terms of decision purpose. Because the networks
of individuals differ, their purposes may differ.171 Ultimately, conflicts of interest
may be unavoidable. A value judgement about relative harms and benefits may be
needed to locate 'best'. This chapter has argued that the broad aim of IcP treatment
170 The term 'interest network' is drawn from Joel Feinberg's work, but is then developed here in
relation to IcPs to include zones and relationships ofmutuality, see below, chapter 6.
171
E.g. in withdrawal of treatment from a defective neonate his/her commonly-valued critical interests
are predominantly future-oriented and contingent on likelihood of development, combined with
actual, experiential interests regarding current/foreseeable pain. By contrast, a p.v.s. patient's interests
are essentially backward-looking, ulterior interests concerning self and those emotionally-closest.
Experiential interests are non-existent, and future interests limited to any deemed 'surviving' (see
Chapter 7 below). Hence, the two patients' networks differ radically, as does purpose of
present/future well-being.
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decisions is to secure patient well-being. In so doing we should take account of all
relevant interests and relate them to purpose. We should be aware of how we use
interests and be prepared to address conflict. Further, we should acknowledge an
IcP's relationships, admit relevant input, and consider interests and issues from a
rounded perspective (i.e. objectively and subjectively).
We may not reconcile every interest conflict, but an informed, enlightened decision¬
maker is better able to choose reflectively to promote an IcP's well-being. This
eventual choice must be justifiable, and this depends on (1) clear expression of
conceptual understanding; and (2) appropriate appeal to value and informed
perspective. Based on the conceptual understanding herein, remaining chapters
• 179
evaluate autonomy and patient perspective, and explore the significance of welfare
and quality of life.173 Ultimately, the value of respect for persons is proffered and







AUTONOMY - A PATIENT'S PERSPECTIVE
Chapter 4 Appeal to value: Autonomy - A patient's
perspective
Appeals to value have an important role in best interests. Beyond retrospective
justification, value can proactively inform and represent purpose in IcP decisions.
Positively connecting value purpose with interest function would clarify the relative
importance of the various interests within a patient's network. This exploration of
appeal to value considers how our (implicit or express) choice of value reflects
perspective. Both factors - value promoted and perspective adopted - influence
which interests we admit and how we resolve conflict. Initially this chapter focuses
on the meaning of 'autonomy' and its value in healthcare. Incapacity causes a
breakdown in the effectiveness of an autonomy model. In this regard two issues are
identified as central to autonomy and patient perspective in IcP decisions:
competence construction; and the choice of decision mechanism, both considered in
the latter part of this chapter.
4.1 Defining autonomy
4.1.1 The nature of autonomy
Autonomy represents self-determination: deriving literally from the Greek terms for
self (autos) and rule or law (nomos).' In relation to individual autonomy, Feinberg
identifies 'four closely related meanings':
'[i]t can refer either to the capacity to govern oneself, which of course is a
matter of degree; or to the actual condition of self-government and its
associated virtues; or to an ideal of character derived from that conception;
or...to the sovereign authority to govern oneself, which is absolute within
one's own moral boundaries'.2
Ifwe apply Feinberg's approach to the IcP context then autonomy concerns:
• the ability to make choices (capacity), usually gauged against a minimum
threshold level of'competence';
• the opportunity to exercise capacity (i.e. absence of inhibitive conditions
of interference, impairment, influence or self-control);
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• limitation to, and acceptance of, the individual's role as a member of a
community (the ideal of autonomy); and
• clarity between the concept of autonomy, and the significance accorded
to choice, under what Feinberg terms 'sovereignty' (autonomy as a
right).3
In essence, therefore, patient capacity and its exercise represent the underlying
foundations of autonomous decision-making.
Hence, the prize for being recognised as autonomous individuals is, as Dworkin
simply identifies, in having
'a right to make important decisions defining their own lives for
themselves'.4
However, autonomy is not always attainable given prevailing conditions. In
Beauchamp and Childress' view there are three requisite conditions for an
'autonomous' decision: it must be (1) intentional; (2) made with understanding; and
(3) made without controlling influence (by others).5 These conditions substantiate
the abstract idea of self-determination and have parity with Feinberg's more
generalised view of capacity and conditions of self-government. Combining the two,
Feinberg's capacity relates to one's ability to understand and intend, which must be
exercised in actual conditions free from interference. Patient capacity is, therefore,
fundamental to autonomous treatment decisions. Capacity for choice is an important
part of this and unavoidably engages issues of reflectivity and preference.
But, clearly, autonomy is not merely about being free to choose,6 but about choice
based on understanding and deliberate intent. However, a dichotomy exists
1
See, for example, T.L. Beauchamp and J.F. Childress, Principles of biomedical ethics (1994) Oxford
University Press, Inc., New York, 120, R. Gillon, Philosophical Medical Ethics (1986) John Wiley &
Sons (BMJ) 60, and J. Feinberg, Harm to self, above, 27.
2
Feinberg, ibid, 28.
3 See more fully, ibid 28-51.
4 R. Dworkin, Life's Dominion, above, 222. Relatedly, Buchanan and Brock, above, 36-37, construe
self-determination as 'a person's interest in making significant decisions about his or her own life'.
5 Above, 123; Beauchamp and Childress require a 'substantial degree of understanding and freedom',
because they acknowledge that realistically 'people's actions are rarely, if ever, fully autonomous'.
6 G. Dworkin differentiates autonomy from liberty and/or power because the latter two are 'necessary
conditions' for individuality, see Theory and Practice of Autonomy, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge
(1988) 108.
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regarding the need for deliberation (or reflection) upon one's preferences in the
choice process. Dworkin suggests that
'[ajutonomy is a second-order capacity to reflect critically upon one's first-
order preferences and desires, and the ability either to identify with these or
to change them...By exercising such a capacity we define our nature, give
meaning and coherence to our lives, and take responsibility for the kind of
n
person we are'.
However, any demand for reflective capacity raises the level of the autonomy
concept. Beauchamp and Childress argue that few choosers would be autonomous
under such a standard, and that
'[n]o theory of autonomy is acceptable if it presents an ideal beyond the
reach of normal choosers'.8
On this basis, any inclusion of reflective capacity must be set at a reasonably
attainable level. Certainly, however, autonomy is important in its subjective role.
An appeal to autonomy seeks to promote subjective preferences; autonomy is used to
justify allowing a patient's evaluation ofwhat makes his life 'good' to prevail.
To some extent, this debate about the nature of autonomy may seem arid in terms of
IcPs because their autonomy is compromised. Thus, while an IcP may be able to
form preferences, incapacity inhibits his/her reflectivity and raises doubts about, or
denies entirely, his/her autonomy. Undoubtedly, some patients cannot meet
prerequisite mental thresholds, and lack sufficient capacity for autonomous choice.
Alternatively, some patients have capacity for autonomy but are unable to exercise it,
their freedom to choose suffering such interference that their actual choice is not
autonomous. Appealing to autonomy in such circumstances seems less valuable,
because the preference it would facilitate would not be truly autonomous. Promoting
a non-autonomous preference may harm, rather than promote, an (incompetent)
patient's interests. Thus, where a patient is incompetent, why do we even need to
consider autonomy? In essence, because: 1) capacity for autonomous choice
determines who makes a treatment decision (patient or proxy); and 2) patient
perspective may be warranted even where a person is non-autonomous. To






4.1.2 The value of autonomy in healthcare
4.1.2.1 Why is autonomy a 'good thing' in healthcare?
Dworkin recognises autonomy as personifying individuality.
'[w]hat makes an individual the particular person he is is his life-plan, his
projects. In pursuing autonomy, one shapes one's life, one constructs its
meaning. The autonomous person gives meaning to his life'.9
Facilitation of individual preference is important in healthcare decisions because
every individual's value system is unique and personal to him/her. Medical treatment
may affect many aspects of life, including the continuance of life itself. Individuals
respond differently to those effects based on their own personal value systems. This
means that in making a decision a patient accords importance to certain things in
his/her life, assesses the relative weight of beneficial effects, and trades-off
conflicting values where necessary. The resulting individual preference, or choice, is
subjective.
In the healthcare context, recent decades have witnessed a burgeoning significance
for autonomy paralleled by a departure from 'doctor knows best' philosophy.
Rather, many patients seek more information and involvement in their treatment
(including decisions), and more HCPs are willing to involve patients.
In essence, autonomy is valuable because it empowers patients. It lends credence
to the principle that persons should not be treated as a means to an end, rather that
they are ends in themselves.10 It enables patients to refuse treatment, irrespective of
the resulting benefits (of treatment) to themselves or others. Recognising autonomy
allows an individual to live his/her own life, in his/her own way. Particular
importance has flowed from this in terms of incapacitated patients. As Mason et al
suggest autonomy has
'enhanced the freedom of those whose vulnerability, physical or mental, may
have exposed them to insensitive treatment or even to exploitation; it has
imparted dignity to the lives of those who might, otherwise, have felt
themselves to be powerless in the face of the articulate and the
professional'.11
9 G. Dworkin, above, 31.
10 An approach evolved in the work of Immanual Kant.
11
(2002) above, paragraph 1.16. However, they also remind us that: 'the acceptance of autonomy as
the benchmark of the good has led us to ignore other values, and this may have negative effects'
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In the medical context the value of autonomy has evolved as consent. Because
treatment invariably invades a person's bodily integrity, it is self-govemance of one's
body that autonomy is invoked to support. Where a patient is competent, the power
to give/withhold consent is rightly his/hers; the patient's perspective should dominate
because individual autonomy is so fundamentally valuable. Anything less would be
an imposition:
'because my body is me, failure to respect my wishes concerning my body is
a particularly insulting denial of autonomy'.12
Interests act as the vehicle by which the relationship between autonomy and consent
connects. Consent protects particular interest objects, for example the patient's
interest in his/her physical and psychological integrity. This interest in personal
integrity serves the valuable purpose of self-determination/autonomy.
However, the state of being autonomous is distinct from requiring respect for
autonomy. Respect for autonomy is the means by which patient perspective is
protected. In other words, respect for autonomy is owed by others to the (competent)
patient. This raises the purposive question: why should we allow our actions (of
respect or paternalism) to be dictated solely by the fact that the individual is in an
autonomous state? Dworkin considers two possible reasons for respecting individual
autonomy: the 'evidentiary view'; and the 'integrity view'.13 He suggests the
evidentiary view to be that:
'we should respect the decisions that people make for themselves...because
each person generally knows what is in his own best interests better than
anyone else'.14
However, that view quickly encounters difficulties.15 Dworkin's integrity view
explains more successfully why we respect autonomy. He argues that autonomy
(ibid), and that autonomy must be qualified by: 'the legitimate interests and expectations of others';
'economic constraints'; the 'sensitivites' of other autonomous agents; and 'the needs of society as a
whole' (ibid).
12 G. Dworkin, above, 113.
13 R. Dworkin, Life's Dominion, above, 222-225.
14
Ibid, 223, citing Buchanan et at, Surrogate decision-making for elderly individuals who are
incompetent or of questionable competence, November 1985, report for Office of Technology
Assessment.
15 As Dworkin points out, ibid 223, even competent individuals do not always act in ways that
promote their own best interests. Autonomy goes beyond mere subjective knowledge of one's own
best interests; autonomy is about the right to make one's own decision - whether that decision
promotes one's best, or indeed, worst interests.
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protects the capacity of people to live a distinct, individual life, and to choose
whether to pursue overall integrity in that life. On this basis, the integrity view of
autonomy
'does not assume that competent people have consistent values or always
make consistent choices, or that they always lead structured, reflective lives.
It recognizes that people often make choices that reflect weakness,
indecision, caprice, or plain irrationality'.16
In effect the integrity view recognises the worth of choice and individuality -
irrespective of outcome.
Admittedly, not all commentators value autonomy so highly. Gert, Culver, and
Clouser identify a persisting problem with using autonomy as an action guide:
'the basic difficulty with autonomy, is knowing whether the actions and
choices one is concerned with are autonomous'.17
In short, this amounts to disagreement about the conditions that are necessary to give
rise to autonomous decision-making, and/or whether a patient is deciding
autonomously under those conditions. Nowhere is this more contentious than in the
face of incapacity.
4.1.2.2 Incapacity - a breakdown in the autonomy model
Potentially, incapacity represents a breakdown in the autonomy model of decision¬
making. While a patient's views about his/her interests may ordinarily be accepted
as the dominant model, the compromise exerted by incapacity shifts the balance from
a subjective to an objective perspective. Incapacity diminishes autonomy in a
number ofways. Harris identifies four 'defects' with this effect: defects in control;18
i Q m ^ i
defects in reasoning; defects in information; and defects in stability. However,
he highlights that autonomy (and any diminution by defect)
16 R. Dworkin, ibid, 224.
17 B. Gert, C.M. Culver, K.D. Clouser, Bioethics, A return to fundamentals (1997) Oxford U.P., New
York, 78.
18
E.g. addiction, see J. Harris, The value of life, above, 196.
19
E.g. parroting the views of others, prejudice, or invalid inference, where the defect undermines
capacity for choice, see ibid, 197-198.
20
E.g. where incomplete or false information is given or received, ibid, 198.
21
However, as people leam and change over time, shifting preferences should not necessarily be
equated with instability undermining autonomy, see ibid, 198-199.
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'is a matter of degree [and] does not make it any the less worth striving for,
nor does it make it any the less important to have as much of it as
possible.. ,[o]ne will be autonomous simply to the extent that one's decisions
are one's own, unfettered by others and suffering as little from the various
defects as possible'.22
However, the breakdown in the autonomy model may be only partial, and patient
perspective could still be relevant if we recognise its importance. This thesis argues
that, even though incapacity compromises autonomy, an appeal to autonomy may
still be relevant for two reasons. First, in one sense, autonomy is already respected
by decision-makers beyond patient incapacity. A decision-maker's need to justify
interference or imposition upon the patient's bodily integrity (by way of necessity or
benefit to the patient him/herself arises because the patient's individuality is still
recognised. We consider autonomy to be so important it may be bypassed only if
justified in its effect on the individual's interests. By contrast, if respect for
autonomy were truly irrelevant then decision-makers would feel no need to justify
treatment, and could treat incompetent patients however they wished. Second,
adopting Dworkin's integrity view, the relevance of autonomy to IcPs turns on
his/her degree of capacity. If we accept that competent individuals may make
irrational or inadvisable choices, then we should not demand more of the less
competent. Thus, as Dworkin suggests:
'[w]hen a mildly demented person's choices are reasonably stable,
reasonably continuous with the general character of his prior life, and
inconsistent and self-defeating only to the rough degree that the choices of
fully competent people are, he can be seen as still in charge of his life, and
9 T
he has a right to autonomy for that reason'.
Hence, for some (mildly) incompetent patients, autonomy may still have value.
Additionally, it is submitted, even regarding more severe patients the individuality
that autonomy embodies may still be important within best interests. In this context,
individuality means the uniqueness of the IcP's personality and circumstance. And,
we may well find considerable direction and value from a consideration of the
patient's individuality. With regard to the connected concept outlined earlier, values
are the highest abstracted level of contribution to a person's well-being.
Consideration at this level helps to universalise the particular, and to explore a
22
Harris, ibid, 200.
23 R. Dworkin, above, 225.
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proposed course of action in relation to the overall purpose of a treatment decision.
In essence, values inform decisions in two ways: values throw up potential factors
for consideration (interest objects), and offer guidance about how we may resolve
conflict between factors (by reference to decision purpose). Both elements are
identified earlier as influential in the content and function of best interests; autonomy
can still be a window to patient perspective. Standing in an IcP's shoes could offer
different factors for consideration, and help to clarify the decision's purpose in light
of this individual's interests. Thus, autonomy framed as individuality may be
valuable even where a patient is obviously non-autonomous in the sense of not being
able to make his/her own choices.
Relatedly, Cox White identifies relationship between value structures and best
interests:
'[different people make different choices, choices that provide them with
value structures that define their personalities and provide the basis for
principled action.. .Value structures, as collections of values, long-term
goals, and beliefs, are an indication of an individual's best interests'.24
Cox White rightly considers only competent patients to be suitably placed to choose
autonomously. However, not all patients are equally /«competent; incapacity is a
matter of degree. Hence, once again it is not obvious that autonomy holds no value
for all 'incompetent' patients, even if in order to experience its value we need to
reframe it as 'patient perspective'. On this basis attention may now turn to the two
issues identified earlier as fundamental to autonomy (and perspective) in the IcP
context: (1) whom we deem 'competent' and 'incompetent' (determining location of
decision-making authority), which clearly depends on how we construct competence;
and (2) the locating of 'patient perspective' in alternative decision mechanisms.
24 B. Cox White, Competence to Consent (1994) Georgetown University Press, Washington D.C., 15.
25 See ibid, 17-18.
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4.2 Construction of competence
4.2.1 Aspects of competence
The current position on competence is questionable regarding both adults and
minors.26 A commitment to autonomy and patient perspective demands sound
construction of competence, because competence is the gateway to self-
determination or best interests. However, Cox White rightly suggests that, while
'[ajgreement is widespread that competence ought to be assessed in terms of
capacities (abilities)..,[c]urrently no consensus exists about what capacities
- and in what number or to what degree - constitute competence to
consent'.27
The contestable aspects of competence comprise: what patients must be competent
about (task/general); the nature of understanding (its meaning and whether
ability/actual understanding should be required); and how the marker for competence
should be set (threshold/degree). Each is considered in turn.
4.2.1.1 General and task-specific competence
In the particular context ofmedical decision-making:
'[competence is always competence for some task - competence to do
something. The concern here is with competence to perform the task of
making a decision. Hence competence is to be understood as decision¬
making capacity...Thus competence is decision-relative, not global'.28
However, some dissent exists. Dworkin considers that, because task-specific
competence varies 'even among ordinary non-demented people', in reference to
autonomy
'[competence] means the more diffuse and general ability...to act out of a
genuine preference or character or conviction or a sense of self.. .[because] it
is no kindness to allow a person to take decisions against his own interests in
9Q
order to protect a capacity he does not and cannot have'.
But, why does it matter which sense of competence is adopted? First, because it
affects who is 'competent'. A patient may be competent regarding his/her life in
general, yet incompetent regarding the specific task of treatment decision. The
reverse may also be true; a patient may be competent for a specific decision, despite
26 See Chapter 2, above.
27 Cox White, above, Introduction xii-xiii.
28 Buchanan and Brock, above, 18.
158
his/her incompetence for many other aspects. Ultimately, therefore, the sense
attributed to competence may determine who makes the decision.30 Second,
adopting task-specificity allows the threshold of competence to shift according to the
task.31
While full evaluation of the nature of competence is beyond the scope herein, it is
submitted a focus on task-specificity is merited for a number of reasons:
• it mirrors the variance of capacities relevant for differing decisions. A
general sense of competence is too blunt for accurate competence
assessment; a refined tool is needed for accuracy;
• it minimises arbitrary drawing of thresholds. Relating requisite
competence levels to a particular situation tailors competence assessment
to individuals, by making fewer assumptions based on (inaccurate)
generalisations;
• task-specificity reflects the reality and complexity of competence. As
Gert, Culver, Clouser argue:
'[i]t is true that some persons (for example, the unconscious) are globally
"incompetent", in that they do not have the ability to do anything. But there
is no one who is globally "competent"; that is, there is no one who has the
ability to perform all mental and physical tasks';32
Cox White refines her definition of competence in terms of task-orientation:
'[a] person is competent for the task of giving a free and informed consent if
(1) he is generally informable and cognitively capable of performing the
actions involved in making a decision, (2) he knows that decision making
requires these tasks, (3) he knows how to perform these tasks, and (4) given
his situation, we can reasonably expect him to be able to make decisions'.
As this thesis is concerned with deciding for incapacitated patients (rather than
informed consent) it is more useful to approach competence issues from the direction
of impairment and its impact. Here, remaining issues are considered as: (1) impact
29 R. Dworkin, above, 225-226.
30 See Cox White, above, 61-62.
31 As Beauchamp and Childress suggest (above 136, citing D. Wikler, Paternalism and the mildly
retarded, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 8 Summer (1979) 377): '[f]or practical and policy reasons, we
need threshold levels...below which a person with a certain level of abilities is incompetent... [wjhere






of cognitive/affective impairment on ability for, or actual, understanding (akin to
informability through cognitive capacity and ability to decide); and (2) competence
thresholds and degrees ofcapacity (reflecting evidential issues).
4.2.1.2 Understanding
Understanding is broadly defined by Beauchamp and Childress as:
'acquiring] pertinent information and justified, relevant beliefs about the
nature and consequences of one's actions'.34
Refinement in the context of competence distinguishes 'understanding' from
'appreciating':
"'[understand" refers to a patient's general comprehension of the
information presented...We take "appreciate" to refer to a patient's
knowledge that the information she has "understood" does in fact apply to
her in the present situation'.35
While much work has been done on how IcPs understand information - and we shall
return to this briefly below - for the purposes of this thesis the most important
distinction to be made is that between ability to understand and actual understanding.
An intellectually disabled patient may be able (cognitively) to understand relevant
information, but s/he might not actually understand. For, ability is attributable to the
patient alone, while actual understanding is influenced by factors such as
environment, information presentation, and the degree of patient inclusion in the
decision process. Roth, Meisel and Lidz characterise the two as tests:
'[wjhat matters in...[ability to understand] is that the patient is able to
comprehend the elements that are presumed.. .to be an important part of
treatment decision making',36 [while actual understanding involves] 'directly
ascertaining] whether he or she has in fact understood'.37
The designation is important because:
'[a]bility to understand is the least demanding.. .since the question is whether
the patient is capable of understanding...whereas if...[the test] is based on
34 Above, 157. See also, ibid, 136.
35
Gert, Culver and Clouser, above, 132-133.





actual understanding she is incompetent until she makes the intellectual
effort to understand, and indeed succeeds in that effort'.38
Additionally, ability allows patients to make autonomous but (objectively)
39inadvisable choices. However, as Gunn et al acknowledge:
'the reality [is] that ability to understand cannot be determined unless actual
understanding is assessed. The latter can be assessed'.40
This may account for the mixed messages apparent in existing common law
decisions. Assessing ability requires a culture shift that sometimes affronts our
intuitive response inhibiting irrational behaviour. Unwise choices raise doubts about
a person's competency, which s/he must then disprove. This has the effect of setting
a more demanding threshold for refusal.41 Combined with presence of some
incapacity (such as intellectual disability or mental illness) it may become virtually
impossible for an IcP refusing treatment to evince this higher requisite level of
showing ability through a test for actual understanding. Furthermore, impairment
often undermines at least some of the abilities perceived as necessary to
understanding. For, understanding is associated with high-level functions.42 Cox
White suggests that:
'cognitive competence applies to the capacities of attention and perception,
language usage (fluency, articulation, and comprehension), memory, and
cognition itself (intelligence, calculation, insight and judgment, manipulation
of data, and abstract thinking).43
By definition, IcPs have impairments limiting these abilities, thereby restricting
receipt or processing of information, or expression of requisite functions. But it
should not be presumed to preclude competence. For, competence is a complex of
ability and facility. This is perhaps clearest in relation to children's competence,
where Alderson identifies a relevant combination of inner and outer aspects:
38 M.A. Jones and K. Keywood, Assessing the patient's competence to consent to medical treatment,
Med. Law Int'l (1996) Vol.2, 107, 113.
39 Because '[t]his approach permits unwise choices, since the weight which the patient places upon the
information or how that information is used is not of relevance': M. Gunn, The meaning of incapacity,
Med. L. Rev. 2 [1994] 8, 18.
40
M.J. Gunn, J.G. Wong, I.C.H. Clare and A.J. Holland, decision- making capacity, Med. L. Rev. 7
[1999] 269, 304.
41 Jones and Keywood suggest that: '[i]t is where patients are refusing treatment that questions of
competence tend to arise...[i]n these circumstances the courts have tended to raise the hurdle by
requiring at least actual understanding of the issues', above, 140.
42 Buchanan and Brock, above 23, suggest competence requires 'possession of various linguistic,
conceptual and cognitive abilities' for receiving and comprehending information.
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'[competence has more to do with qualities, experiences and perceptions. It
is affected by the child's inner qualities (abilities, memories, confidence) and
by outer influences (the nature and circumstances of the decision, its salience
to the child's concerns, the adults' expectations and information, their
support and respect for the child)'.44
Hence, ability should be regarded as a blend of individual qualities (even though
limited or impaired) and opportunities (created by supportive others) for those
qualities to be maximised. Incapacity should not be instantly conflated with
inability. And ability is the preferable criterion because it better reflects the
qualitative nature (accessible through a supportive approach) of capacity, rather than
the defensive rigidity imported by requiring actual understanding. Admittedly,
however, ability is difficult to gauge. We must be clear, therefore, about what a
patient should be able to comprehend and to what degree. Considerable work has
been carried out on the difference between, for example, cognitive and affective
abilities 45 The reader is referred to the relevant literature and to its importance in
terms of appreciating the complexities of incapacity and responding to the actual
needs of individual IcPs. However, for the purposes of this work we need only note
two essential points:
• decision-makers and those who inform them must understand how IcPs
understand in order to meet communication deficits, and this includes the
possibility, of course, that there may be no understanding whatsoever.
Communication, after all, is a two-way deal; we cannot hope to assess an
impaired patient's ability unless we provide suitable opportunities for
him/her to display it. Normative guidance can be drawn from Alderson's
views on children's competence development:
'[competence develops through relationships, which nourish yet restrict
it'.46
43 Above, 117.
44 P. Alderson, Children's consent to surgery (1993) Open University Press, Buckingham, 193.
Furthermore, actual understanding requires patients to justify their right to autonomy, to articulate and
evince actual thought processes, and potentially precludes the right of unwise choice. This latter
aspect is destructive to the importance ofmaking one's life one's own.
45
See, for example: Gunn, above, 18-20 and 22-24; Cox White, above, 117-144; Beauchamp and
Childress, above, 157-162; Buchanan and Brock, above, 23-25; and A. Rudnick, Depression and
competence to refuse psychiatric treatment, J. Med. Eth. [2002] 28, 151.
46 P. Alderson, above, 193.
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For many IcPs the development of relationships as a means to
communicating treatment information may be important; their feelings of
security established through relationship may provide a better environment
for cultivating understanding. By contrast, poor communication creates
confusion for all parties.47 In communication with children, Alderson
concludes that
'[wjilling uncertainty is perhaps the best guide during dilemmas, when the
adults and children concerned work together towards the least harmful
decision'.48
This approach could equally guide our communication efforts with patients
generally - particularly those that are incapacitated. Given our uncertainty
about their capacity, willingness to communicate with them and provide a
supportive, informative environment is the most positive means of assessing
their ability to understand. Furthermore, even if a patient proves
'incompetent', relating with him/her may supply us with valuable
information about him/her as an individual. It also provides IcPs with an
opportunity to feel heard and involved;
• the focus for decision-makers - in light of this evidence - must be to
maximise the IcP's ability to understand and so to participate as fully as
possible in the decision-making process. Competency is a gateway to
decision-making authority. But, it need not entirely preclude patient
involvement. We could still maximise a patient's capacity by permitting
input where some ability is present. This is herein termed'input'. If an
(incompetent) patient can understand information, relate to it, and
experience his/her feelings about how its impact, but cannot choose due
to phobia, we could still take account of how s/he relates to, and
experiences it, to provide input to a proxy decision. Alternatively, where
a patient is unable to relate information to self (for example in anorexia),
we could instead ascertain his/her feelings about it by discussing the
de/merits of treatments in a hypothetical context. Alternatively, where a




relevant issues (for example, through intellectual disability), we should
still hear their views because, although simplistic, they may be strongly
held. Ignoring them may seem valid because they are not fully
autonomous, but to do so fails to respect them as persons. Maximising
patient capacity is about more than pure autonomy. A humane response
to IcPs requires us to allow people to input to their own treatment
decisions as one source within that decision. Rather than worshipping
autonomy the important thing in respect is that a person is heard.
Respect is developed later in this thesis,49 but its starting point is
maximising individual patient capacity. First and foremost this means
listening to patients - whichever side of the competence line they fall and
whatever the difficulties of expression. To make better proxy decisions,
we must listen more, assume less, and be prepared to inform ourselves
from a wider range of sources. The patient's feelings matter - whatever
their status as a decision-maker.
4.2.1.3 Evidencing competence: threshold or degree?
Competence is about determining decision-making authority. Capacity is about
wider issues based on listening, communicating and maximising a person's
participatory abilities. Capacity is a matter of degree. Individual capacities reside
at any of an infinite number of positions along a continuum. Each of us may hold a
different position for varying types of decision.50 However, we could acknowledge
capacity as a strength by attributing weight to capacitated input where possible.
Admitting input and encouraging patients to participate in the decision process
values individuality (a form of autonomy), and is particularly valuable in 'grey
competence' where a patient's capacity borderlines the threshold (such as mature
minors or temporary occlusion by pain/environment). Allowing input is part of






Gunn, above 14, describes such a continuum as 'rang[ing] from full capacity at one end to full
incapacity at the other end'.
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However, a degree approach to legal competence fails as a mechanism. Ultimately a
choice is required between patient or proxy determination because there is no
halfway house in attributing decision-making authority. A patient is either
competent to self-determine or not; s/he falls to one side of the line, or the other.
The essentially functional purpose of competence creates the need for threshold
status, its aim being:
'to divide persons into classes and not to place persons at various points on a
continuum of abilities'.51
As a gateway mechanism,52 competence
en
'expresses an all or nothing concept'.
One either is, or is not, competent to make one's own decision without interference.
Undoubtedly, the setting of thresholds is problematic. Cox White identifies a danger
of thresholds being set for 'bureaucratic convenience',54 and that their designation is
time-consuming and arbitrary.55 However, these issues are not avoided by degree
competence either.56 An intermediate level of threshold is required, to allow people
to run their own lives through choice, while also protecting the vulnerable through a
proxy.57 An issue also arises regarding variance of any threshold.58 The positioning
of a competence threshold is developed in reconstructing best interests, below.59
But, in essence, adopting a 'functional' standard allows a consistent threshold level,
yet permits natural variance in individual decisions through complexity of
information concerned.
51
Beauchamp and Childress, above, 136. Also, Buchanan and Brock, above, 27.
52 See also Beauchamp and Childress, ibid 132.
53 J. Feinberg, Harm to Self, above, 28, citing the work of H. Kelsen, General theory of law and state,




56 As every individual must still be professionally assessed.
57 See also Gunn et at, above, 293, regarding the dangers of setting thresholds too low.
58
Gunn, above, 14, suggests it preferable to 'set a definition which does not vary with the medical
treatment in question nor does its level vary'. This contrasts with current judicial approaches
requiring increased capacity correlative to gravity of decision (or consequences), see Re T (Adult:
refusal of treatment) [1992] above. However, Gunn acknowledges, ibid, that: 'some treatments are
easier to understand or appreciate than others'.
59 See Chapters 7 and 8, below.
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In summary, the standard proffered herein is a composite of task-specificity, based
on an ability to understand and use information.60 Using information concerns
ability to relate information to self, engage with it, and choose. The individual
should be able to perform these elements at 'functional' level, which need not be
sophisticated, merely basic provided that it pertains to all four aspects
(understanding, relating, engaging, and choosing). Lack of ability in any of these
four renders a patient 'incompetent', and a proxy should decide.61 However, two
points merit reiteration: 1) careful communication is warranted using clear and
appropriate language (or other means), and effortful understanding of their forms of
expression; and 2) even where a patient lacks the functional ability for competence,
his/her input may still be relevant. His/her degree of capacity may still offer personal
feelings and perspective to be considered.62 Admitting incompetent patients' views,
where expressed, maximises patient capacity through input. Respect demands
listening - truly attending - to what IcPs have to say.63
4.2.2 Additional issues - creeping incompetence
'Creeping incompetence' may arise through importation of rationality and/or
asymmetry. Use of time can also influence competence construction. The informal
presence of these criteria sometimes causes inappropriate findings of
'incompetence'.
4.2.2.1 Rationality
Rationality is sometimes used informally.64 However, there are good reasons why
rationality should not form part of competence. Practically, there are problems in:
60 This terminology is also employed by the Law Commission, Mental Incapacity (1995) Report No.
231, above, paragraphs 3.14-3.16.
61
However, a presumption of competence should remain in force regarding adult patients;
competence assessment only comes into play if there is reasonable doubt about a person's
competence.
62 See also Buchanan and Brock, above, 27.
63 See also, P. Alderson, above, 163, who suggests regarding children that 'sincere attempts to listen
can sometimes remove the deadlock'.
64 See Jones and Keywood, above, 112: 'even where formally the test of competence is based on the
patient's understanding, the unreasonableness or irrationality of the outcome may strongly influence
the court's assessment of the patient's understanding'. See also Gunn et al, above, 296; and Roth et al,
above, 283.
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'distinguishing rational from irrational reasons and drawing inferences of
causation between any irrationality believed present and the valence (yes or
no) of the patient's decision', [and] '[t]he patient's decision might well be
the same even if his or her cognitive processes were less impaired'.65
However, in contrast, Gert, Culver and Clouser expressly incorporate rationality
fundamentally within their proposed construction of competence, defining
'competence' as
'the ability to make a rational decision'.66
Prima facie this seems a radical normative departure. However, on closer inspection,
their four definitional factors correspond closely to those already proffered herein
within ability to understand, relate to, and engage with information, then to choose.
Hence, 'rationality' so framed adds little to a competency test, yet has ample inherent
scope for misinterpretation.68
Admittedly, irrational behaviour may indicate a need for competence assessment.
Certainly there comes a point where a person's beliefs tilt the balance into
incompetence.69 But the crucial factor in this balance should be the effect on a
person's ability to function. Competence should test a person's ability regarding the
decision process, not outcome.70 If we are really committed to a criterion of ability
to engage with the decision process, then rationality should form no part of
competence construction. Rather, we should assess a person's ability to enter a
'decision space', perceive him/herself to be there, engage with the contents of that
space and choose an exit. This should not involve us in gauging how the contents of
the space relate to the individual's value system unless we deem him/her unable to
evaluate for him/herself. Moreover, competence should not be determined by his/her
choice of exit. In reality, people may decide in ways that contradict rationality and
reason, yet are still capable ofmaking competent choices.
65 Roth et al, above, 281.
66
Above, 137.
67 See Gert, Culver, Clouser, above 139, whose abilities for rationality include understanding,
appreciation, ranking and volition (paraphrased here).
68 See Buchanan and Brock, above, 69-70.
69 See Gunn et al, above, 296.
70
See, for example, Gunn et al, ibid, 298, citing the views of I. Kennedy, Consent: Adult, Refusal of
Consent, Capacity - Commentary on Re MB Med. L. Rev. 5 [1997] 317; Buchanan and Brock, above,
70 and 82; Jones and Keywood, above, 112, citing Roth et al, above, 281; and Gunn, above, 16. Even
attempts to define competence by testing outcome against subjective individual value systems (see
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4.2.2.2 Asymmetry and decision consequences
In practice competence is relatively rarely at issue.7 But, as Gert, Culver, Clouser
highlight:
'[i]t is in cases of treatment refusals, especially those that appear to be
irrational, that the question of a patient's competence most frequently and
appropriately arises'.72
Asymmetry is understandable because treatment refusal raises doubts about
competency, and it is then a naturally human response to seek affirmation of a
73
person's competence. It is appropriate that a refusal may trigger an assessment.
However, mere refusal should not raise the presumption of /«competence.74
Furthermore, even a consenting patient could lack competence. Rather, it is oddity
in behaviour or apparent thought processes (including refusal) that should initiate
competence assessment.75 In these circumstances it is in the interests of patients that
competence be assessed, because wanton attribution of autonomy to patients
suffering functional incapacity fails to respect their need for care. Focusing on
ability helps to alleviate paternalistic presumption of incompetence-by-refusal.76
However, asymmetry represents a consequence driven approach.
Consequential approaches occur as 'risk-related' standards. That is, the requisite
threshold increases in direct proportion to seriousness of consequences. This
approach appears in English law.77 However, the problem with using risk to
determine threshold level is that the relationship between consequences and risk may
• 7R
be ill-founded. Further, a consequence-driven approach could engender
Buchanan and Brock, above, 56) encounter problems - requiring a patient to have a value system (see
Gunn et at, above, 299), and precluding irrational choice in terms of that value system.
71 See Gert, Culver, Clouser, above, 142.
72 Ibid, 142-143.
73 See also Buchanan and Brock, above, 82.
74 See ibid, 85.
75 See Cox White, above, 7-8.
76 Contrast the views of Gert, Culver and Clouser, above, 144, who embrace some asymmetry,
distinguishing between defects in cognitive capacity, and defects in affective and volitional capacity.
They consider the former should be based on competence symmetry, while the latter two situations
can render a person competent to consent but not to refuse. However, their approach relies on
rationality, which may influential.
77 See Re T [1992] above, 796(H), and 796(E).
78 See Chapter 2.
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unattainably high competence thresholds.79 And it is unclear why gravity of
consequence should make the standard differ, rather than merely influencing the
type or amount of information to be understood.80 It seems more likely that our non-
acceptance of negative consequences causes us to conflate refusal with a patient
failing to 'understand'.81 Rationality, asymmetry and consequence-driven standards
can easily collaborate to edge the threshold level of competence ever higher. While
there may be a:
'strong societal bias in favor of treating treatable patients so long as it does
not expose them to serious risks',82
a commitment to individual well-being should include commitment to subjective
• • • RT
individuality. Consequences do have a role in competence as one aspect of the
information that a patient should be able to consider, such that
'[i]t is the complexity, and not the risk, that is correlated with the
R4
understanding needed to make a decision'.
This contrasts with the standard of requisite competence required, which should
RS
remain functional. It need not be 'full' or 'substantial', because healthcare
decisions are so personal and individual that we should seek to maximise patient
capacity wherever feasible. Complexity of information will bring a natural variance
to what must be understood in different decisions,86 but the standard ('ability to
understand and use') should remain constant. And, the requisite level of
understanding should be never more than 'functional'.
4.2.2.3 Temporal aspects
The final element that can feed creeping incompetence is the importance of 'time'.
Assessment of competence at the time of the decision is integral to the existing legal
79 Ibid.
80 See also A. R. Maclean, Caesarean sections, competence and the illusion of autonomy,
webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1999/issuel/macleanl.html, page 5, who discusses M.R. Wicclair, Patient decision¬
making capacity and risk, (1991) 5 Bioethics, 91.
81 See Jones and Keywood, above, 140.
82 Roth et al, above, 283.
83 See Buchanan and Brock, above, 50.
84
Maclean, above, 5.
83 I.e. a person's ability to understand and use relevant information should be the minimum necessary
to process the healthcare decision mentally and emotionally.
86 This is also recognised by Maclean, above, 5, and Buchanan and Brock, above, 83.
169
approach.87 While this accords with task-orientation, a single assessment of
competence may act as a disservice to some incapacitated persons, particularly
oo
whose capacity is impaired cognitively or fluctuates. Beauchamp and Childress
suggest a proactive role for time:
'[w]hen it proves too difficult at first to determine the level of competence, it
is appropriate to evaluate the patient's understanding, deliberative capacity,
and coherence over time, while supplying counseling and further support and
information'.89
A longer period of assessment and delivery of information may benefit some
patients, helping to maximise their capacity for understanding and using
information.90 For example, gradual or repeated delivery, through a variety of
communication methods may aid assimilation for some patients.91 So, although
competence assessment should be current, a number of assessments, say over a
month or two, may inform us about how best to communicate information to an
individual, maximising supportiveness of environment, and enabling patient capacity
to be recognised.
In contrast, time might play a different role regarding patients in fluctuating mental
states. Those with psychosis, anorexia or under environmental stresses may have
widely varying capacity, including periods of lucidity interspersed with periods of
clear incompetence. This inconsistency may cause a finding of incompetence. But,
capacity of such patients could be maximised by taking account of his/her lucid
views. This 'intermittent competence' could endure effectively through temporary
87 See Chapter 2, above.
88 It is noteworthy that in Re C [ 1994] above, the refusal of the patient was deemed valid for all time
coming absent a fundamental change in his circumstances. This was the first judicial recognition of
the legal validity of advance directives and sent a clear message to HCPs that the onus was on them to
show incompetence. However, C was ultimately held to be competent. It is most unlikely that the
same consideration of the patient's input would be given to IcPs - hence the need for this




E.g. see J. O'Hara, Pregnancy in a severely mentally handicapped adult, J. Med. Eth. [1989] 15,
197. Assessment over time, proposed herein, does not mean that historic mental history should be
evidence of current mental state (as occurred inappropriately in Norfolk & Norwich Healthcare (NHS)
Trust v. W [1996] above). Note that in Re B (Adult: refusal of medical treatment) [2002] 2 All ER
449 Dame Butler-Sloss considering evidence regarding depression and psychological regression of a
quadriplegic patient, emphasised that she 'could not see how' Ms B's 'difficult and traumatic
childhood.. .should affect any future choice [by the patient]'.
91 On variation of patient capacity see Gunn et al, above, 280, Figure 1.
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incompetence.92 It is simply a temporally-compressed version of an Advance
Directive, provided that material circumstances are as anticipated. Gert, Culver and
Clouser take an opposing view:
'[t]he ability to make a rational decision of a certain kind is, like all abilities,
usually a relatively stable attribute of a person, not something that quickly
comes and goes'.
However, while ability is usually stable for most patients, for a few others it is not.
A genuine commitment to maximising patient capacity requires that, at the very
least, we hear his/her lucid views, discuss their relevance to periods of fluctuation,
and consider whether his/her position is held consistently enough to constitute
functional competence. If not, then the (lucid) views may still act as informative
input.
Buchanan and Brock identify two important consequences flowing from intermittent
competence: the HCP is responsible for ensuring the patient's competence is re¬
evaluated appropriately, and that s/he
'is responsible for making every reasonable effort to maximize the patient's
, 94
competence .
It is submitted that this is the most important normative guide regarding
competence. Commitment to autonomy demands maximisation of capacity. This
means changing our perspective to distinguish between capacity and competence,
overturning assumed correlation between impaired capacity and incompetence, and
carefully constructing a competence standard. Further, we must avoid the attractions
of creeping incompetence, retain a constant functional standard that varies naturally
only with information complexity, and acknowledge new roles for time within
competence assessment. The notion of /«competence is developed further later in
this thesis.95 However, we may now consider the scope for patient perspective in
states of incapacity.
92





95 See Chapter 7, below.
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4.3 Locating patient perspective in enduring and proxy decisions
Where the governing role of autonomy falls because a patient fails to meet the
threshold level for competence, other decision-making mechanisms come into play.
Alternatives include advance directives, substituted judgment, comprehensive
exclusion of designated types of treatment absent consent, and of course 'best
interests'. Each is considered briefly here in terms of autonomy value. This thesis
ultimately prefers a reframed approach to best interests,96 recognising an important
role for 'input' in promoting autonomy through patient perspective even where a
patient is incompetent for determinative decisional authority.
4.3.1 Advance directives
Advance directives (ADs) represent subjective wishes of patients post-incapacity.
The directive, made during competency, specifies how a patient wishes to be treated
(including withholding treatment) in anticipated future circumstances that may
include incompetence.97 Advance directives have legal effect in English law
QO
provided that they are 'clearly established' and 'expressed in clear terms'. Prima
facie, there are obvious advantages of advance directives in respecting self-
determination and protecting patients from unwanted intervention.99 Further, they
may
'relieve emotional and financial burdens that would otherwise fall on others',
and thereby 'do good to others'.100
ADs accord with the idea that certain interests can survive a person's incompetence
(and/or death),101 allowing his/her autonomous choices post-incapacity to honour
his/her earlier life and value structure. In short, an AD may represent the clearest
• «109
indication available (or needed) of a person's views. Some authors go further,
arguing that it has:
96 See further chapters 6-8, below.
97 In the USA advance directives may instruct about treatment, or appoint a proxy, see Buchanan and
Brock, above, 95.
98 For comment on procedural aspects of ADs see Kennedy and Grubb, Principles of Medical Law,
above, 229. See also Re C [1994] above and Re AK (Medical treatment: consent) [2001] 1 FLR 129.
99 See Buchanan and Brock, above, 99.
100 Buchanan and Brock, ibid.
101 Ibid. The value of 'surviving interests' is developed Chapter 7, below.
102 See also D. Meyers, The family and life and death decisions, in Sutherland and McCall Smith
(eds.), Family Rights, Family Law and Medical Advance (1990) Edinburgh U.P., Edinburgh, 59, 66,
who describes the advance directive as 'best evidence' of the patient's desires.
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'great symbolic significance, for it encompasses three human rights upon
which all other rights hinge. They are the right to life, the right to freedom,
and the right to happiness (in the sense of a good quality of life)'.103
Seen in this way, ADs are tremendously important, facilitating both self-
determination and quality of life values. If we seek to maximise individual liberty
and self-responsibility,104 then we should accord authority to a relevant, valid AD.
However, the difficulties lie in validity and relevance. It can be problematic to
ensure a person was competent, informed and uncoerced when making a directive;105
it can be difficult to foresee future circumstances and therefore to set appropriate
limits on the AD;106 there is always the issue of unforeseen circumstances;107 and
severe illness or injury may cause a person to reconsider their values, such that the
108AD no longer accurately reflects his/her views. Stern suggests that a schema of
recording a person's preferences and values may help to resolve uncertainty about
scope.109 Relatedly, Meyers observes that:
'[ojften there may only be a 'sense' of what the patient would want done
based on knowledge by the family of his or her religious views, philosophy
of life, internal constitution and self-image and other, rather subjective
attitudes or generalized comments'.110
Meyers argues that this supports the need for a 'backup' standard such as 'best
interests'. 11 Indeed, Peart et al illustrate the boundaries of ADs starkly in the
context of women who are pregnant at the time of becoming severely incapacitated
through p.v.s. or brain-stem death). Ethical dilemmas accrue about respecting a
woman's autonomous AD to withdraw treatment (thereby allowing the foetus to die
also) where the woman has no prospect of recovery. Peart et al conclude that: where
an AD is specific (i.e. has foreseen and included the prospect of pregnancy), her wish
V. Frosini, The "Living Will" and the right to die, Ratio Juris (1995), 8(3), 349, 356.
104 See also D. Meyers, above, 66 on the importance ofmaximising freedom of choice.
105 Buchanan and Brock, above, 101. K. Stem, Advance Directives, Med. L.Rev. 2 [1994] 57, 63, also
highlights the dangers of undue influence and lack of informedness at the time the directive is made.
106 See also, Buchanan and Brock, ibid, 105: formulation of qualifications may become unfeasible.
107 See Stem, above, 64.
108 See also, Buchanan and Brock, above, 106, who suggest a change to competence is often
accompanied by changes to other capacities.
109
Stem, above, 64, drawing from the work of P. Lambert, J. Mclvor Gibson and P. Nathanson, The
values history: an innovation in surrogate medical decision-making, (1990) 18 Law, Medicine and
Health Care 202.
110
Meyers, above, 66, drawing from the USA case of Cruzan v. Harmon 760 S.W. 2d 408; Cruzan v.




to withdraw treatment should be respected - autonomy should dominate;112 in
contrast, where her wishes are unknown (no AD in force) they advocate allowing the
interests of the foetus to dominate;113 and it seems likely that they would regard this
applicable also where an AD is non-specific regarding pregnancy, because this raises
significant doubt.114 However, where doubts about ADs occur, Peart et al suggest
that while not binding an AD may still
'offer valuable insight into the patient's wishes which should be respected in
any decisions about treatment'. 15
This corresponds to the position advocated herein: ADs may provide 'input' to
inform any proxy, despite their authority limitations. Additional limitations exist
where patients have never been (cognitively) competent enough to make an AD, or
indeed from the many competent persons who have simply not made any
formal/informal AD. Hence, pragmatically, ADs may provide excellent patient
perspective, but only a limited source of solutions to decision-making authority.
Thus, many decisions still necessarily fall to proxies. While ADs can be useful
sources of informal patient input to future decisions, we should be wary about
adopting an overly formalistic approach to ADs - for example by requiring them to
be in writing, signed, with witnesses etc. - because in such an eventuality they would
become wholly useless to IcPs.
4.3.2 Proxy decisions
Where autonomy fails to bind, it is the responsibility of a proxy to decide on an IcP's
behalf. In some jurisdictions proxies may be appointed by form of AD,116 or by
relationship between proxy and patient,117 or by the court.118 Absent these
jurisdictions, resort is made to declarations of lawfulness.119 Difficulties surrounding
112 See N.S. Peart, A.V. Campbell, A.R. Manara, S.A. Renowden, and G.M. Stirrat, Maintaining a
pregnancy following loss of capacity Med. L. Rev. 8 [2000] 275, 282-283, 284-285.
113 Ibid 291-292, because the 'patient's condition and prognosis have effectively deprived her of the
sort of interests which normally underpin treatment decisions', ibid 294.
114 See ibid, 279.
115 Ibid, 298.
116
E.g. in the U.S.A., see Buchanan and Brock, above, 95. See also Adults with Incapacity (Scotland)
Act 2000, s.16.
117
E.g. assumed in England and Wales through parental capacity to consent to (but not refuse)
treatment on behalf of a minor, see Chapter 2, above.
118 Sheriffs are now empowered to appoint (Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, s58), and the
former function of tutors-dative is abolished (s.80).
119 In England and Wales, see Chapter 1, above.
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proxy appointment include patients designating proxies who are ill-suited to
determining the patient's well-being,120 and patient voluntariness and competence at
the time of appointment.121 Also, in relation to proxies' execution of duties, it is
difficult procedurally to monitor whether surrogates respect patients' earlier wishes
and act responsibly.122 However, whenever proxies do make decisions they are
generally based in one of two approaches: substituted judgment or best interests.
Each is considered here in terms of autonomy.
4.3.2.1 Substituted judgment and other comparative alternatives
4.3.2.1.1 Substituted judgment standard
The substituted judgment standard imposes a responsibility on a proxy:
'to choose as the patient would choose if the patient were competent and
aware of the medical options and of the facts about his or her condition,
including the fact that he or she is incompetent'.123
In essence, it seeks to determine the decision fully from the patient's perspective
through the proxy and is commonly used in the U.S.A.124 Gostin argues that
substituted judgment:
'forces the proxy decision maker to search for the patient's views, and to
respect those views, before making treatment decisions'.125
Prima facie, it replicates as closely as possible what a patient's own choice would be.
Indeed, it is argued herein that determining patient perspective (through his/her
views and values) is extremely valuable within the decision process.126 However, as
the sole decision-making tool, substituted judgement is fraught with difficulty. We
should not underestimate the difficulty of standing in the shoes of another; the
elusiveness of preference and choice is magnified when trying to gauge how another
person would decide. This need not deter us, but we should be aware of the
120 See Buchanan and Brock, above, 102.
121 See Stern, above, 64.
122 See Beauchamp and Childress, above, 177.
123 Buchanan and Brock, above, 94.
124 See ibid, 113, discussing Re Quinlan (1976) 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d.647 and Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz (1977) 373 Mass. 728, 38, 370 N.E.2d. 417.
125 L. Gostin, in C. Dyer's (ed.) Doctors, patients and the law (1992) Blackwell Scientific
Publications, Oxford, 84.
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magnitude of the task the impossibility of fully replicating another's decision
process. Further, Buchanan and Brock argue that substituted judgment fails when:
there is insufficient evidence of what the patient would choose;127 or the patient has
1 78
never been competent. They suggest that lack of evidential base brings the
standards of substituted judgment and what they term 'basic interests' closer; the
latter becoming increasingly important in correlation to diminution of the former.129
These pragmatic limits support the submission in this thesis that, while an IcP's
views are important to proxy informedness, they should form part of a wider decision
perspective such as best interests.
Nowhere is the role of proxies as substitute decision-makers more emotive than in
the context of parents and children. In Israel, an interesting concept of 'parental
competence' has recently arisen in determining a child's best interests within
custody.130 Generally, courts are reluctant to hand absolute authority to parents.
Mason et al highlight American and Canadian judicial approaches countenancing
• 1 71
strongly against such parental scope. Further, they observe that little sensitivity to
parental cultural and religious mores has been accorded in the UK.132
In the context of consent, this is really about 'parental or family autonomy', and
tensions lie in the divergence between the close parent/child relationship and
1 77
provisions protecting the minor as an individual. A minor's individual rights are
strengthened by the Children Act (1989), the Human Rights Act (1998) and the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989).134 While the English courts have
126 See Chapters 6-8, below. It is also clear that incapacitated individuals should be treated equally:
see C. McKay, Legal competency as the basis for human rights, SCOLAG (1994) 108, col.2




Ibid, 114-115, (e.g. due to lifelong cognitive impairment).
129
Ibid, 119-120.
130 See M. Zaki, Parental competency assessment: approaches and issues, Med. Law (2000) 19, 1.
131 Mason et al, above, paragraph 10.19, whereby children should not be made 'martyrs' by parental
choice, and the family not permitted to inhibit the court's parens patriae jurisdiction (paragraph
10.20).
132
Ibid, paragraph 10.21. However, see Re T [1997] above.
133
Highlighted in Re C (HIV Test) [1999] above, 1021, where Butler-Sloss LJ reflected that: 'the
space... in which parental decisions are final, undoubtedly exists, but it exists subject to s 1(1) of the
Children Act'. Parental autonomy was overridden where objectively enforceable (i.e. HIV testing),
but acceded to in the less enforceable private context (of breastfeeding).
134 Cited by Wilson J. at first instance in Re C (HIV test), above.
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rejected subsuming a child's rights under those of the parents,135 the Irish Supreme
Court has recently taken a different view,136 according weight to parental views and
authority. Laurie construes this decision to posit a (rebuttable) constitutional
137
presumption that determination of a child's welfare is found in familial authority.
, , 1 TO . .
But he argues that this is not always in a child's best interests, and the decision
may fail to strike an appropriate balance of parental rights, children's rights, and
parental responsibilities.139 Minors should be protected, and indeed respected.140
However some role for the family is merited by Article 8 (Schedule 1, HRA
1998).141 In essence, the familial right to be heard accrues from relationship and
could equally apply regarding incapacitated adults. Some consider familial
involvement in proxy decisions to be rightly occurring.142 However, family
autonomy is in contrast to familial involvement, and raises concerns of possible
143
misrepresentation.
Additionally, it could overlook the emotional impact of a patient's incapacity and
illness upon the family. The family may not be best placed to uphold an IcP's wishes
and preferences because of its own emotional pain. As Stern observes:
'the family member may find it difficult to place the patient's own interests
above those of the family and other carers. Problems might arise where
there are antagonistic family relations.. .or.. .there is no family or carers to
whom such a decision can be referred'.144
Hence, placing an expectation of decision-making authority upon a family (or those
emotionally closest to an IcP) may be too burdensome. The demands upon a proxy
decision-maker are onerous and, other than a formalised appointee, it is a dangerous
imposition to require a substituted judgment from an emotionally-involved proxy. If
made as an advance appointment and the appointee still feels able to act responsibly,
135 See A. Downie, Re C (HIV test), The limits ofparental autonomy CFLQ 12(2) [2000] 197, 201.
136 See North Western Health Board v W(H) [2001 ] IESC 70, 8 Nov. 2001.
137 G.T. Laurie, Better to hesitate at the threshold of compulsion: PKU testing and the concept of
family autonomy in Eire, J. Med. Eth. [2002] 28, 136.
138 Ibid, 137 col.2.
139 Ibid, col.3.
140 On the importance of respecting children's views see P. Alderson (1993) above.
141 See R. Clayton and H. Tomlinson, The law of human rights, Vol.1 (2000) Oxford U.P., Oxford,
paragraph 13.129: any interference with family life through care proceedings must involve parents in
the process to the extent of protecting their interests.
142 See Meyers, above, 63-64.




it seems reasonable that s/he should be allowed to do so. For, this approach
acknowledges the importance of an IcP's chosen relationships within his/her interest
network. Further, involvement of family/partners/close friends can be a valuable
source of input to a proxy decision. However, the notion that we can hope to
emulate a patient's decision is unrealistic, and his/her ascertainable views are
advocated only as a part (albeit an important one) of the proxy's decision. Hence, a
best interests standard is preferred to pure substituted judgment. Input from a
patient's relationships of mutuality is merited, but not to the extent of supporting
'family autonomy' - regarding minors or adults. Rather, we should seek a rounded
view that takes account of patient perspective and maximises individuality, but keeps
a pragmatic eye on the whole landscape of a person's interests. Autonomy is
important, but to decide compassionately and responsibly we must acknowledge that
autonomy is not all.
4.3.2.1.2 Other comparators
Interesting, additional comparators have occurred recently in proxy decision-making.
The Scottish approach to incapacitated persons is now contained in the Adults with
Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000. Scope for guardianship is a major theme, and an
appointed guardian may have power to consent to medical treatment as a proxy.145
Prima facie, this guardianship supports autonomy, particularly as s/he must be
consulted.146 Aliter, s47 will not confer authority for treatment to a medical
practitioner.147 While his appears commendably protective of autonomy, certain
qualifications under s50 limit the proxy guardian's role somewhat. While
subsections (3) to (6) provide for appeals in the event of disagreement about
145 S. 64(1) and, implicitly, s.50 (subject to exceptions in s. 64(2) prohibiting consent to certain types
of treatment for mental disorder and detention in a mental hospital against the patient's will, and
additional safeguards now required regarding certain types of treatment, contained in supplementary
provisions to the Act).
146
S.50(2), provided it is reasonable so to do (s.50(2)(c)).
147 S.47 authorises treatment reasonable in the circumstances to safeguard or promote the physical or
mental health of the adult, bearing remarkable similarity to the ratio of Re F [1989] above. However,
'best interests' is not used in the Act. Alternatively, if an application for determination has been made
(s.49), that application must be determined (s.49(2)).
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proposed treatment,148 s.50 (5) authorises treatment proceeding on the basis of
certification by a nominated medical practitioner:
'notwithstanding the disagreement with the guardian, welfare attorney, or
person authorised under the intervention order'.149
In effect, the guardian is empowered by one part of the Act and disempowered by
another. The Scottish approach is an improvement on the existing common law
position of England and Wales, as the role of treatment proxies is recognised and
their rights and responsibilities clarified. However, the Act remains disappointing in
terms of autonomy because of the limitations outlined and persisting dominance of
medical opinion. Furthermore, the definition of 'incapable' is too broad, and lacks
emphasis on our duty to communicate with IcPs and maximise their capacity.150
However, the Act does set out a general principle of wide consultation with the IcP,
nearest relative, primary carer, any appointee, and any other person judicially
directed.151 This at least facilitates input as a useful source of information.
A different approach to autonomy is highlighted in German law, regarding
• ... . 1S9
sterilisation of incapable persons, through a notion known as 'natural will'. Little
interprets this to mean that:
'a person who is incompetent to consent to an operation is still regarded as
"competent" to refuse the sterilisation, if by her natural will, she manifests
• • 1 ST
that opposition'.
In essence, this is asymmetry reversed; an IcP under German law may refuse
treatment to which s/he is regarded unable to consent. This radical approach protects
subjective bodily integrity despite lack of traditionally self-determinative capacity.
Little suggests that the provisions acknowledge that
148
Indeed, ultimately, 'any person having an interest in the personal welfare of the adult, may apply to
the Court of Session for a determination as to whether the proposed treatment should be given or not',
s50(6).
149
S.50(5). A right of appeal still lies to the Court of Session, s.50(6). Further provision to treat in
situations of life-saving necessity is made by s.50(7).
150 Sees. 1(6).
151 S. 1(4).
152 See G.B. Little, Comparing German and English law on non-consensual sterilisation: a difference
in approach, Med. L.Rev. 5 [1997], 269, 285-287.
153
Ibid, 285, drawing on the work of A. Jurgens, D. Kroger, R. Marschner and P. Winterstein, Das
neue Betreuungsrecht. Eine systematische Gesamtdarstellung (2nd ed.) (1992), Munich at 58 m.n.
216. Little suggests, above, 285, that opposition may be shown by words, gesture, mimic or defensive
posture is an expression of the ward's natural will... [it] does not therefore require any insight into the
consequences of a refusal'.
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'even for the most helpless and dependent individual there remains always a
residual autonomy, which third parties cannot disregard'.154
While this thesis promotes residual autonomy and maximisation of patient capacity,
is the German approach really protecting individuality? Certainly, it takes account of
an IcP's preferences, but this preference may lack significant understanding. Nor is
autonomy clearly served if refraining from sterilisation deprives an IcP of his/her
sexuality. Little notes that the German courts support the sexuality rights of the
intellectually disabled.155 In combination, this seems to create an invidious position
in German law that could commonly result in pregnancy.156 While the German
approach seeks to respect individual 'autonomy', it is doubtful whether it truly
respects the person because a rounded, balanced view of the whole person is lost.
• 1 S7
Certainly, some jurisdictions adopt a similar stance to certain treatments. Canada
more stringently imposes an effective blanket ban on non-consensual surgical
sterilisation.158 However, defensive approaches to difficult and sensitive situations
serve no one well. The flexibility of best interests has much to offer, provided it is
used with common sense, reflection and consideration.159 Better that IcPs can access
all the treatment options available to competent persons, provided best interests is
used judiciously.
4.3.2.2 Preferring best interests
Best interests is the preferred standard because of its flexibility; it is amenable to
change and adaptation to the uniqueness of individual situations. The way
competence is structured and the position on advance directives and input
significantly influences the degree of value accorded to autonomy within best
interests. It is imperative to understand that the thrust of this thesis sees autonomy as
comprising two (often related) elements, namely choice and individuality. The trend
154 Ibid, 286.
155 See ibid, 287, referencing a decision of the BayObLG of 15 January 1997.
156 Which has a significantly greater impact on bodily integrity than does non-voluntary sterilisation.
157
Indeed, in England and Wales electro-convulsive therapy for mental disorder is restricted to
consent (albeit by non-competent patients), and under the new Scottish provisions, above, there is
scope for certain treatments to be specified by the Scottish Ministers as restricted to certain specified
circumstances, see s.48 of Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000.
l58Re Eve (1986) 2 SCR 388: (1981) 115 DLR (3d) 283.
159
Compare Re B (a minor)(wardship: sterilisation) [1987] 2 All ER 206, which adopted a best
interests approach to the very same question as occurred in Re Eve, above.
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to date has focused on the former and this has meant that autonomy ceases to have
meaning for IcPs. However, if one adopts a broader view of autonomy to include
individuality - in the sense of seeking and respecting varying forms of input from the
IcP to the decision process - then autonomy retains a valuable residual role in
treatment decisions concerning such patients. More particularly, the focus herein
seeks to add value to the existing approach to best interests in three ways:
• by recognising individuality, even where a person is incompetent we
should - wherever possible - maximise a patient's ability and
opportunity for understanding with a view to their having input (but not
determination) of the treatment decision. Individuality offers a
representation of a patient's perspective; we can still recognise and
respect a person as an individual whether competent or not;
• by seeking informedness as a proxy we can better understand the
identity of the person upon whose behalf we decide, enabling a decision
of greater integrity with the IcP. Informedness comes from broadening
the range of information sources ('input') to include the patient's
views/wishes,160 'investments' (of time, attention, energy, if any) s/he
has made, and the views of those persons emotionally closest to
him/her;161
• by adopting a rounded perspective, that combines both objective and
subjective viewpoints. Best interests is normatively capable of
encompassing both perspectives, by looking at the whole individual and
the full contextual situation.
Respect is the value proffered by this thesis to facilitate the above three elements, and
admit autonomy to what has, traditionally, been a welfare-oriented standard. In
essence, the best way to avoid harming any person is to respect him/her. The aim of
decision-making should be to respect the person. Admitting autonomy as valuable
within best interests is essential. However, respect for persons also embraces the
160
Supported by the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act (2000), s.4(a); and the English Law
Commission, Mental Incapacity (1995) above, paragraph 3.28.
161 See in this regard: ibid, s.4(b); ibid, 3.28, respectively.
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WELFARE VIA QUALITY OF LIFE -
A CLINICAL/COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVE
Chapter 5 Appeal to value: Welfare via quality of life - A
clinical/community perspective
Choice of value greatly influences our assessment of best interests, and reflects
decision-making perspective. Both factors - value and perspective - also impact on
our approach to conflict resolution. While autonomy is important, it breaks down to
some degree in the face of incapacity. Welfare often fills this gap, couched as
'quality of life', 'well-being', or 'harm avoidance'. It also often represents a clinical
and/or community perspective on what is 'good' for an incapacitated individual.
None of these roles are definitively 'good' or 'bad', but merit attention because of
their differences. Initially, this chapter focuses on the meaning of 'welfare', its value
in healthcare, and its connection with interests and perspective. From this overview,
two contentious aspects are identified and explored: construction of 'life' in proxy
decisions, and the role of personhood in interest attribution and welfare derivation.
5.1 Defining welfare
5.1.1 The meaning of welfare
'Welfare interests' are considered earlier.1 However, welfare is relatively
unexplored, perhaps because it need not be used in a 'technical' way; Harris
interprets welfare to mean
'what it usually means, 'the state or condition of doing or being
well'...which will include things like happiness, health and living
standards'.
Indeed, its literal roots seem self-evident; 'welfare' is a state of 'faring well', a state
many of us easily recognise through our own experiences. Is there any need to shape
it further - given that we know it when we see it? Ifwe are to make a state of 'doing
or being well' attainable, then we need to know its substance. This raises nebulous
possibilities; 'well-being' for one person is not necessarily so for another. Feinberg's
definition of welfare interests perceives them as facilitative of other (chosen)
1
Chapter 3, above.
2 J. Harris, The value of life, An introduction to medical ethics (1985) Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London, 193, quoting from the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary.
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interests that add further well-being. For Feinberg, therefore, welfare interests are
the foundation, but not the entire structure, of well-being.4 Rather, it is the
combination of basic welfare and other interests that comprise well-being in a more
complete sense. Hence, 'welfare' can appear synonymous with 'well-being', but
sometimes 'welfare' references quite a specific range of minimal 'goods' that are
commonly human. The significance of this is twofold:
• while we should seek well-being in the fuller sense, medical treatment
often seeks to restore welfare in the 'minimal good' sense, lost through
pain, threat to life, or curtailment of social, functional, or experiential
life;
• 'minimal good' welfare is important and can complement autonomy;
together they comprise a person's 'well-being'.5
We can define welfare, therefore, as comprising a range of fundamental factors
contributing to well-being. Action taken in the name ofwelfare maypromote well-
being, or prevent harm from accruing. Thus, welfare is a powerful supportive value,
expressly recognising the purpose ofan action.
5.1.2 The meaning of welfare in healthcare decisions
Illness or incapacity can erode facilitative welfare which, in turn, inhibits other
autonomous interests, and so diminishes overall well-being. Patient well-being lies
at the core of healthcare.6 For, healthcare professionals seek to improve the lives of
others, to make them 'fare better'. In terms ofmentally incapacitated persons, Harris
perceives the responsibility of harm prevention as falling to society.7 HCPs are
members of society with the specialist knowledge and means actively to achieve this.
Welfare, in its ethical guise of beneficence and non-maleficence, accounts for a
clinical/community perspective on treatment. Nowhere is welfare a more appropriate
objective than in an IcP situation. An incapacitated person still needs alleviation of
3
Paraphrasing from J. Feinberg's Harm to others, above, 37, welfare interests include: continued life,
physical health, physical functionality, minimal intellectual acuity, emotional stability, social
engagement, minimal financial security, tolerable environment, and freedom from interference.
4 Ibid.
5
Developed in Chapters 6-8, below.
6 See Buchanan and Brock, above, 29.
7
See Harris, above, 217-218.
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pain/suffering/harm, and promotion of 'good' (positive) experiences - irrespective of
incapacity. As a goal, welfare provides a focus for proxies in taking up decision
responsibility. This is its meaning in IcP treatment decisions.
However, exercise of responsibility involves judgment; an assessment of what
contributes to welfare. The assessable standard developed for gauging welfare
impact in healthcare is 'quality of life'. Although contentious, it is part of welfare's
meaning regarding IcPs because
'
"quality of life" is unavoidable.. .A vital part of the treatment decision rests
on the issue of whether the proposed measures can restore the patient to a
way of living he or she would be likely to consider of reasonable "quality",
despite any side effects or disadvantages of treatment'.8
A proxy must judge the impact of any treatment option on an IcP's life; in short,
whether and how an option contributes to a person's welfare - measured by the
degree of improvement/harm on the quality of that life. Quality of life has drawn a
bad press because it has been wrongly construed as an external judgment of how
valuable that incapacitated person is. This is confusing and inappropriate. Rather, as
Beauchamp and Childress suggest:
' "quality of life judgements" are not about the social worth of individuals,
but about the value of the life for the person who must live it. The value of
life is primarily.. .the value it has for that person'.9
If we look to quality of life judgments in terms of a purposeful welfare objective, and
acknowledge the individuality of 'life', there is nothing to fear from a responsible,
qualitative assessment. Further, best interests is the connective element:
'
[b]est interests judgments are one way to focus attention on this point,
rather than on the value the person's life has for other persons. Accepting a
best interests standard.. .is tantamount to acknowledging that we have to
decide in marginal cases what a patient's welfare interests are at the
moment'.10
This chapter seeks to develop welfare as a purposeful objective in best interests
decisions for IcPs.
8




Beauchamp and Childress, ibid. Buchanan and Brock, above, 123, also identify a relationship
between quality of life, best interests and 'life', such that mere benefit does not evince best interests
because the latter depends upon the expected character of life for the individual.
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5.2 The value of welfare in healthcare
5.2.1 Why is welfare a 'good thing' in healthcare?
Welfare plays a two-way role in healthcare: (1) as a beneficent aim of treatment, and
(2) as a justificatory reason to which appeal is sometimes made regarding a
particular treatment action. These two are mutually supportive mirror images,
providing 'good reasons' for treatment based on its contribution to a patient's well-
being, applicable to both competent and incompetent patients.
Undoubtedly, the impetus to improve the lives of others is at its strongest in
healthcare. Promoting welfare is an action generally born out of kindness, care and
humanity.11 Medical treatment generally seeks to restore, maintain, improve, or
minimise deterioration of a patient's health and quality of life through welfare as a
treatment objective. A competent patient can make his/her own assessment of
welfare in relation to interests, based on information about treatment options and
awareness of other (non-medical) values in his/her life. However, treatment
decisions for incompetent patients rely on assessments of welfare made by others on
the patient's behalf. While an IcP's life and interests may be more limited, we
should still seek directly to promote his/her welfare interests, thereby facilitating
his/her other life goals. In short, treatment decisions should support a person to
become more of him/herself; to enable his/her individual life to become fuller in the
ways s/he is able to choose, and to meet his/her ongoing needs. Welfare as a
treatment objective is about enabling an IcP's well-being. By attending to a
patient's welfare we can help to equip them with the basis for building other aspects
of life.
This function may then be employed as a justificatory reason for treatment choice,
supporting adoption of a particular course of action. Such justificatory use is not
inherently problematic, but its use in healthcare has previously brought it into direct
conflict with autonomy regarding competent patients. Welfare has previously been
proffered as a contentious justification for 'hard' paternalistic behaviour, where a
competent patient's views might be overruled in the name of their welfare. The
heightened role for autonomy within medical ethics, and legal protection of
11 See also Beauchamp and Childress, above, 260.
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autonomous choice, now ensure that this is unlikely to persist. In contrast, the role of
welfare regarding incompetent patients had been simply assumed appropriate (to the
total exclusion of any residual autonomy). Undoubtedly, welfare has a valuable
justificatory role in proxy decisions for IcPs, and willingness to justify choice of
treatment, and balance of interests, is an important part of due process.12 Moreover,
because incapacity diminishes autonomy, welfare becomes a key factor in
determining overall well-being for IcPs. But, this thesis argues that the proper,
valuable role for welfare lies in its relationship with interests and perspective, and its
consideration along with any residual capacity that an IcP retains.
5.2.2 Welfare, interests and clinical/community perspective
Welfare supports important individual interests that form the foundations of good
1-3
quality of life. And, Feinberg rightly characterises 'welfare interests' as facilitative
of ulterior interests. But, surely welfare interests are also ends in themselves;
valuable 'goods' forming part of the quality of life day-to-day. Essentially, they are
the framework of good quality of life, and ulterior or critical interests add the
substance. However, the underlying structure remains no less important because it is
unseen. Our awareness of these important underlying interests often arises only
when they become negatively impacted through illness, impairing our welfare. This
may happen whether or not we are competent. However, the relative importance of
welfare within overall quality of life lies in its connection with interests, and
interests vary with the nature and degree of mental incapacity. Persons temporarily
incapacitated retain many ulterior interests (which are merely temporarily
suspended), and those with developing capacity (such as mature minors) have scope
for future ulteriority. Others with more severe incapacity have a diminution in
ulteriority. This is accompanied, however, by durable welfare interests that adopt a
greater proportional importance in individual quality of life.14 It is clear, therefore,
that welfare is important to almost all patients, but its facilitative role is less
12 Intensified by the Human Rights Act (1998); reasons for decisions should be made available under
Article 6 (Schedule 1 HRA 1998).
13
E.g. avoidance of pain/suffering, a safe and supportive environment, and freedom from
harm/interference.
14
Interestingly, in extreme incapacity (such as p.v.s.) welfare interests may diminish due to the
patient's (non-experiential) insensate state, while some ulterior interests (such as dignity) arguably
endure, see Chapter 7, below.
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extensive for some, depending on the extent to which incapacity inhibits other (non-
welfare) interests. This is not a judgment about how valuable people are. Rather, it
is a simple recognition that individual lives are composed differently. We should
assess and acknowledge what contributes to good quality of life for that individual.
Beyond interests, welfare can provide valuable perspective in proxy decisions.
Welfare can provide a balancing objectivity. Competent patients may
(autonomously) choose against their (objectively perceived) welfare interests.
However, decisions regarding incapacitated patients are, by definition, 'imperfect'
insofar as the 'best' option (i.e. autonomous patient choice) is unavailable. Here, we
must look to objective welfare assessment alongside any (previously held) subjective
views and/or current input to make the best assessment we can of an individual's
overall well-being. Welfare represents an objective perspective (framed clinically or
by the community view of human welfare) that should be heard in all decisions -
even where a patient is competent. For, the objective welfare perspective is as
important to informedness as individual subjectivity. Furthermore, in IcP decisions -
where subjective input may be evidentially very limited - an objective view becomes
increasingly important as a substantial base for decision. Hard paternalism has given
a welfare bad name.15 Yet, clinical perspective is an essential element of information
regarding a patient's personal, medical welfare. And, welfare has been common
currency of IcP healthcare decisions in the U.K.16 On one hand, this is the rightful
role for welfare because of its increased importance where a person is unable to
determine matters for him or herself; welfare is a valuable objective. However, its
overriding dominance has previously sold IcPs short of subjective input. Welfare is
important to informedness in every healthcare decision, but no value should
dominate to the occlusion of all others. Good decision-making is about balance.
'Quality of life' is about assessing balance within an individual life. To understand
what makes a person 'fare well', we must evaluate what makes life 'good' and what
it means to have their life.
15 See Harris, above, 193:'[a]n initial problem is that concern for the welfare of others is compatible
both with paternalism and with moralism'.
16 In the USA welfare is rejected regarding IcPs in favour of'substituted judgment'.
188
5.3 'Life'
Well-being exists only in the context of a life. How we view 'life' and its meaning
influences the content of 'welfare'. To assess welfare impact we must ascertain what
might be considered valuable in life.
5.3.1 What do we mean by 'life'?
Life can be regarded as a biological state, at some cellular level. However, Warren
suggests that 'living' refers to:
'organisms, rather than to their component cells, organs, or tissues -
17
although these are also alive'.
In short, 'life' is a collective of biological components constituting a 'being'.18 Even
on a biological level, however, beginning and ending of 'life' is contentious.19 For,
coming into being and dying are parts of a process that can be difficult to discern.
The nature of being alive was raised in the recent conjoined twins case.20 In the
wealth of commentary thereon, Mason raises an interesting distinction in terms of
biological life. He argues that the weaker twin (Mary) may never have acquired
• 21'alive' status, and confusion may exist
'between the concepts of somatic life and death and cellular life and death. I
have no doubt that Mary's cells were alive by virtue of the fact that they
were oxygenated, albeit "artificially"...Equally. ..the majority of the medical
opinion must be interpreted as showing that her soma was dead in that it had
never been alive'.22
Thus, life can be difficult to define (or its present/absence to diagnose) - even at a
purely biological level.
Furthermore, life as a process is never static. Our body is in a constant state of
change. Sometimes that change is at odds with our intuitive sense of 'living'; in
17 M.A. Warren, Moral status, Obligations to persons and other living things (1997) Oxford U.P. Inc.,
New York, 25.
18 Characteristics ofpersonhood are considered below.
19 As R. Dworkin observes (Life's Dominion, above, 21): '[scientists disagree about exactly when the
biological life of any animal begins, but it seems undeniable that a human embryo is an identifiable
living organism at least by the time it is implanted in a womb...[and] that the cells that compose an
implanted embryo already contain biological codes that will govern its later physical development'.
But, he continues that: 'it does not follow...that a fetus also has rights or interests...[t]hat is plainly a
further question, and it is in large part a moral rather than a biological one' (ibid 22).
20 Re A (Children) (conjoined twins: surgical separation) [2000] above.
21 Under the Births and Deaths Registration Act (1953).
22 J.K. Mason, Conjoined twins: A diagnostic conundrum, E.L.R. Vol. 5 (2001) 226, 233.
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p.v.s the body persists in its vital biological functions of breathing and beating heart
without intervention, but higher-brain function is permanently lost. Yet, arguably
this does not amount to 'life', but a suspended stage of life's process. Recognition of
the tragic absence of any meaningful life in p.v.s. stems not from lack of biological
aliveness, but from some notion beyond biological. In short, 'life' is more than a
biological state.
5.3.1.1 Contribution beyond the biological
Rachels distinguishes biological from biographical life, the latter being
'the sum of one's aspirations, decisions, activities, projects and human
relationships'.
The meaning of a life - and its quality - is shaped as much by these elements as by
biological existence. Biological life is effectively a vehicle for the valuable process
of biographical living. The nomenclature is correct; biographical aspects tell the
story of individuality. Relatedly, Feinberg refers to capacity for 'conative life',
arguing that interests accrue from conations.24 In essence, conative life imports some
volitional or purposeful focus to life. It is submitted that biography and/or conation
reflect the value of engaging or participating in one's life. Any realistic quality of
life assessment must gauge welfare in terms of this purposeful nature of life as well
as biological status. However, exclusive focus on biographical life as the only source
of life value could feasibly exclude severely damaged neonates, long-term coma
patients, and perhaps even severely disabled adults from having quality of life worth
protecting. Alone, this produces harsh results based on diagnostic classification
rather than individual assessment.25
But, biographical life is important to good quality of life assessment, recognising
impact on 'aspirations, activities, projects and relationships',26 not just in respect of
23 See J. Rachels, The End of Life, Euthanasia and morality (1986) Oxford U.P., Oxford. 5.
24 J. Feinberg, The rights of animals and unborn generations (1974) above, 49. He construes conative
life to consist in conscious wishes, desires or hopes, urges and impulses, drives, aims and goals, and
growth, inter alia, ibid.
25
Rachels, above 26, endorses protection of biographical life because: 'there is nothing important
about being alive except that it enables one to have a [biographical] life'. Further, ibid, 32, he doubts
whether such babies 'have any prospect of a life in the biographical sense', and that killing a long-
term coma patient would have 'no effect whatever on her [biographical] life' as 'her life was already
over; it ended when she entered the coma'.
26 Per Rachels, above.
190
(biological) health. At the extremes of life, acknowledging prospective absence of
any biographical life can aid our understanding of the negligible quality of life for a
• • • 27
patient in p.v.s. or of a severely defective neonate. This is not because that person
is not valuable as an individual, but merely because of the lack ofparticipation in
life through activities, relationships or experiences.
Biological and biographical lives are inter-dependent and mutually supportive.
Good quality of life flows from presence of both aspects in some combination. The
lives ofmost incapacitated persons do have this combination. For example, a mature
minor's aspirations may lend direction to life, a young minor's activities form a
significant part of daily life, the intellectually disabled person's familial or intimate
relationships add to his/her quality of life, the anorectic patient may have projects
s/he strives to fulfil, the schizophrenic person may wish for particular experiences,
and the mother in labour may desire to fulfil her parental role. All of these
biographical aspects can be impacted by illness (and/or treatment) interfering with
biological life. Admittedly, certain IcPs, such as p.v.s. patients and/or long-term,
severe, steady-state patients may lack biographical life. However, the p.v.s. patient
has previously had a biographical life that can still inform us about him/her as an
individual. And, although the severe, steady-state patient may have never even had
such a life - making biography for him/her seem meaningless - there is still an
element of biography discernible in individuality of circumstance, such as his/her
care environment and family whose concern for the patient is unique to him/her. To
assess how a treatment option contributes to, or detracts from, an IcP's welfare
we must look at its effect on biographical qualities.
Often the impact of medical intervention on both biological and biographical aspects
differs. Traditional emphasis on medical opinion has inclined weighting of quality of
life to the biological. But, just as competent patients are able to take account of
impact on 'life' in a wider sense of relationships, personal goals and experiences, so
good proxy decisions should consider impact on an IcP's 'combined' life. It is
submitted that, for almost all IcPs, we should value their being alive and being alive.
27 In the severely defective neonate, the biological prognosis may be so bad that the necessary
physical vehicle is absent, precluding development of any biographical life. Whereas, the p.v.s.
patient's biological life may be durable but the biology is undermined (through damage to the higher
cerebral cortex), precluding any further biographical life.
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5.3.2 Life value
5.3.2.1 What is valuable?
Fundamentally, the very existence of life - being alive - is valuable. The Human
Rights Act (1998) already protects biological life, but it also offers significant
normative guidelines for the appropriate treatment of fellow human beings. Under
Article 2 signatory States have an obligation to protect everyone's right to life from
28 • • 29intentional deprivation. It even extends to a positive obligation. In X v FRG this
obligation was sufficient to override concurrent obligations under Article 3 towards a
• • ^f)
prisoner, such that force-feeding was authorised to be in his 'best interests'. Thus,
protection of (biological) life under Article 2 may dominate other Articled rights,
supporting the idea that being alive is an essential vehicle for exercising other
protected aspects of life.31
However, it is also clear that while the right to biological life is fundamental, it is not
absolute.32 In circumstances of futility the right to life might not be infringed by
withdrawal ofmedical treatment. As Maclean argues:
'it cannot be a breach of a person's right to fail to perform an action that
would, in any event, be futile'.33
However, 'futility' draws criticism of 'value judgement'.34 But value judgement is
not inherently 'bad', rather it is inevitable in hard cases and responsibility in making
such judgments is key. However, Maclean rightly suggests that the physiological
sense, which the European Commission has identified with futility,36 could preclude
withdrawal of assisted nutrition and hydration (a.n.h) from p.v.s. patients. For, a.n.h.
28 Article 2, paragraph 1, (Schedule 1, HRA 1998), subject only to certain exceptions (Article 2,
Paragraph 2). 'Deprivation' does not requires an 'intention to kill': Stewart v UK 39 DR 162 (1984).
29 See Osman v UK (2000) 29 EHRR 245, but 'reasonable' measures will suffice (ibid, 306). The
effect of this is such that placing a prisoner suffering from psychosis in hospital care under daily
medical supervision was enough to prevent breach of Article 2, despite inadequate maintenance of
records and absence of psychiatric referral (Keenan v UK (2001) 33 EHRR 38).
30
(1984) 7 EHRR 152.
31
However, other interests such as privacy and family life may endure beyond biological death - and
'being alive' may incorporate 'having been alive' in that regard, see Chapter 7, below.
32 See Clayton and Tomlinson (2000) above, 353.
33 See A. Maclean, Crossing the Rubicon on the human rights ferry (2001) MLR 64(5), 775, 782.
34
Maclean, ibid 783, citing R.D. Tmog, A.S. Brett and J. Frader, The problem with futility (1992) 326
New Eng. J Med. 1560.
35 See Chapter 8, below.
36
Accepted in LCB v UK (1998) 27 EHRR 212.
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would achieve its aim of sustaining biological life;37 hence it is not technically
'futile'. He argues further that an alternative (non-physiological) means is therefore
TO
needed to warrant a finding of 'futility', such as 'benefit' or 'purpose'. Indeed,
benefit does go beyond biological/physiological. Treatment decisions impact not
only medical interests but also personal, relationship and societal interests. Benefit
(or harm) accrues to 'life' in this wider sense. And, its absence in situations of
futility is important. When life in a broader, non-physiological sense is harshly
impacted, this must also be taken into account in making individual quality of life
judgments.
Paraphrasing Mason, McCall Smith and Laurie, the medically intended use of
TQ
'futility' (identified by Jecker and Pearlman) construes as futile treatment that
would be: useless or ineffective; fails to offer minimum quality of life; can't achieve
patient goals; or provides no reasonable chance of survival.40 Such futility pertains
to absence of treatment purpose in either biological or biographical senses.
Inevitably, this may involve a value judgment. As Mason et al identify, across these
four possibilities, two characterisations of futility:
'the effect of a treatment - which is no more than an alteration in some
bodily function - and...the benefit of a treatment - which is something that
can be appreciated by the patient'.41
They proceed to distinguish between physiological futility (based on purely medical
grounds) and normative futility (involving a value judgment which is the prerogative
of the patient or a surrogate).42 When treatment is normatively futile - meaning there
is no purposeful benefit - we should consider withdrawing (biological/physiological)
support. Admittedly, this requires a value judgment. But, provided that judgment is
informed, considered, and follows requirements of due process, an individual's 'right
37 See Maclean, above, 783.
38
E.g. See H. Brody, The Healer's Power (1992) Yale University Press, New Haven, 177. Brody
frames futility as failure to produce any benefit, and/or to promote any reasonable purpose of
treatment (because likelihood or magnitude of any benefit is too small, or relative harm too great).
Again, Maclean criticises this approach as 'based in value judgment', above, 783-784.
39 See N.S. Jecker and R.A. Pearlman, Medical futility: who decides? (1992) 152 Arch. Intern. Med.
1140.
40
(2002) above, paragraph 16.8.
41
Ibid, paragraph 16.9, citing L.J. Schneiderman and N.S. Jecker, Futility in Practice (1993) 153
Arch. Intern. Med. 437.
42
Ibid, citing R.M. Veatch and C.M. Spicer, Futile care: Physicians should not be allowed to refuse to
treat, in T.L. Beauchamp and R.M. Veatch's Ethical issues in death and dying (1996), 392.
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to life' will have been accorded appropriate importance. In essence, withdrawal of
treatment may be warranted because we value life in a sense that is more than
purely biological. Far from undervaluing 'life', we arrive at this point by valuing
'life' highly in its individual biographical and biological senses; 'life' means both
being alive, and being alive.
Indeed, through Articles 3, 8, and 12 of the ECHR some fundamental aspects of
being alive are effected. In the context of medical intervention, Article 3 promotes
dignity and bodily integrity,43 Article 8 individual and familial privacy, and Article
12 protects a right of relationship. In addition Article 14 requires non-discriminatory
enjoyment of these rights. So, incapacity should not negate these rights, the spirit of
which pertains to 'life' in its wider sense of individuality, relationship, personal
choice, and aspiration.44 Hence, there is value in the process and experience ofliving
a life (as well as simply being alive). Human rights legislation merely reflects
underlying values fundamental within philosophy, medicine, and amongst persons.
As Harris observes:
'[wjhile to many just staying alive may be the most important consideration,
and while they may even wish to continue to live even at appalling cost in
terms of pain, disability and so on.. .they of course prefer to live worthwhile
lives. So that while any life might be better than no life, people generally
expect medical care of concern itself not simply with preventing death but
with restoring worthwhile existence'.45
The notion of 'whole life' within a best interests framework is developed in the
remainder of this thesis by relating 'combined life' to interests and time in the
context of individuality. All that need be reiterated here is that in considering
welfare we should evaluate impact (benefit/detriment) accruing to an
incapacitated individual's biographical aspects of life - in addition to the
biological effect.
5.3.2.2 How do we value life?
The value of life accrues in different ways:
43
Loughrey (2001) above, 500, highlights: 'medically necessary treatment will not breach Article 3
and...established principles of medicine will usually be decisive of medical necessity' (Herczegfalvy
v Austria (1992) 15 EHRR 437 para. 82).
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'[s]omething is instrumentally important if its value depends on its
usefulness... [sjomething is subjectively valuable only to people who happen
to desire it.. .[sjomething is intrinsically valuable.. .if its value is independent
ofwhat people happen to enjoy or want or need or what is good for them'.46
Dworkin rightly suggests human life to be valuable in all three ways.
Instrumental value of life is often seen as inappropriately treating persons as means
AO
rather than ends. But, arguably, this is
'an evocative way of articulating the complaint that one has been treated as a
mere thing, as an object, as having no intrinsic value, or as lacking the
distinctive human capacities. However, the language of instrumentalization
is pretty elastic and, at its broadest, it simply conveys the complaint that one
feels that one has been 'used' or exploited'.49
Rather, a person's life may serve the lives of others without any hint of exploitation
but because we choose it as part of our (biographical) life. Most of us are constantly
relating to other people and functioning within small teams or within wider society -
and we choose this.50 Instrumental value is part of the story of a life that merits
acknowledgement. Indeed, instrumental value may form part of subjective life value
(considered below).
Dworkin's main focus, however, is intrinsic life value, being sacred or inviolable.51
He regards this value as based in process 52 supporting the approach already outlined
that being alive (in the sense of experiencing the process of living one's life) is a
fundamental part of life's importance. Admittedly, not all IcPs are able to experience
their lives; permanently insensate individuals are unable to experience even their
day-to-day life. Yet, intuitively we still may feel that their life bears some intrinsic
value, which is apparent in our experiencing decisions to withdraw treatment from
44 These aspects might be summed up as 'human dignity': for a definition of dignity, see D. Beyleveld
and R. Brownsword, Human dignity in bioethics and biolaw (2001) Oxford U.P., Oxford, 18.
45
Harris, above, 99-100.
46 R. Dworkin, above, 71.
47
Ibid, 72. He defines instrumental value as 'how much...being alive serves the interests of others',
subjective value as 'how much he wants to be alive or how much being alive is good for him', and
intrinsic value within the very state of being 'because - and therefore only once - it exists', see ibid
72-74.
48
In terms of Kant's Categorical Imperative.
49
Beyleveld and Brownsword, above, 17.
50 See also, Warren, above, 98. It is submitted that, despite incapacity the fact remains IcPs do relate
to others, therefore their life may have instrumental value in the most positive sense; they matter to




them as dilemmas. This may be a recognition of intrinsic value in biological life
aswell, or a manifestation of the scope for intrinsic value of a person's life to be
experienced by others (where a person's own experiential capacity is lost).
However, most IcPs are capable of experiencing their lives, and Dworkin's
interpretation of intrinsic life value accounts for two important features of 'well-
being':
• that we should be (biologically) able (so far as is possible) to experience
this (biographical) process - being physiologically well enough to
participate in life's process. Any treatment decision made in the name of
welfare must contribute towards this state, and 'benefit' may accrue from
enabling/restoring a person's capacity for participation; and
• that we should be free to live our life - free from interference in our
choices about (biographical) content of life's process.53
These may be termed welfare and autonomy respectively, and are developed as
'respect' in the remaining chapters hereof. For present purposes, it is submitted that
the potent intrinsic value of life lies in accepting its combined nature. Whether we
call this 'human dignity', 'combined life', or 'whole life' matters less than its spirit.
As Dworkin concludes:
'[t]he idea that each individual human life is inviolable is therefore
rooted...in two combined and intersecting bases of the sacred: natural and
human creation'.54
5.3.2.3 Whose value?
Having established what is valuable and how we as humans value it, there remains
the issue of who attributes that value. In essence, this is an objective/subjective
debate. In ideal circumstances a quality of life evaluation (and the impact of any
treatment decision upon it) would be made by the individual concerned. Every
person is an expert in his/her own life. For, part of the value of living is experiential,
and the subject is the only person experiencing his/her individual life in all its
aspects. Many subjective choices are made in anticipation of the added value we
53 This accords with Beyleveld and Brownsword's view on 'dignity', which incorporates freedom and
support, see above, 18.
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perceive an action will bring. Because life is a unique experience, less controversy
surrounds an individual subjectively choosing what is valuable in his/her life, than
does an objective judgment about it. As Dworkin suggests, subjective life value is
about its 'personal value'.55 Thus, if we believe life value to be partly experiential
then, by corollary, freedom to choose one's experience is fundamental.
As proxies we might seek to assess impact on an IcP's life in terms of zoe and bios -
traditional Greek terminology which Dworkin highlights: zoe, meaning physical or
biological life, and bios meaning
'a life as lived, as made up of the actions, decisions, motives, and events that
compose what we now call a biography'.56
But from whose perspective do we make this assessment? Any assumption that we
might want to judge IcPs as 'worthless' or 'less valuable' is misplaced. It
underestimates our humanity; we recognise our own humanity in, and through,
others. In respecting the (combined) value of another's life we respect our own life.
Indeed, Dworkin suggests that:
'the most powerful reason we have for wanting others to respect the intrinsic
value of human life - in the way we think that value demands respect - is not
concern for our own or other people's interests at all, but just concern for the
value itself.57
On this basis, whether deciding about our own subjective life, or the life of another,
we are making a judgment about the value of life itself. Thus, quality of life
judgments are rarely so trite as to be about social worth. They are about personal
impact first and foremost and, perhaps at a subconscious level, a reflection on the
nature of being human. Indeed, we should guard against any extension of the
discussion into the realms of social worth.
In proxy decisions, the prime focus is the impact on an IcP's life, and Buchanan and
Brock seemingly promote subjectivity, that is:
'the value or quality of an individual's life to that individual, regardless of
how society or would-be calculators of social utility evaluate it'.58
54 R. Dworkin, above, 83.
55 Ibid, 73.





It is submitted that we should try to establish impact subjectively as far as possible in
order to allow life experience to be maximally personal and unique. Furthermore,
the value ofparticipation should extend to an IcP's involvement in his/her treatment
decision where achievable in terms of 'input'. However, it is unrealistic to assume
that even as a highly informed proxy we could evaluate impact on an IcP's quality of
life wholly subjectively. We simply cannot step into his/her shoes or draw the
inferences and conclusions that s/he would.59 Rather, we must allow for a proxy to
exercise his/her responsibility; seeking to benefit the patient's life, acknowledging
the patient's subjective perspective on his/her life value where possible, but
accepting that an objective perspective is also warranted in determining welfare.
Objectivity incorporates clinical perspective on an IcP's medical needs, together with
societal influence about which values are acceptable across the community, and
scope to act from compassionate concern for another human being in need of our
care and protection. It has been argued herein that life is a combination of the
biological and biographical. It is submitted that welfare too must be assessed from a
combined viewpoint. To understand fully what would benefit a person we must: (1)
be aware of their objective needs (which they may be unable to recognise and act
upon due to incapacity);60 yet (2) act with compassion and respect for their
subjective views. This is protective rather than paternalistic. It is respectful because
we act in sight of individuality, yet in accordance with humanity; essentially
providing the conditions of freedom and support that characterise human dignity.
While notions of welfare, life and quality of life have been explored, there remains
one issue that connects these issues with respect for persons; personhood.
5.4 'Personhood'
A contentious area, over many years, concerns the question of whether and to whom
we attribute moral rights and worth. People disagree over the classification used
because its end point is attribution ofmoral status and, in turn, this acts as a means of
59 For this reason a pure substituted judgment standard is rejected herein.
60 These needs include a person's clinical need for treatment, which contributes to his/her physical and
psychological health, freedom from pain, suitable care environment, and relationship needs. In other
words, those things that objectively can be seen to contribute to his/her welfare interests. See
discussion of interests deriving from needs (contrasted with desires), particularly Feinberg's welfare
interests, Chapter 3, above. These are determinable by reference to input from HCPs, carers, and
those emotionally closest to an IcP.
198
establishing the type of moral duties we owe to them. Personhood acts as a form of
gateway to moral status, determining who possesses 'life' in a valuable sense, and is
consequently hotly debated at the 'edges' of life.61 This is particularly poignant
regarding incapacitated persons where their incapacity often impinges upon their
ability to fulfil their biographical lives. Although some sort of identifying
classification must be set,62 the fundamental danger is that rigid application of
personhood criteria often excludes these patients and contradicts our compulsive
moral intuition. In particular, because those who do not meet the requisite criteria -
'non-persons' - are owed different (often lesser) moral duties by others. Thus,
groups of 'exceptions' are often created in order to protect IcPs who fail to meet the
criteria. It is submitted that incapacitated humans merit our respect and we should
bear these individuals in mind when setting any such criteria. Ultimately, we cannot
permit personhood to create a stumbling block to treating these patients respectfully.
For, if the personhood concept works against our moral intuition and compassion as
humans, then the criteria are functionally (morally) questionable. With this in mind,
how should we frame the criteria for attributing moral worth? What terminology
best represents classes of individuals to whom we owe moral duties? Three varying
possibilities are identified from relevant literature: human organisms; persons; and
human beings.
5.4.1 Requisite biological states
Should biological existence be enough to merit moral status? If we adopt a 'human
organism' approach then it would be so.63 A human organism represents the
collection of cells, DNA, and physiological systems of human biological
constitution. Certainly, some form of biological existence is needed for attribution of
61
Harris, above, 8, summarises the question as: 'when does life begin to have that special value we
believe attaches to human life and when does it cease to have that value?'
62 Aliter, we would owe such extensive duties to all organisms that it becomes practically impossible
to fulfil.
63 See: M. Lockwood who defines a living human organism as 'a (complete) living organism of the
species Homo Sapiens', Moral dilemmas in modem medicine (1984) Oxford U.P., Oxford, 10; and H.
Watt who Relatedly describes such an organism as 'a living, self-organising whole', Conjoined twins:
separation as mutilation', Med. L. Rev. 9 [2001] 237, 238
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moral worth in any substantially meaningful way. Watt places heavy emphasis on
the significance of the physical body in attributing interests to individuals:
'[w]e are bodily beings, not purely spiritual beings or a series of thoughts.
We all experience ourselves as bodily beings at times when we are
conscious. We also know that there are times when we go on existing
despite not being conscious - for example, when we are asleep or in a coma.
The human moral subject is not reducible to his or her experiences, which
come and go; rather, it is the underlying bodily being who is the subject of
interests and rights'.64
It was argued earlier that the physical body acts as a vehicle for other aspects of
being, such as cognition, emotion and spirit. Clearly, the issue of assessing an
individual's quality of life for purposes of treatment does not even arise if no
physical person exists. The human organism as a functioning (or dysfunctioning)
whole is fundamental. Whenever we recognise the value of biological life we are -
in effect - honouring the notion of human organism. But, while the human organism
is important, its employment as the sole definitive criterion for accrediting moral
worth raises two problems: 1) where does the definition of 'living human organism'
begin and end?; and 2) is it really appropriate (given that it takes no real account of
any intrinsic value of biographical life)?
In terms of the beginning of life, the 'living human organism' definition has scope,
prima facie, to attribute moral value from the moment of conception, based on the
combining of cells capable of forming something programmed for human status.
However, development of a whole human organism from fertilisation is not a
foregone conclusion. Harris rightly concludes that:
'[ljife, then, is a continuum and the emergence of the individual occurs
gradually. ..[a] 11 that can safely be said of the fertilised egg is that it is live
human tissue'. 65
It is surely the ample scope for misconstruing life's beginning at cellular stage that
causes the qualifications 'whole' or 'complete' to be added to 'human organism'.
Aliter, (if a human organism need simply be 'living' to merit moral value) then
abortion - or even contraception - could be prohibited. Such a position on
64
Watt, ibid.
65 See Harris, above, 11-12.
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contraception has been legally tested recently and found untenable.66 Further, the
problem with any construction that prohibits abortion through such early attribution
of moral status is its creation of conflict with freedom and autonomy - also valued as
part of human dignity - of another whole living organism who is already living a life.
It is this conflict, as much as any definitional weakness, that inhibits pragmatic use of
early-life moral status.
Certainly, foetal life is accorded some legal status prior to birth.67 In England and
Wales the current legal time limit for termination of pregnancy (on 'therapeutic and
social' grounds68) is set at 24 weeks.69 As a foetus may be capable of being born
alive (and surviving with medical assistance) at this developmental stage this appears
pragmatic.70 But, perhaps the transition to morally protected status at 24 weeks (by
virtue of biological capacity to be born alive) is something of a red herring. Is such
choice really about the moral status of biological human organisms (or even
sentience to pain), or is it equally about loss of a chance; that terminating an embryo
or foetus ends all opportunity for it to live a life? It is submitted that it is our
recognition of human life as more-than-biological that fuels our concerns about
terminating an individual's life at any of its stages. Thus, the intensity of issues
increases as a pregnancy proceeds not only because of sentiency, but also because
potential to live a life becomes more real.71 Certainly, in part, we attribute moral
status on the basis of being, or having potential to become a living (whole) human
organism. However, a physical collection of cells is not the whole story; we
manifest respect also in our perception of life as more-than-biological, recognising
66 See The Queen on the application of Smeaton on behalf of the Society for the Protection of Unborn
Children v Sec. State for Health (Schering Health Care Ltd and Family Planning Asscn as interested
parties [2002] EWHC 610 (Admin.), reported by C. Bridge, Fam. Law 32 [2002] 664.
67 This is considered below paragraph 5.4.3.
68 See Mason et al (2002) above, paragraph 5.7.
69 See the Abortion Act 1967, as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990
(s37). This is only one of four possible grounds for abortion, and the only one to be temporally
limited, see Mason et al, ibid.
70
However, little consensus exists. Beyleveld and Brownsword, above, 32, identify a distinction in
the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1996): 'Article 1 brokers a clear compromise:
while those signatories who cannot agree that the conceptus is a bearer of human rights are to be
allowed to persist with this belief, all signatories are required to accept that, in the name of human
dignity, the conceptus is a protected entity', ibid 32. Hence, while the embryo or foetus must be
treated with some respect as a living human organism, its moral status is not protected as of right (to
life) until some later point designated by society through domestic provisions.
71
Relatedly, we feel the loss of a child or young person keenly because death totally frustrates their
(biographical) living yet to be done (see also R. Dworkin, above, 84-85).
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the participatory element in the process of living. We can still respect biographical
7? • 7*1
life both before biological life has started, and after biological life has ended.
Biological life as a human organism is important to moral status, but this does not
mean that we should always protect or perpetuate it. For, we also attribute moral
status on the basis of life as lived. This biographical sense of life, involving mental,
emotional and spiritual capacities, may be represented as belonging to 'persons'.
5.4.2 Requisite mental states
In the treatment context, the ethical tenets of medicine become applicable once an
individual's moral status as a 'person' is established. As Harris observes, this means
that
'[o]nce this threshold is crossed, no individual is more of a person or more
valuable than any other. This concept of the person sets out to identify
which individuals and which forms of life have the sort of value and
importance that makes appropriate and justifies our according to them the
same concern, respect and protections as we grant to one another'.74
Strictly speaking, if an individual does not meet the requirements of personhood then
we need not accord him/her the same moral status.
However, the term 'person' connotes possession of certain mental capacities beyond
the merely physiological:
'[pjersonhood is a psychological concept, not a biological one. It is a
being's mental and behavioural capacities that make it a person, not the
shape of its body, the microstructure of its chromosomes, or any other
strictly physiological characteristic'.75
The origins of modern philosophical use of the term 'person' derive from Locke's
seventeenth century writings.76 Singer highlights the connection between these
origins and current use of personhood in medical ethics.77 Relatedly, Harris defines
'persons' as
72 I.e. by respecting the biographical life of a pregnant woman up until a foetus reaches a stage of
having a 'real prospect' of biological (and potential biographical) existence.





76 Based on reasoning, reflective capacity and some form of self-consciousness over time, see J.
Locke, Essay on Human Understanding (1690), Book II, Chapter 9.




'beings capable of valuing their own lives', and argues that '[i]n order to
value its own life a being would have to be aware that it has a life to value.
This would at the very least require something like Locke's conception of
self-consciousness.. .[which] is not simple awareness, rather it is awareness
of awareness'.79
A need for self-consciousness imports certain requisite capacities.80 Characterisation
through experience and self-awareness posits personhood firmly within a concept of
biographical life.81 However, these capacities are also based in biological function
such as the physiology for cognitive function, which enables us to 'think' or
'believe'. Hence, ironically, recognising moral status under personhood also
depends upon a combination ofbiology and biography.
Some of the difficulties of requiring reflective capacity in terms of incapacitated
patients are considered earlier.82 Essentially, tying moral status to personhood makes
it impossible for some incapacitated humans to be included. Certain groups of IcPs
such as neonates, infants, those with severe intellectual disability, severe mental
illness, low cognitive awareness states, or p.v.s. are simply excluded from meriting
moral status. Some authors overcome exclusion of the first two groups (neonates
and infants) by adding 'ability to acquire' (self-consciousness) into the criteria.83
This allows for attribution ofmoral status where current absence of self-awareness is
purely developmental. However, it fails to relieve the pressure for severely damaged
babies and children, whose developmental capacity may be non-existent or whose
expected short lifespan will preclude any real opportunity for such development.
Further, it does not address the other excluded groups at all.
Why does this matter? Why can't we simply accept that incapacitated humans do
not have the same moral status as those with full capacity for self-consciousness?






Lockwood, above, 10, suggests that '[a] person is a being that is conscious, in the sense of having
the capacity for conscious thought and experiences, but not only that: it must have the capacity for
reflective consciousness and self-consciousness. It must have, or at any rate have the ability to
acquire, a concept of itself, as a being with a past and a future'.
81 Harris also adopts an association between personhood and biographical life: Human beings, persons




See, for example, Lockwood, above.
84
E.g. Harris [2001] above, 233.
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status are acceptable in terms of our focus (as moral agents). Traditionally,
however, moral rights were based in moral agency; only those that had full moral
agency might be accorded reciprocal moral (and legal) rights.86 However, moral
agency as a key is diminishing:
'in so far as very young children, foetuses, the dead, and members of the
human biological species who are apparently not agents are granted rights
under the human rights instruments, this claim [of rights-bearers as moral
agents] is challenged'.87
Beyleveld and Brownsword acknowledge that human rights are now being extended
oo
to some of these groups. But, even assuming that moral agency is no longer the
appropriate criterion for moral status, a problem persists with attribution of different
moral status based on 'personhood'. Given that the purpose of determining moral
status is to establish what our moral obligations are towards an individual, the
exclusiveness of personhood engenders anomaly. Arguably, some higher animals
could constitute (self-conscious) 'persons',89 yet many incapacitated humans would
not. This is where intuitive moral discomfort for many observers begins, because it
means according more significant moral duties to animals than to incapacitated
humans. While some might not regard this problematic, it is submitted that many
people do feel an intuitive dis-ease about that position.90 Surely, we owe moral
duties to IcPs. Why? Because, fundamentally, as human beings we have
compassion for their human plight. We acknowledge that: (a) there is some value in
their biological lives to consider; and (b) some of these individuals also have some
sort of biographical life. It may be minimal (i.e. for severely intellectually disabled
adults), short (i.e. for severely disabled neonates), unpredictably transient (in the
mentally ill), or past (i.e. for p.v.s. patients). However, it remains part of the story of
85
E.g. regarding a doomed, severely damaged infant our main concern may be short-lived sentience-
welfare, whereas our prime concern regarding a temporarily incapacitated adult may be to protect
his/her autonomy.
86
Implicit in Kant' s attribution of full moral status only to 'rational moral agents'. See Warren,
above, 101-102.
87
Beyleveld and Brownsword, above, 80.
88
Ibid, 80-81.
89 See: Singer, above, 172-183; and T. Regan, Frey on interests and animal rights, Philosophical
Quarterly, 27 (1977) 335; cf. R.G. Frey, above, Chapter VII.
90
Perhaps partly because it amounts to the type of objective 'social worth' quality of life judgment
rejected above. This is not to suggest that moral duties are not also owed to animals. But, the duties
owed to IcPs may be differently founded; 'personhood' can protect some animals, but we need an
additional criterion regarding IcPs.
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that individual's life. And, it is part of what identifies a person as a valuable
individual. Additionally, these individuals do still have interests that could be
infringed, such as privacy, dignity or bodily integrity.91 As compassionate humans
we do, and should, feel offended by such invasions. Treating these individuals as
being of no significant moral status affronts our moral intuitions.92 This is why
personhood as a sole criterion is unsuitable; these individuals fall through the gap,
and end up being included as 'special exceptions' to the personhood rule. Harris
makes an interesting distinction between 'non-human persons',93 and 'human non-
persons',94 and suggests that this explains why we perceive variance in the right to
life between full persons (with full moral status) and, say, the foetus (whose full
moral status is yet to come into being) or the p.v.s. patient (where it has essentially
gone). However, ultimately this distinction makes no difference to the
insufficiencies of personhood as the sole base for moral status; personhood is simply
too demanding. Some humans cannot meet it, yet surely their life still merits our
respect. This does not mean that we must always treat them, or keep them alive
indefinitely, but simply that we should see them as morally important individuals to
whom we owe consideration, care and compassion. Further, these individuals should
be allowed a role centre-stage, not as marginalised 'exceptions'. Personhood fails to
admit this to them.
5.4.3 Incapacitated individuals
We have seen that the term 'human organism' (potentially) attributes moral status to
all forms of humanity (however undeveloped), and a person's life would cease to
have any significant moral value only on physiological death. In short, it 'organism'
values only biological life. But, it is submitted, a person's biography is also valuable
and durable. Although we cling to our memories of another's life for fear that, with
biological death, they might be lost, in truth their legacy persists. Indeed, our moral
qualms about ending the lives of p.v.s. patients are eased, not by reference to any
suffering of their physical bodies (as they are insentient), but in recognising and
91
Indeed, some patients in coma states have been raped during incapacity.
92 See also Frey, discussed above, Chapter 3.
93 Harris [2001] above, 233, regards 'non-human persons' to include: animals (real/fictional) and
disembodied/non-human entities such as 'gods, demigods, ghosts, extraterrestrials, angels and devils'.
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releasing the lost prospect of any future biographical life. We acknowledge that they
can no longer live in a more-than-biological sense. In these various ways we do,
instinctively, recognise and value life in a combined sense. And, our moral intuitions
matter; we should listen to them because they offer guidance. However, a sole
personhood criterion, raises attribution of moral status unacceptably high and
inaccessible to many IcPs, and creates contradictory results for our moral intuition.
Rather, IcPs should have moral status because of their being human - in terms of
their physiology and biography. Certainly, their lives may be very different, seeming
diminished even, but their uniquely individual 'stories' still consist in their
relationships (however rudimentary) and experiences of daily (and/or historical or
future) life. It is argued here that 'human being' is a definition capable of including
these individuals, and connecting with both biological and biographical life values.
How, then, might we define a 'human being'? Watt conflates the meaning of a
human being with living human organism in arguing that we are 'bodily beings'.95
However, arguably this overlooks the biographical nature of being. Lockwood
differentiates between human organisms, persons and beings,96 but his definition
Q7
appears somewhat tautological. However, ifwe seek a term that encompasses both
being alive (biologically) and being alive (biographically), then 'human being' can
fulfil this attributive role. For, 'human being' recognises that individuals are
members of the human species, in a state of being alive, and being in the process
of a uniquely individual life of relationships, experiences and circumstances. In
essence, it accepts that the unique combination of biological and biographical is
enough to warrant moral status; whatever the proportions of that combination.98
The three elements of this proffered definition require clarification in terms of IcPs.
Membership of the human species is fairly self-evident. It is intended to admit
'human non-persons' (including IcPs) to the core of moral status rather than
squeezing their inclusion in at the margins. Its purpose is not to exclude 'non-human
94
Harris, ibid, includes zygotes, embryos, 'brain-dead' and PVS individuals, and anencephalic infants





97 'Human being' representing 'whatever it is that you and I essentially are, what we can neither
become nor cease to be, without ceasing to exist', ibid 13.
98 Considered further, below.
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persons'" from moral status, but pragmatically no single definition will cover all.
Hence, the moral status of 'human beings' should be additional to any status that
society might choose to accord to 'non-human persons'.100 Even patients in extreme
states of incapacity remain identifiable as members of that species known as
'human'.
The second element 'in a state of being alive' admittedly raises some of the
problems outlined earlier regarding beginning of life. A state of being alive
essentially can be construed as being in (biological) existence. However, this raises
issues about foetal interests, as a foetus is in existence, yet his/her moral status is
contentious. While debate about abortion is extensive,101 and beyond the parameters
of this paper, attribution of foetal moral status is relevant because it raises conflict in
the situation where a pregnant woman (whose competence is in question) refuses
intervention, thereby threatening the life of her unborn baby. In certain regards
foetal moral status is recognised. This morality is effected through the legal
provisions regarding abortion,102 and recognition of injury caused in utero}03
However, in both cases arguably this recognition occurs through the medium of the
mother. This explains the apparent conundrum comprising absence of foetal right to
life prior to 24 weeks (when termination can occur for a variety of maternal welfare
reasons), yet that potential 'right to life' - to use a value-laden term - can be
destroyed by actions of other individuals (outside the mother). This integral/external
approach also accounts for judicial reluctance to recognise foetal interests actionable
against the mother.104 However, beyond 24 weeks of pregnancy abortion is
99 'Human non-persons' and 'non-human persons' are terms employed by Harris [2001] above.
100
Hence, this approach is not speciesist because it does not purport humanness to be the only
criterion for moral status candidacy.
101
Regarding abortion the reader is referred to the works of: R. Dworkin; Tooley; Singer; and Harris
(1985) all above.
102 See above paragraph 5.4.1.
103 See Attorney-General's Reference (No. 3 of 1994) [1996] QB 581, where the respondent stabbed
his pregnant girlfriend in the stomach and she (some days later) delivered a premature baby who died
after 120 days. While the Court of Appeal held that the requisite intent for murder or manslaughter
could be shown through the doctrine of transferred malice (being directed at the mother and, prior to
birth, the foetus being viewed 'an integral part of the mother', ibid 598), the House of Lords
emphasised that mother and foetus were distinct, but declining to accord personhood status to the
foetus, [1997] 3 All ER 936, for discussion see Mason et al (2002) above, paragraphs 5.34-5.37.
104 See Re F (in utero) [1988] 2 All ER 193 where the Court of Appeal refused to make a wardship
order regarding a foetus, due to lack of individual foetal personality and inapplicability of
paramountcy of foetal interests when conflicting with the mother's legal interests. Also, in Winnipeg
Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v G (DF) [1997] 2 SCR 925 the Supreme Court of
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permitted only for serious welfare reasons; implicitly the foetus seems then to
acquire an interest in being born contrary to the 'integral' approach outlined. This
could be regarded as an exception, but realistically the extent of any foetal interests
still may not trump maternal welfare if termination is needed to protect the woman's
health or other legitimate reasons.105
While it is dangerous to derive the normative from the descriptive, this description
highlights the moral difficulties involved in maternal-foetal conflict. Essentially, this
is a problem of 'potentiality'. Undoubtedly, potential for life comes about at some
point in utero, and a foetus can be attributed with immediate (welfare) and potential
(ulterior) interests once it is born into being. The potentiality problem arises where
we ask whether potential interests include an interest actually to be born, particularly
where that conflicts with maternal autonomy. Ultimately there is no single right
answer; it is a policy choice based on preferred moral position. However, it is
submitted that, as life is a process, the birth process could be the point at which the
right to, and value of, life become 'real' rather than potential. From the twenty-
fourth week of pregnancy onwards it may be possible for a foetus to survive if born.
Hence, from this point we might attribute to the foetus an 'interest in the birth
process' (subject to the mother's welfare). This is not necessarily synonymous with
a 'right to life'. 'Interest in the birth process' would essentially mean according to
the foetus a moral interest in attempting to realise its potentiality, but that is all. The
birth process is hazardous and, if a foetus presents in a manner requiring
intervention, its potentiality (for being born alive) may be jeopardised if the
(competent) mother exercises autonomy by refusing intervention. In essence, the
birth process is the point at which the reality of foetal potentiality is realised. The
being has progressed from foetus to neonate and possesses individuality independent
of the mother. 6 This should be protected in the same way that any human being is
Canada refused to uphold an order to detain a pregnant woman addicted to solvent abuse in order to
protect her foetus because of the 'unique relationship' between mother and foetus (as not separable).
105 Such termination may be carried for reasons of; risk of grave permanent injury to the pregnant
woman; that continuance of pregnancy carries greater risk to the woman's life than does termination;
or foetal abnormality, (Abortion Act 1967, as amended). For discussion see Mason et al (2002)
above, paragraph 5.7.
106
Clearly, a neonate has an independent existence that means decisions can then be taken about the
quality of life of that individual. Relatedly, Mason et al (2002) above, paragraph 5.51 (referring to a
parliamentary speech by A. Widdicombe (Official Reports (HC) 24 April 1990, vol. 171, col. 192))
suggest it is 'illogical to distinguish in legal terms between abandonment of the newborn infant and
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valued. Crystallisation, then, is a point of transition where the potential becomes
real. However, if a competent pregnant woman refuses intervention needed by the
foetus, difficult as we may find it, arguably we should refrain from intervening
because: 1) the woman is already in being and should be respected as a valuable
individual capable of autonomy; and 2) the foetus has had its interest in attempting
the birth process, but during that process has failed to progress sufficiently to make
its potential become real. Further, we have no more justification to invade the
competent woman's body to remove and allow life to the foetus, than to invade her
body against her will in order to remove a kidney and give life to another existing
human being. To do so would diminish one of the very aspects of life we value -
freedom. Even if it serves the woman's welfare, we still should not intervene
because autonomy should hold the balance of power in this situation. Admittedly,
this may seem harsh, but the conflict in this situation is acute and views will differ
about its correctness - whatever the position adopted.
What about a mother who is incompetent? Our natural inclination seems then to
shift to intervention in the interests of foetus and/or mother because incompetence
alters the value balance - we can take account of a greater relative proportion of the
woman's welfare. However, it is still debatable whether we should intervene purely
in the potential interests of her foetus. Peart et al explore this issue, initially in the
context of two American cases and one known case in the UK where women became
i r\n
incapacitated during pregnancy, and they raise interesting distinctions based on
1 08
classification of the pregnant woman's prognosis. Where the woman has a chance
of recovery Peart et al suggest that
'[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that her interests
are best served by whatever treatment would be best for both her and her
unborn child'.109
Where there is no chance ofthe woman's recovery, they argue that
abandonment of the living abortus'. On the approach adopted herein, it could be said that the living
abortus has managed - against the odds - to survive the birth process and its interests have
'crystallised' meriting protection of life value.
107
[2001] above, see also earlier discussion by J.J. Finnerty, C.A. Chisholm, H. Chappie, I.S. Login
and J.V. Pinkerton, Cerebral arteriovenous malformation in pregnancy: presentation and neurologic,




Ibid, 287-288, including Caesarean section if clinically warranted.
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'maintaining life support in these circumstances is neither in the woman's
best interests nor against her best interests. It is a-therapeutic, because she
has no real interests'.110
They conclude, on this basis, that proceeding with the pregnancy to birth does not
conflict with her interests.111 Under the third prognosis, brain stem death, they
112 •observe that because the foetus is alive but the woman is not, (despite non-
crystallisation of interests until live birth):113
'the benefit to the foetus of continuing treatment surely outweighs any harm
to the cadaver'.114
In essence, the first situation recognises the 'integral' nature of the woman and child;
their mutual welfare being bound up in a joint outcome. The second recognises that
where no conflict exists (because her biographical life has ceased), the foetus'
interest in the birth process gains stronger moral status. And, in the final scenario the
moral status of the foetus' potentiality outweighs the woman's because even her
biological status has gone.115 The views of Peart et al essentially acknowledge that
circumstances alter cases. And, surely, that is vitally important in all cases of
incapacity; every individual should be regarded as valuable and have their unique
interests, views and needs fully considered. This is the end-point to which attribution
of moral status should drive. Furthermore, the views of Peart et al do not contradict
those offered herein. It remains feasible that interests crystallise upon birth, prior to
which there may be an interest in the birth process, rather than in life itself. This
interest in process may simply become stronger or weaker depending on the
circumstances of the pregnant woman's incapacity. Once born, however, an
individual is then in a state ofbeing alive.
However, being alive is not all there is to being human. The final criterion in the
definition is being in the process of a unique individual life. This refers to
experiences and relationships present in an individual's life (even at a simple level),









whatever that may mean for different individuals. It bears some resonance with
'personhood' - acknowledging that humans participate in life rather than merely
existing as organisms - but does not make the same demands for self-consciousness.
Rather, it emphasises capacity to engage with one's life (i.e. to interact with one's
experiences, other people, and circumstances, even in very simple ways such as
response to touch, experience of pain, simple likes and dislikes etc.) as an important
part of what it is to be human. It does not require that individuals be any particular
way, or have any requisite mental capacities other than a capacity to participate in the
process of life - however rudimentary or simple for them, or however complex their
goals and objectives. In terms of wholly insensate patients, they may previously
have been able to participate and this means that they are still in the process of their
lives, but account must be taken of their prospective total inability to participate
further. The only group of incapacitated patients who might be excluded on this
definition are those who have never been participatory in any way; the utterly and
permanently insensate neonate for example (perhaps the nearest example thus far has
been the position ofMary in the recent conjoined twins case). While such a patient
meets the criteria of membership of the human species, and the state of being alive,
s/he arguably fails the criterion of being in the process of life in a participatory or
engaged manner. This is an extreme example that sits on the farthest margin
between the status of a 'human organism' and a 'human being'. However, by
surviving the birth process, his/her interests have crystallised. Moreover, rather than
exclude the individual from moral status in such a marginal case, it is surely better to
err on the side of caution by admitting moral status, and taking account of the
patient's permanent and total incapacity to participate at the stage of quality of life
evaluation (perhaps warranting treatment withdrawal to allow biological life to end).
For, our quality of life judgment could justifiably conclude that the value of being is
so diminished that continued biological life no longer holds real value to that
individual other than mere existence. Despite this one marginal scenario that may
require an exceptional admission, the term human being is preferred herein because it
"5 This might differ if the woman was known to have held conflicting views. Peart et al, above, 297,
do acknowledge 'some force' in the view that interests may extend beyond a lifetime, and posit
application of their harm/benefit approach where her wishes are unknown.
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does embrace most incapacitated patients without difficulty,116 and embodies both
the biological (i.e. species membership and the state of being alive) and biographical
(i.e. engagement with the process ofliving) values of life.
Many debates about moral status have traditionally revolved around de/merits of
maintaining or ending life. But IcP treatment decisions may also be about impact on
quality of life in non-life-threatening situations. The purpose of using human being
as a designate of moral status is to ensure recognition of both the biological and
biographical values, and to secure a middle path between the biological
fundamentalism of 'organism' and the exclusivity of 'personhood'. It is submitted
that the scope for status of all IcPs as human beings merits our respecting them as
individuals, at all times and in all degrees of their incapacity. This means taking
them into account as individuals, recognising their interests over time, admitting their
subjective involvement and input, improving proxy informedness, and according
them dignity in the way we address conflict. Ultimately, respect requires us to act
with humane responsibility as proxies. This in no way inhibits making quality of life
judgements that might result in biological life ending, but it accords to incapacitated
patients equal status and dignity in considering their well-being.117 Respect is the
key; an ethic that openly embraces both autonomy and welfare and allows that
combination to adapt to individuality. Respect therefore forms the basis for best
interests reconstruction in remaining chapters.
116 For example, many severely defective neonates do experience life to some degree (even if based on
sentience and minimal relationship with parents), and some have a 'personality' of sorts. In this
(albeit basic) experiential sense they are engaged in their individual life. Whereas, in the context of
p.v.s., patients have previously engaged with their life. Thus, most incapacitated patients are or have
been human beings.
117 As Freeman suggests [2001] above, 279, regarding the conjoined twins decision: 'it was...in the
best interests of both twins that they be separated. The decision is one which upholds dignity; the
right of Jodie to live with dignity, the right of Mary to die with dignity. Perhaps even the right of
Mary to confer life upon her sister'.
CHAPTER SIX
RESPECT FOR PERSONS - A SYNTHESIS
Chapter 6 Respect for persons - A synthesis
While 'rights' (in the guise of autonomy), and 'responsibilities' (particularly
beneficence), are of value regarding incapacitated persons, it is apparent from the
previous two chapters that - alone - neither satisfactorily resolves these difficult
decisions. Respect is a concept enjoying a revival under the currency of human
rights discourse. The notion of respecting persons could reinvigorate the rather
sterile debates of rights and duties. Respect can embrace the significance of both
autonomy and professional responsibility as a synthesis. 'Synthesis' imports a
dynamic melding; making something more than its constituent parts. This is needed
ifwe are to achieve better decisions for IcPs. This dynamic allows inherent conflicts
to be resolved in a more balanced, transparent and realistic way. This chapter
explores this potential.
6.1 Defining respect for persons
6.1.1 General definition
What do we mean by 'respect'? One simple dictionary definition refers to respect as:
'[djeferential esteem felt or shown towards a person, thing, or quality'.
In other words, respect concerns acting in a way that acknowledges the other as
valuable and worthy ofbeing heard and considered.
The term 'respect' is express in the European Convention on Human Rights,
conferring rights to have one's private and family life respected, and respect for
freedom of conscience, thought and religion. This does not prevent interference
with those aspects absolutely. In a sense 'respect' is used both as enabling the right
and qualifying it; conferring a right to have one's views treated as valuable and
worthy of consideration. Clayton and Tomlinson highlight that:
'the notion of 'respect' (and its requirements)...vary considerably from case
to case'.3
However, it is clear that respect in human rights law can encompass both negative
(i.e. refraining from interference) and positive obligations (to act) upon states.4 In
' New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993) 2565, col.2.
2 Articles 8 and 9, respectively (Human Rights Act (1998), Schedule 1).
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terms of healthcare, however, respect seems to extend beyond a purely 'rights-
oriented' approach.
Harris' definition of respect reflects mutuality. He suggests that to respect a person
we must exhibit:
'(1) concern for their welfare, and (2) respect for their wishes'.5
These clearly parallel values of welfare and autonomy, respectively.6 The
importance of respect lies in the conscious choice to meld both of these principles.
Accepting their joint value within any single context, rather than as separate and
divisive norms, reminds us to engage with both elements and to resolve conflict
where we can. Furthermore, Harris' specific approach pinpoints welfare and patient
wishes as core issues. This contrasts with vaguer appeals to beneficence or
autonomy, which are open to wider interpretation. He also specifies conflict
resolution by according lexical priority to respecting patient wishes,7 and develops
this weighting further by then defining a 'point of transition' at which paternalistic
intervention loses its justification.8
In practical application Harris' approach has limits regarding IcPs as it remains
heavily dependent on knowing the patient's wishes. Hence, problems persist where
an IcP is unable to give (and has not previously given) any view. Harris
acknowledges four 'defects' that may diminish autonomy:
'(1) defects in the individual's ability to control either her desires or her
actions or both; (2) defects in the individual's reasoning; (3) defect in the
information available to the individual, upon which she bases her choice; (4)
defects in the stability of the individual's own desires'.9
Clearly many incapacitated patients would fall into these categories. Hence, while
Harris' definition helps specificity, acceptance of conflict and lexical priority, the
3
Clayton and Tomlinson, above, 820, citing Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. U.K. (1985) 7
EHRU 471, paragraph 67.
4 See Clayton and Tomlinson, ibid. 820-824. See also: X and Y v. The Netherlands (1985) 8 EHRR
235 (criminal legal provisions as a deterrent to sexual assault on an intellectually disabled girl); and B.
v. France (1992) 16 EF1RR 1 (re-registration of gender following reassignment surgery).
5 Harris (1985) above, 193.
6 See ibid. 194-5.
7 J. Harris, 'Professional responsibility and consent to treatment' in Hirsch and Harris, Consent and
the Incompetent patient, Ethics Law and Medicine (1988) Gaskell, 37-47, 42.
8 This occurs where 'paternalistic interference...operates to frustrate the exercise of choices', Harris,
ibid. 43.
9 Harris (1985) above, 196.
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'defect' classification still causes us to view incapacitated patients as ideal subjects
for paternalistic intervention. But, respect for persons has scope to go further, and
must do so if a genuine synthesis is sought regarding IcPs.
6.1.2 A new take on an old theme
The new approach, proffered herein, aims to strengthen the synthesis of respect by
embracing autonomy and welfare, reconsidering the impact of attributing moral
status, and developing issues outlined earlier on interests, competence, purpose, and
temporal aspects. It is submitted that an approach is needed that derives support
from ethical bases, which is geared specifically to incompetent patients. The
argument proposed herein can be characterised by beliefs about IcP decisions that
have evolved from consideration in foregoing chapters:
• some conflict within a patient's interests (intra-interest conflict) is
unavoidable; balancing is necessary in many cases;
• no uniquely 'right' ethical solution may exist, merely an acceptable
one;
• incapacitated patients should be protected from harmful consequences
ofmedical treatment as far as is possible;
• an incapacitated patient may still have capacity in degree, intermittently,
or regarding some aspects of life;
• a proxy decision-maker is a morally responsible agent, and should be
prepared to justify a treatment decision, including expressing its purpose
- 'incompetence' does not exonerate a need for justification;
• due consideration should be given to the 'whole' circumstances of the
incapacitated patient (including their in/capacities, across their lifetime
where appropriate, and in terms of their broader interests).
This chapter starts to develop a revised ethic of respect for IcPs flowing from these
beliefs and taking into account the philosophical, ethical and legal issues already
raised. The ideas raised as a revised concept of respect can be summarised in a
shorthanded form using an acronym for 'respect'. In essence, to respect an IcP, a
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proxy should Respond Empathically to the Subject's Personality, Experiences,
Capacity and Truth. Empathic response refers to the need for a proxy to decide
compassionately.10 The subjective elements of the decision lie in recognising an
incapacitated person's personality, experiences and residual capacity.11 Truth
recognises the need for objectivity to be added to the proxy decision to balance
overall perspective on interests and issues. The starting point for this 'new take' lies
in picking up the 'old theme', by accepting the relevance of autonomy (subjectivity)
and (objective) paternalism.
6.1.2.1 Embracing autonomy and defects of incapacity
The concept of autonomy is considered above (Chapter 4). Here, we are concerned
with its relevance to respect. The issue is one of being autonomous enough for the
treatment decision in hand. We all suffer Harris' defects to some degree,12 yet might
not accept being disrespected. A balance must also be struck regarding people
suffering significant impairment. Incapacitated individuals are more susceptible to
Harris' autonomy defects. Hence, a woman in labour, with a phobia of needles, may
well have a control defect fulfilling Harris' definition:
'the illness has such extreme effects on the individual's ability to control his
life...[that] preferences expressed while so comprehensively out of control
must not be regarded as the genuine preferences of the individual'.13
Thus, while she desires that her baby be delivered safely (her 'genuine' preference),
she refuses an injection (her 'expressed' preference) due to phobia. Alternatively,
we can see that the mature minor, on the cusp of autonomy, might suffer from
Harris' second category defect in reasoning if s/he blindly accepts the views of
others, infers invalidly from one premise to an unrelated conclusion, or vitiates
his/her reasons by prejudice.14 Harris' third defect could occur regarding the
10
Chapter 8, below.
11 Considered below, Chapter 7. Subjective experience in the form of relationship is discussed in this
chapter.
12 See also Harris (1985) above, 200.
13
Ibid, 196.
14 Harris includes as a defect decision-making based on 'received opinion' or 'gut reaction', ibid. 197.
But surely, a decision according with medical advice is one taken on 'received opinion', and a
decision based on 'gut reaction' is taken in awareness of the values lying at an individual's very core.
Thus, it seems Harris' approach is heavily oriented to respecting logic.
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intellectually disabled adult labouring under cognitive management of information to
the extent of deficiency.15
Where these defects occur, Harris considers that the patient may fail to be
'maximally autonomous', and paternalistic interference aimed at securing his/her
welfare may be justified.16 Hence, on application to incapacitated patients, respect
really flows from the caveats that Harris places upon 'defect' categories,17 including
task-specificity.18
These caveats are important. But, to respect incapacitated individuals we should go
further:
• we should recognise that a proxy decision-maker may equally be subject
to autonomy defects. If a proxy fails to evaluate an IcP's interests -
including his/her preferences - across the full network, then the proxy
may fail to identify the genuine decision purpose (a defect in control).
Alternatively, failing to consider all relevant risks and benefits could
amount to defective reasoning. Relatedly, gender assumptions may be
based in prejudicial beliefs.19 Furthermore, proxy decisions taken
without knowledge or admittance of an IcP's lifestyle, preferences,
values and relationships are defective in information. Thus, to respect
incapacitated patients it is vital that any proxy is maximally
autonomous, and as free from Harris' defects in autonomy as is
possible;
• we should acknowledge that 'autonomy' is not synonymous with 'input'.
Exercise of autonomy is based on competence thresholds, whereas, input
is based in capacity. Allowing an incapacitated individual to be
genuinely heard respects that individual and can reduce conflict. To
15




Namely, 'that the illness was such that none of the individual's choices could be taken as genuine,
or that this particular choice could not be so taken' (ibid. 196); that 'the defects undermine or tend to
undermine the agent's capacity to make choices' (ibid. 198); and that defects in information 'can
happen of course by others deliberately deceiving him...or knowingly giving only partial information,
or.. .by negligence or sheer mischance' (ibid. 198).
18 The defect must inhibit ability regarding a particular decision, ibid, 210.
19
E.g. about the greater acceptability of sterilising female intellectually disabled patients.
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respect an IcP we must allow them involvement in decisions about their
life, and permit input from other significant persons. This helps to
maximise the proxy's autonomy and recognises that respect endures
beyond simple autonomous/non-autonomous distinctions;
• as irrationality is part of human nature, logic should not have an absolute
right of dominance. IcPs have no less right to irrationality than
competent persons. Admittedly, it may be difficult to identify when a
choice is simply (acceptably) irrational rather than substantially
defective, but we should not assume from irrationality that reasoning is
defective.
6.1.2.2 Autonomy as a process
Interestingly, Harris does not include his fourth category defect (instability) as
justifying paternalistic intervention. The reasons for this are unclear from the text.
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However, his recognition of Mill's position, and his emphasis that having our
autonomy respected may result in different - but nonetheless autonomous - decisions
9 1
over a lifetime, indicate understanding of autonomy as an organic, developing
process. This author concurs with his approach. Each individual is a unique product
of his/her own experiences. These experiences are not externalised, subject to
judgment of validity by others. Rather, the decisions we make in the light of our
experiences reflect the essence of the individual in that moment. And, deciding in
the present moment is the most any individual can ever do. On this basis, if only the
patient's stability is in doubt, it is arguable that the 'point of transition', whereupon
paternalism becomes justified, has not been reached.
To act respectfully in the context of incapacity we must recognise autonomy as a
process that relates not only to the patient, but also to the proxy. And, that patient
incompetence does not justify ignoring input. We must also be clear about how to
act when autonomy is significantly compromised. Harris pragmatically resorts to
20 I.e. '[sjelf-determination improves not with time but with practice, and that one's later decisions
only have a chance of being more self-determined than one's earlier ones if one is permitted to make
the earlier ones and learn from them', Harris, ibid 199, describing Mill's view.
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22welfare. But, we need to clarify the pressures of paternalism that have so long
dogged the notion ofwelfare.
6.1.2.3 Accepting paternalism
Many debates in medical ethics focus on the head-on collision between autonomy
and beneficence in so-called 'hard paternalism'. Meanwhile, acceptability has been
assumed of (soft) paternalism.23 On a strict definition of 'paternalism' this position
may be warranted.24 However, focusing on the 'more interesting' problem of hard
paternalism is unfortunate because: (1) it contributes to an assumption that where
autonomy is compromised medical intervention is defensible automatically, provided
that it seeks to prevent harm or promote benefit. Consequently, IcP interests in the
wider sense are overlooked, and ethical acceptability reduced to an unquestioned
appeal to principle; and (2) it blurs the edges of paternalism and welfare. Welfare is
a valuable objective in an IcP treatment decision, and a significant part of respect,
whereas 'paternalism' primes the situation for conflict; importing dominance of
medical opinion.
6.1.2.3.1 Paternalistic or parental?
Accepted notions of paternalism are of little assistance in seeking ethically
acceptable solutions to decisions for incapacitated patients. Issues geared to justify
overruling competent patients are insufficiently focused to handle the multifarious
considerations arising within an IcP's interests. A purely 'principled' approach,25 or
9
a 'common morality' approach, tends to classify incapacitated patient situations as
'exceptions' or 'special cases'. That approach is too blunt to do justice to
incapacitated individuals. What is the alternative? The context of these decisions is,
at a basic level, parental; that is, in the sense of seeking a decision that protects the
IcP's interests. It is imperative that this protective responsibility is acknowledged, as
21
'Autonomy is the running of one's own life according to one's own lights. The fact that these lights
change colour and intensity over time is no evidence at all that the later lights are either better or more




E.g.: R. Carter, Justifying paternalism, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. VII, No. 1 (1977) 133,
143; Beauchamp and Childress, above, 277; and even Feinberg, Harm to Self, above, 14.
24 I.e. it may be impossible to act paternalistically towards a patient who cannot hold/express a view.
25 See Beauchamp and Childress, above.
26 See Gert, Culver and Clouser, above.
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these patients are undoubtedly some of the most vulnerable individuals in society. It
is our responsibility to act protectively towards them. A treatment decision may
seriously impact the incapacitated patient's life, and any proxy holds a powerful
position in that regard. However, even adopting the context as 'parental' contains
dangers; it is easy for many parents to ignore the autonomy even of their mature
children. Hence, the relationship of IcP and proxy is better seen as slightly more
distant, and objective, guardianship.
However, the importance of embracing autonomy as part of respectful decision¬
making means that, in making a protective decision, it is essential that the IcP's
views and preferences are also acknowledged and considered where possible. Aliter,
a decision-maker may act for objectively 'good reasons', yet still fail to respect the
IcP. Hence, the context must be one of respect. Furthermore, the justification for
the eventual decision should be at least as stringent, perhaps even more so, than the
perceived need for justification in 'hard' paternalism. In hard paternalism we are
justifying overruling a competent patient who has been able to express their view,
and the disagreement is really about ranking of priorities. But, an IcP's input may be
very limited, or even absent. It is submitted that this heightens the importance of
acting compassionately and openly on the basis of full information. In short, we
should take extra care to ensure our actions are respectful, as respect is too easily
overlooked in relation to such patients.
6.1.2.4 Moral status revisited
The fundamental aspects of 'respect' are considered above. However, the
inescapable focus is respect for persons. True respect for persons should extend
beyond autonomy, beneficence or personhood. Harris argues that respect is
'the starting point of morality.. .because it involves recognising that other
people matter and so also that how they live their lives, and the quality of
their lives, matters as well'.27
The importance of respecting incapacitated individuals is apparent in this statement;
rather than shying away from 'difficult' issues surrounding 'quality of life' and
individuality; respect can be based upon it. Fundamentally, this is the reason that
27 Above, 192.
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'personhood' should not be a stumbling block to respecting incapacitated patients.
Their status as human beings, as individuals whose life (past, present or future) is
the only one they have, merits that we treat them with respect. It is that simple. If
we choose respect as our guiding ethic, then recognising others as individuals with
dignity and compassion is all that is required. It need be no more complex than
acting responsibly within a clear framework, and acknowledging the individual as
valuable.
6.1.3 Seeking a synthesis - A balanced ethic for incapable patients
To redefine respect in terms of incapacitated patients we need to release limiting
notions of autonomy and welfare, and momentarily reflect upon the purpose behind
respect. What is the objective of respect? Richardson's perception that it concerns
respect for self-conscious life merely returns us to personhood issues.28 Rather, ifwe
acknowledge our intuitive response (that all incapable patients merit admission as
morally significant by virtue of their being, having been, or having potential to be
90
human beings), we can access the core of respect; that through it we explicitly
acknowledge our respect for humanity. Thus, we respect each individual that
comprises part of humanity, and by respecting others we respect ourselves,
because we accept and experience our own intuitive moral commitment to valuing
every individual. In this light, respect represents a formal moral recognition of
individual worth. In view of this purpose, three objectives emerge. Respect for
human beings should:
• be impartial, considering each individual equally;
• actively recognise value in life (both intrinsically and as elements valued
within one's own life);
28 H.S. Richardson, Specifying norms as a way to resolve concrete ethical problems, Philosophy &
Public Affairs, 19 (1990) 279, 304.
29 The only possible exception is the neonate bom wholly ad permanently insensate, who may not
even have potential to develop engagement with the process of living. This is considered above,
Chapter 5, and the conclusion drawn that such marginal cases should err on the side of caution by
admitting moral status, particularly as diagnosis of sentience to pain, and response to touch can be
difficult to gauge. Account can be taken of the patient's total, permanent incapacity within the
subsequent quality of life judgment.
221
• function responsibly in the name of common humanity, such that each
moral agent gives respect to - and receives reciprocal respect from -
others with regard to moral norms.
These objectives give direction to respecting incapable individuals. The remainder
of this chapter gives substantive content to the first of these goals, drawing from
earlier consideration of interests and relating respect to interests and the dynamic of
using interest networks. The second objective (life value) is considered in Chapter 7,
while the third objective of common humanity is the focus of ethical acceptability
and legal representation in Chapter 8.
6.2 Equality of the individual
Respect requires recognition of individuality, including the combination of
experiences, beliefs and values comprising an individual life. Treating human beings
equally does not mean ignoring incapacity, but rather acknowledging individuality -
of which incapacity is a part. Respect means respecting this individual whomever,
and however, s/he is.
6.2.1 Relating interests to respect - persisting and prevailing
interests
Interests represent the stakes a person holds in life (Chapter 3, above). Some are
commonly held (representing welfare), others highly individual (representing
preferences). By recognising fully an individual's interests we express our respect.
Interests give content and meaning to respect; the range of admissible interests is
fundamental.
6.2.1.1 Range: prevailing and persisting interests
The range of interests may include broad, but definable, common interests: good
physical and psychological health, care, a safe environment, freedom from pain,
freedom of choice, bodily integrity, privacy, dignity, relationships, quality of life and
being heard. These elements represent a secure base - from which an individual can
function to develop subjective interests, which s/he chooses through reflective
preference. The variance in the latter is infinite in range and highly individualistic in
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combination. Herein lies individual uniqueness. To respect the individual requires
us to admit the range of both interest types. This does not mean that we can serve
every interest, or know the inner corners of another's mind. But, respect lies in
acknowledging individuality,30 acknowledging that s/he exists, in a unique life, as an
individual - irrespective of incompetence. This requires us to open ourselves to:
• the full range of potentially relevant common interests; we should not
assume, for example, that because an individual is not conscious of their
own dignity or bodily integrity, that our behaviour need not acknowledge
those interests which are part of common humanity. Failure to respect
these traits in others also fails to accord importance to those interests
within common humanity. We can frame these as 'prevailing interests',
forming an umbrella of interests that shields every human being and
facilitates his/her fulfdment of potential. Such interests are often
embodied in national constitutions as legally enforceable 'rights',
possessed equally and impartially. Regarding IcPs, particularly those
institutionalised, certain overarching protective interests (such as privacy
and dignity) and interests in self-expression are easily overlooked
because his/her capacity to exercise them is diminished. This can falsely
increase the significance of other interests, and risks a distorted and
"5 1
# ... .
unequal perspective. Recognising every individual as valuable requires
that these prevailing, protective rights be universally applied. The
enactment of the Human Rights Act (1998) now attributes to every
citizen the rights and freedoms embodied therein.32 Hence, decision¬
makers must consider more explicitly the interests of incapable patients
in terms of those rights and freedoms;33 and
• recognise the contribution of subjective preferences to individual
uniqueness. Many IcPs do currently, or have previously, held views
30
Individuality being part of autonomy, along with choice.
31
Certainly differences in judicial approach can be seen from Bland, above, contrasted with Re a
Ward, above. In the latter the Irish Constitutional interests, outlined by Denham J, made clear that the
patient still possessed these interests despite her near-p.v.s. state. No explicit framework is
attributable in the English case where the patient's possession of interests was effectively dismissed.
32 In reference to the Convention (1950), Article 1.
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about the content, nature and purpose of their life. These contribute to
individual identity. For example: the intellectually disabled individual
has a preference about whether, and with whom, s/he wishes sexual
involvement; the p.v.s. patient has lived his/her earlier life in a unique
way; the pregnant woman in labour still holds her own set of beliefs -
who are we to deem her beliefs invalid simply because they seem
illogical to us. However, beyond express preferences lie investments -
expression by action. It has already been highlighted that we invest in
our lives in a wide variety of ways (Chapter 3, above). These
investments comprise part of individual identity. They may usefully
indicate stakes we hold in life, and investments made pre-incapacity may
be valuably admitted post-incapacity; current incompetence need not
negate an individual's previous investments. Life is a continuum, a
process, and past investments can mark the way to informing us about
this individual now. Admittedly, people do change; their investments
and choices do not remain static. However, some investments (and
preferences) endure. If we can identify these then we know more about
the individual whom we seek to respect. Such interests, personal to the
individual, 'persist' within his/her identity despite incapacity. To
respect subjective preference we must listen to action-statements
individuals make during their lives. Hearing the uniqueness of others
informs us better about who the individual is, or has been. We have
nothing to fear from listening - perhaps we are simply afraid it may
challenge us to derogate from decisions based on assumption, prejudice
and questionable categorisation of incapacitated patients.
6.2.1.2 Range and Equality
We need not accept all we discover as relevant, but respect requires that we discover
who the individual is. This entails openness and consideration of all potential
interests. The decision-maker is responsible for ascertaining the shape, and detail, of
an IcP's interest network. Equality flows from this in two ways:
33 The 1998 Act is discussed comprehensively in J. Wadham and H. Mountfield's Blackstones Guide
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• in identifying interests relevant to the patient's network each interest is
considered equally in terms of (i) how the interest relates to the particular
patient, and (ii) how that interest relates to other interests in the
individual's network;
• the purpose of mapping interests is to facilitate decisions on the dual
basis of: (i) current circumstances, objectively understood; and (ii)
integrity of the incapacitated individual. This ensures that patients'
interests are not lost to general situational categories. We respect the
incapable patient through a combined objective assessment (of present
and foreseeable circumstances), and evaluation of impact on his/her
subjective interest network.
Range is the starting point for this equal consideration. Inequality lies in arbitrary
selectivity. Hence, we must perceive honestly the full range of impacts; blinkered
acknowledgement ofbenefits and harms perpetuates inequality.
6.2.1.3 Interest sets and respect
The value of interest sets in understanding the concept of interests is considered
earlier. Because of their conceptual nature, set groupings remind us why single
interest objects are important. Fundamentally, the sets reflect a respect ethic. Those
groups offered by Feinberg,34 and by Dworkin,35 seem to reflect Harris' approach to
respecting persons; evincing the combination of objective welfare and subjective
preference that comprises a 'life'.
6.2.1.3.1 Interest sets embracing autonomy
Interest sets support individuality by helping to focus our attention on how interest
objects contribute to an IcP's life.36 Hence, a single interest may impact a patient's
various interest sets in a number of ways. We should seek to identify and consider
to the Human Rights Act 1998, (1999) Blackstone Press Ltd, London.
34 I.e. 'welfare' and 'ulterior' interests.
35 I.e. 'experiential' and 'critical' interests (subdivided to 'subjective critical' and 'genuine critical').
36
E.g. the intellectually disabled person's interest in relationship/sexual freedom could contribute to:
his/her 'ulterior' interests (having a valuable relationship, and being permitted to make choose such
relationships); and his/her 'experiential' interests - intimate contact contributing to his/her day-to-day
experiences in life.
225
all potential impacts regarding this incapacitated individual - only then can our
decision to be truly informed. Furthermore, evaluating impacts under the umbrella
of interest sets sharpens our focus, by constantly filtering through the decision¬
maker's mind the question: what is the objective here; how important is this interest
in X to this individual's overall network? This awareness keeps the individual, and
the bigger picture, in mind as the decision process evolves.
Sets also remind us that input need not equate with autonomy. Benn's 'perceived'
and 'real' interest groupings reflect location of decision-making power,37 which may
necessarily be placed in a proxy regarding IcPs. However, while a proxy views the
objective 'reality' of the situation, s/he should take account of the IcP's perceptions
because admitting this input is part of 'becoming informed', and 'knowing' the
individual s/he seeks to respect. Benn's sets remind the decision-maker that different
perceptions may exist, and should be heard.
The specifically autonomy-oriented groupings further remind us of the importance of
individuality; that we are all entitled to live our life by our own experiences, ulterior
goals, and values derived through subjective critical reflection - however irrational
the outcome. Even where capacity for reflectivity is significantly impaired,
experiential interests remain important. Most IcPs still have day-to-day experiences
that comprise their individual life. Indeed, arguably, the very open nature of some
intellectually disabled patients and maturing minors may intensify, rather than
diminish, their daily experience of themselves and their life. In effect, they may
invest more heavily in their daily experiences. Such intensity need not determine a
decision, but we should be aware of its validity for that individual. Additionally,
awareness of an IcP's 'ulterior' goals facilitates direction and purpose in our proxy
decision, by recognising that their subjectively 'critical' views (even as
'preferences', or previously-held opinions) can inform us about how a treatment
option might impact an individual in an unexpected way. By acknowledging that
IcPs are entitled to autonomy-oriented experiential and subjective values we may




6.2.1.3.2 Interest sets assisting guardianship
Interest groupings can also help us to fulfil good respectful guardianship. 'Welfare',
'genuine critical', and 'real' interest groupings emphasise the protective
responsibility important in respecting incapable individuals. Awareness of welfare-
oriented groupings encourages us to look at both harms and benefits. For example,
an intellectually disabled adult's interest in intimate relationship may benefit his/her
psychological well-being, and the genuine critical interest of an opportunity to
mature in a relationship. On the other hand, his/her welfare interests also demand
protection of physical health from sexually transmitted disease, or from any potential
abuse of power in the relationship. Thus welfare-oriented groupings remind
decision-makers of the 'reality' and responsibilities of respectful, protective
guardianship.
Interestingly, autonomy-oriented interest sets also serve guardianship. The personal
quality of 'ulterior', 'experiential' and 'perceived' interests reminds us that an
important characteristic of a respectful guardian is to act compassionately, seeing
clearly the individual concerned. Protection is important, of course, but protection
must be measured with equal compassion for genuine respect to result. Excessive
protection actually makes for a poor guardian who substitutes his own values for
those of the IcP. Compassion is an important linking characteristic; it connects care
(and welfare), to recognition of the individual subject (and his/her experiences,
perceptions and preferences). An informed, compassionate decision-maker is
fundamental to good decision-making.
6.2.1.3.3 Interest sets and equality
The juxtaposition of collective groupings is useful, highlighting the inevitability of
conflict, and the need to see the whole picture. Each interest must be given equal
consideration (though not necessarily equal weighting), l'he occurrence of some
interests in more than one grouping may signify their importance or reinforcement
within a patient's interest network. Furthermore, juxtaposition emphasises that all
lives comprise a combination of common,39 and personal,40 interests. The degree
38 See X and Y v. Netherlands, above.
39 I.e. 'welfare', 'genuine critical', or 'real' interests.
40 I.e. 'experiential', 'subjective critical', 'perceived' interests.
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may vary individually, but the significance of both endures. In this regard we can
ensure equality for IcPs; by recognising that they too have a 'combined' life, its
combination being as individual as yours or mine. Equality is not about evaluating
what life is 'worth' - a concept that any assessment of another's life too often
founders upon. Even in assessments involving quality of life evaluation, we can treat
IcPs equally provided that we respect their individuality. If we inform ourselves
fully about the individual, admit his/her input and act with focused, protective,
compassionate guardianship then we will act respectfully in the IcP's 'best interests'.
Interest sets are merely a practical marker of concept that aids our focus. Even in
situations laden with conflicting intra-patient interests, we can act respectfully.
Conflict and support is part of the human condition - for IcPs no less than those with
capacity. Sometimes the most we can do is acknowledge conflict, be informed, and
make the best decision we can with clear purpose and reasoning. In respecting the
incapable individual in this way we respect ourselves.
Thus far, this chapter has established the nature of respect for IcPs, the need for
openness to the full range of interests and impacts, and the value of conceptual
groupings to link interests with the overarching ethic of respect. Emphasis
throughout has been on individuality. The remainder of this section considers how
we can gather and use information about the individual in a respectful treatment
decision.
6.2.1.4 Inputs; recognising relationship, respecting individuals
To understand how an IcP's interests may be impacted we need information about
the individual. The range of potential sources of input is outlined earlier, concluding
that admittance of input depends upon recognising relationship. This thesis argues,
however, that recognition of incapacitated individuals' relationships is currently too
limited; to respect IcPs we must expand our view.
6.2.1.4.1 The reality of relationships
Relationships are a significant part of human life. An individual's relationships
contribute to the quality and content of his/her life. They are investments of time,
energy, emotion and self that we make in mutual reciprocation. Relationships
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represent part of a human being's experiences as an individual 41 They may even
represent part of his/her identity because relationships engender roles.42 No single
role embodies the whole of someone's identity; rather identity consists in the
individual him/herself, plus a combination of these roles. For each individual the
exact combination of self and roles (including role in society/community) is unique.
If we make a proxy treatment decision without awareness of an individual's
significant relationships then we base the decision on a limited view. These
relationships need not dominate a decision, but we should be willing to consider
input from them and impact upon them.
Furthermore, relationships are real for almost all incapable patients. Even the p.v.s.
patient has previously had relationships that form part of his/her life and which may
be regarded as persisting (in the minds of those significant others). Severely
defective neonates may have a very simplistic relationship or bond with parents. The
only possible exception is the wholly insensate neonate, whose capacity for
engagement with others may be completely absent. This could be considered only
from the perspective of admitting the parents' interest in the baby. However, this is a
marginal case. Other examples of relationship might include:
• regarding minors, parents invest love and affection in raising that child
and making a commitment to his/her future care through to maturity.
The relationship is so strong that a child depends upon the parents for
his/her very survival, and any treatment decision about the child's life is
certain to impact child, parents and their relationship;
• the relationships between adult partners, and between friends, are based
on mutual investments of time and energy in practical daily life and
across the lifetime of the relationship itself. These mutual investments
form part of our shared, critical interests. Interest networks overlap in
these areas of shared mutuality. It is unrealistic simply to disconnect an
individual's interests from this overlap where one suffers incapacity. An
incapacitated individual may be able currently to interact in significant
relationships, or will become so enabled (e.g. if temporarily
41
Experiences being a fundamental element of the R.E.S.P.E.C.T. acronym outlined earlier.
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incompetent), or has been able to do so previously.43 Hence, a treatment
decision may draw insight from these relationships, and will almost
certainly impact upon them;
• relationships exist in time: formerly-competent patients have had
relationships; other patients, such as young minors may not yet have
attained competence, but do currently have relationships and may
develop a wealth of relationships in the future; even severely defective
neonates might have a very rudimentary mutual relationship with their
parents (perhaps through response to touch), and certainly the parents
have extensive concerns for their baby; transiently-competent patients
relate to others when not in a dissociative state; adolescent patients (with
emerging competence) clearly have similar relationships to all other
young adults; while intellectually disabled patients (with capacity in
some aspects of life) may have relationships with carers, family, friends,
and perhaps intimate others.
This is the reality of relationships. It is human nature to relate, and relationships can
be a central element of what makes life 'good'. Although relationships serve
critical/subjective interests, autonomy is not a prerequisite to relationship;
relationships may be as real in an IcP's life as yours, or mine. Ignoring that reality
leads to being misinformed about an IcP's interests.
6.2.1.4.2 Respect via relationship interests
If we accept relationship as important, then how does relationship associate with
respect? The answer lies in interests. Or, more specifically, in the input available
from mutual others to assist identification of IcP interests, and to the impact of a
treatment decision on those interests; relationship points the way to input and impact.
Respect depends on admitting all relevant input, and considering all relevant impacts.
Some relationships are more easily admitted than others: the clinical relationship is
obviously important to our degree of informedness; also input from, and impact on,
parents regarding treatment of minors is often willingly considered; and the patient's
42 I.e. it is part of an individual's identity that s/he is a parent, partner, friend, or son/daughter.
43 And that former relationship persists in the hearts and minds of those significant others.
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relationship with State and society may be acknowledged by the moral/legal context
of the decision. However, more contentious - and less accepted - relationships lie in
the personal sphere. Where a benefit from a personal relationship can be ascertained
to flow to the patient (say, if it contributes to his/her quality of life) this may reduce
contention and increase acceptability. However, the reciprocity of relationships
means that the other person also enjoys or benefits from his/her relationship with the
IcP. Admitting this as input is more contentious due to fears of self-interest. The
interests of those emotionally close to an IcP may be classified, in Feinberg's terms,
as 'indirectly self-regarding'.
However, by classifying relationship as based on mutuality, a fuller and more
balanced perspective is offered. Mutual interests are reciprocal stakes that arise
quite naturally from the love, affection or esteem flowing between an IcP and those
emotionally closest to him/her. Although they arise naturally, these interests are a
matter of individuality meriting a proxy's consideration rather than presumption.44
Relationship is set to receive growing attention judicially. The advent of the Human
Rights Act (1998) imports a responsibility on the domestic courts to determine issues
in ways that comply with the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (1950). Of particular relevance is Article 8, which protects
respect for private and family life, and the right to marry and found a family
enshrined in Article 12. The European Court of Human Rights has construed the
notion of 'family life' widely, expressly recognising a variety of familial
relationships as subject to protection from unjustified interference (considered
below). Relatedly, the recognition of a right to marry is express acknowledgement of
the choice of individuals to formalise their relationship.45 Hence, any proposed
reconstruction of best interests must take account of the significant role of
relationship. Furthermore, overtly recognising relationship-derived interests reflects
the core value of individuality in a patient's interest network (and its overlap with the
networks of others).
44
E.g. in Re Y, above, Y's relationship with her sister appeared relatively weak, and would barely
amount to one of 'mutuality'. However, Y's relationship with her mother was clearly stronger and
mutual. Whether this should influence the decision about Y as a donor depends on how the indirect
impact (through Y's sister's illness/death severely impacting their mother) could impinge on Y's
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Undoubtedly, there are risks in recognising relationship. There is some foundation in
fears that the self-serving characteristics of human nature risk abusing mutuality
interests; exposing IcPs to deliberate or inadvertent selfishness of others. But, this is
likely to be rare, and harm may result equally from ignoring the importance of a
person's relationships.46 Balance may be further encouraged by placing decision
authority with a 'disinterested' third party.47 Additionally, mutual interests would
accrue from establishing a personal relationship 'significant' within a patient's
interest network - they may be just one of a number of interests, and not all
relationships would have significant mutuality. The alternative (i.e. excluding input
from personal relationships) is an attenuated perspective that could be ill-informed.
It fails to respect the incapable individual, because it fails to accredit to him aspects
of life significant to human beings generally.
6.2.1.4.3 Relationships; identify and inform
Four relationships are potentially relevant: 'individual relationship with self;
'mutual relationships'; 'clinical relationship'; and 'community/State relationship'.
Relationships also give rise to interests. Interests are grouped herein as 'personal
medical'; 'personal non-medical' (of which a sub-group are 'social'); and
'contextual'. The connections between these relationships and the interests they
create are represented in Appendix 4, hereto, and developed within the text.
6.2.1.4.3.1 'Individual relationship with self
This relationship concerns how an individual engages with his/her own life,
reflecting personal perspective on the meaning and content of life and subjective
value of life for that individual. Incapacity can inhibit relationship with self (through
lack of self-awareness). However, most patients with incapacity still have subjective
goals or experiential preferences that can represent this relationship and found
interests. The interests arising from this personal connection might be termed
'personal non-medical' and are highly individualistic, embracing experiential and
relationship with her mother. Indirect impact could be relevant, but its significance should require
supporting evidence, and caution about the degree of indirectness.
45
'Marriage' under Article 12 has been narrowly construed.
46 See also Buchanan and Brock, above, 134.
47 'Disinterested' being construed by Feinberg as 'unbiased and impartial', Harm to others, above, 76.
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ulterior goals in day-to-day life or in the longer term. Their subjectivity makes them
harder to discern, particularly in IcPs, but they represent the essence of individual
uniqueness. It seems natural for a competent, self-determining patient to take
account of a treatment's impact on his/her broader 'well being' in this sense. A
proxy should also seek to construe the impact on an IcP's personal non-medical
interests wherever possible, in order to achieve an improved, holistic assessment of
impact on the individual's network.
6.2.1.4.3.2 'Mutual relationships'
Mutual relationships embrace those relationships in which we engage with others,
such as spouses, partners or friends and family with whom we have close ties; in
other words, emotionally-closest others. Human rights law now recognises the
importance of many of these relationships, and the scope for admittance of de facto
'familial' relationships is relatively wide,48 in relation to decisions that might
interfere with 'family life'.49 This gives rise to a recognisable interest regarding
parents and children,50 which appears potentially relevant to decisions about
treatment of minors.51 However, it is submitted that the approach to relationship
should go beyond the current parameters of the European Court's position on it 52
Relationships of mutuality give rise to what might be termed 'social interests',
which some authors use to mean the incapacitated individual's personal interests in
4
'Family life' may be attributed to: married couples (Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v UK
(1985) 7 EHRR 471); cohabitees with children (X, Y and Z v UK (1997) 24 EFIRR 143); parents not
resident with children (A and A v Netherlands (1992) 72 DR 118); adoptive parents/children (X v
Belgium and Netherlands (1975) 7 DR 75, E Comm HR; and, sometimes, children's relationships
with aunts (Marckx v Belgium (1979) 2 EE1RR 330, uncles (Boyle v UK (1994) 19 EHRR 179 cf. X
and Y v UK (1971) 12 DR 32, E Comm HR), grandparents (Marckx, above); also adult siblings (e.g.
Nasri v France (1995) 21 EHRR 458). For discussion Clayton and Tomlinson, above, paragraphs
13.89-13.110.
49 Where 'family life' is established, Article 8 seeks to protect: 'the right to live together so that family
relationships can develop naturally and that members of the family can enjoy one another's company',
Clayton and Tomlinson, above, paragraph 13.90.
50 Parents must be consulted as part of any decision process regarding taking a child into Local
Authority care: W v UK (1987) 10 EHRR 29.
51 As such decisions have scope to interfere with 'family life'. However, protecting a child's health
might amount to a 'justified' interference (Article 8(2)), provided it is necessary, proportionate and in
the child's best interests (Gribler v UK (1988) 10 EHRR 546).
52 While the Court has upheld the rights of relationship for homosexuals in terms of non-interference
in 'private life' under Article 8 (see Dudgeon v UK (1981) 4 EHRR 149), exclusion of homosexual
and lesbian relationships from parental status in 'family life' (Article 8), or 'marriage' under Article
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the wider (non-medical) sense.53 However, 'social interests' deriving from mutual
relationships are really a sub-group of an IcP's 'personal non-medical' interests,
simply reflecting the overlap of part of the IcP's interest network with that of another
significant person's.
It is submitted that any reconstruction of best interests should take account of an
IcP's mutual relationships accruing from a grouping of'emotionally closest' others.
This is capable of admitting any relevant, significant relationship. Relationships of
mutuality are significant investments that individuals make in their lives. To ignore
such investment surely disrespects the individual. Interests arising from mutual
relationships could include: dignity;54 privacy;55 or concern of an IcP for the well
being of mutual others;56 and the reciprocal concern of those mutual others towards
the IcP. Admitting this sub-group of 'personal non-medical interests' is fundamental
to our understanding the identity of the IcP. The two relationships already
considered (with self and with mutual others) together create an IcP's 'personal non¬
medical' interests. A third relationship adds to personal interests.
6.2.1.4.3.3 'Clinical relationship'
The function of this relationship is to inform proxies about the patient's current
health situation, his/her competence, and prognosis. The clinical relationship gives
rise to an IcP's 'personal medical interests'. These comprise common interests
such as the right to life, freedom from pain, and an interest in good health. Impact on
these interests may be determined by the objectively assessable gain/detriment to an
IcP's health, flowing from a predominantly medical evaluation of risks and benefits.
Traditionally, best interests decisions promote heavily these medical interests,
sometimes to the exclusion of other personal interests.57 However, there is no
apparent reason why this relationship should inform beyond medical aspects into
12 (see Clayton and Tomlinson, above, paragraphs 13.84-13.87) jeopardises the role of relationship in
these cases.
53 See N. Cica, above.
54
E.g. dignity of the severely incapacitated may be perceived only through the eyes of others;
acknowledging relationship allows enduring dignity even of p.v.s. patients.
55 Article 8 protects 'private life', including the maintenance of personal relationships, see G.T.
Laurie, Genetic privacy, A challenge to medico-legal norms (2002) Cambridge U.P., Cambridge, 249.
56
E.g. the physical/mental health, emotional stability, or happiness of that significant other.
57 See Cica, above, 195.
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moral/legal decision-making about how best to respect an individual. The
clinical/IcP relationship informs us about an IcP's 'personal medical interests' but
'personal interests' are formed by a combination of medical and rco«-medical
interests. Hence, all three relationships (self, mutual and clinical) should be taken as
sources of input regarding personal interests. The combined personal interests
comprise the principal representation of an individual's identity and stakes.
However, all three relationships outlined are set against a contextual background.
6.2.1.4.3.4 'Community and State relationships'
Community/State relationships form the contextual framework in which decisions
are made. They relate to incapacitated individuals by ensuring that IcPs are treated
respectfully and in accordance with their human rights. Two contexts are
identifiable:
• societal context, embodies the moral context of the treatment decision,
including society generally, and/or the views of recognised groups (such
as those representing clinicians, patients or other sectors of society). The
societal context can only reflect the mores of a society within a median
band of current values;
• State context embraces due legal process, and entitlement to common
rights, such as human rights.59 Treatment decisions may push at the
boundaries of the State context as an impetus for legal reform but, until
reform is enacted, treatment decisions must remain within the boundaries
of existing criminal and civil law.
Contextual frameworks invariably involve certain value judgments: societally, about
moral and ethical propriety, and recognition of representative groups; while the
State's responsibility lies in structuring due process, and willingness to reform. An
individual's interests may arise from relationships with Community and State
through his/her interaction with the decision-making process and exercise of human
rights. This contextual environment also provides a forum for conflict resolution
where, say, the views of those emotionally closest to the patient are contradictory, or
58 See e.g. X and Y v Netherlands (1985) 8 EHRR 235.
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contradict the clinical view, or contradict the community.60 A judicial (or quasi-
judicial) forum can represent an impartial, unbiased, informed observer. This
forum's role would be to identify and relate to an IcP's interests in the widest sense,
resolve conflicts, and achieve the best decisions it could for the individual, within the
parameters of a framework that reflects the State position on moral/ethical issues.
Excluding any of the four relationships outlined from an IcP's interest network
would fail to respect that individual. Each relationship group offers information
enabling a proxy to understand an individual, his/her present situation, and explore
all relevant impacts on interests. Deny these sources of input and we deny the
incapacitated individual. Hence, it is axiomatic that these relationships are
acknowledged. Once we identify an individual, and sources of input, we then need
to determine what to do with the information we acquire about his/her interests. At
this point, networks and perspective become important.
6.2.1.5 Network and perspective
The value of conceiving an IcP's interests as a form of interest network is outlined
earlier.61 A network performs an important function of respect. Where the range of
interests and inputs inform the decision-maker, a network describes an incapable
individual's interests. Description is as important as identification because it is a
prerequisite to assessing impact. We cannot take account of something that we
cannot describe. Further, we must be able to show due consideration.62 Clear
description is fundamental to express consideration.
6.2.1.5.1 Networks: interests and incapable individuals
A network is a structure on which we can hang relevant interests. A network is a
collation of an individual's interest objects.63 A network is an individual description
of the IcP we seek to respect. It expresses his/her individuality and mutuality. It is
59
E.g. the right to a fair hearing (article 6) and non-discrimination (Article 14).
60 As Clayton and Tomlinson, above, paragraph 13.114, suggest regarding interference with 'family
life': '[it] requires a fair balance that has to be struck between the general interests of the community
and the interests of the individual'.
61
Chapter 3, above, drawing on the work of Joel Feinberg.
62 Due process is increasingly important in human rights - showing due process can indicate an action
'justified' within a margin of appreciation.
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not temporally constrained, and can therefore take into account who s/he has been, or
may yet become.
The network need not be literally drawn. But it can be carried as a conceptual
framework in the awareness of the decision-maker as s/he gathers information and
locates its relevance other interests. It is a valuable reminder to adopt a wide,
flexible view directed to a clear purpose for this incapacitated individual, and the
network accepts the inevitability of conflict and support between interests. The
network concept also emphasises individuality; that the IcP matters most. By
permitting (commonly human) 'prevailing' interests, and having the scope for
(personal) 'persisting' interests, a network admits of common welfare goals and
individual preferences, thereby according with an ethic of respect.
The network structure allows for inter-interest conflict and support. This reflects the
reality that no single interest is 'all good' or 'all bad' in terms of a patient's interests
overall. In effect, interests pull and push at one another, but a network concept
encourages us to view the network as a whole, and permits the idea too that interests
change over time. This reflects the human condition; our lives are not static, our
experiences change our values, and we do not hold interests in isolation. However,
the structure endures and is flexible enough to accommodate this growth. Hence, a
network can be important expression of an individual's interests and identity. How
may we respect that?
6.2.1.5.2 Networks: respecting IcPs
Primarily, we should be aware that the individual we seek to respect is the whole of
that network; we do him/her a disservice if we attenuate our focus to certain
elements. A decision-maker's role is, therefore:
• to take stock of the broad network as representing the incapacitated
individual;
• acknowledge areas ofmutuality;
63
Objects are based on stakes, drawn from a potential range of interests and identified by input,
investment or commonality.
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• note connections (and their directional flow) between interest objects,
and take a balanced view of impacts upon them;
• to be aware of network flexibility - it is rarely static, reflecting the nature
of human beings whose identity alters and adapts;
• to be aware of how the perceptions of the network vary depending on
zonal awareness. That is, our perception of an individual's network
depends from which direction we are viewing. Thus, viewed from a
clinician's perspective, an IcP's interests may appear differently than
from a patient's perspective. The proxy must be aware of the limitations
of any single perspective, and be prepared to consider all relevant
viewpoints, thereby evaluating information and impact in all network
zones;
• and, finally, to negotiate the best path s/he can across the network to an
identified purpose, bearing in mind that the network always belongs to
the incapacitated individual.
Respect, it is submitted, flows from this approach. The framework forms a realistic
combination of protective care and admission of individuality - despite incapacity.
Decisions may be difficult; a network reflects only the diversity, complexity and
contradiction of the human condition. A proxy must make decisions despite this.
However, a network approach opens up what is involved in these decisions. Much
depends, however, on perspective.
6.2.1.5.3 Respecting individuals through perspective
Let us imagine the IcP's interest network as a three-dimensional landscape,
comprising small structures (representing interest objects - nodes on the network)
that are interconnected by paths (representing access between nodes). Where access
is blocked, due to conflict, a hill is created by pressure. Imagine entering this
landscape and scanning across the network's panorama. From our stance we have a
clear view of the immediate zone around us. Into the far distance, objects (interests)
are less distinct. However, where a conflict-hill occurs, we can see the near slope but
not the far side of it. If the hill is big enough to seize our attention, it may
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completely obscure our view of distant areas and objects. In short, our single
perspective is limited and unsighted in relation to some areas of the patient's interest
network. A decision made purely from this perspective may seem perfectly justified
in terms of the immediate zone, yet could be appallingly unjustified from other zonal
perspectives. Hence, it is axiomatic that our perception must admit the genuine
breadth and depth of an interest network.
It is easy to allow our view to be obstructed and, indeed, to forget the existence of
anything on the other side. However, the informed decision-maker is aware ofmore
distant zones - even when the view is obstructed from the current vantage point.
This awareness is key; durable awareness engenders respectful decision-making.
Recognising present perspective permits clarity about why an interest is regarded
significant, and whether this is motivated by concern for the individual, concerns for
mutuality, or for context. It offers respect through honesty and transparency, and
precludes dressing-up contextually motivated decisions as individually oriented.
Further, what is herein termed 'zonal awareness' incorporates belief in the existence
of the other zones of the network, even when unsighted. This respects IcPs by
acknowledging their importance as whole individuals, within the lives of others, and
as part of society. A proxy should be willing to survey the problem and process from
multiple perspectives. This respects the IcP by ensuring all relevant inputs are heard,
and a fuller, three-dimensional view is taken. Zonal belief acts as a prompt to view
all angles, and to be willing to justify the choice of dominant perspective (if any).
Coupled with acceptance that the landscapes of incapable patients are hilly (i.e. full
of conflict), and a willingness to examine connecting paths (i.e. impacts) to progress
to the (purpose-oriented) far side of the landscape, the zonally-aware proxy has a
realistic prospect ofmaking an informed and soundly evaluated decision. Seeing the
whole landscape network of the individual (with all its zones), and deciding with
integrity for that is maximally respectful.
For example, in a decision whether to sterilise an intellectually disabled adult male,
our attention as a proxy may be caught initially by an interest object of bodily
integrity; we do not wish to invade his bodily integrity unless to do so benefits him.
His interest in sexual freedom and relationship is also a valid object in his network.
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But the possibility of his causing pregnancy creates conflict between the two interest
objects of bodily integrity and sexual freedom. Ifwe remain static in our perspective
this conflict may be all that we see, and our focal point remains the original (bodily
integrity). However, ifwe change our position and survey the network from, say, the
perspective of others with whom he might have a relationship, then we discover that
the scope for mutuality (of network overlap) with those others is currently
significantly limited by protecting his bodily integrity. In effect, this other side of
the conflict-hill is obscured in our first perspective. Moreover, this interest in
relationship and sexual intimacy is supported by an additional interest object of
quality of life. Hence, by changing perspective our awareness of other zones of
importance in a patient's network becomes enhanced. We could also consider
further perspectives, such as the clinician's view of what is involved in surgical
sterilisation, and the views from the patient's care environment (which may offer
more information about the connection between his interest in sexual relationship
and his quality of life). It is equally important that we consider the network from the
patient's point of view, and admit input from him as a means to understanding his
feelings about relationships for him. The network is simply a useful, adaptable
reminder that our evaluative stance should be as full and extensive as possible.
This chapter has related interests to individuality and respect. Networks have been
proffered as a descriptive means of expressing that relationship. However, to respect
IcPs it is surely essential that we see them as whole individuals - despite incapacity.
To genuinely acknowledge IcPs we must look, it is submitted, at 'whole life' 'over
time', considered next.
CHAPTER SEVEN
RESPECT - A SYNTHESIS:
RECOGNISING LIFE VALUE
Chapter 7 Respect - A synthesis: Recognising life value
Respecting individuality requires acknowledgement of the components of an
individual's life; the values, experiences, and beliefs that make that life uniquely
his/hers. The importance of recognising 'whole life' is considered first in this
chapter. The second section argues that, to decide respectfully, we should look
beyond an individual's current incapacity to view his/her life more broadly 'over
time' to gain a better understanding of the individual and his/her life values. 'Whole
life' 'over time' is really about becoming as informed as we can be, thereby
improving the achievable degree of respect.
7.1 'Whole life'
What makes up a life? The possibilities are infinite. Some aspects have already
been outlined (Chapters 4 and 5, above). Genuine respect acknowledges the value of
an individual. Individuality is about the whole person, cognisance of whom is
identifiable from his/her whole life. Any failure to recognise an IcP's whole life risks
making a decision from ignorance rather than information. Every life is unique in its
blend, and we must respect its breadth in order to evaluate the depth - the weighty
significance - of its most important elements.
Incorporating a broad sense of 'life' (i.e. biological and biographical) permits an
individual's identity, and what is important to him/her, to be comprehensively
ascertained. A proxy who is well informed in these regards should be more able to
resolve conflict, because the individual's values act as heuristic rules of
interpretation. This enables objective and subjective perspectives to be combined.
In so doing, we give effect to the notion of residual autonomy,1 while recognising the
simultaneous need for welfare to be assessed too. To see an individual's life as a
'whole', we need to be aware of the connectedness within that life, and the
unbreachable connection it has with the individual. Even in the face of complete
incapacity that life still belongs to that individual, and we may act only as a
respectful caretaker of it. This demands, fundamentally, that we acknowledge that
'life' extends beyond the biological.
1 I.e. we seek to access any remaining pockets of patient capacity that may be brought to bear on the
treatment decision.
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7.1.1 Making life 'whole' - beyond the biological
The notion of life being a 'combination' of'biological' and 'biographical' aspects is
made by Rachels.2 It is argued earlier that respectful assessments of 'quality of life'
should take account of 'life' in both senses because they are interdependent and
mutually beneficial. Thus, establishing a biographical life requires a biological
existence, and our biological existence is lent greater significance through our
biographical life. On this basis, any assessment of the impact upon a person's life
should encompass combined senses. Hence, the impact of a treatment option should
take account of the benefit/detriment flowing to both biological life (e.g. physical
health) and biographical life (e.g. ulterior goals, capacity to engage in valued
relationships and experiential interests).
In terms of quality of life, impact can be gauged by how an action improves or
diminishes the quality of an individual's biological and biographical life. To some
extent this depends on his/her existing quality of life, which can vary considerably
between individuals. Hence, a person who is a severely physically incapacitated
person may still have a good quality of biographical life, provided that his/her
(diminished) quality of biological life is still physically comfortable enough to allow
focus on ulterior interests or engagement in relationships and so forth. Equally, a
person with no incapacity may have excellent quality of biological life, yet a poor or
non-existent biographical life. Thus, the quality of a competent person's 'combined
life' can be seen to be based on a sufficient quality ofbiological existence to support
the quality of biographical life that s/he chooses. For, even where poor quality of
life exists - in one or other sense - the overall quality of the individual's life depends,
to some degree, on the combined quality, and whether the diminution in one is
sufficiently compensated by the other.
It is not dissimilar for those with mental incapacity. The needs they seek to fulfil in
life are of the same type as for competent persons. Admittedly, the content of an
IcP's biographical life may differ in degree - s/he may take pleasure in 'small' things
that competent persons might overlook or take for granted. But, the importance of
those things to the individual is what counts; it is the contribution to his/her
2 See above, Chapter 5 where R. Dworkin's emphasised distinction between physical life (zoe") and
life as lived ('bios') is also considered.
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biographical life that matters. Moreover, some needs are essentially the same. For
example, the contribution an IcP's relationships make to his/her life may be just the
same as those of mentally competent persons; it is merely the nature of engagement
that varies. Furthermore, the biological needs ofmany IcPs clearly replicate those of
competent persons; seeking freedom from pain and good physical health is just as
important and perhaps achievable. Hence, quality of combined life holds good for
human beings generally, whether physically and mentally able or incapacitated. The
point at which this appears to break down is where a person is totally and
permanently insensate. In a situation such as p.v.s. the patient's biographical life
appears presently non-existent. However, his/her past biographical life surely can be
admitted as a guide to his/her individuality (and views) in the present. Certainly, the
absence of any prospect of biographical life is something that we must consider in a
quality of life assessment. But, arguably, some biographical aspects of his/her life
may endure incapacity and remain attributable. Surviving interests are considered
further below. Admittedly, the totally and permanently insensate neonate's life is
even more limited to biological elements. However, even there, some (albeit
minimal) biography can be found in the uniqueness of circumstance that attaches to
every individual, in terms of a parental or family bond with the child (despite non-
reciprocity), who cares for him/her, and how s/he is cared for. Thus, we should seek
to locate relevant past biography, and consider the prospects for its future
development. However, it may be that in cases of severe incapacity from birth the
biographical element is limited to evaluating uniqueness of circumstance (as the
totality of individuality).
However, for many IcPs good quality of life is grounded in having sufficient
biological quality of life to support and enable the quality of biographical life that
s/he can achieve. Together these amount to good quality of life in a combined sense.
The starting point of this is to admit interests in their widest sense, embracing the
groupings outlined earlier and including relationship as a valuable element.
However, the fundamental concept of combined life needs to go further. It is argued
herein that respecting persons requires that a proxy recognises an IcP's 'whole life',
'over time'. Impact is assessable by the effect on quality of life, but quality of life is
often seen as a welfare-oriented concept. Hence, quality of life has the potential to
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draw us towards respecting welfare of IcPs, rather than respecting their life in true
combination. It is submitted that a better term of recognition and respect is that of
'whole life'. This is definable in terms of the full breadth of that life being uniquely
connected with that individual: that the 'combined life' that we recognise is the
'whole' context for that individual's engagement with life's experiences and
relationships. The diminution of a person's mental capacity is, too easily, assumed
to preclude his/her ulterior goals or biographical existence. In some cases such a
reduction will occur, but in other cases the incapacity may have been always
present,4 or may be purely temporary,5 or may simply result in different, but no less
important, biographical interests.6 By keeping in mind that this is the whole of this
individual's life, we are reminded that the combination of his/her life at any given
time is uniquely individual. Hence, while 'welfare' may incorporate quality of life in
its combined sense, the role for autonomy remains, in recognition that that life is still
wholly individualistic in its combination and is inherently attached to the
incapacitated individual. Respectful proxy decisions should consider both of these
welfare and autonomy values.
To respect an IcP's 'whole life' we must recognise that - despite his/her incapacity -
the individual's life remains entirely his/hers; unique in its combination and quality,
unique in its combination of biological situation and biographical engagement. We
cannot perfect an IcP's life by curing their incapacity, or even curing any physical
health problems - any more than we can for competent patients. We must be
realistic about this. Life 'happens' to people both with and without capacity; it has
trials and tribulations for all of us. But we can offer to respect an IcP by
acknowledging the wholeness of life for that individual. However impeded a life
might seem to an objective observer, it is still the entirety of life, and it is still
unique, for that human being. This is not an argument based on vitalism or sanctity
of life. This author is not advocating that treatment should never be withdrawn.7
Rather, simply that incapacitated individuals have a combined life, just like the rest
3 For example, in severe incapacity situations, such as p.v.s. However, if we look at whole life, over
time, even this need not totally inhibit recognition of life value.
4
E.g. in intellectually disability through say Downs' syndrome.
5
E.g. where phobia inhibits treatment.
6 Illness may cause an individual's personal priorities to change.
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of us, that embodies the whole of who they are. It belongs to them wholly and
regardless of incapacity. We can honour this by permitting respect for that whole,
unique life to be the aim of our decision as proxy. The import of biological and
biographical aspects is important to that wholeness. To make a compassionate
decision it is imperative that we see an IcP's life in its fullest, widest sense. This
requires admission of all that may be relevant to this individual, and recognition of a
life in its unique blend of elements. Furthermore, the investments s/he makes can
offer valuable information about his/her personal, unique, individual combination,
and we need to identify these useful investments as markers that point the way to
individuality.
7.1.2 Making life whole: investing in individuality
Investments provide information about some of the stakes that an individual holds in
his/her life. Acknowledging these investments enhances proxy informedness,
enabling an IcP's individuality to be better respected within the decision. The nature
of investment is considered above (Chapter 3). In short, investments include both
simple and complex choices about where an individual engages energy and focus.
Investments are part of his/her subjective 'experiences' within life. Acknowledging
these experiences is an important part of the respect concept posited here.8
Investments may, objectively, benefit or harm an individual, but they remain a
subjective focus, by his/her conscious attention or sub-conscious action.9 Dworkin
attributes the very value we accord to life itself as lying in the 'complex creative
investment it represents'.10 The complexity is further increased by the impact of
death or illness 'frustrating our investments'.11 Clearly, throughout our lifetime our
investments vary: predominantly biological in early life, shifting to heavily
biographical during the main part of adult life, which may steadily decline towards
the end of life, becoming biologically focused again. Considered in this way,
evaluation of treatment options should have affinity with the previous choices and
7 That would be an assessment based on a narrowly biological view of life - quite the reverse of the
combined approach promoted here.
8
Part of the R.E.S.P.E.C.T. acronym outlined in Chapter 6, above.
9
A person may have an interest through sub-conscious actions, despite not consciously taking an
interest in that object, nor even necessarily knowing (in the sense of acknowledging) of it.
10 R. Dworkin, above, 84.
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human input that a person has made,12 and should be aware of the scope for future
investment in life experiences and relationships. By acknowledging previous
investments, and being aware s/he may yet make other investments, we allow the
individual's life in its whole sense to be considered. The alternative of limiting our
evaluation to a current snapshot restricts our view of the individual; we recognise
less individuality by operating from limited information.
However, investments are not definitive. Rather, they are indicative markers of
objects that should be considered in assessing an IcP's unique combination of
interests. An investment can be seen as a valuable pointer to an individual's interest
network: a potential node within the network capable of interacting with other
interests in an individual life. In essence, an interest network should reflect the most
important investments that an individual makes. Admittedly, the investments we
make change over time. We might not make the same investments later in our lives,
or with the benefit of hindsight. However, this is part of the fullness of life; that our
individuality evolves as a product of our experiences; experiences that each of us
interprets uniquely. As proxy decision-makers we cannot aspire to interpret the
experiences of another human being as s/he would.13 However, we can still respect
individuality by identifying, considering and acknowledging the investments s/he
currently makes, has made previously, and/or has scope to make in the future.14
Aliter, if we ignore those investments we also ignore the identity of the IcP - how
may we decide respectfully if we do not know about the individual upon whose
behalfwe decide?
7.1.3 Returns on investment; integrity with identity
The 'return' on recognising individual investments is better decision-making. But
this return is only accessible if we employ the information discovered in a
manageable, connected way in the decision process. Networks provide the
" R. Dworkin, ibid, 87, whose approach to evaluating degree of frustration (by death or illness) of a
person's life investment looks both forward and back in time.
12 See ibid.
13 This forms part of the reason for rejecting a pure substituted judgment approach herein.
14 It is not intended to attribute life value purely in proportion to investments in life. As human beings
we can all be regarded as having some 'commonly human' investments in welfare interests that
should be respected. Rather, investments are a source offurther information about the identity of an
incapacitated individual, enabling our decision to have more integrity with his/her values.
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framework for managing information, enabling us to act with respect by seeking a
decision that has integrity with individual identity.
If we are to be aware of the whole of an IcP's network, and to be able to evaluate
impact in terms of his/her whole life, then we must look at all relevant investments.
Undoubtedly, conflicts will occur in the investments an individual makes. For
example, in choosing to become and remain pregnant a woman makes an investment
in the life of her foetus. Even if her choice is made unwillingly, it is still a choice,
albeit perhaps made in subconscious acquiescence. Having made that investment,
she may then choose against obstetric intervention, despite a need for it in order to
deliver the baby safely. This too is a choice. Both choices are represented by
investment, yet the two investments contradict each other. Both investments are
relevant to a decision about intervention because to acknowledge the woman's whole
life we must consider all relevant investments.
But, we must also acknowledge that a person's life is a work in progress, a journey
of acquired experiences. This does not mean that a later decision should always
supersede an earlier one, merely that we must allow every individual where possible
to travel his/her own journey. Ultimately, therefore, we respect a person only by
allowing them to make their own decisions where able. In the example, the decision
authority would still come down to issues of competence. However, respecting her
whole individual life involves us acknowledging her early investment (in getting
pregnant) by addressing that choice with her, and encouraging her to evaluate its
relevance in the later choice that she is now making. Where her competence is in
serious doubt, we can still respect her by acknowledging both investments. This
would mean ensuring that her (incompetent) refusal has been clearly listened to and
acknowledged, because sometimes simply feeling genuinely heard may diffuse
conflict or even alter a person's current perspective.15 This is not about paying
patronising lip-service to autonomy, or adopting any type of retrospective 'thank-
you' test. Rather, it is about genuinely acknowledging that an individual's life
consists of all his/her investments - even those that apparently conflict. Our very act
15 In contrast, by riding roughshod over a person's (in/competent) choice we resist hearing his/her
current investment. Our resistance may actually encourage that person to persist further, becoming
even more vociferous in their vain attempt to be heard.
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of acknowledgement, or of encouraging the individual to acknowledge the whole of
his/her investments, may alter the stance that the individual adopts in relation to
them, because s/he feels recognised and respected in the decision process.
However, ultimately we may still have to make a difficult proxy decision - in the
earlier example, either to let the competent woman lose her life or that of her child,
or to overrule the protestations of an incompetent woman and offer support to help
her come to terms with our choice. But respect flows from acknowledging her life in
its whole sense, through her various investments.16 Of course, the competence
threshold is a crucial gateway that determines who makes the decision. However, as
a proxy, we should not decide without giving serious consideration to the whole of a
person's investments - even an incompetent individual's investments - within their
life. Respect is achieved through the giving of that consideration. But, genuine
respect reaches beyond current incapacity; 'whole life' is incomplete in according
life value unless it is allied to time.
7.2 'Over time' - temporal issues
Seeking a respectful approach warrants reconsidering time in relation to IcPs because
it is a potentially valuable source of information that is mostly overlooked. Indeed,
incompetence and incapacity tend to be the 'poor relations' of competency.
Incompetence is relatively unconsidered as an issue because 'soft' paternalism is
often assumed an acceptable solution to decisions for this group of patients. This
thesis offers a reclassification of '/«competence' as a starting point for temporal
assessment. The idea of temporal interests is then introduced, together with the
notion of an 'ascertained' interest network representing life's value to an individual.
Conclusions are then drawn about the character of a genuinely informed decision¬
maker.
16 A similar example occurs where an individual refuses life-saving treatment for, say, religious
reasons. We must acknowledge that his/her religion (one investment) may be such a fundamental part
of that individual's life that s/he values it above all other investments. If we ignore this, we ignore the
identity of the individual whose 'best interests' we seek to serve.
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7.2.1 Competence over time - reclassifying /ncompetence
The normative construction of competence is considered earlier,17 and reconstruction
proffered in the concluding chapter.18 Clearly, the construction of competence
significantly influences who meets the requisite standard for decision-making
authority. However, this thesis argues that input from an incompetent patient may
still be relevant: his/her views should still be heard where s/he could express them.
For example, while an intellectually disabled person may be unable to weigh up the
issues in surgical sterilisation, s/he may be able to offer views about pursuing a
sexual relationship. By hearing this input a proxy could better understand the
significance and meaning of that relationship which, in turn, influences assessment of
risk of pregnancy and the need for contraception. This example supports the
argument proposed in this paragraph: '/«competence' is complex and demands
consideration if we are to accord genuine respect to legally incompetent patients.
Recognising competence over time is a means of acknowledging residual capacity of
IcPs. Residual capacity is a reflection of subjectivity that can be accorded
importance within the RESPECT acronym already outlined. The input that an IcP
may offer flows from his/her 'residual autonomy'. This residue is enhanced by
recognising temporality - looking beyond the 'here and now' of 'incompetence'.
By attributing to person a 'lifetime line' (considered below), and raising awareness
of incompetence within the time context, we can credit capacity and/or input where it
is due. We all have lives beyond the present moment. When our ability to live
effectively within that moment is diminished, by incapacity, our identity remains
defined by the rest of life before incompetence and life yet to come. Thus, the
decision-maker should recognise this temporal extension as part of acknowledging
'identity'. This may mean that an individual's views prior to incompetence, or
during lucid intervals, comprise relevant input. However, this is not about
manipulating a person's past mental history or present inconsistency to generate a
finding of incompetence. Nor it is about diminishing the authority of an advance
directive now in terms of its future authority. For, even competent persons can only
make a decision in the present based on their past experience and estimate of future




think differently at some future point or with benefit of hindsight. That is part of the
process of living and gaining our life's experiences. Rather, it must be emphasised
this is simply about enabling patients who are under some degree of incapacity to
have input (wherever possible) by viewing competency in a longer time frame.
To achieve this change we must first consider the nature of incompetence. This
thesis submits a new classification of incompetence that connects time with
incapacity. It aims to perceive IcPs in the context of their 'lifetime competence'.
This then acts as a guide to possible input, possession of interests, and the directive
purpose of their interest network. Viewing incompetence in this way allows us to
recognise scope for residual input, and permits identity to endure a phase of
incompetence enabling more integrity to be attainable in proxy decisions.
Incompetence can be classified into three basic groupings: temporal variance; degree
variance; and mixed incompetencies.
7.2.1.1 Temporal variance
This concerns individuals whose competence, when seen over time, is at variance
with his/her current incompetence. Temporal variation occurs in three forms:
previously competent; never-been competent; and/or transiently competent. In
all three situations, the patient is deemed 'incompetent' because s/he fails to meet the
threshold at the time of the treatment decision. However, this does not mean that
s/he has always been, or will always be, unable to meet it. By looking to his/her
competence at other times we may be able to glean input about his/her views and
identity, and acquire guidance about interests that persist beyond incompetence.
7.2.1.1.1 Previously-competent
This recognises that the person has been competent earlier in his/her life, but is not
competent now. Some previously-competent individuals may regain competence in
future (perhaps contingent on a restorative treatment decision made now), while
others will remain incompetent. For example, a patient currently incompetent due to
concussion resulting from trauma was previously competent and may be expected to
regain competence on recovery - his/her incompetence may be purely temporary. In
18 See below, Chapter 8.
contrast a p.v.s. patient has also been previously competent, but will not regain
competence again in the future - his/her incompetence is permanent. The aim of the
proxy decision in both cases is to secure the patient's well-being, but the objectives
vary with the type of incompetence. For the temporarily incompetent patient, the
objective is to restore competence. Whereas, for the p.v.s. patient the objective could
be to make a decision about future treatment that has integrity with his/her life.
However, despite the differences in objective, both patients were previously
competent and have a past life of subjective interests, which are assessable as input
to the current decision.19 By acknowledging previous competence and admitting
former subjective interests, the proxy is better informed about the individual upon
whose behalf he decides. Respect demands integrity. Integrity requires awareness of
identity. Previous competence can illuminate identity.
7.2.1.1.2 Never-been competent
In contrast to the first category some patients have never met the minimum threshold
for competence; they have not been 'competent' at any point in life. This category
may also be subdivided to two groups. While both subdivisions start from the same
point of never-having-been competent, a distinction again arises on forward
projection between patients who (i) may become competent, and (ii) will never
become competent. For example, a neonate, infant or young child has never been
competent, and is incompetent currently. However, s/he may be expected gradually
to develop competence in the future (group (i) above). Meanwhile, a neonate or
infant suffering from severe mental and/or physical impairment may never become
competent in the future, because his/her capacity for cognitive development is so
severely undermined, or his/her life expectancy short (group (ii) above). In either
case, we may look to current personality to provide relevant subjective input and
combine this with common interests to determine the decision. However, any scope
for development of future subjective capacity is limited to group (i) patients. What
effect does this have? It may influence the range of the patient's forward-looking
interest network. Group (i) patients are likely to have a heavier predominance of
welfare-oriented focus, and less critical or ulterior scope. Indeed, severe impairment
19 I.e. experiential, ulterior or critical interests.
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may significantly limit experiential capacity and/or capacity to form relationships.20
This does not determine the value of his/her life (in the sense of being 'less' or
'more' valuable), but may locate its combination balance as predominantly
biological, rather than biographical. Hence, the 'best' treatment achievable may
focus, legitimately and respectfully, on biological objectives.
7.2.1.1.3 Transient
The competence of this group of patients fluctuates. They may be seen to drift in and
out of incompetence, with this transience making it hard to rely upon their views in
determining the treatment decision. Transiently competent patients could be
regarded as including those suffering from mental illness, such as schizophrenia,
psychoses, delusions, and perhaps anorexia. These patients may well have been
competent previously, and may regain competence in the future (though this may be
contingent on the treatment decision at hand, say, in administering anti-psychotic
drugs). Admittedly, transience makes assessing subjective patient views difficult.
However, merely dismissing a patient's previously-competent views or his/her views
expressed during lucid periods, fails to respect him/her as an individual. Whereas, if
we admit a patient's input, through either his/her previous or intermittently lucid
views (when the patient is generally 'well'), the decision-maker is able to accord
more integrity with that (transiently competent) input during the patient's periods of
illness. Respect flows from this acknowledgement and admittance of input. We
recognise individuality by seeing the IcP as a whole and allowing for transient
incompetence within that, rather than the transient incompetence being projected as
the whole of the individual.
Awareness that competence varies over time moves us closer to realistic acceptance
of ourselves and others as transient, variable creatures - a clearer acknowledgement
of human identity and the variance of personality (and individuality) within that
collective identity.
However, the nature of incompetence also varies beyond time, through degree
(considered next) and combination (considered below).
20 This does not preclude totally any significance for such relationships and interests, but it may
influence the relative balance of interest groupings held
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7.2.1.2 Degree variance
It has already been argued that IcPs may often have some residual autonomy that
• •21should be taken into account and respected in any proxy decision. In essence,
because in/capacity is a matter of degree (whereas competence requires setting of a
threshold) some 'incompetent' patients may still have a significant degree of
capacity. It has been argued herein that these individuals should be permitted input
to a decision about their treatment insofar as we can admit their views and concerns,
because to do so contributes to our informedness as proxies and respects them by
ensuring that their views are heard and considered. These patients form groups that
might be termed 'semi-competent', whereby they are competent in some aspects of
their lives but not in others (e.g. intellectually disabled patients who may have some
cognitive or affective impairment that limits their competence for some decisions in
their lives, but not others). Additionally, patients such as mature minors who may be
'Gillick-competenf or in the process of developing competence, form a further
group of degree variance. We can describe them as having 'emerging' competence.
While it is unnecessary to reconsider these classifications further here, it is
emphasised that there should be a general responsibility on proxies to maximise the
capacity and input of IcPs wherever possible. For, it is integral to respect that we
enable them as individuals to participate in decisions about them to the fullest extent
they can achieve. Thus far we have seen how incapacity may vary in time and
degree. However, complexity increases where variance occurs in mixed
combinations.
7.2.1.3 Mixed incompetencies
The final reclassification of incompetence recognises that the groups already
considered are not mutually exclusive. Variation may occur in more than one
dimension, causing incompetency to be 'mixed' in one of two ways:
• between subjects, that is, where the treatment decision directly affects
more than one person. For example, a competent mother refusing life-
saving treatment on behalf of her infant, mixes (1) her own current
competency with (2) the infant who has never been competent, and
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whose future competence depends on the prognosis (and the decision).
More contentiously, where a pregnant woman is refusing obstetric
intervention due to incapacity, such as phobia, thereby endangering the
foetus, this combines: (1) her temporary incompetence (including
previous competence and scope for its restoration); and (2) the fetus who
has never been competent, and whose future competence is contingent on
being bom. These situations demand yet more of a proxy's commitment
to respect, because by respecting the individuality of one subject we fear
disrespecting the individuality of the other. However, simply through
recognising temporal aspects of incompetence, the proxy begins to
accord respect. Both individuals are at different stages of temporal
22
incompetence, and at different stages of their respective lifetime lines.
Provided all relevant input is gathered we can acknowledge residual
autonomy by really listening to what the woman is expressing in her
refusal. Further, we can genuinely engage with the issues by making a
clear and full assessment of interests, including the welfare interests of
both parties. In this way we are acknowledging the whole lives
(including temporal and degree incompetence) as far as time will allow.
This may not provide any 'easy' answer to resolving conflict therein.
But, through this process we offer the respect to both subjects that is the
maximal aim in these situations;
• combining time and degree variation regarding one subject, that is,
where a patient's incompetence imports both temporal and degree
dimensions. For example, a maturing minor suffering from anorexia has
(1) transient competence, depending upon the intensity of anorexic
compulsions at any given time, and (2) emerging competence, in the
sense that his/her competence is also in the process of degree
development. We can also interpret the incompetence of other
individuals in both dimensions. Hence, an intellectually disabled adult's
competence may be described in terms of degree variation - namely the
21 In Chapters 2 and 4, above.
22 Lifetime lines are discussed below.
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s/he is semi-competent - and temporally as 'never having been' nor
'likely to become' fully competent.
The purpose of classifying incompetence by time and degree is to evince
incompetence as a complex issue. It is not a simple or all-inclusive category.
Certainly, a threshold must be drawn for the pragmatic attribution of decision¬
making authority. However, below that threshold an IcP is not 'totally' incompetent
for all time and all purposes. Rather, variance can support individuality of subject
even in proxy decisions. Variance over time may warrant input from an IcP's
previous subjective views, or that we acknowledge his/her anticipated future capacity
as a good reason for delaying the decision where possible, or minimising the
permanence of any impact. Relatedly, transience variation may drive us to seek to
ascertain his/her views during lucidity and give effect to those. Alternatively, degree
variance may encourage acceptance of an IcP's input to some aspects of the decision,
or attributing more significance to his/her emerging competence than occurs at
present.
It is not intended for this classification of incompetence to be used simplistically to
categorise patients with certain illnesses as 'incompetent'. Rather the classification
is intended to support an argument for better acknowledgement of residual capacity
as decision input. The present branding of all IcPs as a vague generic class is
disrespectful. 'Incompetent' persons vary as individuals just as much as those who
are 'competent'. The issues of incompetence are just as complex. Incompetence is a
state of infinitely diverse combinations, feelings, beliefs and choices. And, as a state,
it fluctuates in degree and over time. Ifwe are to act with the respect posited herein,
by viewing IcPs holistically through their lifetime to identify individuality, then we
must look beyond current incompetence to locate markers that enable us to know the
individual we seek to respect. This is no threat to competence thresholds, for this
reclassification of incompetence is about seeing beyond the present moment in order
to admit useful input - not to dictate decision-making authority.23
Recognising the complexity of incompetence is a starting point to understanding the
temporal issues involved in reconstructing best interests. Viewing an incompetent
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patient's whole life, over time, is a means of actively recognising individual values.
It is through our active efforts to do this, and to be compassionately informed, that
we respect the human being. In short, it is through our actions and acceptance that
we accord respect to another. We can do no more. Having raised awareness of
temporal variance in incompetence, we now must progress to understanding how
interests may vary over a lifetime.
7.2.2 Developing temporal interests
The further relevance of time pertains both to the 'life' and 'interests' of an
individual. Each is considered in turn.
7.2.2.1 Lifetime line
Every individual's life is a continuum. Its continuity is manifest in its relentless
consistency: a person's life belongs to him/her throughout, and there are no breaks in
it - a person cannot step in or out of life temporarily, nor choose to experience only
certain parts of it. Even in the face of incapacity (through physical or mental illness,
substance abuse, or abdication of self-responsibility), it remains a fact that that
period of incapacity is only part of the continuous whole. It is the continuity - the
wholeness of it - that contributes to individuality; the unique combination of aspects
makes all of those aspects part of his/her journey. The experiences acquired on that
journey assist the person incrementally in developing his/her identity over a lifetime.
We can usefully represent an individual's life as a line flowing through time. It
flows from biological conception, through the physicality of birth, the physical and
emotional development of childhood and adolescence, the experiential development
of adulthood (including life events, illness, personal growth, and older age), to death
and beyond (including the legacies of ourselves left in the hearts and minds of
others). Conscious recognition of an incapacitated individual's life in terms of a
lifetime line usefully positions any current healthcare decision as an event in the
context of that life as a whole. It reminds the proxy that the IcP is a unique
23
Allowing an incompetent, non-autonomous patient to make his/her own treatment decision would
be disrespectful because it fails to fulfil the welfare aspect of respect. This is not intended here.
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individual and that any current decision must consider carefully any future impact
and the degree of accordance with past individual investment. Seeing the decision as
merely a point (albeit an important one) on the line also reminds us that incapacity is
only a state - some patients may have been, or may again become, competent.
A decision of integrity requires knowledge of identity. Broadening the view to
encompass lifetime context, ofwhich the present decision is only a part, enhances the
view of an individual's identity. However, some pragmatic temporal limits are
necessary in order to make this approach workable. Aliter, interest attribution and
the flow of identity become unmanageable and unhelpful to the decision process. So,
where should we set temporal limits? Interests are attributable to individuals. An
individual lifetime line could begin from the moment of conception, but a foetus'
capacity to engage with the world is contingent on birth.24 In essence, we can regard
the interests of a foetus as being future-located until they crystallise into actual
interests, based upon a capacity to engage with individual life, upon being born. At
the opposite end of a lifetime line, the situation differs by virtue of a life of
9 S
engagement and experiences that has already taken place. It is important that a
proxy acknowledges these individual experiences, and interests flowing from them.
It is argued herein that such interests may persist beyond entry into severe incapacity
states such as p.v.s. (or perhaps even death). The reader is referred to Appendix 5,
which represents the lifetime line diagrammatically as a solid line between the times
of birth and death, during which it meanders through experiences and crosses the
lines of other individuals through mutual relationship. The period between
conception and birth can be represented as a dotted line of potentiality, which
becomes solid upon birth (recognising crystallisation of capacity for individual
engagement in life). Relatedly, an intermittent broken line can represent the period
post-mortem, where an individual can no longer exercise his own interests, but
interests may still be attributable in recognition of investments made during life, and
the experiential memories that remains in the lives of mutual others.
24 Considered above, chapter 5.
25 This need not be a 'lifetime' however, as a healthcare crisis can occur at any point in a person's life,
from neonatal stages through to old age. However, life experiences and events accumulate, as do
relationships of mutuality. There is no hard and fast rule here; the lives of some individuals may
touch many others in a very short space of time, while some persons live long but very independently.
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Certain stages identifiable on a lifetime line are associated with temporal
incompetence. Regarding 'previously-competent' IcPs, these individuals have
attained a stage of adult competence from which we can evaluate investments and
identity. For those individuals whose competence can be restored the incapacity
stage will be relatively short within their lifetime line. For others where competence
cannot be restored (such as p.v.s. patients), the post-capacity stage becomes
commensurate with the remainder of their (potentially lengthy) lifetime, until death
brings about the post-mortem stage. Where young children are concerned ('never
been' competent), some will emerge from their pre-capacity stage, developing
capacity gradually, while those suffering impairment may live through various stages
of incapacity for much of their lifetime. Severely damaged individuals may never
emerge into a capacity stage. Meanwhile, patients with certain mental illnesses
('transiently competent') have a variety of stages of capacity, post-capacity (i.e.
incompetent), and post-incapacity (i.e. return to competence) stages. Other
individuals, such as those that are intellectually disabled, may remain in a relatively
consistent state of semi-competence throughout their lifetime. The stages in their life
will pertain to limited intellectual and emotional development in an overall context
of incapacity throughout their lifetime.
Hence, a 'lifetime line' is a means of setting the complexities of incompetence in the
context of an individual lifetime, acknowledging the various stages, end-points (at its
extremes of birth and death), the contingency that may exist before birth, and the
legacy that may exist post-incapacity or post-mortem. Further, it reminds us that a
treatment decisions is made only at one moment in an individual's life, though its
impact may extend thereafter. Hence, the proxy has a responsibility to act with
integrity towards the individual's broader context of a lifetime. Having set the proxy
decision in its 'life' context, we still need to resolve attribution of interests
temporally. Where lifetime line is about perspective, temporal interests are about the
stakes belonging to an individual that are susceptible to impact by a proxy decision.
The attribution of current interests is considered earlier,26 as is the attribution of
Neither is wrong nor right - merely different. But each comprises part of individual life and merits




interests in utero 21 The remaining contentious issue lies in whether interests can
'survive' beyond entry to permanent incapacity.
7.2.2.2 Can interests 'survive'?
The issue of attributing interests to IcPs who suffer total, permanent loss of capacity
severely taxes best interests. However, this thesis contends that respect surely
demands respect for the individual now because s/he is already in the process of a
life, and his/her prior existence can provide input that assists us in knowing more
about them as an individual for whom we must now decide.
The interest concept strongly influences which interests are recognised, to whom,
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and which values are served. However, interests are not static; some endure
through a lifetime, while others are fluidly changing during our lifetime experience.
The degree to which interests are accepted in a temporal context has important
implications for attribution, and for the subjective/objective content. In turn, this
influences how we might effect 'respect'. The most severe challenge comes from
permanent insentience. Hence, this is the focus of this section, arguing that a non-
temporal view of interests is too attenuated, and drawing on philosophical debate
about 'posthumous interests' to provide a temporally enlightened perspective on IcP
interests.
7.2.2.2.1 Interests from the past - defining 'surviving interests'
The 'nil' prognosis of p.v.s. tests the interest concept to its limits. The patient's
permanent state of suspense renders his/her life a matter of indifference to him/her in
the present.29 Indeed, any forward-looking interest in continued life arguably has
also gone because the individual exists merely as a shell, unable to engage (even in
the smallest way) in life.30 Prima facie, this permanent and total incapacity denies
any attributable interests due to an absence of experiential, subjective critical,
ulterior, or even welfare interests (due to insentience), either currently or
27
Chapter 5, above.
28 See Chapter 3, above.
29 The term 'indifference' was used in the Bland decision, discussed above, Chapter 2.
30
If, in contrast, a possibility of some future recovery exists then we could regard a person's interests
as temporarily 'suspended1, but not entirely lost.
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prospectively. However, there remains a possibility of interest attribution through
the notion of interests 'surviving' entry to p.v.s.
In this regard, Buchanan and Brock suggest that:
'the interests of persons [who were once self-determining] can survive not
only incompetence and the loss of personhood, but death itself. Because of
the values and preferences an individual now has, he or she may have an
interest in the coming to be of certain states of affairs in the future. In some
cases the state of affairs in question is not expected to come about until after
death'.31
Further, that we should look not only at experiential interests, but also those interests
'whose formation presupposed capacities that he or she no longer has but
whose satisfaction or thwarting will depend upon events yet to transpire...the
application of the best interests principle...requires consideration of both sets
of interests'.32
In essence, this means that a person's interests at any given time can relate to states
(or events) occurring later. Applied to incapacitated individuals this would warrant
considering any past subjective (critical or ulterior) interests that, then, related to
future states/events that have now manifested. In other words, if a patient - while
competent - was concerned for the future welfare ofmutual others, then that interest
may endure his/her subsequent incapacity.
Further support for interest durability can be found in Frey's work. He raises three
significant points. First, he concurs with Feinberg's view that
'an interest is something a person always possesses in some condition,
something that can grow and flourish or diminish and decay, but which can
rarely be totally lost'.33
This could support a valuable shift in the burden of interest possession; moving from
an onus on proving interest durability to disproving it. Frey then develops his
general observation by specifically relating it to incapacitated persons in the context
of pain:
'it is an important fact in our thinking about people that the stake they have
in the concerns of life is not lost through, for instance, having suffered





Frey, above, 146, n5, citing J. Feinberg, Social philosophy, above, 26.
34 R.G. Frey, ibid.
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Finally, he suggests that interests should be attributed to these individuals (i.e.
beyond insentience) because:
'(i)---the individuals in such cases have vital concerns in respect of what
happens to them and theirs, (ii)...these vital concerns represent interests they
have, (iii)...these concerns are things in which they have an interest in spite
of the fact that they are things in which they cannot take an interest, and
(iv)...these interests do not simply vanish the moment an individual...steps
upon an anti-personnel mine or lapses into coma'.35
Hence, Frey clearly considers these 'vital concerns' to be markers of interests capable
of surviving incapacity. He grounds his attribution of such interests in membership
of the human race. This thesis concurs with this in essence; that we feel driven
intuitively to respect individuals (even in the way we treat their body posthumously)
because they have once existed as human beings. But such membership should not
be conflated with 'personhood' - which demands reflective capacity and results in
Frey's creation of 'special exceptions' for neonates and the severely impaired.
Simply 'being' in life, as a human interaction with the world should be sufficient to
merit attribution of durable interests. Indeed, this would require respect even of
those who are permanently incapacitated from birth. Their worth derives from their
status as human beings simpliciter.
7.2.2.2.2 Parity with posthumous interests
Other authors, such as Feinberg, expressly use the term 'surviving interests' in the
context of a person's death.36 Although p.v.s. patients are biologically alive,37 this
approach is relevant because, as Buchanan and Brock argue:
'[i]f interests can survive death, then a fortiori they can survive permanent
unconsciousness, loss of personal identity, and less extensive departures
from competence'.38
Feinberg argues that some interests 'survive' death insofar as they might still be
affected by posthumous events/actions. Hence, he concludes that death
'does not prevent us from referring now, in the present tense, to his interests,
if they are still capable of being blocked or fulfilled'.39
35 Ibid.
36 See Harm to others, above, 83-89.
37 In p.v.s. the part of the brain controlling functions such as breathing and heartbeat is intact, while
higher brain function (concerning consciousness and thought process) is irretrievably damaged. Thus,




In other words, some interests may still be harmed or promoted after one's death.
The examples Feinberg offers all relate to an individual's relationships, which is a
limited potential range.40 However, the idea of impact persisting was acknowledged
historically by Aristotle, who perceived the dead to be affected by the impact of
actions on others, but not in an experiential sense.41 It is submitted that, while a dead
person cannot experience harm directly, it is surely possible for those things a person
leaves behind as a marker of self, such as reputation,42 life's work, or achievements,
to be harmed. Certainly, we have long recognised a person's wishes in the form of
testamentary disposition, and protected a deceased person's property through the
mechanism of trusts. Permitting protectable interests in material objects to survive
death, while denying a surviving interest in one's identity, lacks respect for the
individual as a whole. However, the purpose of establishing that some interests may
survive incapacity is to contribute to the proxy decision process. This process has, at
its core, an action of 'ascertainment' of an individual's interests by an informed
decision-maker. The remainder of this chapter is about applying this action to the
whole, incapacitated individual that we can identify. This involves developing the
idea of temporal identity outlined towards an ascertainment process within an interest
network. Finally, the role of the informed decision-maker will be explained.
7.2.3 Ascertainment
To say that an IcP's interests have been 'ascertained' means that due consideration
and process have been accorded to attributing interests to the individual. Assuming
that a suitable interest structure and value acknowledgement is in place,
ascertainment involves a process of determining the identity of the individual to
39 Harm to others, above, 83.
40
Feinberg's examples include: an individual's concerns about well-being of others, maintaining
reputation, and the way in which others remember that individual, see ibid, 86. This latter example,
he regards as an interest in oneself, while the others concern other people. However, while Feinberg
sees many self-regarding interests as defeated by death, he acknowledges that not all are defeated
because some events 'can harm my interests by forcing nonfulfillment of goals in which I had placed a
great stake', see ibid, 87.
41
'[I]t appears that the dead are affected to some extent by the good fortunes of those whom they love,
and similarly by their misfortunes; but that the effects are not of such a kind or so great as to make the
happy unhappy, or to produce any other such result', The Nichomachean Ethics, Book I, Chapter xi.
42 While English law does not currently recognise libel in relation to a dead subject, but a duty of
confidence may persist legally beyond death of the subject, see Re C (adult patient: publicity) [1996]
2 FLR 251, discussed by Mason et al (2002) paragraphs 8.68-8.69.
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whom interests attach and employing interests in his/her network. We need to know
who we are dealing with in order to identify which interests are relevant.
7.2.3.1 Ascertaining the individual
To act respectfully we must allow IcPs to be attributed with their interests as an
individual. The proxy is merely a caretaker who carries out an evaluation exercise
that the IcP is unable to do for him/herself. Allowing the unique association
(between an IcP and his/her interests) to endure requires a proxy to ascertain who the
interest-bearer is, as this enables a proxy to act with better understanding. We must
ascertain the identity of the IcP in order to make a decision that has integrity with
that individual.
Identity is part of the continuum notion already outlined. Our identity persists
beyond our physical/mental state because it is such a potent projection of
individuality.43 However, identity is a complex subject, which has received
considerable philosophical attention in relation to the notion, existence and
persistence of self.44 Debate has centred upon ideas of divided self, and the degree of
psychological continuity needed to establish continuing identity between two
different selves.45
Clearly identity relates conceptually to time. This essentially accords with the 'life
as a continuum' idea proffered earlier. However, because identity imports some
requirement of self-consciousness or mental activity as a base for identity, this
creates problems regarding IcPs.
43
Indeed, Benn's reasons for respecting persons post-mortem are founded not in the notion of
surviving interests, but in the important connection between subjectivity and identity, because: '[h]is
projects are an exteriorization of himself, projections, indeed, of himself into the world; his identity as
a person, qualifying for respect not only from others but also from himself, depends on his sense that
they are indeed his own, informed by interests which together constitute him an intentional agent with
an enduring nature, not simply a stream of experiences', S.I. Benn, above, 107.
44
Early examples are found in the seventeenth century writings of John Locke. A more recent
evaluation is D. Parfit's 'Personal Identity', in Honderich and Burnyeat's (eds.) Philosophy As It Is,
(1979) Penguin, 186.
45
See, for example: Parfit, ibid; M. Lockwood, Identity Matters, in K.W.M. Fulford, G.R. Gillett and
J.M. Soskice's (eds.), Medicine and moral reasoning (1994) Cambridge U.P., Cambridge, 60;
Buchanan and Brock, above, 165-189, discussing the relevance of personal identity to advance
directives; and G.R. Gillett, Why let people die?, J. Med. Eth. (1986) 12, 83
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7.2.3.1.1 Identity and incompetent patients
Because this thesis focuses on decision-making for IcPs, a theoretical consideration
of the nature of identity would be a diversion. Any discussion of identity must be
limited, therefore, to the context of patients with impaired (or undeveloped)
cognitive/affective capacity. Identity is based on consciousness of self and this is a
matter of degree. Incapacitated patients span a range of self-consciousness. For
example, if we apply the varying approaches of Gillett,46 contrasted with
Lockwood,47 to IcPs:
• a woman in labour refusing intervention, but borderline incompetent, is
plainly aware of herself and her identity persists despite incompetence;
• the competent mature minor has a concept of self and identity - even
though the wisdom of his/her decision may be questionable;
• an intellectually disabled patient's position is more tenuous. Disability
may impair capacity for mental function (in terms of Lockwood's
interpretation of identity), and/or sense of self (in Gillett's terms). On a
strict interpretation, severe impairment could deny the patient an identity.
However, if a patient has subjective life history, character, and/or some
enjoyment of life, s/he may still be a candidate for identity on Gillett's
view;
• patients suffering mental illness may have problems central to their
4o
identity. For example, s/he may be delusional about his/her identity,
while anorexic patients' views of self differ drastically from an objective
observer's. Although these patients have capacity for mental function,
their perception of selfmay be distorted by their mental illness;
• an infant patient may meet Lockwood's view of identity if s/he has the
requisite brain hardware for mental function, but could fail Gillett's view
as s/he can only fulfil the character criterion at that stage. However, as
identity is temporally-related, a future identity could be attributed to an
46 Based in life history, character and sense of self (1986) above, 85.
47 Based in organisation of the brain to sustain mental processes (1994) above, 72.
48
E.g. in Re C [1994] above, the patient had grandiose delusions believing himself to be a medical
consultant.
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infant if s/he presently has capacity to develop a sense of self and
subjective life history later on;
• a severely defective neonate may lack the brain facility required by
Lockwood, both currently and in the future. Relatedly, s/he may lack
capacity ever to develop any of Gillett's features of identity. It is
difficult to attribute 'identity' to such neonates, even on a temporally
related view;
• perhaps the most extreme examples, however, are p.v.s. patients, who
fail Lockwood's criterion, and no longer possess capacity for subjective
life, sense of self, or enjoyment of life posited by Gillett. Certainly, the
p.v.s. patient has, currently and prospectively, lost even his/her character.
On this basis, the identity of the p.v.s. patient seems lost permanently on
entry to p.v.s.
On a straight application of these recognised identity criteria to IcPs the results are
hit-and-miss. The potential of a mildly impaired infant transpires to have stronger
force for identity than does a patient in p.v.s. Yet, the latter may have already lived
forty years of unimpaired self-consciousness; this seems intuitively wrong.
Meanwhile, the patient suffering delusions of paranoid schizophrenia has identity -
but do we acknowledge his/her (distorted) subjectively perceived identity, or the
objective reality? And, even regarding severely impaired adults and infants, are we
really prepared to hold that they have no identity to consider? Ifwe do so, we ignore
the importance of the individual's relationships of mutuality, and make an overly
literal interpretation of individuality being based on awareness of identity. Any
individual may be unaware of aspects of their own identity, but this does not mean
objectively that those aspects are any less part of his/her identity.49 Identity theory
cannot be enough if, in practical application, it unrealistically results in humans
treating other (incapacitated) humans inappropriately.
Furthermore, any straight association between identity and interests fails. For, while
many IcPs might lack identity in pure philosophical terms, they do clearly have
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interests to be considered. In these cases, a subject exists despite lacking narrowly
defined identity. Thus, identity's value - its accepted persistence through time -
seems useful, but its theoretical base tends to be too narrow when applied to
incapacity. A less restricted, more robust representation of an individual is needed if
it is to be workable in respecting IcPs. This is developed here as respecting
'personality', rather than pure identity, as part of individuality.
7.2.3.1.2 Respecting personality through time
The real issue is respecting (incapacitated) individuals. It has already been argued
that even severely incapacitated individuals (such as those in p.v.s.) may be
attributed with interests that should influence our actions. This is supportable by
respecting who that individual has been, despite his/her incapacity being permanent
prospectively. This practically durable form of individuality accords with the views
of Buchanan and Brock regarding identity:
'a person's prudential concern that is expressed in an advance directive can
extend beyond the bounds of personal identity to the fate of the human body
in which the person once "resided"'.50
Personality is an element of individuality,51 and more inclusive than identity.
Personality is simply about the character and uniqueness of the individual.
Moreover, it need make no reference to psychological continuity personality could
be perceived by others, rather than by the IcP. Hence, personality is not necessarily
lost when incapacity strikes. Indeed, as Benn concludes:
'[mjortality is not wholly fatal to personality so long as such an idea of the
dead person remains in the awareness of the living...Understood in this
way...the known wishes of a person now dead can still constitute reasons for
action for the living'.
If Benn's view is correct then an individual's (ante-mortem) personality may survive
his/her death, for it is still attributable (post-mortem), through his/her (ante-mortem)
49
Relatedly, surely competent persons are not any less identifiable as individuals when they are
unaware (e.g. when sleeping), or their perception of themselves is distorted (e.g. through dreams while
sleeping, or strong emotion while in waking state).
50
Above, 185. This accounts for our inclination to accord respect to the dead. As Benn, above 253,
suggests: 'we accord the corpse a kind of dignity, by virtue of what it has been...under the aspect of
humanity'.
51





relationships with others. On this basis, a fortiori, ante-incapacity personality could
survive even severe incompetence and remain attributable to a post-incapacity
individual, his/her personality persisting in the minds of others.53 Personality
perceived through mutuality does not require self-consciousness and need not be
complex. Acknowledging personality could be as simple as recognising an IcP's
(basic) dis/likes, such as Baby C's liking for her forehead to be stroked.54
Certainly personality develops naturally through time. Hence, a neonate has very
limited personality, but this develops (subject to the extent of any impairment) as
s/he becomes an infant, a young minor, a mature minor and towards adulthood. S/he
gains personal, subjective interests as personality develops. We look instinctively to
the future capacity of incapacitated minors to develop as individuals and engage in
their lives. In essence, we seek to respect IcPs (and individual personality) through
time - in terms of what has been, what is, and what may become. The role of
interests is to represent stakes and values a person had, currently has, or to facilitate
their development in the future. Thus, although 'pure identity' sets unachievable
requirements of psychological continuity regarding IcPs, a broader, robust idea of
personality allows us to recognise the individual to whom interests belong. It should
be noted that personality is not regarded here as a prerequisite to accrediting respect;
rather, as has been outlined above (Chapter 5), respect is merited to IcPs based on
their status as human beings. Rather, personality is an additional source of
information about how we can respect a particular IcP. It tells us more about whom
that individual is as a means of the proxy knowing him/her better. Acknowledging
individuality is essential to 'ascertaining' interests; pragmatically we need to let in
the idea that individual personality endures incapacity. We must respect personality
wherever it exists. Admittedly, personality may not be identifiable in all IcPs (e.g.
the permanently insensate neonate),55 but for most IcPs it is an access point to
information about the individual upon whose behalf a proxy decides.
53 This allows us to view an individual's former wishes, feelings and stakes as exterior representations
of his/her personality that endure. Personality is an aspect of subjectivity in the earlier identified
acronym of R.E.S.P.E.C.T.
54 Re C (a baby) [1996] 2 FLR 43.
55
Though we may still respect them as human beings and attribute them with commonly-human
interests.
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7.2.3.2 Employment within network
The final important element of 'ascertaining' interests lies in the dynamics of the
process; employing interests in individual networks. Interest networks are
considered earlier (Chapter 3). 'Ascertaining' can be summarised as mapping
information and interests within the network frame. This extends beyond
identification of (single) interest objects. Ascertaining concerns the following
threefold relationships of interests:
• how interests interrelate - helping to identify conflict and support within
the network overall. Interrelationships are pathways connecting (or
veering away from) various nodes. Ultimately, the degree to which
interests are mutually supportive, or in conflict, may influence a
decision's weighting; promoting one interest may 'feed' others it
supports, strengthening the potency of that interest;
• the purpose to which interest relationships are directed - it is imperative
that purpose is made clear through objectives; the overall aim may be to
respect the (incapacitated) individual, but different objectives gear this to
the particular situation.56 Objectives provide a focus for an individual's
various interests and his/her mutual relationships;
• areas of overlap between an IcP's interest network and the networks of
others - acknowledging relationships of mutuality. It is important to
keep the decision process real, and most individuals have relationships
that may be impacted by a healthcare decision. The flow is two-way;
input may flow into a decision from mutual others, and impact may flow
from it to others. To ignore this reality isolates an IcP inappropriately,
because choice to engage in relationships is part of individuality.
In summary, only once the interest concept is soundly and broadly structured, the
personality of the subject recognised, and the interests employed in a network can we
56
E.g., in a sterilisation decision, respect may be achieved through specific objectives of providing
reliable contraception, with minimum bodily infringement, and avoidance of irreversible
consequences.
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consider the individual's interests 'ascertained'. We should seek to achieve this
'ascertainment' in every proxy decision if it is to be genuinely respectful.57
7.2.4 Informed decision maker
The process of ascertaining interests is a central part of 'informing' the decision¬
maker. It is axiomatic in this synthesis of respect that a proxy is informed. This
involves: comprehensive awareness of issues surrounding interests, competence and
input; knowledge about the incapacitated individual; address of preliminary issues,
and establishing directive purpose of the decision through respectful individual
objectives; and employment of this information in a decision process made with
clarity and compassion. An 'informed' decision-maker is fundamental to this
proposed reconstruction of best interests. A proxy decision that has integrity with
the IcP - one that resonates with his/her unique life - must be made from a position
of informedness. Informedness is achieved by ascertaining interests, and actively
deciding in the light of those ascertained interests. It remains to consider the role of
the decision-maker in choosing actively, with integrity.
7.2.4.1 Decision-maker's role: deciding with integrity for individuality
Ascertained interests are only given real value if a proxy chooses in a way that has
integrity with those interests. This demands obvious qualities in the proxy such as
CO
# m #
non-bias and the willingness to set aside one's own values. Further, it is submitted,
to respect an incapacitated patient we must acknowledge his/her whole life, over
time, as a basis of interests and as a means to integrity with individuality in its fullest
sense. The role of the informed decision-maker combines objectivity,59 and the
individual's subjectivity.60 Dworkin's views on integrity also support a combined
57 It is acknowledged that this desirable position may be unattainable in emergency situations, where
the objective could be to stabilise the situation to permit full evaluation. However, 'emergency' status
must not be abused; too many situations previously have been inappropriately classed as
'emergencies'.
58
Impartiality is now an even more important element of judicial determination of civil rights by
Article 6 ECHR (Schedule 1, HRA (1998)).
59 Shorthanded herein as 'Truth' in the RESPECT acronym - acknowledging the objectively real
circumstances and welfare interests involved.
60 Shorthanded in the acronym as 'Subjective Personality, Experiences and Capacity'.
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objective/subjective approach,61 and its being forward and backward looking. Thus,
he suggest that
'[i]ntegrity...is the mark of conviction, of commitment, not just past choice; it
also reflects investment, the idea that the value of a life lies in part in its
integrity'.62
Commitment to integrity can be seen as raising a rebuttable presumption that
subjective past investments and future commitments (that a patient has formed ante-
incapacity) should be recognised and related to the treatment decision post-
incapacity. Thus, a patient's subjective stakes form durable interests influencing a
decision beyond incapacity, while (objectively) the decision-maker is still able to
address current and foreseeable circumstances and take into account other stakes
attributable to the IcP (despite his/her unawareness). By considering a patient's
subjective interests over time, acknowledging relevant current and future (objective)
interests, and seeking to resolve (or choose between) conflicts of interest, the
complexity of the interest network (and an individual's 'whole' life) can be
honoured.
Hence, the integrity responsibility of an informed proxy is to decide objectively,
but with compassion for the individual. In fulfilling this responsibility, s/he must
have awareness of, and respect for, the enduring nature of personality (as a
significant part of individuality) and ascertainable interests. The process of
respectful decision-making, thus far, can now be concluded as comprising:
• awareness of preliminaries, such as competence, and interest
construction, wholeness of individuality (which incorporates the IcP's
ascertainable personality, individual needs and circumstances, and
relationships ofmutuality) and temporal aspects;
• acknowledgement of the aim (of respecting IcPs);
61 See above, Chapter 3.
62 R Dworkin, above, 206. Currently, imbalance exists in English law: absence of future commitments
in p.v.s. causes lack of interest attribution; the patient's (past) personality being dismissed as
irrelevant. Also, reluctance to recognise the current and past (subjective) views of pregnant women
refusing obstetric intervention contrasts with judicial/medical willingness regarding objective interests
looking ahead to safe delivery (the potential harm to her subjective, critical interests resulting from
enforced intervention is ignored). Further: while courts (rightly) attribute current welfare and future
objectively critical interests to neonates, they are less willing to consider past, current and future
subjectively critical interests ofmature minors who refuse treatment.
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• derivation of objectives for each incapacitated individual;
• ascertainment of his/her interests; and
• evaluation of impact: assessing how well each treatment option serves
ascertained interests in terms of objectives.
The informed decision-maker must be fully 'present', that is, in a state of
informedness and engagement throughout each stage if a decision is to have integrity
and respect for its subject. Ultimately, however, hard cases will demand choices.
Respect requires choice to be made responsibly in the name ofcommon humanity.
CHAPTER EIGHT
RESPECT - A SYNTHESIS:
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE NAME OF COMMON
HUMANITY
Chapter 8 Respect - A synthesis: Responsibility in the
name of common humanity
A proxy has to perform nothing short of alchemy, creating the 'best' decision from
fragments of information and perceived resultant impacts. The proxy role is an
immensely powerful, yet onerous, responsibility that must be exercised insightfully.
Responsibility in the name of common humanity is proffered herein as a willingness
to resolve difficulties and conflicts regarding the treatment of an incapacitated
person with a compassionate, benevolent and unbiased regard for their welfare
and individuality as a fellow human being.1 This amounts to a responsible action
even if a perfect decision outcome is unachievable. Humanity is the common bond
between all parties in the decision; incapacitated patient, emotionally closest mutual
others, advocate representatives, healthcare professionals, wider society, and
informed proxy. Respect demands simple recognition of an IcP's humanity in
common with our own (including our human limits of 'best efforts'). The need to act
reflectively is gathering strength through the Human Rights Act (1998), which
reinforces equal attribution for fundamental rights to all individuals by virtue of
being citizens of signatory States. Improved decision-making for IcPs must embrace
ethical and legal issues. This concluding chapter proffers a legal process designed to
encourage better proxy decision-making, by way of a route of clear ethical
evaluation. Fulfilling ethical acceptability is considered first, legal objectives are
then set, and finally a means of legally representing the respect for persons ethic is
outlined.
8.1 Respect for persons: ethically acceptable?
8.1.1 Drawing from principles
The value of ethical principle governing medical action is long established and
durable. In laymen's language too, founding decisions 'on principle' is common,
and principles provide a useful starting point for ethical acceptability. The principled
approach in medicine is expounded strongly by Beauchamp and Childress, and has
dominated medical ethics in recent years.
' This is represented as Responding Empathetically in the R.E.S.P.E.C.T. acronym already outlined.
2 Above.
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Beauchamp and Childress' approach offers four normative principles (respect for
autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and justice) in a justificatory model that
employs deductive and inductive reasoning towards a theory of coherence.
Coherence is based on Rawls' notion of 'reflective equilibrium', and produces
'considered judgments' that are applied paradigmatically. Any resulting incoherence
is subject to further reflection, and action guides (normative rules) are adjusted
appropriately through 'specification'. Beauchamp and Childress offer a simple
example of the need for specification where a rule that 'doctors should put their
patients interests first' conflicts with rules against deception (in the event of a patient
needing diagnosis/treatment which is affordable only by falsifying information on
insurance forms).4 They suggest that conflicting rules
'are not categorical demands, and they stand in need of specification to give
fuller, more concrete moral advice to physicians'.
Thus, specification concerns increasing the content of rules in order to improve our
understanding of their conditions of application in relation to particular situations.
Beauchamp and Childress conclude that
'[specification is a way of resolving problems through deliberation, but no
proposed specification is justified without a showing of coherence. All
moral norms are, in principle, subject to such revision, specification and
justification'.6
The objective of specifying to overcome conflict is framed, therefore, within the
process ofworking towards a 'coherent moral judgment'.
The principled approach has value. It offers relative certainty; and the ethical
principles which might apply are relatively easily recognised in any given situation.
Furthermore, by seeking some sort of integration, through specification (and
reflective equilibrium), conflict between principles can (theoretically) be resolved.
Further, the scope for decision-making to be traced (through principles, rules, sub-
rules, and particular applications and exceptions) appeals to our human desire to





7 See Beauchamp and Childress, above, 13-40.
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classify and catalogue. Prima facie, therefore, individual decisions are justifiable,
which is an important facet of ethical acceptability. Justification enables
independent observers to recognise why a decision is made as it is. However, while
principles justify, do they make for justice? Are 'good' (just) decisions generated by
pure principlism?
The principled approach is heavily criticised by Gert, Culver, and Clouser who coin
the term 'principlism'.8 Fundamentally, they argue that principlism fails to recognise
the public nature of morality, fails to distinguish between moral imperatives and
ideals, and lacks lexical ranking (therefore failing to offer true action guides).
Further, they consider that autonomy as a centrepiece is unclear, and that principlism
lacks a mechanism for conflict resolution.
This thesis does not seek to consider ethical theory per se, but rather to explore how
these theories might facilitate better decisions at a practical level. The most
significant criticism on applying principlism to IcPs is that doubts arise about its
capacity to resolve conflict. The immense scope for conflict within an incapacitated
person's interests has already been emphasised. Prima facie, specification of
normative rules seems an attractive means of clarifying application in IcP decisions.
Indeed, Richardson develops specification as an effective way of resolving conflict,9
arguing that specification learns from conflict by seeking qualification, tailoring
specification to the issue being addressed and articulating its rationale.10 In effect,
specification is regarded as a form of (reflective) refinement of principles and rules.11
Undoubtedly, reflectivity about application of principles to cases is a valuable to any
decision process, and developing clarity about the meaning of rules employed is also
useful. However, does increasing specification really resolve conflict? This is
doubtful, as specification tells us little about any means of weighing competing
issues or trading-off conflicting commitments. Rather, what specification might
create is an increasing range of qualifications and exceptions. Rather than aiding our
application this could generate further scope for conflict. Arguably, the specification
8
Bioethics, A return to fundamentals, above.
9 H.S. Richardson, Specifying norms as a way to resolve concrete ethical problems, Philosophy and
Public Affairs, 19 (1990) 279.
10
Ibid, 308.
11 See ibid, 309-310.
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offered as part of a principled approach to conflict resolution still leaves hard cases
that too often would fall into the 'exception' category; hard cases are the norm in
'best interests' situations. Moreover, the use of qualification could persistently
attenuate our focus to concentrate on finer and finer distinctions between aspects in a
particular decision. In relation to IcP decisions, this may result in excessive focus on
interest objects (and the conflict therein), which has already been identified as an
unhelpful focus in existing best interests decisions. In essence, our attention may be
engaged by defining and refining norms, rather than focusing on the individual
concerned. It is submitted that, in order to resolve conflict between their interests
(and between our commitments to values), it is better to take a broader perspective
aimed at understanding more about who that person is. Hence, the principled
approach alone seems to offer too limited a perspective to respond robustly to some
of the conflicting pressures endemic in IcP decisions.
However, the principled approach does have some obvious parity with a respect
ethic. The four principles of non-maleficence, beneficence, autonomy and justice are
not so different from respect for persons. Non-maleficence and beneficence can be
subsumed within 'welfare', while 'autonomy' is acknowledged as an important part
of respect, and justice can be seen as 'due process'. Indeed, most ethical theories
seek to empower the individual, minimise harm where possible, and ensure some
kind of framework of application. But, resolution through integration of all relevant
norms is not always possible; sometimes we must rely on an informed moral agent to
decide as best s/he can despite persisting conflict.
8.1.2 Accepting conflict - a strategy for resolution
Conflict in IcP decisions is inevitable. Every individual experiences mixed feelings,
and we make trades-off daily about choices serving, or even acting against, our own
interests. The choices in medical treatment can be stark, and incorporate potential
for conflict at a profound level. Hence, any approach to decision-making must
address conflict successfully in order to be ethically acceptable.
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8.1.2.1 Increasing specification?
Although the principled approach seeks to handle conflict by increasing specification
towards 'coherence', such coherence is realistically unachievable regarding most
IcPs. While some coherence may be attainable between cases through careful
specification,12 this approach risks developing a series of relatively isolated
'exceptions' rather than any normative convergence. Admittedly, being specific - in
the sense of clarity - helps decision-making. Delineating norms clearly aids our
understanding of a broad normative value, and illustrates and invites reflection upon
its strengths and weaknesses. However, as a real strategy for conflict resolution that
task is simply beyond the means of specification. For, endless specification hits a
point of 'diminishing returns' where, rather than contributing to coherence,
specification detracts from it. Our efforts to specify become so diverse and divisive
that they render overall reflection unmanageable. Relevant norms become lost,
disappearing under a mass of further specification. This occludes their original
purpose, creating an excess of exceptions. Thus, while specific use of language and
purpose is a valuable aid to clarity, endless specification in response to conflict is not
the answer.13
In addition, the quest for overall coherence could invite over-zealous attempts to
make a case 'fit' the general pattern, causing individual injustice and making any
'coherence' superficial and forced. In addition, many conflicts occur within an
individual's set of interests, where 'coherence' is impossible - no amount of
specification will resolve conflict between a person's interests in good health and
bodily integrity if beneficial treatment involves invading bodily integrity. Thus,
while coherence may be theoretically desirable, in pragmatic terms it seems
unattainable. Better we forsake our overblown claims to coherence and rather take
the blow of conflict 'on the chin'. We can do this by recognising its omnipresence
yet still making an informed choice based on justified reasons. Ultimately, the issue
is one of balance.
12 Via factual distinctions being made clear and drawing the ratio of cases narrowly.
13 Indeed, Beauchamp and Childress, above, 31, recognise the limits/weaknesses of specification in
terms of: continued conflict from competing specifications; inevitability of moral conflict; and
potential persistence of dogma/bias etc.
276
8.1.2.2 An alternative: Respect for human beings
Respect embraces balance at its core. By incorporating both autonomy and welfare
as constituent values it presses for acknowledgement of both, despite their possible
prima facie conflict. Respect accepts the tension-filled complexity of being
human. Pragmatically, sometimes the 'best' we can hope for is an informed,
justifiable balance between tense issues. Indeed, even Beauchamp and Childress are
driven to acknowledge that in some cases
'some intuitive judgments and subjective weightings are unavoidable, just as
they are everywhere in life'.14
This author concurs that balancing is a combination of normative reflection - that is,
making use of principled consideration to its useful extent - and thereafter relying on
an intuitive (and empathic) response to the situation. This is developed further
below. The starting point for this approach is perspective. To establish an informed
(intuitive) balance position it is paramount that the decision-maker adopts a broad
view of the issues. This ensures that any conflict is raised not in minutiae, but in
relevance to the whole context and purpose of the decision.
Employing respect as the guiding ethic does not dissolve conflict - it does not seek to
do so. Rather, it embraces tension. It allows us to acknowledge these tensions as
part of individual (and commonly human) experience. It encourages us to accept our
responsibility; a proxy is no magician able to spirit difficulties away, but rather an
alchemist seeking resolution through responsible awareness. Ultimately, balancing
comes down to responsible choice. And respect for persons empowers us as
decision-makers; because it demands of us, yet allows for our human limitations. To
respect another we must fulfil demanding requirements of informedness, and possess
the requisite qualities of a compassionate decision-maker. Yet, our own limits are
acknowledged; that the 'best' we can do is to decide respectfully, through the process
outlined herein, and choosing to balance issues responsibly.
14
Ibid, 36. Certainly, the principled approach raises valuable elements of ethical acceptability: the




What, then, is it that we must accept about conflict? First, that conflict is
unavoidable in IcP decisions. It pervades them at all levels: from conflicting
specific objectives,15 through conflict within the overall interests of an individual,16
to conflict between interest objects.17 Further conflicts may arise beyond the
individual regarding other stakeholders, such as those emotionally closest to the IcP
and healthcare professionals involved. The impact of a decision flows beyond the
individual due to mutuality, and the simple fact that s/he is a member of wider
society. The role of a decision-maker is analogous to an alchemist, creating a
valuable outcome from relatively base elements. Respect is no 'golden elixir' that
can relieve the pain of the decision. But, in contrast to singular polarity (heavily
oriented to either autonomy or welfare as a panacea), respect for individuals at least
acknowledges conflict at its essence because it embodies both potentially polar
values (autonomy and welfare). This reminds us that the most a proxy can do is
respect the individual by realistically experiencing his/her own commitment to both
1 8
values.
Secondly, acceptance involves directness in approach. To accept something we
should face it squarely and openly. It is submitted that this requires us:
• to acknowledge the real scope for conflict in medical treatment
decisions, and its exacerbation in proxy decisions where we also face our
own dilemmas about deciding on another's behalf;
• to evaluate the impact of conflicting aspects honestly and in a manner as
free from bias as possible,19 this requires awareness of our own
15
E.g. trying to prevent pregnancy in an intellectually disabled woman, while simultaneously avoiding
invading the integrity of her body or relationships.
16
E.g. whereby a woman's experiential interests may be enhanced by her intimate relationships, yet
jeopardised by risk to her mental or physical well-being resulting from any pregnancy.
17
E.g. her interest in relationship cannot be served easily without diminishing her interest in bodily
integrity.
18 Which brings this argument full circle to the discussion in Chapter 1, above, about the inherent
conflict in dual role commitment offered by Benn.
19 Freedom from bias is now important as legal right (Article 6 ECHR, Schedule 1 HRA (1998)).
Individuals have a right to have civil (and criminal) matters determined by an independent and
impartial court (or legal tribunal). Impartiality is rebuttably presumed, but - if raised - requires that an
adjudicator be free from undue influence (Zand v. Austria (1978) 15 D.R. 70), and have objective
non-familiarity with those involved (see Pullar v. UK (1996) SCCR 755).
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preferences and emotional bias to enable us to identify them as ours -
rather than projecting them onto an IcP; and
• to remain open about trade-off and be willing to explain why we arrived
at a particular conclusion. This is part of transparent responsible choice,
which includes helping others to understand our decision process.
There is risk attached to directness. Being open and direct compels us to
acknowledge - to ourselves and others - that we may not have all the answers and
that we are human and fallible. It also reflects the reality that proxy decisions may
not be definitively 'right' (or 'wrong'), and therefore challenges the assumption that
a 'best' outcome is realisable. The conventional conception of best interests sets an
impossibly high hurdle, and sets the decision-maker up to fail if s/he fails to produce
an 'optimal' outcome. The alternative analysis proposed here requires merely that
we make the best decision we can through informed, compassionate and responsible
choice. The imperative is to make the effort to arrive at the best decision. This is
'all' that we can do, but it is 'enough' because it characterises human compassion.
8.1.2.4 Resolving conflict
So how does this help to resolve conflict? Conflict resolution is the core difficulty in
best interests decisions and resolution starts with the genuine acceptance of conflict
already outlined. But, beyond acceptance, resolving conflict is about the dynamics
of balancing. Debate about whether a decision is 'best' is really about 'ranking', that
is, the relative importance of interests and impacts involved. Complete consensus is
not possible on this issue; we live in a pluralistic society where we justifiably feel
entitled to our own opinion, and we struggle vociferously against imposition by
others. Individuality will always give rise to argument about ranking of values,
interests and impacts. Indeed, therein lies the spirit of individuality. However, it
opens us to difference of opinion about the Tightness' of any balance position
adopted.
The strategy for resolution lies in accepting that we cannot prove our chosen ranking
to be 'right' within such a pluralistic value system. However, by corollary, neither
can our ranking be 'wrong' provided that we have acted respectfully. This is based
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on an underlying belief that deciding respectfully is enough. While this is open to
criticism that 'best' should mean better than all other possible decisions in the
circumstances, it is submitted that ifwe think this realistically provable or achievable
then we delude ourselves. Such a position is simply a mirror image of positing
consensus/coherence. This belief is not borne from any sense of failure, rather from
a simple recognition that a middle way (whereby we recognise our conflicting
commitments and the subject's conflicting interests) can achieve sound balance. For,
by seeing issues from a rounded perspective, and setting aside our own bias, we
choose an informed balance point. The capacity to inform ourselves is part of the
beauty of being human; we can step in and out of another's perspective and refine
our own view on the basis of information received. This is similar to the reflective
equilibrium proffered by Rawls, and applied to the principled approach by
Richardson.20 This thesis seeks to marry the valuable aspects of these approaches,
and to go further by deepening the connection with temporal and holistic aspects
considered earlier, to create a workable process for proxy decisions. The strategy for
conflict resolution proffered here lies simply in a genuinely informed decision-maker
making an 'integrity' decision. This means that: (1) s/he soundly ascertains the
.... 21individual's interests; and (2) fulfils his/her role responsibly in accordance with
'common humanity', which is explored in the remainder of this chapter.
Respect provides an umbrella that shelters this process from the harshness of
unrealities brought about by polar needs to be proven 'right', or to show that the
decision is 'best', which in turn implies that it is unquestionably 'right'. Respect for
persons aids conflict resolution by providing an environment where the human
strengths and limitations of both the proxy and subject are taken into account, and
where a balance is justifiable because it is genuinely 'informed' and made in the
spirit of respect, embracing values of compassion and individuality. Acting
compassionately from a position of informed respect is an important part ofwhat it is
to be human. This is 'enough' because it is all that can be achieved - not in the
sense of merely all, but in the sense that its achievement is everything that can
reasonably and realistically be expected.
20 Above.
21 Per Chapter 7, above.
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8.1.2.5 Respecting humanity: recognising commonality and
individuality
Respecting humanity combines recognition of both commonality and individuality.
The case for individuality is outlined earlier, based on its vital role and the unique
association between an IcP and the interests comprising his/her whole life.
Recognising commonality, at a simple level, is about recognising interests common
among humans. Commonly human interests include welfare interests (the minima of
comfort and security that facilitate development of other interests), and also critical
interests held by humans generally such as interests in dignity, privacy, reputation or
raising a family. However, commonality is also about acknowledging common
experience. This extends beyond interests to recognise context. 'Common
experience' denotes persons living their individual lives as part of a social structure.
This structure may be an immediate group with whom we share relationships of
mutuality,23 and/or the wider societal group or, at its broadest, as part of humanity.
Commonality enables us to share the experiences of others, thereby extending our
own experience; allowing it to become common amongst us. Compassion flows
from commonality; we can have compassion and respect for another's experience
through recognition of our own individuality as part of wider human experience.24
Why is commonality important to IcP decisions? Because to respect persons we
must acknowledge what it is to be human. To respect an IcP we must recognise who
that person is and what is their experience. This is a combination of individual
identity and aspects of shared common humanity. Failure to acknowledge
individuality ignores the subject's identity, while failure to acknowledge
commonality ignores the context in which an individual lives his/her (uniquely
blended) life, and ignores the role s/he plays in relation to other persons.
Additionally, conflict is a significant part of common human experience.
Recognising individuality within the context of common humanity may help to abate
conflict by admitting that a balance position may be individualistic within a range of
22
Chapter 7, above.
23 I.e. our 'emotionally closest others': partners, friends, family etc.
24
Indeed, even the permanently insensate p.v.s. patient has shared common experiences in the past,
and the totally insensate neonate shares in the common status of being human, which imports certain
commonly held welfare interests. Further, the experience of others (in caring for and treating these
patients) extends the common experience of compassion amongst HCPs and families.
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commonly human experience. This obviates a need to evince Tightness' or
25
'wrongness', such that it will be substantially acceptable if made through a process
of respect, informedness and individual responsibility within the commonly human
context.
8.1.3 Willingness to justify; degree and strength of justification
As part of individual responsibility, a proxy must be willing to justify the balance
point s/he adopts. Strength of justification depends on the degree to which a proxy's
reasons for that choice are clearly acceptable within the commonly human range.
This implies that a checklist of factors can be developed against which any particular
decision can be judged. We return to this below, for it has especial significance in the
realm of legal regulation of the decision-making process. Perhaps even more
important, however, is the proxy's willingness to justify his/her choice with reasons
why s/he believes it acceptable. For, proxy decisions come down to individual
responsibility. In essence, a proxy must be prepared to show informedness and
reflectivity to evince his/her respect for the incapacitated individual, and that the
proxy has actively sought to make a well-rounded decision of integrity. If so, the
proxy has fulfilled his/her role and the IcP has been properly respected as an
individual. Certainly, the legal framework should set guidance for proxies regarding
the substance of the decision in terms of what a proxy should consider, information
sources, evaluation and decision process. Departure from guidance is permissible -
as even extensive guidance will not cover every individual circumstance and we
must ultimately trust the proxy. However, any such departure should require the
proxy to justify his/her chosen position. Hence, respect for IcPs lies both in process
and justification.
8.1.3.1 Justification: a prospective process
We often regard justification as retrospective defence of our actions. This still
applies in best interests decisions; we should be able to offer good and sufficient
reasons (i.e. defence) for having made a particular decision. However, justification
25 A decision could only be 'wrong' if it lay in extreme polarity at the edges of common human
experience. E.g. an idiosyncratic position that is extreme in disrespecting the common experience -
but such a position would also fail on grounds of bias, narrow perspective, lack of informedness etc.
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can be more proactive in resolving ethical dilemmas. By testing a theoretical action
guide (a norm) in application, we re-evaluate our perception/belief about whether
that norm is really justified. In essence, theory and experience inform one another in
terms of establishing degree of justification.26 We adjust our beliefs and norms by
experiencing how 'just' they are in practice. While reflective equilibrium is
important to Beauchamp and Childress' principled approach, it raises potential
criticism as an intuitive element that is too nebulous. Beauchamp and Childress pre¬
empt this by incorporating De Grazia's argument that
'the good and sufficient reasons that one offers in an act of balancing can be
27viewed as a specification of norms that incorporates one's reasons',
and by formulating five minimal conditions that
'must be met to justify infringing one prima facie norm in order to adhere to
another'.28
However, as Holm rightly observes, Beauchamp and Childress' conditions are
'totally uncontroversial'.29 The conditions merely reiterate that our choice of balance
should cause as little harm (to the patient) as possible, and adding that our
assessment of success must be realistic and our infringement (or choice of
non/intervention) minimal. Furthermore, Beauchamp and Childress retain a caveat
TO
that these conditions are not absolute.
While specification and conditions clarify norms, they still cannot posit which norm
should be followed when conflict occurs. While reflection is also valuable, the bare
fact remains that ultimately balance has to be struck in states of conflict. The
problem of balancing is considered below. However, thus far we can acknowledge
that:
26
Relatedly, Beauchamp and Childress, above, regard justification as involving deductive and
inductive reasoning and develop Rawls' reflective equilibrium to facilitate 'considered judgments'.
27
Ibid, 34, discussing D. De Grazia: Moving Forward in Bioethical Theory: Theories, Cases and
Specified Principlism, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17 (1992) 511.
28
Beauchamp and Childress, above, 34. Paraphrasing, these conditions concern whether: the
overriding norm evinces better reasons to act; the justifying moral objective has a realistic prospect of
success; no morally preferable alternative exists; that this is the least infringing effective alternative;
and that negative effects of infringement are minimised.
29 S. Holm, Not Just Autonomy: The principles of American Biomedical Ethics, in J. Harris (ed.),
Bioethics, Oxford University Press (2001) 494, 504.
30
Scope is retained therefore for a further range of 'exceptions' where outcomes are counter-intuitive.
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• justification may play an inductive, reflective function. A proxy may test
conflicting norms at various levels of abstraction to determine their
degree of justification, which then further inform the decision process;
• to be ethically 'justifiable' a proxy should be willing to: (1) offer reasons
for the decision, and (2) show those reasons to be soundly considered.
Much depends, however, on the framing of 'justification'.
8.1.3.2 Recognising justification
If a decision meets the above two criteria it is potentially justifiable. But how do we
decide whether a decision is justified? Certainly, this depends partly on balancing.
But it also depends which features we attribute to 'justification'. If we base
justification only in our full concurrence with a decision, we are likely to be
frequently disappointed. Justification surely is a matter of degree. The work of Gert,
Culver and Clouser characterises justification in this way, violation (of a norm)
ranging from being 'strongly justified' (if all impartial rational persons would agree
that less harm flows from allowing the violation), to 'unjustified' (if all impartial
rational persons would not allow the violation), through 'weakly justified' (if
impartial rational persons would disagree about the estimate of harm flowing from
violation).31 In application to the real world of treatment decisions, a consensus of
evaluation seems unlikely. Contentious IcP decisions are unlikely to fall in the
strongly or weakly justified categories - as a strong degree of consensus posited
between IRPs (impartial, rational persons) is probably rare. Most would fall as
'weakly justified' interventions.32 So, in a sense, simply recognising justification as
a matter of degree does not resolve how we determine that degree. But the approach
of Gert et al does raise our awareness of the nature of justification because, by
reinforcing justification as degree, we can acknowledge that:
31 See Gert et al, above, 40-41. In determining how justified a violation may be, they propose a
normative standard of an 'impartial rational person'. Rationality' can be contentious. However, they
define irrationality as: 'act[ing] in a way that one knows (justifiably believes), or should know, will
significantly increase the probability that oneself, or those one cares for, will suffer death, pain,
disability, loss of freedom or loss of pleasure; and one does not have an adequate reason for so acting.
Any intentional action that is not irrational is rational' (ibid, 26). Arguably rationality in this public
sense is relatively unproblematic; an IRP merely being an unbiased, disinterested decision-maker who
avoids unjustified harm.
284
• moral agents may disagree about whether an action is 'justified';
• realistically many decisions may fall in the (broad) range of 'weakly
justified' (and that may be all we can evince);
• disagreement about the degree of justification arises from 1) differences
in ranking of benefits/harms, and/or 2) differences in estimated
consequences of allowing a violation.33 In essence, these are both about
difference in assessment of impact.
Beyond this, decision-making comes down to balance. Disagreement will occur
about how issues are ranked and balance struck. Indeed, it is possible to posit, in
addition to the approach of Gert et al, that a further preferable option is available to
us, namely, recognition of the scope for legitimate disagreement. This thesis
argues for this option because it acknowledges that consensus is frequently
unrealistic and even less frequently possible. Rather, we should strive for a state of
legitimate disagreement wherein it is accepted that while a particular outcome might
not satisfy all parties, it is none the less reasonably and responsibly arrived at. In this
sense, then, it is justified. Of course, the question arises, what is 'legitimate'? But
this can be settled in large part by reference to the commonly accepted ethical
frameworks that can help by setting out an environment that expresses our moral
beliefs about what it is to be part of common humanity. So long as decisions are
taken within these frameworks there is less scope for legitimate disagreement.
Illegitimate disagreement can, then, be disregarded. The framework offered here is
that of respect for human beings, as already outlined - a framework that few could
legitimately challenge.
8.1.4 No unique solution; best achievable decision
A reasonably and responsibly arrived at balance point may be the 'best' a proxy
believes achievable, but pluralism and the nature of justification preclude its being
proven 'best' definitively. Hence, 'best interests' is something of a misnomer. Gert,
32 It is unclear why Gert et al do not classify such decisions as weakly ««justified, rather than weakly
justified.
33 See Gert et al, above, 40.
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Culver and Clouser, in positing 'common morality' as a 'justified moral system',
argue that:
'
[i]t is not useful but dangerous to provide a system that can be applied
mechanically to arrive at the correct solution to a moral problem; not all
moral problems have unique correct solutions. Common morality only
provides a framework for dealing with moral problems in a way that will be
acceptable to all who are involved; this justified moral system does not
provide a unique right answer to every moral question'.34
The valuable point we can derive from this is that there may be no uniquely 'right'
answer to some moral dilemmas. We tend to talk freely of a solution being 'in a
person's best interests', yet more realistically we must accept a proxy's limits.
Further pressure is applied by 'best'; the superlative implies that the 'right' or 'most
right' answer to the dilemma is found. Realistically, this is excessively demanding.
Ifwe adopt the 'no unique right solution' proposition, then IcP situations can be seen
more pragmatically as decisions where no perfect moral answer may be attainable.
Rather, a proxy should create a soundly justified moral solution that seeks to
promote the IcP's interests overall. This is both the maximum a proxy can hope to
achieve and the minimum that an IcP can expect. Some commentators may find this
unsatisfactory - that 'best' should mean that we could prove it better than all other
solutions. But, we must be realistic if we are to improve decisions for incapacitated
individuals. Respect and realism are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they are close
cousins; if we act unrealistically then we act disrespectfully. Ignoring reality - that
these are decisions where the alternatives may seem entirely at odds and equally
awful - does the IcP no favour. Furthermore, perceiving a super-level of 'right'
decision-making as attainable heaps pressure on the decision-maker, potentially
inhibiting rather than encouraging, good clear decision-making and willingness to
justify. Indeed, even a competent, autonomous person can only choose an option
s/he believes (at the time) to be 'best' for him/herself. Only time will tell whether it
really was 'best'; 'best' is only determinable retrospectively. We cannot set a task
for proxies that is beyond the reach even of autonomous individuals.
Certainly, a proxy could - and should - act from a position of informedness and
compassion. Further, s/he can identify clearly a treatment decision's aim(s) and
34 Ibid, 34.
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objectives, and ascertain carefully a patient's interests (including relationship-based
ones) and inter-connections. Ensuring due process is followed is another part of
honouring an incapacitated individual. But, beyond this the decision becomes the
responsibility of the proxy. Impact assessment and foresight of consequences will
vary between different decision-makers. The balancing process where conflict
occurs is indefinable. In short, we have to trust the decision-maker at this point of
the process. We must have faith in his/her self-responsibility as s/he considers
information compassionately, evaluates impacts in terms of objectives, and
ultimately chooses the option s/he believes best serves the overall interest stakes of
the incapacitated individual. To some this may seem unsatisfactory, nebulous even,
as a process. But it is disrespectful, to incapacitated subject and compassionate
proxy alike, to posit any means of deriving balance that is formulaic, or focused on
retrospective, external justification. Better to allow a proxy to do all s/he can to fulfil
his/her role, and ensure an environment where an incapacitated individual's interests
are ascertained thoroughly and caringly. This is the 'best achievable' decision. For,
it allows a proxy to fulfil his/her responsibilities in a humane and respectful way.
Responsibility and respect go hand-in-hand; to respect the IcP we must trust in the
process and, ultimately, the decision-maker. Ifwe feel unable or uneasy about doing
so then we are failing due to breakdowns in the process, or in selecting suitable
proxies. It is better to correct those elements than to develop an ethical system that is
unachievable in practice, or one that produces intuitively unjust results.
8.1.5 A balanced ethic
8.1.5.1 The need to balance
The need to balance norms where conflict occurs is inherent in moral decision¬
making.36 But problems arise in the balancing process. Fundamentally, in balancing
conflicting norms (or interests) at any level of abstraction, the crux question is how
may a proxy justifiably assign relative weights to those norms/interests? On one
hand, even if it were humanly possible to assign totally objective weightings,
35 Indicated by an excess of 'exceptions'.
36 See for example, Beauchamp and Childress, above, 33, citing W.D. Ross, The right and the good,
(1930) and The foundations of ethics (1939) both Clarendon Press, Oxford; Buchanan and Brock,
above, 41 and 123; Benn, above, 59-64; Feinberg, Harm to Self, above, 25.
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decisions so founded would draw criticism for being purely formulaic or utilitarian.
Arguably, this lacks common humanity, and disrespects individualism and pluralistic
value of life. Alternatively, introducing subjectivity into the process risks criticism
of arbitrariness and ad hoc decisions that fundamentally lack consistency. This is
equally disrespectful. Yet, balancing dilemmas require resolution. In a sense there is
'no answer' to the balancing dilemma, because no answer will satisfy all viewpoints.
However, the mechanistic net benefit approach and the formless ad hoc approach are
both polar extremes. The achievable 'best' probably lies in a 'middle way',
combining objective consistency with subjective, responsible reflectivity that is part
of the value of human capacity. In short, adopting some sort of 'reflective
equilibrium'.37
However, far from rejecting intuition as part of decision-making, perhaps we could
wisely embrace it as a means to reflective balancing. The approach preferred herein
is 'responsibility in the name of common humanity', and it is proffered very much as
a process. Decision-making is a process, and balancing a further process within it.
In 'best interest' treatment decisions, it is submitted that three stages embody the
decision process: network identification; informedness; and realistic consideration.
Network identification is the stage that determines an incapacitated patient's
various interests, interrelationships between those interests, and areas of overlap with
mutual others. Informedness is the stage of a proxy fully informing him/herself
about who the subject is, his/her wishes, personality, investments, and relationships.
It aims to ensure that a proxy knows the subject as well as s/he reasonably can to
engender a decision that has integrity with identity. In practice, network
identification and informedness would occur in conjunction, each facilitating the
other. Together they provide the means to act compassionately and respectfully.
The third stage is about so acting.
8.1.5.1.1 'Realistic consideration'
In acting as a responsible and humane moral agent in the decision-making process
one cannot (and should not) detach oneself from that process nor attempt to take a
totally objective stance. Compassion is part of what makes us human and connects
37 Posited by Rawls and employed by Beauchamp and Childress.
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individuals together across barriers of language, geography and religion. It is one of
the most valuable facets of our humanity. We should embrace our capacity for
compassion, enabling us to envisage an interest network from the patient's
perspective wherever possible, yet combining this with his/her objectively
identifiable needs. This combined approach does not engender arbitrary/ar/ hoc
decisions driven uncontrollably by emotion, or totally objective decisions that lack
respect or empathy for the subject. Rather, it adopts a middle way, allowing
objective responsible choice to be made from an enlightened compassionate
understanding of the patient's issues and interests. But, this path requires that we
trust ourselves as responsible moral agents; that we are capable of having
compassion for another, without compromising our capacity for philosophically
sound, legally astute and ethically justifiable decisions. 'Realistic consideration'
seeks to create this blend.
TO
It begins from a premiss that all human beings merit respect. This avoids the
encumbrance of 'personhood' status, accords with our intuitive inclination to treat
even severely incapacitated individual respectfully, and averts development of
numerous exceptions when personhood criteria produce intuitively harsh results.
From this premiss, scope for justification lies in the evaluative process. This is based
in a suitable legal environment that encourages clear aims/objectives, factors for
consideration, rights of fair representation, and that selects the appropriate people as
proxies. Beyond this environment, evaluation is about balancing. And balancing
comes down to a matter of trust; trusting the proxy to strike a soundly reflective
balance point on an IcP's behalf. Far from weakening a decision it requires an
informed decision-maker to shoulder his/her responsibility. S/he must actively trust
his/her own judgment - even if that judgment involves an intuitive element. This, it
is submitted, is 'realistic' because having an emotional, or instinctive, response to a
situation is part of the human condition. Trust and intuition are not something to be
feared or eradicated from decision-making unless we are afraid to trust ourselves, or
we have placed decision-making power with the wrong person. Trust is not about
blind faith. Rather we can trust in a principle, a process, and/or the qualities of an
38 Per Chapters 5 and 7, above.
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individual.39 And all of these should be in place in proxy decisions. Admittedly,
intuition is often rejected as an unjustifiable way of deciding. Perhaps this is because
it has been treated philosophically as separate from reasoning.40 Yet, intuition about
a choice may surely arise at any point in a reflective process. Certainly, it may arise
instantly, but also by gravitating instinctively towards a choice that feels 'right'.
However, more importantly in a combined approach we may experience an
inexplicable resistance (at a non-conscious level) to an option by feeling reluctant to
choose it. Once we let this resistance into our conscious mind, it frees us to
eliminate that option, and return to consider other options more openly. This often
seems to occur in ethical approaches where 'counter-intuitive' results accrue, despite
a carefully constructed ethical system. These cases are then promptly developed as
an 'exception' to the general rule. The problem is that many 'exceptions' involve
incapacitated patients; we clearly do already have intuitive responses from a humane
perspective about such individuals. It is submitted that better decisions flow from
embracing this intuition openly and treating it as valuable, rather than creating
endless exceptions in denial of our own human capacity.41
Notwithstanding, this thesis does not advocate making purely intuitive decisions. It is
emphasised that a firm framework must be established, and proxies carefully selected
and expected to reason about impacts on interests so far as is possible. Any
advocated role for intuition is merely as a means to resolving conflict when
reasoning runs out. It is a relatively small percentage of the whole decision process.
Certainly, it is difficult to explain and justify an intuitive element of decision-making
to an impartial observer. But, it is submitted, admitting it in a combined approach
merely makes express a facility that we do already frequently employ but often deny.
Surely, doctors making choices of conscience about not carrying out treatments
against their own beliefs are making an intuitive response; they feel an action is not
'right' for them. Or, in resource allocation situations, if two patients are very evenly
matched in rational terms, on what basis does an HCP choose to allocate? Perhaps
39 See generally, O. O'Neill, Autonomy and trust in bioethics (2002) Cambridge U.P.
40 Intuition is defined (New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993) Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1407,
col.l) as '[i]mmediate apprehension by the mind without the intervention of reasoning, direct or
immediate insight'.
41 See also Gert et al, above, 3: 'moral theory should be firmly based on and tested by clear moral
intuitions', such that moral theory and moral experience are mutually supportive.
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s/he intuitively recognises that one patient will fight harder to recover than the other.
Judges also surely act from intuition when meting out equity; we trust their
instinctive perception ofjustice and fairness. Of course, these decisions are informed
by logical reasoning, but in finely balanced decisions what pushes a decision-maker
to choose one course rather than another? Surely, it is in intuitive sense, a sense that
our self-responsibility drives us towards. Intuition informs beliefs. Beliefs, in turn,
inform responsible choice. Mill acknowledged intuition as locating 'truths':
'[tjruths are known to us in two ways: some are known directly, and of
themselves; some through the medium of other truths. The former are the
subject of Intuition...the latter of Inference'.42
Further, he accorded importance to intuitions within a process:
'[t]he truths known by intuition are the original premises from which all
others are inferred'.43
This view acknowledges that reason alone is not enough - it is based in some
intuitive truths that are 'just known'. In effect, these are fundamental beliefs that
inform our reasoning through a process of application and sifting to test the veracity
of beliefs against outcomes. This process is exemplified too in the work of Leibniz:
'[t]he human mind is analogous to a sieve: the process of thinking consists in
shaking it until all the subtlest items pass through. Meanwhile, as they pass
through, Reason acts as an inspector snatching out whatever seems useful'.44
From this, Ross, writing on Leibniz, concludes that:
'he could not altogether eliminate the need for judgement and intuition, since
the combinatory art was only a method for generating all the possible
combinations of a set of concepts. It could not tell you how to analyse
complex concepts into simples, nor could it tell you which combinations to
prefer'.45
These scholarly perspectives on intuition elevate awareness that, however sound or
extensive our (logical) reasoning, as human beings we cannot escape our faculty for
intuitively known beliefs that we experience at a fundamental level. Our need to
42 See 'Introduction', J.S. Mill, A system of logic (1884) Longman.
43 Mill, ibid.
44 Leibniz. Cited in Opuscules et fragments inedits de Leibniz, Louis Couturat (ed.) (1903) Paris, 170.
The approach of Leibniz is succinctly summarised by G.M. Ross in Leibniz (1984), Oxford University
Press (Past Masters) also published (2000) on University of Leeds Electronic Text Centre's website:
www.etext.leeds.ac.uk. Ross construes Leibniz' central idea to be that 'the logic of discovery and that
of judgement should be perfectly complementary. Since judgements of truth were always analytic,
symmetry suggested that the process of discovery should be synthetic, or combinatorial', ibid, 61.
291
respect others is perhaps one such intuitive truth. If we trust ourselves as open,
responsible decision-makers we will - in cases of severe dilemma when the support
of reasoning runs out - be capable of balancing issues to align with this truth.
The parameters of this thesis do not permit debate about intuition in logic theory.
However, it is submitted that intuitive sense can be a valuable element of judging the
relative weights of impacts in IcP treatment decisions.46 In truth it probably already
does play a part, but is unacknowledged. Intuitive sense can enlighten and inform
the reflective process by inductively feeding back into evaluation of options against
interests. Further, it can allow a proxy to 'arrive at' a decision where conflicting
obligations seem evenly matched. Indeed, where logic and reason fail to produce a
result, a sense of intuition may be the only tool left in the decision-maker's kit.47
And no set of criteria can provide reasons for all seasons. At the point where a
dilemma is intensely balanced a proxy must trust his/her own intuition to provide a
'sense' of responsible choice. To restrict a proxy from employing this intuitive sense
actually fails to respect him/her (as it manifests our lack of trust in our decision¬
makers). And, it risks injustice to a subject, because we are not allowing a decision¬
maker to discharge his/her responsibilities in accordance with common humanity.
Admittedly, use of intuition might seem to diminish the transparency or
accountability for a particular decision. However, it need not do so provided that the
proxy is simply honest about employing intuition regarding certain aspects of his/her
decision. Moreover, intuition is advocated here only in addition to reasoning and
reasons would be required to justify choice insofar as they were available.
In summary, realistic consideration requires a firm framework and criteria for
consideration, but it also requires that we choose decision-makers who have the right
qualities to engage (and be fully present)48 in the decision process. Certainly, we can
45G.M. Ross, ibid. 61.
46
Indeed, perhaps it best mimics the decision-making of some individuals who arrive at an
autonomous decision through sub-conscious 'knowing', rather than logical conscious evaluation.
47 Some ethical authors regard non-logic based characteristics as valuable. E.g. in virtue theory
Beauchamp (Principlism and its alleged competitors, in J. Harris (ed.), Bioethics, above, 491-2)
highlights that Annette Baier considers 'sympathy, virtue, and various emotional capacities at least as
fundamental in the moral life as the categories of rationality, obligation, justice and rights. She argues
that moral philosophy should broaden its scope to consider virtues of caring, loving, trusting,
gentleness, and the like', (A. Baier, Moral Prejudices (1994) Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts).
48 See further below.
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train selected proxies in addressing the reflective process generally. And, through
reflection, s/he may be able to identify the weightings of some impacts and interests
relatively easily in terms of the whole network, enabling a filtering-out of less
important aspects. But, when it comes to finely balanced impacts (or options,
interests, or obligations), balance is not necessarily a measurable exercise. In short,
we can no more tell someone how to 'balance' conflicting issues, than tell them how
to balance (successfully) on a tightrope, bicycle, or skates. It is simply something
that one acquires through practice, experience, informedness (in an information-
based context), and ultimately by using one's senses responsibly. The proxy must
combine the structured framework and interest network (i.e. recognising common
humanity), with his/her own experience and intuition to find a balance point (i.e.
self-responsibility). In short, to trust and respect both the incapacitated patient and
the proxy, we must allow the decision-maker to act responsibly. This may not
engender a uniquely 'right' outcome, but it will create a soundly reasoned,
considered, and developed decision. We can expect no more, and should do no less.
8.1.5.2 Justification
How, then, is this synthesised ethic of respect ethically justified? Its justification
derives from embracing a series of features that create acceptability. No apology is
made for this approach being a 'middle way', because the alternative polar extremes
of autonomy or (soft) paternalism are unhelpfully unattainable or lacking in
individuality. Rather, this synthesised respect and combined approach to balancing
offer a realistic tenor of what is achievable and valuable. The respectful decision
process offered herein embodies the following important features:
• a structured environment for decision-making. This incorporates clear
role definition and factors for consideration being made explicit at the
outset. The overarching ethic of respect should embrace both autonomy
and welfare, together with additional features facilitating respect across
temporal and individual limitations. The aims and objectives of a
decision should be clearly set out as a directive purpose. A
compassionate proxy, who is open to becoming informed, must be
available and s/he should 'ascertain' an IcP's interest network to ensure
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the fullest understanding possible prior to making a decision. In sum,
this structure facilitates consistency, clarity, and careful, informed
decision-making, while still allowing a proxy the flexibility to decide
responsibly;
openness regarding both input to, and output from, the decision process.
This includes the proxy's openness to identifying the subject's
individuality by admitting a wide range of potentially relevant
information sources. Further, s/he should be open and transparent about
the features considered important to the decision, how interests are
impacted, and the reasons for choosing as s/he does. The role of
intuition, as an element of decision process should be openly
acknowledged in finely balanced, difficult cases;
fullness, of the range of interests an incapacitated individual may
possess; IcPs are not deprived of commonly human, or personal
individual, interests purely due to incapacity. Fullness also corresponds
to the degree of consideration given to an individual's interests; that
his/her network should be fully considered and the gravity of the proxy's
responsibility recognised. Both of these aspects contribute to a person's
interests being fully ascertained;
acceptance of premisses that: 1) all human beings merit respect by virtue
of being part of common humanity (and that this accords with our
intuitive inclination to treat other humans with respect); 2) all human
beings possess interests of some sort; 3) that the incapacitated individual
is of central importance in the decision and a proxy must try to perceive
interests from the subject's viewpoint as well as from an objective
stance. This provides a fuller perspective; 4) conflict between interests
and moral commitments is inevitable in many cases; and 5) as decision¬
makers we are only human. We cannot achieve a perfect decision, nor
make any better quality decision (that is definitively and uniquely
justifiable as 'the right decision') than we are able to make for ourselves.
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Acceptance of these issues encourages us to keep proxy decisions
realistically achievable;
• informedness accrues in three respects. We need a proxy to be informed
about: 1) background issues, such as: philosophical conceptions of
interests, moral and ethical awareness, the role of self-responsibility, the
nature of the 'human condition', and recognition that societal/cultural
issues also influence on an individual's interest network. This provides
insight to 'commonly human' interests; 2) the individual subject through
his/her investments, choices, identity/personality, and relationships of
mutuality, all of which may give rise to 'personal, non-medical' interests;
3) objective information about prognosis and treatment options
('personal, medical' interests); and 4) their own role as the decision¬
making authority in the case, together with the framework within which
the decision is to be made, and need for reflective reasoning and use of
intuition as part of engagement with the process;
• focused engagement of the proxy in his/her role is extremely important.
If a proxy fails to engage in the decision process in a focused way then
the decision will be correspondingly poor. By 'focused engagement' it is
meant that the proxy is fully present in his/her information gathering and,
particularly, the evaluation stage of the process. Being psychologically
fully present means an absence of distractions, and being effortful to
involve oneself in addressing information and issues. It also requires
awareness of one's own state of involvement (and a willingness to take
breaks from the process when necessary, and ask for
clarification/confirmation of understanding if appropriate). It means too
having awareness of one's own biases, and wisdom to distinguish those
from one's genuine intuition regarding the IcP. Most importantly, it
demands listening actively to available information and being willing to
act with the IcP's interests genuinely at the heart of the decision. This, in
turn, requires commitment to openness. Although these are stringent
demands a proxy would not be acting responsibly without such
awareness, presence and commitment. We must demand a proxy's full
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presence within his/her role because, in essence, respect for others comes
from making oneself fully available to genuine contact with that other
(or in this case with his/her interests) during periods of engagement;
• willingness to offer reasons for the decision wherever they are available,
and to be honest about the significance of using an intuitive sense where
reasoning runs out.
These features provide the necessary ethical justification in this approach. Openness
and full involvement within a carefully constructed framework are the most that we
can demand of any decision-maker (proxy or otherwise). If these elements are
fulfilled then we can be reasonably sure that the incapacitated individual's interests
have been fully acknowledged and considered, and that the ultimate decision is a
justifiable one. Furthermore, the process should not be purely deductive, but
reflective; the process of engagement and re-engagement is important. This allows
a distillation to occur, enabling principal issues and conflicts to emerge gradually,
and allowing our sense of intuition to become more informed through re-
engagement. Hence, the decision develops.
How justified must a decision be? Well, proxy decisions are deemed here to consist
in acting self-responsibly, in common with another human being. Hence, it is
submitted ifwe were able to explain our decision process to the incapacitated patient,
and could expect him/her to understand how, and why, we arrived at that choice
based on his/her ascertained interests, and for him/her to accept the decision as a
reasonable one, then we can consider the decision 'sufficiently justified'. The
individual is of utmost importance in the decision, but it is enough that s/he could
understand our decision process (if capacity could be momentarily restored) - even if
s/he might not arrive at exactly the same choice. For, we cannot hope to emulate the
refined decision a person might make for him/herself from a position of capacity.
But, by actively engaging in the process outlined, security of justified decision¬
making should flow from the proxy's combination of self-responsibility and
compassion. Trust and respect are mutually creative. If we trust ourselves, we feel
able to respect others. In turn, feeling respected, others are encouraged to trust us.
Hence, mutual trust and respect can develop. In IcP decisions we must trust the
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proxy to uphold the ethic of respect and engage in the process, and we must trust in
the individuality of the patient and inputs from others. By so doing, an alliance of
trust and respect may evolve. The only question remaining is how we can translate
this synthesised ethic of respect for persons into a legally achievable framework.
8.2 Respect for human beings: legally representing the synthesis
Which objectives should the law provide in seeking to respect incapacitated patients?
And, how can those objectives be created and supported by a legal framework? This
final section makes clear what the law needs to effect, and proffers guidelines for
how we may bring about these objectives.
The purpose of deconstructing and reconstructing best interests has been to improve
'best interests' decisions for incapacitated patients. It is outlined earlier that
consistency is an important factor in improvement. It has been argued that internal
consistency - in the form of integrity with an individual's interests - is of central
importance. Additionally, consistency between cases is important, but less in terms
of outcome than in consistent decision process.49 These concluding paragraphs seek
to offer the essence and detail of this process.
The objectives of the process are divisible to three levels: the high-level normative
aim; preliminary objectives, which must form part of the framework before a
process is actioned; and purposeful objectives that give effect to the essence of the
process. In each case, objectives are set out, and the means of achieving them
expressed as bullet points. It is intended that these bullet points could form the basis
of guidelines, by means of a Practice Direction or similar instrument, which would
allow significant change without the formality of wholesale legislative reform. This
enables the most valuable elements of the 'best interests' mechanism (such as
flexibility and sensitivity to individual circumstances) to be retained. Yet, the
guidelines also provide a more structured base, and introduce more radical changes
to the current approach where they are most needed. Guidelines permit a focused,
creative approach to best interests without losing its essence.
49
Because individuality may bring some variance at outcome level.
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8.2.1 Preferred overarching aim
The overarching aim of reconstructed 'best interests' in proxy decision-making is to
treat the incapacitated individual with respect and compassion. Respect is the
purpose to which interests are employed. The nature of this respect has been
outlined already as comprising a synthesis of autonomy and welfare, together with an
expanded interpretation of 'interests', relevance of individuality, and admittance of
temporal aspects. In short, we must look at the whole person, over time. This
includes acknowledging residual competence where possible and relationships of
mutuality. The aim provides a focal point for viewing the interests, connections and
impacts within an individual's network. It is the reason why we seek to evaluate
these elements. We carry out this evaluation by asking ourselves: what is in this
person's best interests? This question connects the interest network with the respect
ethic. Furthermore, genuine engagement in seeking that which is in his/her
cumulative interests is a proactive dynamic. It demands excellent information
gathering, honest evaluation of harms/benefits, clear interest attribution and focus on
the goal. Engendering this overarching aim of respect and compassion has its
foundations in the environment for decision-making. An appropriate environment
consists of: a suitable decision framework, an 'enabled' proxy, and appropriate
procedural representation.
8.2.1.1 Decision framework
It is submitted that the decision-making framework should consist of:
• a decision forum akin to a quasi-judicial tribunal, and a non-adversarial
approach to healthcare decisions for incapacitated patients. This
provides a clear locus for decision-making, without the formalities of
seeking court orders, and allows the flexibility of best interests to be
retained enabling individual circumstances to be considered. Further, a
more inquisitorial approach seeks to reduce conflict from the outset;
• a single proxy would sit in any one case. Fundamentally, this accords
with the importance of self-responsibility advocated herein. It is
submitted that full responsibility encourages a proxy to step up to that
responsibility. By corollary, it diminishes scope for hiding behind an
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organisational, consensus-oriented or anonymous policy decision. In
addition, it meets the criteria regarding judicial forums posited by Stern,
namely that expense and delay should be minimised;50
• the proxy should be drawn from a register of approved decision-makers,
selected because they possess appropriate qualities. This pre-selected
register offers expediency in appointing a proxy to any given case.
Clearly, good selection criteria are crucial, and the proxies concerned
need to be unbiased, without vested interest and able to take abroad
perspective.51
• the proxy represents the decision-making authority in the judicial forum.
However, the purpose of employing a forum is to minimise formalities
and maximise understanding of the incapacitated individual. This in no
way means, however, that a decision should be lightly taken. But, what
is sought is a form of therapeutic alliance. The preferred idea is of all
parties involved in an IcP decision being able to sit down around a table,
offer their input, make their representations, and for the proxy to have
access to this (and more, by being able to request further information
where s/he requires). This provides the 'informed' element in the
decision. But, decision-making authority rests clearly with the proxy,
and s/he chooses compassionately and responsibly in the light of that
information. Far from being na'ive or ideological, this process brings an
element of common sense to proceedings by ensuring, first and foremost,
that all parties feel heard; a fundamental way ofminimising conflict right
from the start of the process.
50 See K. Stern, Advance Directives, Med. L. Rev. 2 [1994] 57, 69-70.
51 The inquisitorial proxy's role is akin to that of a tribunal chairman - s/he must seek all relevant
perspectives/input and be unbiased about evidential sources.
52 See H. Teff, Reasonable Care, Legal perspectives on the doctor/patient relationship (1994)
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 117-128 who discusses the merits of 'collaborative autonomy' regarding
competent patients.
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8.2.1.2 'Enabling' a proxy
While framework is a starting point, a proxy must be enabled to fulfil his/her role.
53S/he must have the power to ascertain interests and to make a treatment decision.
This requires:
• a form of protective jurisdiction regarding legally incompetent minors
and adults. The jurisdiction should empower a proxy to consent/refuse
or choose between healthcare options on behalf of such incapacitated
patients;
• it matters less whether this protective jurisdiction follows the form of
historic parens patriae, or a modern equivalent,54 than its substance
being protective of the IcP, and enabling the proxy to obtain all relevant
information, and to decide actively and responsibly. To allow a proxy to
make the 'best' decision in the individual circumstances, the jurisdiction
should be broad and relatively free from restrictions. Any restrictions
that are placed upon it should be for the additional protection of the
incapacitated individual;
• the jurisdiction should enable a proxy to appoint an Advocate-Guardian,
whose responsibility is to speak in advocacy for an IcP to ensure that the
latter's views and perspective are presented in health and care decisions.
Legislative provisions may be required to create the framework and permit
jurisdictional aspects to be put in place. It is axiomatic that any quasi-judicial forum
must be appropriately constituted, and that any jurisdiction must be legally sound.
Aliter, the framework structure is unstable, and the proxy disempowered. Legislative
procedures, conforming to the requirements of domestic public law and European
Human Rights provisions, are the best means of achieving this satisfactorily, but the
parameters of this thesis inhibit further discussion of these public law matters.
However, it is important that any new decision-making process conforms to human
rights law. It is this process that is of greater interest to our overarching aim in the
'best interests' context.
53 In contrast to merely declaring lawfulness, see Chapter 2, above.
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8.2.1.3 Process: procedure and representation
Vital aspects of process, procedure and representation are outlined in turn:
• any decision-making process must conform to Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (Schedule 1, HRA (1998)). This provides
citizens with a right to have civil and criminal matters determined by
way of fair and public hearing, within a reasonable time, by and
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. It is a moot point
whether a judicial forum would be 'determining civil rights ',55 but it is
good practice (and ethically warranted as part of 'respect') that the
decision process should conform to Article 6 provisions because fairness
and respect are close allies. Furthermore, Article 6 would seem to apply
to 'any tribunal' in which legal proceedings may be brought;56
• Article 6 incorporates an over-riding fairness requirement,57 regarding
CO
the process as a whole. The process herein can be summarised as one
of 'ascertaining' interests and making the 'best achievable decision'
based on that ascertainment. Clearly, this process overall must accord
with Article 6, which means that the structure of the process must
provide for: an IcP's right to a hearing; that the hearing should be subject
to public scrutiny;59 within a reasonable time;60 by an independent and
impartial tribunal. In essence, therefore, to comply with these objectives
any proxy decision process must be accessible, transparent, efficient, and
54 Such as the more specific responsibilities conferred by the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act
2000 to courts (s2-5), the public guardian (s6-7), and the Mental Welfare Commission (s9).
55
Proceedings must be 'determinative' to be subject to Article 6, and some proceedings (such as
interim applications) do not amount to 'determination' (see Clayton and Tomlinson, above, paragraph
11.315). However, the combined effect of Articles 6 and 8 is to extend procedural requirements
where the issue is respect for family life (see ibid, paragraph 13.119). As most cases fall within
'family law', these decisions seem likely to be matters of determining civil rights/obligations, see ibid,
paragraph 11.364.
56 See Clayton and Tomlinson, ibid, paragraph 11.324, (and paragraph 11.363: the GMC procedure
has been held by the Commission to comply with Article 6, see Stefan v UK (1997) 25 EHRR CD 130,
and Wickramsinghe v UK [1998] EHRLR 338).
57 See A. Brown, Law Basics, Human Rights (2000) W. Green/Sweet & Maxwell, Edinburgh, 40.
58 See Asch v Austria (1993) 15 EHRR 597, discussed ibid, 41.
59 To ensure open administration of justice, but anonymity may be retained where necessary (Article
6(1)).
60 Reasonableness comes down to particular circumstances, see Konig v Germany (1980) 2 EHRR
170. The duty is upon States to construct their judicial systems to achieve this, see A. Brown, above,
48-49, discussing Caillot v France (1999).
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independent, respectively. It is submitted that this is achievable here
within the procedural and representation provisions proffered below.
However, as a further safeguard, a right of appeal to a court should be
included. If any interested party objects to an individual proxy decision,
it should be possible to appeal to a court for judicial determination.61
Importantly, the right to a court accorded under Article 6 seems to propel
'best interests' decision-making away from reliance on Bolam. As
Maclean highlights:
'[a]ny judicial refusal to review the doctor's opinion concerning the patient's
best interests would arguably breach Article 6'.62
Indeed, the pressures of Article 6 may be greater. As Clayton and
Tomlinson suggest:
'it is arguable that the obligation to ensure effective access to the court
means that the court will have to address the issue of the patient's best
interests directly'.
If so, this is a welcome gift of clarity and responsibility. Good practice
demands that any tribunal proxy also gather up this responsibility willingly.
The 'ascertainment and decision' process is given effect through the
fundamentals of procedure and representation;
• the procedure should be inquisitorial in character. An appointed proxy
should act as a compassionate inquirer into an IcP's stakes, relationships
and individuality. The purpose of gathering this information is to
establish an individual's interests - his/her stakes in life;
• to respect an IcP a proxy should seek to ascertain any of an individual's
relevant views to the extent that they can be communicated. This
opportunity is important as a means to finding the subject's personality
in order to understand how a treatment decision might affect him/her. If
61 The right of appeal is an important safeguard. It is retained under the new Scottish legislation, see
s50(3) and s50(7) of the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000. Furthermore, Article 6 ECHR
also provides for judicial review of tribunal decisions.




necessary, the proxy should go to the IcP for this part of the procedure.64
Where a person has been competent previously, any formal Advance
Directive should be considered, or any relevant informal statement heard;
• if we are to ensure the individual patient is represented throughout the
process, then the views of any Advocate-Guardian should be established
and considered;65
• additionally, to address the reality of individual lives, the proxy should
consider any role or relevance for the views of others with whom an IcP
has a relationship ofmutuality;66
• the inquisitorial procedure is geared towards gathering information about
the stakes that make up an IcP's life, and establishing the identity of the
individual upon whose behalf a decision is made. This information stage
is crucial to respect. The quality of a proxy's understanding, evaluation
and balancing are directly correlative to his/her degree of informedness;
• beyond this informedness, the procedure is one of a proxy sifting and
assimilating what s/he has heard: (a) to ascertain the incapacitated
individual's interest network (within an awareness of the contextual
framework of State and society), and (b) to evaluate and balance impacts
in working towards the best decision achievable for the individual IcP in
light of that ascertained interest network. There can be no procedural
guidance about this stage, because this is the point at which we must trust
the proxy decision-maker's quality of compassionate respect, and trust in
the process already outlined of informedness, open ascertainment and
therapeutic co-operation to ensure all relevant voices have been fairly
heard and considered. Ultimately, we must trust a proxy to fulfd his/her
decision responsibility and allow that proxy the space so to do. Aliter,
we undermine the scope for flexibility and individuality available to
IcP's through best interests;
64
E.g. if the incapacitated person is restricted physically from attending, or if it is conducive to
respectful understanding to see an IcP in his/her own environment.
65 The role of Advocate-Guardian is outlined below.
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• procedural safeguards remain, however, in the form of a right of appeal,
and the importance of patient representation. Each incapacitated
patient should be properly represented as an individual within the
process. This representation is termed herein an Advocate-Guardian
(AG). While some existing legislation allows for guardianship, 7 too
little emphasis is currently placed upon advocacy. A person specifically
representing the IcP emphasises the central importance of the patient
throughout the process. The Advocate-Guardian's role is to ensure that
an IcP's views and interests are heard. An IcP might appoint an AG
during some period of competence (prior to entry to incompetence, or
during intermittent lucidity). Alternatively, in the absence of such
competency, the proxy could appoint an AG. The Advocate-Guardian's
sole focus should be the incapacitated patient; to represent the IcP's
views and inform about day-to-day life for that person, yet without
taking responsibility for actual decision-making. It seems advisable that
an AG should be independent of close relationship with the patient in
order to minimise any personal agenda. Thus, an Advocate-Guardian
appointed by a proxy could be drawn from a pool of suitably trained
professionals whose role is to act, in effect, like an amicus curiae who
engages in observing and communicating with the patient to provide an
additional information source. It is not his/her role to judge the patient,
but rather to get to know him/her. However, it is recognised that a
patient appointing during a competent period should be free to choose a
representative individually, and this freedom should extend to selecting
an AG from a relationship ofmutuality;
• an appointed AG should always be consulted in treatment decision as a
significant source of information. S/he is not involved in the decision,
but would have the right to appeal a decision if s/he believed it contrary
to an IcP's interests. In this regard, an AG constitutes an additional
safeguard to an incapacitated patient's interests. An AG would be
66 This clearly would incorporate parents in relation to children as is now required by Human Rights
provisions in the context of interference with family life.
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expected to spend time with a patient to get to know his/her preferences,
beliefs, concerns, understanding, relationships, and lifestyle. This
information s/he then offers to the forum in representing the patient. A
proxy could, and should, substantiate this through personal interview
with incapacitated patients where appropriate. It must be emphasised,
however, that this new form for decision-making is regarded very much
as a process. Information gathering could be a back-and-forth process.
Gathering all interested parties around a table is not envisaged
necessarily to be a once and for all decision. Rather, it is about gradually
sifting all available information to determine the most relevant aspects.
This process may involve one or several meetings, information
exchanges, requests for clarification, interviews with an IcP and/or other
interested parties, and consultation with professionals at all levels. While
this may be laborious and time-consuming it is necessary if we really
want to improve decision-making.68 Effort is the expense of better 'best
interests', where patients are heard, considered and respected as human
beings with feelings and beliefs important to their individual lives.
8.2.2 Preferred preliminary objectives
Within the framework, certain preliminary objectives must be allowed space.
Appropriate construction of these preliminary issues reinforces the strength of the
framework and supports the rounded perspective of the proxy. Two preliminary
objectives are identified: a) competence construction; and b) clear assessment of
risk. These are identified earlier as important issues in the environs of 'best
interests'. Others may yet arise and could be embodied as 'preliminary objectives' if
their influence in the decision process is indirect (rather than as a directly considered
'factor'). Such objectives are 'preliminary' because their construction can be
67
E.g. in the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000.
68
Clearly, a genuine situation of medical emergency may prohibit such a process. As an ancillary
issue, it is also recognised that it is not practical for every minor procedure to be referred through the
whole process outlined herein. Hence, some general authority would need to be made to permit HCPs
to carry out routine healthcare procedures (or daily care routines) for IcPs. However, if any interested
party (including the IcP) objected to these procedures, then this process for determining the IcP's best
interests should be initiated.
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determined before any decision process is actioned. An individual decision simply
applies them as part of the framework.69 The construction of preliminary objectives
is consistent and applicable across the full range of incapacitated patients.
8.2.2.1 Reconstructing competence
Competence is included as a preliminary objective because it is the starting point, a
gateway to the proxy decision process. It is the prerequisite assessment determining
who makes a treatment decision. A finding of 'incompetence' opens the gateway for
the process to become activated in an individual case. The constituent elements of
competence have already been considered, and a reconstruction of incompetence
submitted.70 Here, it is intended to summarise the objectives considered important
for any construction of competence in view of the position of incapacitated patients:
• respecting others requires that autonomy be respected wherever feasible.
Autonomy is based on self-determination, and the latter requires
competence. Hence, if we are to offer maximal respect then we must
also maximise patient capacity. This means that we must not set the
standard for competence exclusively high, nor assume that everyone
suffering from incapacity is incompetent;
• competence assessment should be carefully focused. A person needs to
be competent for the treatment decision at hand; s/he need not be
globally competent. Global competence is unrealistically idealistic - no
one is competent for all decisions.71 All persons (competent and
incompetent) have areas of varying competency. It is respectful,
therefore, to limit assessment to a real treatment decision rather than
demanding elusive, hypothetical, generic competence;
• ability to understand and use information is preferable to actual
understanding and use. The latter requires that a person justifies and
69
Whereas, 'purposeful objectives' are elemental to an individual decision - they embody that
process, their nature and impact differing between individual cases in response to individual purpose.
70
Chapters 4 and 7, respectively.
71
Arguably, some patients might be incompetent for all decisions, however, if they are in a state of
permanent, total insentience. However, if these patients have previously been competent individuals
we may be able to ascertain guidance from evidence of their previously-held views.
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explains his/her thought processes and could preclude unwise choice by
even highly autonomous and articulate individuals, whereas ability
maximises patient capacity. Understanding is cognitive, while use is
about being able to relate to the information, engage with it and choose.
If a person meets the ability criterion we should respect his/her
competence, irrespective of the outcome of his/her decision;
• a threshold approach to the requisite standard of competence is
inevitable. The standard should be realistically achievable. A
'functional' level is consistent with this, in setting ability to understand
and use information at a relatively basic level, across all relevant
information, such as: the need for treatment, treatment options, risks,
benefits and impacts of non/treatment. Some incapacitated patients may
be capable ofmeeting this requisite ability to understand the specific task
in hand; mental illness, intellectual disability, minority, and pregnancy
do not definitively preclude competence. The assessment of
competence, to be respectful, must look at the individual in each case.
By keeping the competence profile symmetrical, and ability functional
the threshold is set to maximise patient competence. In essence, to
accord competence where it is due;
• even with a functional standard, natural variance will occur. The ability
to understand and use information remains consistent, but the exact
nature of information varies with individual situations. Hence, what a
person must be able to understand and use will vary for every individual.
In other words, the breadth of relevant information is individual, but the
depth of ability remains the same. Natural variance is part of
individuality;
• 'competence' should not be equated with 'input'. While a pragmatic
threshold must be set for competence as a gateway to decision authority,
the concept of competence is degree based. We can give this meaning by
acknowledging that, even where a person is not competent to make a
decision, s/he may still have relevant input to the decision. Respecting
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individuals means involving them in decisions on their behalf. We must
listen to their views, preferences, wishes and fears.72 To trivialise the
views of an adult woman in labour, or the concerns of a mature minor, or
the preferences of an intellectually disabled person, disrespects that
individual's individuality, and elevates inappropriately categorisation by
situation, age or impairment. It is dangerous and arrogant to assume that
we can determine what is in a patient's best interests without making
ourselves properly informed about that individual and his/her interests.
If a decision-maker trusts him/herself, and roles are clearly defined, s/he
has nothing to fear - and much to gain - from gathering all relevant input;
• affective disorders, such as pain, stress, environment, delusion,
misperception, depression and phobia can render a person incompetent.
But, to do so, they must be relevant to the decision at hand,73 and impose
a degree of incompetence that makes the person incapable of
understanding and using information.74 This impact must also occur at
the time of decision-making.75 Affective factors are at play on every
individual in the context of medical decision-making - even the most
competent. It is a matter of degree whether they impact inhibitively. To
determine this degree requires us to listen to an individual. Indeed,
his/her views could be the same irrespective of competence. While we
should treat irrationality cautiously - it may be symptomatic of
incompetence - it could simply characterise individuality. A person's
view may be no less strongly held simply because s/he cannot
sufficiently understand (cognitively), or apply (affectively), the issues to
him/herself. We must listen to individuals to find out who they are.
72
E.g. in affective impairment a person may be able to understand cognitively, to relate information to
self and engage with it, but merely cannot choose. It is respectful that decision authority remains with
a proxy - but that listening to those stages of competence that the individual can achieve enhances a
proxy's informedness.
73
E.g. a schizophrenic may be delusional about his/her identity, but may genuinely recognise his/her
illness, need for treatment, and impacts of non/treatment.
74
E.g. depression or physical pain may diminish, but not necessarily preclude, an individual's
capacity to relate or engage with information, or to choose.
75
Hence, a person's mental history of depression may be completely irrelevant to a current decision.
Assessing on a historic basis disrespects the reality that people recover and change.
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Failure to recognise individuality - whatever the competence status -
fails to respect the him/her;
• other capacities may be relevant to competence assessment. An IQ test
tells us relatively little about an IcP's capacity for understanding and
using information, and even less about their relationships and interaction
with environment. To maximise an individual's capacity we should make
a broader assessment of his/her cognitive and affective understanding,
together with functioning and capacity for expression. Even if s/he is
still found incompetent to decide, a proxy decision-maker will be better
informed about the individual and it provides scope for patient
involvement and input;
• communication is crucial. Terminology used to impart information
about need for treatment, options, and risks and benefits can significantly
influence anyone's ability to understand. Tailoring communication to a
suitable format does not necessitate limiting information, but does
require use of simple clear language, and possibly alternative
communication methods beyond purely verbal or written. Careful
communication fundamentally respects the individual; it seeks to ensure
that this person has the maximum opportunity to use their ability to
understand. It does not make assumptions about a person's ability to
understand based on an incapacitating condition, or on a benchmark of
'normal'. Rather, it seeks to access capacity wherever it lies;
• possession of competence and exercise of competence are different.
Although a patient may currently be incapable of exercising any kind of
competence (for example, due to states of delusion or unconsciousness) a
straight denial of any possession of competence is shortsighted.
Maximising patient capacity should recognise temporal competence.76
The patient with delusions may be 'transiently competent', and the
unconscious patient 'previously competent', respectively. This would
permit their views during periods of lucidity, or prior to entry to
76 Discussed above, Chapter 7.
incapacity to be considered. Such consideration respects another human
being in his/her fullest sense, by seeing beyond the incapacitating illness
to the individual;
• maximising patient capacity is not about finding the incompetent to be
fictitiously competent. It is about recognising a patient's incompetence,
yet enabling him/her to inform us and to be as involved in the decision as
is realistically possible. To respect IcPs we must maximise patient
capacity. Aliter, we see not the individual but the illness. In truth the
illness is part of the individual as a whole - respect demands that we
recognise the whole patient and decide motivated by his/her interests.
Competency is a gateway determining who makes the decision, and
competence requires informedness. Input from the individual (and
others) informs. To offer respect, and for the sake of our competence as
decision-makers, we should maximise patient capacity. Competence
construction must fulfil this preliminary objective of respect.
8.2.2.2 Risk assessment
Risk assessment is considered earlier. Risk is important as a preliminary objective
because it is the second gateway through which some treatment decisions (such as
77 . . •
sterilisation) must pass to warrant invoking the proxy process. It is essential that it
is suitably framed so as the process is invoked in appropriate cases. This requires:
• distinguishing consequences flowing from a risk from the likelihood of
78
its occurrence. While the consequential events that could result from
non/treatment may be serious (if they happen), the probability of their
occurring may be minimal. Alternatively, the consequences may be
quite mild, but are highly likely in probability terms. Any proxy must be
clear whether a risk exists to such a degree that some form of treatment is
'necessary' at all.
Beyond this gateway role, risk assessment is still important:
77 The first gateway being incompetence.
78 See Carson, Risk-taking policies (1980) above, and Chapter 2, above.
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• the approach to risk should be balanced. That is, a proxy should be open
and even-handed about his/her assessment of the consequential harms
and benefits likely to flow from various treatment options. The 'risk' to
the patient's interest network should be honestly assessed. As decision¬
makers we must ensure that we do not become affectively incompetent.
We too are subject to influence by environment. It is easy to stumble
into viewing a situation as (unrealistically) 'urgent' when caught in the
hype of treatment pressures. Relatedly, it is fallacious to deem a
treatment 'necessary' if we have failed to look seriously at viable
alternatives. Acting on the basis of consequence-driven risk assessments
encourages this skewing. Respect requires openness to establishing
balanced information about options, risks and benefits. There is no need
to manipulate information unless we are running scared of a rounded,
genuine perspective. This is an important prerequisite to informedness;
• serious or grave consequences of a treatment decision simply mean that
more information abounds for consideration; we (or a patient) do not
have to be more competent, we need to be equally competent but more
informed. We need to ensure that we have looked at all relevant
information before making our evaluation of best interests. Of course,
the consequences flowing from non/treatment are relevant. These
foreseeable outcomes will significantly impact a patient's life. However,
their role is to inform our decision, not to drive it. Individual interests
should drive best interests. If we are clear about what comprises an
individual's interest network, then we can more confidently assess the
impact of various treatment options - and their foreseeable outcomes -
upon that network. This respects individuality. Whereas, allowing
consequences to drive a decision, respects generalised fears about
abstract, a-contextual events.
8.2.3 Desired purposeful objectives
With the framework and preliminary objectives set, purposeful objectives can be
created. The principal purpose of all proxy decisions for IcPs is to make a sensitive,
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compassionate and just decision that has integrity with the incapacitated
individual's interests. It has been established that a proxy must be informed and
empowered, and act responsibly in the name of common humanity. This flows from
the blend of framework and qualities outlined. It progresses from gathering the right
information (outlined as factors for consideration, below) to employing it through a
reflective decision process of mapping, evaluation, balancing and justification
(considered below). The reader is referred to Appendices 6 and 7 hereto for example
applications of this decision process in the IcP context.
8.2.3.1 Factors for consideration
79
A series of questions provides the basis of a checklist for a proxy to consider,
aimed at securing all relevant information. In other words, it provides a series of
prompts to informeduess. The answers to these questions would contribute
information about decision-making authority, the individual subject, his/her relevant
interests, the input ofmutual others, decision purpose, treatment options and impact.
1. Competence - This is a threshold device aimed at identifying decision-making
authority. The guidelines regarding competence assessment are outlined above (as a
preliminary objective). Ultimate assessment should lie within the remit of the proxy,
but this must be based on information provided by medical and/or psychiatric
assessment, the views available from an Advocate-Guardian, and any other source
the proxy finds relevant. The proxy's assessment is preferred as s/he is in effect an
objective observer able to take account of a wide range of information about the
patient's capacity. The fundamental questions to address are:
• Is this person competent to make his/her own treatment decision?
• Is there any advance directive (formal or informal)?
• What capacity does s/he have? To what extent can s/he understand and
use (relate to, engage with and choose) information? Does s/he have
capacity in some aspects of life but not others?
79 The value of asking a series of questions is based on Gert, Culver, Clouser's approach to identifying
'morally relevant features', above, 38.
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• Could the patient's competence be maximised by supportive
communication methods, or evaluation over a period of time?
2. Establishing individuality - this is about input, circumstances, relationships and
personality:
• Can the patient offer input, despite incompetence (i.e. based on the
reconstruction of incompetence)? If so, what is this input?
• What is the Advocate-Guardian's understanding of the individual
patient's views?
• What is the patient's position within his/her lifetime line? How does this
relate to any past, transient, or future competence and/or views?
• What can we discover about the patient's personality? Who is this
person on whose behalf a respectful decision is to be made?
• With whom does s/he have relationships of mutuality?
• Which circumstances are uniquely involved with this patient's situation?
3. Establishing interests - which interests are at stake?
• What commonly human interests might this patient have?
• Which human rights laws are relevant to this patient's treatment
circumstances?
• What matters to this IcP in (a) daily life (preferences and choices), (b)
longer-term goals/values, and (c) in the context of the decision at hand?
• What does this individual need in clinical terms? What would improve
his/her well being - both medical and non-medical?
• Which of his/her interests endure incapacity?
• Which interests, identified and attributed to this IcP, conflict with each
other? Which support one another?
4. Establishing input - input should be reassessed once the patient's interests have
been initially established in order to ensure that all influential sources of input are
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considered, such as the individual IcP, emotionally closest others, carers, HCPs, and
the Advocate-Guardian.
• With whom does this patient share mutually important relationships? To
whom is s/he emotionally close? What input can these people offer?
• What medical input has been provided? What else do we need to know
about (e.g. additional information on risks/benefits, prognoses etc)?
• Do we need to consult further with any of the above interested parties
(including the IcP)?
5. Establishing decisional purpose and treatment options - to clarify what we are
trying to achieve and what is realistically achievable:
• What is the purpose of this decision for this particular individual?
• Are any requisite preliminary risk factors (such as the need for a 'real'
risk to exist) fulfilled?
• What is the range of treatment options available?
6. Establishing impact on interests and individual(s):
• How could each treatment option benefit the IcP's identified interests?
How likely are these benefits to occur?
• How could each treatment option harm his/her identified interests? How
likely are these harms to occur?
• How would the treatment options impact the lives ofmutual others?
7. The decision-maker should then assess his/her current position in terms of
informedness:
• Am I as informed as I can be about:
(a) this patient as an individual;
(b) his/her personal medical interests;
(c) his/her personal non-medical interests;
(d) his/her stakes in life;
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(e) his/her views and preferences;
(f) his/her relevant relationships;
(g) his/her needs.
If so, then the proxy is equipped to make a decision that involves
reflective evaluation, balancing and intuition (if necessary). In other
words, to use this information within the decision process.
The remaining purposeful objectives embody the decision process. This process
consists of mapping the patient's individual network, evaluation (in terms of
autonomy and welfare (i.e. respect) and progressive ascertainment), to reach a
balance point that offers a justifiable decision about treatment choice for this
individual patient. Each is considered in turn and guidelines proffered.
8.2.3.2 Individuality of interest network
Respect must acknowledge individuality through the human right to have privacy
and relationships respected. Actively representing such respect is termed herein
'mapping'. This is about a proxy describing a person's interests. 'Mapping' is the
part of the dynamic that assesses relevance of interests to an individual.
Representing an individual's interests as a network valuably clarifies the function of,
and interrelationships between, various interest objects. A network image provides a
mental inner framework, against which a proxy can 'map' (i.e. locate) single
interests, while keeping sight of the overall aim. Mapping need not focus on detailed
minute analysis of every knock-on effect, as this would be unworkable and generate
indecision. Nor is mapping, of itself, a conflict resolution strategy. Rather, mapping
focuses on individuality, reminding a proxy:
• to consider the factors outlined, looking to a broad range of potentially
relevant interests in order to identify those important for this
individual80 The network highlights that different interests facilitate
(and create) one another. The individuality of any network also
80 The process of mapping a network should safeguard against arbitrary, premature value judgments
about assumed non/relevance.
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encourages respect for interests important to that individual, rather than
on generic interest-type;
• s/he should take account of relevant interests in terms of: (1) the
importance of the interest itself within the network; and (2) the
connections flowing from it to other interests;
• that life is a continuum; an essentially individualistic process, that
sometimes overlaps mutually with lives of others, but a process during
which each grows through personal interpretation of experiences. A
proxy should acknowledge the uniqueness of the individual as an
ongoing, unfinished creation that changes with the developing blend of
his/her experiences. Describing interests as a network raises awareness
of the instant decision in the broader life context, and encourages
ownership of decision impact to remain with an individual;
• that a proxy should determine the shape of a patient's network,
establishing areas of importance for that individual, including overlaps
with networks ofmutual others;
• that objects in the network should be employed towards identifying an
option in the patient's interests (the purpose), rather than vice versa.
8.2.3.3 Autonomy where it is due - The issue of input
As part of the evaluative stage of the process, there are two component objectives of
respect: promotion of autonomy and welfare. It should be a purposeful objective to
credit an individual with autonomy wherever it is due. In essence, to maximise
autonomy by:
• adopting a reconstruction of 'competence' as a gateway to decision¬
making authority;
• seeking all sources of relevant input establishing who this individual is;
• acknowledging an IcP's significant relationships;
• acknowledging an IcP's relationship with self- with his/her own life;
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• maintaining awareness of individual uniqueness that merits respect;
• actively ascertaining his/her network;
• recognising and taking into account 'whole life, over time'. We should
hold this individual in esteem in an individually tailored decision;
• recognising the full range of subjective interests, prevailing common
interests, temporally persisting interests, and an individual's ulterior,
critical and experiential interests.
8.2.3.4 The welfare aspect of common humanity
Also part of the evaluative stage, an IcP's welfare forms a purposeful objective. A
proxy should seek to enhance or restore a patient's well-being, and act in a
protective role towards the patient. This means:
• recognising that an IcP's status as a human being commands equal
respect;
• attributing commonly prevailing interests, welfare interests, and genuine
critical interests;
• valuing objective input about a patient's prognosis;
• assessing the patient's relationship with State and society, and with
HCPs;
• acting compassionately towards an IcP as a fellow human being in need
of care;
• accepting conflict/support where it occurs;
• recognising one's own limitations, acting responsibly and engaging with
the process.
8.2.3.5 Ascertainment
Ascertainment ensures that an individual receives due consideration and process,
is a fundamental part of evaluation, achievable by:
It
• ascertaining whom an individual is; discovering his/her personality,
current temporal position in life, and how his/her personality has endured
in relation to incapacity (or how it may yet develop). It is about
accepting (with an open mind) his/her preferences, choices of
relationship, and establishing a picture of who this unique individual
is/has been/may become;
• accrediting possession of interests to incapacitated individuals (by
allowing interests to be conceptually durable through time). It is about
determining which interests have endured as part of this IcP's network.
Further, it is about the interrelationships of those various interests;
acknowledging conflict and support within the network, and the
pathways and pressures created within it;
• determining impact of treatment options upon the network. A treatment
option may support, block, or damage single interest objects in a
network. The impact of each option should be considered across the
whole individual network; identifying pressures created or relieved,
extent to which any purpose is achieved, and the effect on areas of
overlap (with networks ofmutual others);
The ascertainment process is a gradual one of gathering information, accrediting its
importance to the individual, and evaluating impact. Assessing and reassessing in a
sifting progression towards overall aim.
8.2.3.6 Balancing
Beyond dynamic and framework, proxy decisions come down to balancing of any
issues of conflict within an individual network. No hard-and-fast rules can apply,
and a combination of logic and intuition is advocated:
• a combined approach melds awareness and understanding of subjective
issues with human compassion. The former derives from informedness,
the latter from trust;
• we must trust the proxies with whom we place responsibility. Further,
those proxies must trust their own capacity to engage fully and genuinely
318
with the decision process and, where necessary, to trust their intuitive
response;
• intuition is valuable as an addition to logical evaluation. It can support
the reflective process, inductively feeding a proxy's gradual evaluation
and sifting of information;
• we must allow a proxy to exercise his/her responsibility; the act of
balancing is the most fundamental aspect of this responsibility. If we
feel uneasy about trusting a proxy to fulfil this, we could be appointing
the wrong proxies, or we have an insubstantial framework. If a proxy
O 1
t
can act with R.E.S.P.E.C.T., then this is as much as any human being
deciding on another's behalf can achieve.
8.2.3.7 Justification
Conflict between interests is inevitable and is best acknowledged and the adopted
position justified. But, respect demands realism and if we seek to justify 'best' as a
'uniquely right solution' then we will be disappointed for reasons already outlined in
this chapter.
In view of these limits, a proxy should be willing to justify his/her treatment choice
by showing that s/he has decided:
• within the structured environment, addressing factors outlined and any
relevant domestic and European legal provisions;
• openly, having regard to subjective input and personality, making
express the issues and interests arising, and the reasons for the eventual
choice (including any role of intuition);
• in full recognition of an IcP's broad range of interests',
• respectfully, accepting that all IcPs possess interests, and that both
subject and proxy are valuable human beings, but with limited human
capacities;
81 I.e. acting responsibly by Responding Empathetically to the Subject's Personality, Experiences,
Capacity and Truth.
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• from a state of informedness about background understanding of issues
raised herein, and through available evidence of a subject's 'personal
medical', 'personal non-medical' stakes, and his/her personality and
individuality;
• through focused engagement - genuinely listening to all information
involved, and acting as a beneficent inquisitor to the process; and
• with willingness to discuss reasons, decision process and making
him/herself available to any appeals process.
Any decision statement should make all of these justificatory points available as part
of transparency. If a proxy has actively engaged with the process then his/her
decision is sufficiently justified. A decision report should detail: assessment of a
person's capacity and competence, sources of input, medical prognoses, evidence of
the subject's individuality, which issues are deemed important, relationships of
mutuality, the patient's views, the involvement of an Advocate-Guardian, identified
interests, areas of conflict/support, how treatment options are foreseen to impact
identified interests, reasons for ultimate choice and areas of compliance with law.
But, the key factor above all else is respect. Clear respect for the subject, throughout
the process, will create a proxy decision that is justified enough.
8.2.4 Improvements, weaknesses, and the 'best' way forward
The time has come to close the historical chapter of anachronistic, misunderstood
labelling of legally incompetent individual. Incapacitated human beings are,
primarily, individuals. They warrant the same degree of respect as any other
individual. But, these vulnerable human beings are also in need of our care,
compassion and help from time to time. When illness strikes them - as anyone -
they need access to suitable treatment and care. When medical treatment could
improve their quality of life it should be considered - as any competent person would
consider for him/herself. The legal framework should be in place to enable this to
happen. Previously, the dysfunction that incapacity causes within the autonomy
model of decision-making has compelled the courts in England and Wales to resort
320
to the beneficence offered by 'best interests'.82 However, a purely welfare-oriented
approach to best interests decisions risks disrespecting a patient's residual autonomy
that may have existed previously, or exists transiently, or may exist in the future.
Furthermore, conflicts remain about how 'best' to 'benefit' the patient.
However, the ethic of respecting persons offers improvement. It embraces both
beneficence and autonomy. In addition, it encourages focus upon the value of all
individuals - whatever their capacity. And, we can adapt the respect for persons
approach to suit incapacitated individuals. By adopting the concept of 'interest'
proffered herein, and the idea of reflecting upon an individual's life in its broadest
and temporally unconstrained senses, we can accept an IcP's residual autonomy
while attending to his/her welfare needs in a uniquely tailored combination. In
essence, we can both acknowledge and support the individual because autonomy and
welfare become more malleable. Each value retains its own integral role, yet allows
for the importance of the other, under an umbrella of purpose known as 'respect'.
It is submitted that the approach put forward in this thesis would create a form of
decision-making for IcPs that aims to secure their well-being through a well-rounded
perspective. This approach recognises both common human experience and
individuality. It is focused, yet aware of the wider context. It is realistic, yet strives
to attain philosophical and ethical objectives. By seeking the best achievable
decision based on an individual's ascertained interests, we can offer a genuine
respect towards all incapacitated human beings. And, in respecting the individual,
we respect ourselves as part of common humanity. The approach adopted herein
aims to retain the valued flexibility inherent in 'best interests'. However, in so
doing, we must provide more guidance than has previously existed. We can do this
by creating an outer framework comprising a judicial forum, and an inner framework
of process and role. We can choose our decision-makers with specific qualities in
mind, and educate them to become informed, to act responsibly and
compassionately. And, we can give guidance about the factors that might be
involved and should be considered. But, beyond this, we must trust in the proxies we
appoint, trust in the process, and permit the flexibility of best interests to adapt to
82 Scotland has previously focused that beneficent principle through a proxy decision-maker - a 'tutor-
dative'.
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new cases and advances in medical technology. We must trust in our human
capacity for both compassion and invention.
Certainly, weaknesses will still exist. Using the term 'best interests' is perhaps
something of a misnomer if no choice can be proven 'better than all others'. And,
not all commentators will be satisfied by anything less than that. Ideally, we feel we
ought to be able to say definitively that we made the 'best' choice. But,
pragmatically, life is simply not this predictable or quantifiable. We can make a
choice with someone's best interests genuinely in our heart at the time, but we cannot
prove it is the best of all options. Perhaps an alternative term could be used, but with
respect as the underlying ethic, the name of the tool seems to matter less than the
motivation and care with which it is used.
A further potential weakness lies in the time and effort involved in gathering
information from so many sources, and mapping and ascertaining an interest network
for each individual subject. Admittedly, this could be seen as pragmatically
inhibitive. However, this is what determining 'best interests' surely should be setting
out to achieve. While commentators could argue about nomenclature and
justifiability, none of that is significant in any case if the job is not done properly.
No apology is made for such a heavy onus on finding out about the incapacitated
individual. S/he should be the effortful focus of a decision-maker's attention, and we
cannot aspire to doing what is 'best' for him/her if we do not know who s/he is and
what interests s/he has. These individual subjects are unfortunate to suffer their
incapacity. The rest of us, as competent proxies, mutual others, Advocate-
Guardians, carers and members of society are in the fortunate position of having
enough capacity to share with others. Our capacity can help to compensate their lack
of capacity provided it is used carefully. Far from being an extravagance of time or
energy to attain a state of informedness, it is a gift we are able to share by evaluating
another's interests and well-being on their decision-making behalf. Full
consideration and respectful choice should be the gifts that we offer in return for our
involvement.
One final weakness could be considered to exist in the balancing process. Balancing
is inherently difficult to pin down. Of itself, balancing requires a balance of
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establishing guidance while allowing flexibility. Intuition has been included here as
a decision-making tool to use when (logical) reasoning fails to provide a clear
answer. Some might regard the use of intuition as a weakness. Admittedly, were the
parameters of this paper more extensive, further development of this area could be
valuable, simply in view of the contentiousness of its use in decision-making.
However, it has been included within the balancing armoury because it is believed
significant. Indeed, it may be present already in medical and legal decision-making
(such as in resource allocation and equity, respectively). Furthermore, some may
regard intuition as a strength rather than a weakness. It may not fit the traditionally
patriarchal, logic-oriented models of decision-making to which we are accustomed.
However, it could form part of a new wave of more compassionate, instinctive and
emotion-based approaches to decisions and choice that is perhaps beginning to
emerge in the twenty-first century. Further research into gender and generational
issues in decision-making might usefully illuminate this aspect, as might
psychological analyses of decision motivation. Unfortunately, these approaches lie
beyond the limitations of this present thesis.
While acknowledging this scope for further development, it is submitted that the
approach proffered herein is still a valuable way forward. It has clarified the
existing meaning of best interests, identified dysfunction in its application through
caselaw, explored the characteristics of 'interests', considered underlying ethical
values, and developed a reconstruction of the legal framework based on the preferred
ethic of respect. In total, rethinking how we structure the interest concept, the value
or purpose to which it is employed, and the roles within the decision can contribute
significantly to creating the right environment for attributing interests where they are
due. With an enlightened structure and purpose there is scope for relevant interests
to be better identified and their significance to the individual evaluated. But,
according genuine respect requires a weighty emphasis on recognising individuality;
to act with sound judgment we must ascertain clearly not only interests and purpose,
but the individual to whom they belong. It is anticipated that the 'best achievable
decision based on ascertained interests' would provide a more robust and
compassionate approach to many decisions for incapacitated patients. It is
philosophically supportable, ethically acceptable, and traceable within individual
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decisions; a reconstructed process by way of ethical evaluation. A new form of
'best interests' that can be 'many things to many incapacitated patients'. But, more




Appendix 1 - Interpretation of Benn's figure 2, here applied to
the decision whether to sterilise and incapax patient





a - sterilise regardless
b - sterilise, on balance of evidence
c - don't sterilise, on balance of evidence
d - delay decision until later/patient older
e - use alternative, reversible contraceptive methods
f - preclude patient permanently from sexual relationships
g - do nothing, i.e. run the risk ofpregnancy
z - a combined solution of (c) and (e)
Factors influencing positioning:
a - protects from pregnancy, but lacks sound assessment of overall welfare (i.e. some
commitment to welfare); ignores patient's integrity and potential interests in having
children (i.e. lacks commitment to autonomy)
b - protects from pregnancy, facilitates quality of life through sexual relationship,
(i.e. good commitment to welfare); necessarily invades bodily integrity, precludes
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any interest in having children, but does consider these issues (i.e. limited
commitment to autonomy), risks sexual assault going unnoticed (i.e. undermines
commitment to welfare)
c - may not protect from pregnancy, does not make patient more vulnerable to sexual
assault (i.e. limited commitment to welfare); does not invade bodily integrity, does
not have irreversible consequences, may limit or preclude sexual activity (i.e. some
commitment to autonomy)
d - may not protect from pregnancy, may/may not permit sexual activity, but leaves
option of sterilisation open (i.e. limited commitment to welfare); does not invade
bodily integrity, not irreversible, but really fails to address patient's interests now (i.e.
limited commitment to autonomy)
e - offers significant protection from pregnancy, but may increase vulnerability to
assault (i.e. some commitment to welfare); limits invasion of bodily integrity
(depending on method), reversible, facilitates sexual relationships (i.e. good
commitment to autonomy)
f - protects bodily integrity, reversible, ignores any potential interest in having
children (i.e. reasonable commitment to autonomy); protects from pregnancy,
minimises vulnerability to assault, but very poor commitment to patient's quality of
life and (i.e. lacks significant commitment to welfare);
g - permits sexual relations, but fundamentally fails to protect from pregnancy,
minimises vulnerability to assault (i.e. limited commitment to welfare); protects
bodily integrity (in the short-term), reversible, (i.e. some commitment to autonomy)
z - provides best elements of (e) by protecting from pregnancy, and facilitating
sexual relationships, but may create some vulnerability to assault (i.e. some
commitment to welfare); also best elements of (c) minimising invasiveness of bodily
integrity and reversible, (i.e. good commitment to autonomy). This combination may
offer 'best' overall commitment to the two roles, reflected in its positioning on right
uppermost curve, but is often unavailable in sterilisation decisions due to
unsuitability of alternative contraceptive methods for the incapax patient.
In summary, by considering the extent to which various treatment options commit
to each role, these options can be plotted relative to the two axes, and to one another.
Certain options (a, f and g) on the outer negative sectors of the graph appear
untenable because they profoundly fail to commit to either axis value. Options c and
d show limited commitment to both roles. The most tenable options sit in the
positive quarter and, of these, the most northerly, then easterly would be regarded
(on Benn's approach) to represent the option with the highest commitment level to
both axis values. However, arguably as a means of conflict resolution this creates
bias towards the value on the vertical (y) axis as a priority. The curves always run
from upper left to lower right because the relationship between the two axis values is
inverse; as commitment to one value increases, commitment to the other value
diminishes.
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Appendix 2 - Interpretation of Benn's figure 4, applied to a












a - no instructions from the patient, withdraw treatment, allow the patient to die
b - no instructions from the patient, continue the patient, maintain life
c - patient has left explicit instructions, which do not contravene decision-maker's
commitments
Factors influencing positioning:
a - meets the threshold for autonomy by respecting the nature of personhood, but
falls below the threshold for respecting life because withdrawal will result in the
patient's certain death
b - falls below the threshold for respecting autonomy because continuance of
treatment disregards the nature of personhood and maintains the patient in a state less
than a 'person', but meets the threshold for respecting life by not causing the patient's
death
c - desirable rational decision location, attainable only if the patient leaves explicit
instructions which do not contravene the decision-maker's commitment to respecting
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life and respecting autonomy - essentially an unattainable position in most pvs
scenarios due to absence of patient instructions
In summary, withdrawing alimentation will certainly mean ending the patient's life -
which falls below the threshold for respecting life (position (a). However,
maintaining the patient's existence disrespects autonomy/personhood (position (b).
Thus, neither option sufficiently meets the decision-maker's role commitments.
Hence, no rational decision position is available to us. The only rationally acceptable
position would be (c) - if the patient had left a valid Advance Directive that did not
contravene the decision-maker's minimum commitments to both values.
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Appendix 3 - Interpretation of Benn's figure 5, applied to a










a - continue therapeutic treatment
b - withdraw therapeutic treatment, maintain palliative care only
Factors influencing positioning:
a - meets the threshold for sanctity of life because the decision does not shorten the
neonate's life, but falls below the threshold respect for welfare because continuance
will cause pain and/or very poor quality of life
b - falls below the threshold for sanctity of life because withdrawal of therapeutic
treatment will result in the neonate's death, but meets the welfare threshold by
minimising the duration of pain, and avoiding poor quality of life in the longer-term
329
In this situation, no desirable rational decision location is attainable; the only two
possible options result in harm of some sort ensuing. A subthreshold choice
therefore becomes necessary.
In summary, this situation involves different conflicting values: 'sanctity of life' and
'welfare' (i.e. avoidance of suffering). Available options include (a) continuing
therapeutic treatment (which may delay/avoid the neonate's death, but will prolong
pain and poor quality of life), or (b) maintaining palliative care only (accelerating the
neonate's death, but minimising pain and suffering). Option (a) meets the sanctity of
life threshold but fails the welfare threshold. Option (b) meets the welfare threshold
but fails the sanctity threshold. Either decision is 'wrong', therefore, in either
condemning the baby to a limited life full of pain, or condemning him/her to death.
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(based on investments during
individual's lifetime, and
enduring perception of
individual in the experience of
mutual others)
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Appendix 6: Application of reconstructed best interests
decision process to Re Y
This appendix seeks to evince how the reconstruction of best interests, proposed by
this thesis, might function in application to the existing case Re Y (Mental
Incapacity: Bone Marrow Transplant) [1996], above, as a means to highlighting how
analysis would differ.
Additional information would be needed for a full proxy analysis of Y's interests,
including medical information on the risks/probabilities involved in the procedures,
evidence of relationships, and about Y as an individual. But, a brief overview can be
given here and differences highlighted, as much by the variance in questions raised
(contrasting with earlier formulations of best interests), as by the answers (which
would depend on further information):
The overarching aim of the decision would be to treat Y with respect and
compassion.
In establishing Y's individuality:
> Y's severe intellectual impairment would mean that she was not competent
to self-determine, had never been able to make an advance directive, and that
her capacity seemed minimal (being able to understand her own needs, but
not those of others). However, a supportive environment might enable us to
gain input from Y, or to better understand her level and deficiencies in
capacity, for example while Y did not appear to understand what was said to
her about her sister's situation, Y made most of her own communication
through signs - could this be employed to improve her understanding/input?
> An Advocate-Guardian could be appointed to Y to gain more information
about her as an individual. While we know that she had always been
incompetent and would remain so, we know little about her personality (only
that she had a cheerful disposition). The AG would seek information about
how Y interacted with her environment, her family, her carers, and the
content of her daily life (preferences, likes/dislikes etc), and individual
circumstances as a means for us to know Y better;
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> The relevance ofY's relationships in the context of her broader life would be
an important part of identifying Y as an individual in the context of this
decision. It seems that Y's relationship with her (plaintiff) sister was not
strong - we can construe the overlap in their interest networks as minimal. In
contrast, her close, affectionate relationship with her mother would represent
a significant area of overlap in Y's interest network. We should also be
aware of the mother's interest network overlapping with the sister's - this is
the indirect area of relationship interest regarding Y, and that certain
circumstances existed (i.e. the mother's poor state of health, exacerbated by
anxiety over the plaintiff sister), but again these exist indirectly in relation to
Y's network, being located in the overlap between the mother's and sister's
networks.
This awareness of relative interest networks is the beginning of mapping Y's
interests. It raises a particularly important question in the context of this decision:
> Should mutuality be regarded as the whole of Y's interest network? We
return to the answer, below.
> To map Y's interest network we must set aside, for now, her relationship
interests to consider the potential range of other interests attributable to Y as
human being. Further information about Y's daily life/preferences/capacity
for communication (using her methods) would facilitate our understanding of
her life as an individual, both its biological and biographical content (albeit
that the latter may be limited). This would enable us to understand her needs
as an individual on a day-to-day basis. Certainly, we can attribute her with
some commonly human, prevailing interests in bodily integrity, dignity,
health, and freedom from pain. These interests should be protected, and we
can identify that Y has a need to be protected from unjustified invasion;
> However, Y also has a subjective, persisting interest in her relationship with
her mother by virtue of the investment of engagement that Y makes in so
relating. This relationship contributes to Y's well-being (it is not clear
whether Y has capacity to experience this in an other-regarding sense - for
her mother's well-being). But, because this is a relationship ofmutuality, we
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can identify that the mother has an interest in Y (for Y's sake, and for her
own enjoyment of engaging with Y);
> Further, Article 8 (HRA 1998, Schedule 1) raises an interest belonging to the
family in ensuring that they are considered within a decision process that may
interfere with family life. This supports the family's interest in Y. But, at
this point an important distinction should be made: the (other-regarding)
interests of the mother (or family) in Y should not be equiparated with the
mother's/family's self-related interests via Y. In other, words, while a
relationship of mutuality would contribute to the well-being of each, ultimate
self-related interest through an IcP says nothing about concern for the IcP (as
the interests pertain wholly to the other people). Thus, the indirect areas of
overlap outlined earlier arguably should not form part of Y's interest network
because they are served via Y, rather than in mutuality with Y;
> Such indirect interests (relating to the mother and sister rather than Y)
effectively conflict with Y's commonly human interests and need for
protection from unjust intervention. Further, they also overshadow Y's
persisting subjective interest in her relationship ofmutuality with her mother.
It seems in the actual decided case that what effectively happened was that,
rather than the mutual relationship between Y and her mother being an area
of overlap in the two networks, the relationship was regarded as the whole of
Y's interest network. However, in answer to the question raised at the outset
ofmapping, surely Y's whole range of interests as an individual should form
the majority of her interest network (i.e. her commonly human and subjective
interests as an individual), with her maternal relationship forming only one
part of the network in overlap;
At this stage, having mapped Y's interests, additional input might be needed in
order to make an evaluation:
> Particular input would be required about the nature and significance of the
familial relationships. An AG could perhaps obtain this information through
observation and communication with the IcP. The proxy could secure further
information direct from the family members. The questions that this
information should be directed to address are how Y's acting/not acting as a
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donor would realistically be likely to impact (i) Y's relationship with her
mother, and (ii) Y's relationship with her sister/family unit.
> Additional input would also be needed from medical experts about the
position regarding alternative donors (i.e. the statistical effect of using a non-
sibling donor, success rates, availability, testing), which was dismissed
somewhat perfunctorily in the actual case.
By this point in evaluation we can identify:
> decision purpose: the case is unusual insofar as the proposed medical
procedure served no diagnostic, prophylactic, or curative purpose for Y
directly. Rather, the case required a decision about whether Y should make a
contribution to the health of her sister (and mother);
> However, having established Y's interest network as extending beyond
mutual relationships, the decision purpose that best interests should serve is
to support and protect Y as an individual, that is, to protect and support her
full range of interests (including her relationships). Thus, while we can
experience compassion for the family's situation as a whole, we must focus
primarily on our concerns for Y's interests (of which her familial
relationships are only a part);
> The range of treatment options are identifiable as (1) authorising the donation
procedure, (2) not authorising the donation procedure, and/or (3) advocating
seeking other donors;
> The impact of these options in terms of Y's mapped interests would be
determined from fuller information. However, at a simplistic level,
authorizing the procedure would benefit Y's persisting interest in her
continued relationship with her mother (thereby supporting her relationships
in terms of purpose), but could harm her commonly human interests (in
bodily integrity, possibly her health, etc.) and we do not know how she might
respond to what is involved in carrying out the procedures (she may/may not
experience them as traumatic). In contrast, not authorising the procedure,
benefits Y's commonly human interests (protects her welfare interests), does
not impact her personality (as there is no procedure to respond to), but might
damage her relationship with her mother. Assessment could, therefore, turn
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on the likelihood of this damage happening and the degree of importance that
this relationship interest serves in Y's whole interest network. However, it
must be said relationships should not be based in one individual having to act
in certain ways in order for the other to continuing relating to them, and there
is no reason to think that Y's not acting as a donor would necessarily damage
her mother's relationship with her (which remained unelucidated in the actual
case). Thus, in terms of decision purpose, not authorising the procedure
would protect Y's interests, but may/may not support her relationships. The
final option of seeking other donors was given minimal consideration the
actual decision, yet is the option that best protects Y's interests (protecting
her commonly human interests, not affecting her persisting relationship
interests), while minimising damage to the family's interests as a unit.
Thus, on balance, the preferred option based on a reconstructed analysis of Y's best
interests is not to authorise the donation procedure. Evaluation has taken account of
Y's commonly human interests, and her subjective interests in mutual relationships,
and concludes that the absence of any benefit to Y's health, bodily integrity, dignity,
and freedom from pain is not outweighed by the benefit that may (or may not) accrue
to her mutual relationships, particularly as this benefit is to some degree indirect. If
the procedure were authorised it would support Y's relationships to the exclusion of
her other interests and, it is submitted, would be unjustified in terms of her individual
interest network identified herein. And, while the potential pressures on Y's
relationships are acknowledged, we must respect Y as a whole individual (of which
her membership of her family unit is only one part).
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Appendix 7: Application of reconstructed best interests
decision process to Bland
This appendix seeks to evince how the reconstruction of best interests, proposed
herein, might function in application to the existing case Airedale NHS Trust v Bland
[1993], above, as a means of highlighting how analysis could differ.
Additional information would be needed for a full proxy analysis of Bland's
interests, including more information about Anthony Bland's personality (pre-
incapacity), and his mutual relationships. But a brief overview here can provide an
example of the different reasoning that might result.
The overarching aim of the decision would be to treat Anthony Bland with respect
and compassion.
In establishing Bland's individuality:
> We can conclude that Anthony Bland was clearly unable to self-determine,
and would remain so. However, he had been previously-competent. No
advance directive had been made by him, but his previous life might provide
indicators of input to the decision;
> Appointment of an AG could enable information to be sought from those
emotionally closest to Anthony Bland to gain a clearer impression of his
personality (we know only that he was 'sensitive and willing' and his father's
belief that Anthony would not wish 'to be left like he is', above, 826). An
AG might identify further information to confirm this perceived personal
view. In essence, we could seek to know more about how Bland interacted
with life, and his choices and investments, prior to incapacity as a means of
better knowing him as an individual, and identifying his interests;
> Bland's pre-incapacity relationships with those emotionally closest to him
may also inform us about what mattered to him; how important were those
relationships in his life? Would he be concerned (if he were able to know of
his situation) for the effect now on his family and friends? In which areas
might Bland's interest network have overlapped with the networks of others?
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This initiates mapping ofBland's interest network:
> If information regarding Bland's relationships of mutuality warranted it, he
could be attributed with a subjective interest in the well-being of those mutual
others. Moreover, on this reconstructed account of best interests, such an
interest could endure Bland's entry to incapacity as a persisting interest in his
network;
> Additionally, if information about his life, prior to p.v.s., were to furnish
personal interests, such as his former views on existence in such states,
religious beliefs (or secular beliefs about the life/death cycle), the importance
of life to him/her in biological and biographical senses, or strongly held views
on ancillary issues (e.g. tissue donation), then these aspects may also persist.
For, such aspects contribute to making him the individual he was (pre-p.v.s.),
and should not be merely abandoned due to current (permanent) incapacity.
This information may help us to resolve conflict, for example, if he would not
wish to 'live' long-term in p.v.s. then we might attribute him with a
significant interest in the importance ofbiographical life as valuable;
> We can attribute Bland with some commonly human, prevailing interests in
dignity, and bodily integrity. There is no reason why these interests should
not endure his incapacity, as commonly human interests are not dependent on
being able to know of them, or take an interest in them. Further, we could
also attribute Bland with a commonly human, prevailing interest in
(biological) life which remains part of his network despite incapacity;
> Flowever, we should also acknowledge that other commonly human interests
are affected to an extreme degree by permanent insentience. Thus, certain
welfare interests are rendered irrelevant to Bland, such as freedom from pain
(as he has no sentience), tolerable environment (as he does not experience it),
and non-interference with choice (as he has no prospect of making even
simple choices). Moreover, his subjective interest in participating in his
(biographical) life is permanently lost to him, other than in terms of
reputation and how he is remembered by others;
> In terms of how these interests support and conflict with one another, Bland's
persisting concern for those emotionally closest others with whom he had
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mutual relationships, and remembrance by them, would be supported by his
enduring interests in bodily integrity and dignity. And, both would be
supported by his loss (prospectively) of any experiential participation in
biographical life. However, conflict occurs between these interests and his
remaining commonly human interest in (biological) life, particularly if he
might have had a subjective interest in 'not wanting to live in such a state';
We may need to reconsider input at this stage to see if we are fully informed about
Anthony Bland as an individual; could more information about his personality,
relationships, present circumstances or previous interaction with life help us to
resolve the conflicting aspects, or further reinforce the supporting aspects, of his
interest network?
By this stage of evaluation, we can posit that:
> Decision purpose is an assessment of Anthony Bland's quality of life.
Although he may be subject to intermittent infections, his biological life
could be sustainable for some time. Whereas, his scope to participate and
experience his own life biographically has ceased. A decision is required
about which aspect is most important in terms of his interest network;
> The treatment options are simple, either: (1) to withdraw a.n.h. from him
thereby allowing him to die, or (2) to continue providing a.n.h. thereby
sustaining his life, as it is, for the foreseeable future;
> The impact of these options in terms of Bland's mapped interest network
would benefit from fuller information about him as an individual. However,
withdrawing treatment would have a positive impact on his prevailing,
commonly human interests of dignity and bodily integrity (given the
invasive nature of support care and a.n.h.), it could have positive integrity
with his subjective biographical life (pre-incapacity). It could have a mixed
impact regarding his interests of mutuality: it may relieve his family of their
emotional distress, which accords with his enduring other-regarding
concerns for his family's well-being, and with their other-regarding concerns
for him; yet, his death will create grief among his emotionally-closest which
would be likely to also concern him if he were able to consider it. However,
beyond this, the only overtly negative impact on Bland's network is of
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withdrawal ending his interest in biological life. In contrast, continuing
treatment clearly benefits biological life (to the extent that it is valuable).
But, this is the only positive impact it brings. Continuance would invade
Bland's prevailing interests in bodily integrity and dignity. It could have
little integrity with his pre-incapacity biographical life, in terms of the active
life and relationships that he valued. Further, it would continue to impact
negatively the lives and experience of those emotionally closest to him,
whose memory of him could become dominated by the continued
invasiveness of treatment. Hence, no benefit would accrue to Bland in terms
of his biographical life by continuing treatment.
Thus, on balance, the preferred option based on a reconstructed analysis ofAnthony
Bland's interests would be to withdraw treatment. Evaluation has taken into
account Anthony Bland's current, commonly human interests in dignity and bodily
integrity, his enduring interests in terms of his personality and past investments in
engaging with life and with mutual others, and the total prospective absence of any
participatory biographical life. It has been shown that he has these relevant interests
to consider, but his total incapacity precludes him engaging with, experiencing or
participating in his life in any biographical way, and this outweighs his continued
interest in biological life. His only engagement with living would be in the sense of
continued invasive treatment that impacts negatively on his dignity and bodily
integrity. In short, the quality of Bland's biographical life would be prospectively so
poor, that it is more respectful to accord integrity to his pre-incapacity biography and
recognise the negative impact of treatment on his current interests. It is therefore in
his best interests to withdraw treatment and allowing his (biological) life to end.
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Applying best interests to persistent
vegetative state - a principled distortion ?
Andrea J Fenwick Department of Private Law, University ofEdinburgh, Edinburgh
Abstract
"Best interests"is widely accepted as the appropriate
foundation principle for medico-legal decisions
concerning treatment withdrawal from patients in
persistent vegetative state (PVS). Its application
appears to progress logically from earlier use
regarding legally incompetent patients. This author
argues, however, that such confidence in the relevance
of the principle of best interests to PVS is misplaced,
and that current construction in this context is
questionable on four specific grounds. Furthermore, it
is argued that the resulting legal inconsistency is
distorting both the principle itself and, more
particularly, individual patient interests.
Editor's note
This paper won the 1997 UK Forum Essay Com¬
petition, organized in collaboration with the Jour¬
nal ofMedical Ethics.
(Journal ofMedical Ethics 1998;24:86-92)
Keywords: Persistent vegetative state; "best interests";
legal decisions
A contextual introduction
Patients in persistent vegetative state, being
incognizant, incapacitated and insensate, pose
difficulties for both law and medicine. Burgeoning
legal support for patient autonomy and self-
determination falters on confronting patients pre¬
viously possessed of such interests, but now
permanently unable to express them. Incurability,
coupled with potentially indefinite continued
existence, raises questions of withdrawing "treat¬
ment" from a non-terminal patient. This involves
medical professionals in action diametrically
opposed to the very life-sustaining aims of "treat¬
ment". Nevertheless, a decision is needed.
Few would dispute the PVS patient's lack of
legal capacity, ie the patient's inability to exercise
his/her own rights, particularly the right of
self-determination and, indeed, his/her unaware-
ness of the very need for any decision. With rela¬
tive ease, we can therefore conclude that the
patient fails to meet the requisite "competency
threshold" of consent. However, such rights are
not lost simply because the patient cannot
personally exercise them - proceeding to treat may
still be unlawful unless it is "justified". The
chronic nature of PVS means that the situation
can no longer be characterised as an "emergency"
(justifying intervention as "necessary"). Without
consent, continuing treatment could therefore
invade privacy and constitute an illegal battery,
whilst ceasing treatment may not fulfil ethical and
legal duties towards the patient. Thus, some form
of authorisation of the continuance (or with¬
drawal) is required, and this decision necessarily
falls to others. "Best interests", being an estab¬
lished and beneficent solution, seems a safe and
uncontentious route to take. Paradoxically
though, PVS may involve the most contentious
treatment-outcome of all consent decisions,
namely the death of the patient. The relevant
decision-making device must therefore withstand
the closest and most critical scrutiny.
Certainly the application of "best interests" to
PVS decisions is espoused at the highest levels of
legal authority. Its current standing as "the law"
within the United Kingdom and Ireland is
unquestionable. However, doubts arise regarding
the way in which it is applied to PVS. Are the
foundations of the principle as soundly reasoned
as we might expect? Is this new application a
legally consistent development? Does closer in¬
spection reveal structural weakness? This author
believes that there are fundamental grounds for
concern and that distortion, rather than develop¬
ment, is occuring. Before substantiating these
claims though, it is worth considering from where
"best interests" has sprung.
"Best interests" at source
"Best interests" constitutes something of a
panacea in medico-legal decision-making - in¬
voked in the treatment of severely disabled
infants,1 sterilisation of incompetent adults,2 and
as a "fall-back" where consent is defective.3 A
principle's gradual levitation to such multi¬
functional status draws it inexorably away from
contextual application, to more-generalised for¬
mulation. Airedale NHS Trust v Bland' witnessed
this shift by way of heavy cross-contextual reliance
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upon Re F (a mental patient: sterilisation),2 where
lawful treatment of incompetent patients was
equated with treatment in patient "best interests",
ie that which sought: "...to save their lives or to
ensure improvement or prevent deterioration in
their physical or mental health".'
The court deemed such evaluation to be within
the remit of "Bolam",6 thereby effectively requir¬
ing "a responsible body of medical opinion" so to
construe it. In its entirety, this formulation
comprises one of the most explicit formulations of
"best interests" to date.
Further support for applying "best interests" to
PVS derives from its earlier application to
life/death decisions on withholding treatment (Re
J (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment)).' Here,
however, a different formulation involved more
overt weighing of "benefits" and "burdens" and
minimal reference to "Bolam", thus rendering Re
J a more individualistic, "quality-of-life" decision
than Re F.
The difficulty in extending "best interests" to
PVS decisions lies essentially in the apparent
similarity to other non-treatment cases. Like Re J,
PVS concerns withdrawing/withholding life-
sustaining treatment, but regarding an adult
unable to express any consent - like Re F. The dis¬
parity of formulation, coupled with high profile,
and emotive overtones of "ending life", meant
that applying best interests to PVS - though
perhaps logical - was never going to be easy.
Best interests in PVS - current aspects
Construction of "best interests" in recent UK and
Irish PVS cases, essentially seeks to steer some¬
thing of a middle course between the generalised
and individualistic formulations and permits
identification of three component elements: juris¬
diction; medical involvement; and classification of
interest.
JURISDICTION
Both the Scots Court of Session' and the Irish
Supreme Court8 are empowered with parens
patriae jurisdiction, enabling them to exercise a
role akin to guardianship, in respect of incompe¬
tent adults. This effectively imbues these courts
with a power to consent on the patient's behalf.
This contrasts sharply with the English courts,
where its absence limits jurisdiction to a power to
declare a treatment decision "lawful",9 ie stating
that deciding to cease (or, indeed, continue) treat¬
ment will not contravene civil or criminal law.
The wider scope of the Scots and Irish courts
facilitates a broad perspective, and "weighing" of
the various factors involved (analogous to the Re J
formulation involving wardship). Whereas the
more restrictive jurisdiction of the English courts
centres the decision upon questions of infringing
legal "duties", drawing the focus away from
patient need towards more generalised principles
(more akin to a Re F formulation). This is not to
say that such jurisdictional limits are totally
distinct, nor inflexible, merely that each may pre¬
dispose "best interests" to a particular type of for¬
mulation.
MEDICAL INVOLVEMENT
Medical involvement in "best interests" invokes
aspects of both Re F and Re J. Thus, in Bland/
continued application of "Bolam", renders medi¬
cal opinion fundamental to "best interests", a role
which is similarly emphasised in the Scots
decision of Law Hospital NHS Trust v Lord
Advocate.7 Such emphasis clearly simulates the Re
F construction. However, by contrast, most of the
PVS decisions also make reference to other
individualistic facets of medical evaluation such
as: benefits and burdens of treatment'0; likely
effect upon prognosis," and invasiveness of treat¬
ment to bodily integrity10 - all essentially more
representative of the "balancing" approach so evi¬
dent in Re J.
It thus seems that, not only is there considerable
medical input in determining best interests in
PVS, but also that this input is then utilised in a
mixed construction of formal general principle
and informal individualistic balancing.
CLASSIFICATION OF "INTEREST"
The PVS context appears to have spawned a new
classification of "interest", and consequent
restructuring of "best interests". In previous con¬
texts, identifying the optimal ("best") implicitly
required deriving "net benefits", which Buchanan
and Brock succinctly explain as: "... assigning dif¬
ferent weights to the [treatment] options to reflect
the relative importance of the various interests ...
then subtracting costs or 'disbenefits'...".12
In Re J such assessment was made openly by the
court, whereas in Re F evaluation fell to the medi¬
cal professionals, whose decision could be judi¬
cially verified as "lawful". However, in PVS, con¬
tinued "treatment" confers only extremely limited
"benefits" (such as maintaining the status quo), or
"burdens" (such as treatment hazards). This lack
of input to the "net benefit" equation results in
PVS patients' interests being classified as "none",
and a consequent denial of any need for
weighing." This rather radical classificatory de¬
parture demands - not surprisingly - an alternative
formulation of "best", which has ultimately
resulted in inverting the formula to consider
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whether continued alimentation is "not in the
patient's best interests".14
Essentially then, current application of "best
interests" to PVS comprises a mixture of previous
formulations (and terminology), together with a
new classification designed to address the peculi¬
arities of PVS. This may be construed as a princi¬
pled development, and heavy judicial emphasis on
"patient interests" in PVS decisions means that
the relevance of "best interests" is undoubtedly
firmly established. However, construction of prin¬
ciple is really a secondary step in the decision¬
making process. Initially let us clarify the objective
of that process.
"True" objective
Essentially, we must initially ask: what is the pur¬
pose of making this treatment decision? Existing
formulations focus upon whether we should treat
so as to "prolong life" 14 " - a construction which
avoids the emotive nature of "causing the patient
to die", and pre-empts suggestions of euthanistic
overtones. However, formulating sound legal
principle requires honesty of objective and no
matter how euphemistically phrased, or finely
distinguished, the inevitable consequence ofwith¬
drawing alimentation from a PVS patient is death.
This is simply a fact which, if one is honest,
renders the decision one of life-or-death choice.
The true objective should therefore be: to establish
whether artificial nutrition and hydration should be
withdrawn (or withheld) from a patient in persistent
vegetative state, such that the patient will die. This is
not to comment upon the moral or ethical
correctness of so doing. It is merely a more truth¬
ful statement of the ultimate objective of the deci¬
sion, which then enables us to seek the most
appropriate principle to attain it justly and
compassionately.
What is being suggested is that "best interests",
as currently formulated, fails to address this
"true" objective, thereby distorting both interests
and principle - a claim which must now be
substantiated.
The distortion of a principle?
Despite "best interests" value in other medico¬
legal areas, doubts concerning its construction in
PVS decisions are founded on four specific
grounds: delusory objective; illogicality; medicali-
sation, and range of "interests".
DELUSORY OBJECTIVE
Current construction seeks to constrain "best
interests" within strictly delineated parameters.
This, in itself, may be no bad thing. However, the
means used to achieve this are less well founded,
insofar as suggested substantive conceptual dis¬
tinction often transpires - on closer inspection - to
be merely semantic, and delusory as to true
objective. Recurrent judicial distinction between
"letting die" and "euthanasia" is a prime
example.16 Judicial motivation for avoiding "slip¬
pery slopes" may well be valid, but in terms of
PVS this distinction is negligible, as withdrawing
"treatment" results in the death of a patient who is
not "terminally", but rather "chronically", ill.
Thus we are not merely "letting" an already
imminent death occur. The choice of a particular
label, and use of supporting terminology such as
"natural death", whilst suggestive of a more
remote, less direct consequence, lying only on the
very periphery of our sphere of influence, cannot
change the character of the event. In truth, as
McLean suggests: "... the actual decision, however
reached, is a decision for or against death. We are,
in its purest form, considering euthanasia".1'
Further judicial semantics skirt this by constru¬
ing euthanasia as requiring positive, direct action.
But as Mason and Mulligan indicate, this consti¬
tutes "... a very limited definition of euthanasia".18
These semantic distinctions are similarly paral¬
leled in promoting "ceasing to prolong life" as dif¬
fering from "terminating lifeand devolves from
Re J. However, withholding reventilation where
death is already imminent (through cessation of
breathing, as would occur in Re J) possesses a
natural, preliminary factor such that "ceasing to
prolong" and "terminating" may be distinct. This
is simply not apparent in PVS - where the death
only becomes imminent as a result ofwithdrawing
or withholding the life-sustaining treatment, thus
it is difficult to see how "not prolonging" differs
substantially from "ending", when life would not
otherwise cease. Craig suggests that such semantic
juggling arises from the vagaries of English crimi¬
nal law,20 whilst Mason and Laurie emphasise the
designation of "cause of death" as a factor.21
Whatever the origin, the effect of such fine
distinction implicitly suggests "not extending" to
be somehow more legally, morally and ethically
acceptable than "ending". This exemplifies judi¬
cial delusion as to the decision's true objective and
consequences.
This delusion is supported by further semantics
categorising withdrawal of treatment as an "omis¬
sion" rather than an "act",22 thereby averting
problems of criminal liability, and facilitating a
shift of focus towards "duty" and Bolam-
relevance. Such distinction is therefore, perhaps, a
means to an end rather than substantive in itself
and, indeed, its suitability in the PVS context was
doubted by Lord Mustill in Bland.2'
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In totality, it therefore seems that the current
formulation of "best interests" is derived from a
number of semantic distinctions. These distinc¬
tions, though seemingly "substantial", are - on
closer inspection - euphemistic at best. Realisti¬
cally, they perhaps represent delusion as to the
true objective of the decision, and comprise a
practical means of circumventing the contentious¬
ness of outcome - ie the patient's death. However,
this semantic juggling merely creates inherent
inconsistency within the principle itself, which
results - ultimately - in a disservice to the
individual patient.
ILLOGICALITY
The delusion extends beyond semantics though,
to more fundamental illogicality. This arises from
the particular difficulties of making a life/death
decision, without encountering a problematic
valuation of "death" - an unknown concept - or
risking intimation of euthanasia. In addition, the
generally relevant factors do not possess the same
significance in PVS as they have in previous con¬
texts. The patient feels no pain, hazards are few,
benefit is minimal, prognosis unalterable, and
treatment "futile". This lack of "input" renders
weighing of tangible, measurable "interests" near
impossible, and has led the courts to conclude
(apparently logically) that the patient really has
"no interests", thereby denying the need to
"weigh" the potentially contentious issues. Such a
multiplicity of problems does not, however, justify
distorting or misapplying legal principle, yet this is
exactly what occurs in seeking to derive "best
interests" from "none". Irrespective ofwhether we
believe that the PVS patient does or does not
retain interests,24 once we declare "no" interest
then surely "best" becomes superfluous - no pool
exists from which to draw the "best". The deriva¬
tion is, therefore, simply not logical, yet this seems
overlooked in judgments thus far.
It would be logical to justify withdrawal by say¬
ing that the patient has "no interests"and therefore
no claim on treatment. Alternatively recognising
"minimal" (ie some) interests, in PVS (or particu¬
larly near-PVS) patients, would enable determina¬
tion of "best interests". However, no logic lies
within mixing the two. Such confusion probably
arises from judicial reluctance to classify with¬
drawal of treatment in PVS as a "quality of life"
decision,14 whilst seeking simultaneously to use a
principle evolved from exactly that type of case.
Such inconsistency is, however, both inappropri¬
ate and unnecessary. A treatment decision in the
context of PVS surely requires evaluation of
"quality of life" - even if only to establish an
answer of "nil" or "minimal". Brock and Bucha¬
nan suggest that evaluating "interest" "...depends
upon how it affects that patient's life ...", thereby
rendering "quality of life" judgments
unavoidable.12 If so, then "best interests" in PVS
cases either should involve "quality of life"
(together with recognition of some interests), and
current construction is therefore incorrect, OR
the decision not being a "quality of life" one, (the
patient having no interests to assess), "best
interests" is inapplicable.
Furthermore, it is difficult to see how "best"
cannot involve comparative evaluation, ie weigh¬
ing, of some sort. McLean rightly identifies a fear
factor involved in acknowledging that "...there
may be conditions which make death preferable to
life",2' and judicial concern has been voiced in
categorising one life as "... intrinsically worth less
than another".26 Such judicial fears are misplaced
however, as they misconstrue "quality of life" as
comprising an (offensive) external valuation,
rather than an (inoffensive) valuation of that life to
that individual. (Brock and Buchanan appropri¬
ately term the former a "social" sense and the lat¬
ter an "intrapersonal" sense2'). This judicial
misinterpretation fundamentally distorts the
evaluative character of "best interests". A valid
assessment of intrapersonal "quality of life"
(requiring explicit consideration of the patient's
likely wishes and feelings, similar to Re J) would,
in fact, represent a protection rather than deroga¬
tion of patient "interests".
Judicial conclusions of "no interests" and "no
weighing", combined with marked reluctance to
suggest death as being "in the patient's best inter¬
ests", ultimately result in reversed construction.
Thus courts have seen fit to indicate what is "not
in best interests",14 to the effect that: where treat¬
ment is futile, and the PVS patient no longer has
any interest in being kept alive, then it is not in his
best interests to have his life artificially prolonged
- consequently duty to treat ceases and withdrawal
is lawful. This eventual construction remains,
however, illogical in several respects. Primarily,
the derivation of "best" from "none" is question¬
able. Furthermore, the accepted negative con¬
struction of "not in best interests to prolong life"
is logically no different from the refuted construc¬
tion that "it is in this patient's best interests to die"
- the two are merely mirror images of the same
equation, possessing the same outcome, by way of
the same passive route. In addition, despite deny¬
ing the relevance of "quality of life", judgments
still refer to "invasiveness" and "futility" of
treatment28 - suggesting informal weighing of
burdens/benefits. Current construction of "best
interests" is therefore inherently illogical, and dis¬
torts previous formulations. It is also questionable
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whether we are any longer deciding "in" the
patient's "best interests", rather than implement¬
ing solutions "not in" those interests - a contortion
running a gamut of inappropriate possibilities.
Finally, we may doubt whether "best interests"
was ever a logically analogous application in PVS
decisions. Despite superficial similarity to both Re
J and Re F there is, after all, one fundamental dis¬
similarity. Both of those cases concerned patients
who had never been legally competent - in stark
contrast with most PVS patients. "Best interests"
may therefore even be a "misapplication" in this
context, causing patients' previous wishes to be
under-valued. An alternative principle might,
therefore, have been warranted and avoided the
need for contortion. However, at present, "best
interests" still prevail.
MEDICALISATION
The inherent medicalisation within the Re F for¬
mulation (commented upon by the Law
Commission)29 is similarly apparent in Bland,4
despite the Bolam standard finding disfavour in its
original negligence context in recent years.30
Accepting a "responsible body of medical opin¬
ion" as evincing "best interests" essentially subju¬
gates patient interests to professional duty and,
whilst reliance upon medical evidence is neces¬
sary, it should remain purely evidential - not
determinative. Importation of Bolam into PVS
decisions insupportably abrogates the decision,
thereby failing to protect those individuals most in
need of court protection regarding the ultimate
decision: life or death. Although its invocation was
not universally embraced, (doubts being cast by
the Court of Appeal, and subsequently Lord
Mustill, in Bland),3' the Scottish courts appear to
have similarly accepted medicalisation as a
foundation for "best interests".15 By contrast
though, the Irish courts retain a more patient-
oriented, individualistic approach, deeming the
judge the ultimate decision-maker.32 Subsequent
attempts by English law to reserve final authority
to the court, though explicitly expressed in
Frenchay Healthcare NHS Trust v S,33 implicitly
lack substance - in view of the alarming speed,
lack of full investigation and weighty emphasis on
medical evidence apparent in that case.
The danger in medicalisation is its denial of the
patient's previous, and continuing, wow-medical
interests. In addition, the minimisation of judicial
involvement in this new legal area, concerning
decisions laden with ethical and social implica¬
tions, is highly questionable and risks courts
merely "rubber-stamping" medical decisions.
Once combined with judicial willingness to
categorise artificial hydration and nutrition as
"medical treatment",14 and contrasted with judi¬
cial ««willingness to countenance alternative
patient-oriented tests,1' the distortion becomes
yet more exaggerated. How might this distorted
principle cope with circumstances yet to arise?
What if all family members (rather than just one -
as in Re G30) oppose withdrawal? Or if strong evi¬
dence of "patient wishes" contradicts medical
opinion? Could courts justifiably construe the
interests of a near-PVS adult as "none" thereby
denying any "balancing", when Re J would be
more closely analogous? Reliance on medical
opinion, and British Medical Association
guidelines,37 is no substitute for clear judicial
guidelines founded on sound, consistent princi¬
ple. This begs the serious question: just whose
interests are currently being served?
LIMITATION OF RANGE OF INTERESTS
Medicalisation admits only a narrow conception
of "interests". A broader perspective, seeking "best
interests" in totality, might view medical best
interests as just one segment, others perhaps
comprising: "personal" interests, incorporating
non-medical aspects such as religious belief;
"familial" interests, admitting views of those
emotionally closest to the patient; and even "soci¬
etal" interests, considering a decision's effect upon
society or other, similarly placed patients, poten¬
tially including the issue of resource allocation.
Undoubtedly the non-individualistic interests
are contentious but, before rejecting them out of
hand, it should be borne in mind that they may
already play an unofficial role in PVS decisions.
Judgments are, after all, sprinkled with references
to familial opinion,38 and "indignity"39 - a state
which is perceived by those associated with the
patient, whilst the repeated distinction from
"euthanasia" surely indicates evaluation of poten¬
tial social implications.
So, where does this current construction, of
formal medical interests and informal non-
individual interests, leave the actual PVS patient?
Where are his personal, non-medical interests
incorporated? The short answer is that they are
not - a result of imputing "no interests", or even
"no relevant personality",40 to PVS patients.
However, in Re J,1 concerning withholding reven-
tilation from a severely brain-damaged baby, the
Court ofAppeal did view the patient's perspective
as being relevant to "quality of life" - itself an ele¬
ment weighed in determining "best interests".
Thus, the court emphasised that "quality of life"
should be viewed "... from the assumed point of
view of the patient ...", and that "... the test must
be whether the child in question, if capable of
exercising sound judgment, would consider the
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life tolerable".41 The irony of this is, of course, that
in the PVS context "best interests" takes no
account of a genuine, previously existing person¬
ality. However, a non-existent opinion is imputed
regarding a severely disabled baby who has never
actually possessed competence, opinions, or
beliefs.1 This distorts, beyond recognition, the
very thing supposedly sought, ie the "interests" of
that individual PVS patient.
We cannot conclude from this, however, that
"best interests" is completely inapplicable to PVS,
but rather that its current construction is inappro¬
priate. Would it not be preferable to adopt the
broader perspective, enabling other interests to be
formally incorporated and permitting proper
relevance to the patient's non-medical interests?
Although a PVS patient appears to have no
current or future interest in living, this does not
automatically equate to "no interests". Interests
deriving from his previous personality are surely
still attributable to him, and potentially relevant.
These "subsisting interests" include religious
beliefs, former opinion as to his present situation,
feelings towards his family, and perhaps even
beneficence towards others (for example, strong
personal belief in organ donation). By adopting a
fuller, rounder view of "interests"a. truer picture of
the whole individual is formed, providing a firmer
basis for formulating "best" interests. Its invoca¬
tion would require us to turn the Bland decision
upon its head, and to go beyond "Re J individual¬
ism" in making explicit which interests are
relevant. So far only one judgment (by Denham J)
has even approached this, by identifying and
applying fifteen "factors" in determining "best
interests".42 These included, for example, the
patient's life history and previously expressed
views; the family/carer's view; privacy, dignity and
autonomy; and the "common good" involved in
protecting life. Until this clearer-visioned, non-
delusory approach is adopted, both principle and
"interests" seem set for distortion.
In conclusion...
Medico-legal decision-making faces difficulties in
addressing persistent vegetative state (PVS) due to
the condition's chronic nature, potentially conten¬
tious outcome, and intrinsic patient incapacity.
Law has tried to address these difficulties using
the beneficent solution of "best interests". This is
a valuable decision-making device in areas such as
emergency treatment and (perhaps) treatment of
patients who have never been competent. How¬
ever, its relevance to PVS decisions - and patients
previously possessed of competence and opinions
- is less readily apparent. Dismissing its applicabil¬
ity out of hand is overly simplistic though, and
untested in terms of viable alternatives. "Best
interests" should, therefore, be seen as potentially
relevant, but needing careful formulation.
Whilst the judgments correctly identify the PVS
situation as a product of technological and medi¬
cal advances,43 they fail to acknowledge that this
novel situation may warrant a more innovative
legal approach to "best interests". Earlier formu¬
lations of "best interests" have varied considerably
and are essentially contextual in construction.1 2
Judicial attempts to "fit" PVS into these formula¬
tions have distorted the concept of "best inter¬
ests", resulting in an illogical mixed
interpretation. In addition, denying that the
patient still possesses any real interests distorts the
focus of the decision. This has been exacerbated
by judicial delusion regarding the true nature of
treatment withdrawal in PVS, perhaps due to fears
of confronting the all-too-real life/death issues
involved.
Judgments are peppered with semantic distinc¬
tions, which are dubiously founded, lend nothing
to clarity and, indeed, the very need to invoke such
distinctions is a telling criticism in itself. Denying
PVS to be a "quality of life" decision is also highly
questionable, (virtually non-existent quality of life
surely must be a major factor in the decision), and
is at odds with its central relevance in previous
constructions of best interests. The related
disinclination to openly "weigh" relevant factors
contradicts the very essence of best interests itself.
Thus, the path of "best interests" is now
effectively strewn with interpretational debris.
Furthermore, judicial use of "best interests" has
persisted, despite simultaneously declaring PVS
patients to possess "no" interests at all. This
approach lies far beyond this author's understand¬
ing of logic as, even setting aside problems of lin¬
guistic vagueness and viewing from a purely logi¬
cal perspective, it is difficult to see how
"something" may be derived from "nothing".
Meanwhile, overly heavy reliance upon medical
determination of PVS patients' "best interests"
causes other relevant interests - such as individual,
personal (non-medical) interests - to be displaced
entirely.
This current, contorted approach is doing no
one any favours: PVS patients are ill-protected;
the burden on medical opinion is heavy, and the
law is on course for castigation when case circum¬
stances arise such as to highlight weaknesses. It
may well be that a reformulation of "best
interests" to comprise elements outlined by Den¬
ham J, or perhaps those of the Law Commission,44
could provide a better reasoned, more productive
approach. Alternatively, hierarchical structuring
of decision-making "devices" could primarily
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emphasise patients' wishes, and use "best inter¬
ests" only in a fall-back capacity.45 Whichever the
preferred solution, the essential focus must lie
with the interests of the individual patient, admit¬
ting other interests only where relevant. Any such
development will however require a preliminary
step of honesty - as to issues and objective.
Admittedly, the PVS patient may well be legally
incompetent, physically insensate and ultimately
incurable. However, we would do well to remem¬
ber that the decision to withhold nutrition is the
"ultimate" one of life or death, and - no matter
how beneficent or "right" the outcome - it should
not consist in a legal formulation which is illogical,
or inimical to that patient's former and subsisting
interests. Otherwise it is, by definition, most
certainly not in his "best interests".
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While I agree with several points
raised in your recent editorial' on my
paper, Applying best interests to per¬
sistent vegetative state - a principled
distortion?,"' I must respond to a
number of other issues which you
raise. I agree unreservedly with your
caveat that both doctors and judges
must act within the law. My paper,
however, sought to expose that the
paradox for the court in the Bland
case' lay in struggling to attain: 1) a
morally "right" outcome (withdrawal
of life-prolonging treatment (LPT));
while at the same time 2) remaining
within the bounds of the current law.
As the current law stands it permits
allowing patients to die in certain
circumstances, whilst prohibiting in¬
tentional killing. We should not be¬
lieve, however, that this state of affairs
compels us to accept it as the best we
could hope for. Changes to the law
may be justified if sufficient moral
support exists for making such
changes. Although medical ethics, as a
discipline, places considerable reliance
on moral values, the relationship of
law and morality has been traditionally
fraught. This latter tension is reflected
in the strained semantics of the
persistent vegetative state (PVS) deci¬
sions. Thus, far from condoning any
flouting of the criminal law, I submit
that we, as decision makers, need to
embrace more honestly the moral
content of LPT withdrawal decisions,
if decisions are to be clearer and more
consistent.
Your editorial suggests that my arti¬
cle implicitly equates "not in" a
patient's best interests with "against"
best interests. I accept that this is the
effect of my approach. However, I
adopt this position on the basis that
any further distinction regarding best
interests is ineffective. While your pro¬
posed three categories of "in"; "not
in" (presumably neutral); and
"against" a patient's best interests are
viable regarding "interests" as such, I
would argue that the addition of the
superlative "best" seeks the optimal
action for the patient. This absolutist
tone creates an either/or situation,
such that an action can only be "in" or
"not in" the patient's "best interests".
Any further distinction, such as ac¬
tions which are "not in" or are
"against" a patient's best interests,
merely represents examples from the
same category; namely a non-optimal
solution. It is therefore a distinction
without difference. Furthermore,
while your Smith/Jones example is
warranted regarding the patient's in¬
terest in other patients' treatment, the
LPT decision in PVS obviously relates
to the patient personally. Thus, the
decision/outcome can never be neutral
to that patient's interests, and there¬
fore must fall to one side or other of
the "best interests" line.
With regard to my argument that
the decisions are founded upon a
"delusory objective", (ie that non-
treatment is sought rather than the
death of the patient), I agree with your
suggestion that "...any action is prop¬
erly described in part by the intentions
of the agent...". Certainly, for exam¬
ple, English law's distinction between
murder (where death or serious injury
is intended) and manslaughter (where
such intention is absent) would sup¬
port your view. However, as a lawyer, I
must dispute your conclusion that a
patient's death is not "intended" when
it is merely "... foreseen as inevitable".
Several years of debate in English
criminal law have concluded that
where an agent foresees death to be
the "virtually certain" consequence of
his or her actions he or she may be
inferred to possess criminal
"intention".4 Thus, a doctor knowing
death to be the virtually certain result
of withdrawing LPT from a PVS
patient could legally "intend" that
death. The House of Lords' denial of
such criminality on the basis that a
doctor is under no duty to maintain
the patient's life, may (commendably)
reflect judicial recognition of such
medical action as both morally sup¬
portable and ethically sound. How¬
ever, the complex semantic juggling
needed to achieve this moral recogni¬
tion suggests that medical law is being
contorted to bridge the gap between
criminal law and modern morality in
LPT situations.
Relatedly, your suggested test of a
doctor's/judge's true intention (ie his
reaction to the patient waking and
asking for food) I find unhelpful as, by
definition, a PVS patient's conscious¬
ness and communication have ceased
and the possibility is therefore ex¬
tremely remote. Contemplating such
unlikely events regarding PVS patients
is not the answer to establishing
doctors' intentions. This is the task of
legal and medical professionals and
commentators. Open examination and
recognition of realistic consequences
of decisions is the initial step in
providing acceptable solutions to
these difficult cases.
With regard to my argument that it
is illogical to derive "best interests"
from "no interests", I agree entirely
with your suggestion that finding the
alternative of "no best interests" may
be logical where a patient has "no
interests". In PVS cases the courts
have been compelled to use this
approach because the test offered by
earlier cases,5 namely seeking what is
in best interests, seems to offer noth¬
ing to weigh in the balance. On this
view, "no interests/not in best inter¬
ests" therefore provides the only logi¬
cal solution. However, this is premised
on the view that only the patient's
experiential interests matter. Yet, pa¬
tients arguably do possess interests
beyond the purely experiential.1' And,
if such interests are deemed to persist
beyond entry to PVS,; then merely
construing "no interests/not in best
interests" is inappropriate, and we
must revert to the original construe-
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tion of seeking what is in the PVS
patient's best interests.
Finally I would emphasise my prin¬
cipal argument which focuses on the
need for clear decision making in PVS,
LPT decisions. Existing judgments do
not - and cannot - deliver this until
relevant criminal, civil, medical, ethi¬
cal and moral issues are openly
debated. Undoubtedly all concerned -
doctors, family, nursing staff, lawyers
and judiciary - seek the best outcome
for the patient. However, the appropri¬
ate mechanistic tools are needed to
allow decisions to be taken with that
objective in mind. Recent judicial
semantics and reconstructions show
that, in England and Scotland at least,
courts are not suitably equipped. A
broader, empowered judicial function
is therefore needed. Open debate of
these issues is the essential first step
towards meeting the genuine best
interests of patients in this tragic,
highly personal situation.
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Re S (Medical Treatment: Adult Sterilisation)
Retrenching on risk - revising the lawful boundaries of
sterilisation
Andrea J. Fenwick, Research Student, University ofEdinburgh*
Making decisions for others is a risky business. We fear making the wrong decision. Yet
medical treatment and what we might term 'life management' of intellectually disabled people
frequently necessitate difficult decisions being made on their behalf. Such decisions are not
only risky in terms of getting it wrong, but also risk driven. The decision-maker must assess the
risks associated with each option in arriving at the optimal solution. This involves identifying
the relevant range of risk factors, and evaluating their impact on the incapax, which is
inherently problematic in terms of accuracy and attribution of value. However, the recent case
of Re S (Medical Treatment: Adult Sterilisation)2 has confronted risk head-on in the context of
proposed prophylactic sterilisation of an intellectually disabled woman. This commentary
argues that Re S represents a retrenchment from the previously expansive boundaries of lawful
sterilisation, based on a re-evaluation of risk. In calling for a more extensive redefinition this
commentary also proffers a more realistic two-stage approach to risk assessment.
RE S: REAL RETRENCHMENT?
Re S concerned a vulnerable 22-year-old intellectually disabled woman, who was not sexually
active. Pregnancy could, therefore, only result from sexual assault. The High Court's
unexpected refusal to authorise sterilisation was clearly posited in 'risk'. In overtly assessing
the risk of pregnancy, Johnson J gave detailed consideration to S's daily routine,
superviser/client ratio, tactile behaviour, respite care supervision, and need for supervision
generally. This focus on supervision and degree of care had been previously highlighted in
Re LC (Medical Treatment: Sterilisation)3 where the High Court had similarly refused
authorisation partly based on evidence that existing levels of care and supervision 'would
effectively eliminate the risk of sexual abuse to L'.4 In Re S, while acknowledging the irony of
overriding the wishes of parents because of their responsible supervision, Johnson J
emphasised the need for 'identifiable consistency' and thus felt 'driven' to find parity of
circumstance with Re LC.
Although both Re S and Re LC adopt a similar approach, the tenor of Re S is altogether
broader. Johnson J considered the impact of the decision regarding the family unit, the
Children Act 1989 and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. While admitting the relevance of parental opinion, the ultimate
balancing exercise was reserved to the court alone. Broader risk factors were acknowledged,
including, most importantly, the risk and seriousness of sexual assault itself (as opposed to
resultant pregnancy). Furthermore, Johnson J set new temporal limits on risk assessment. He
cautioned that 'speculation as to future risk must be based on circumstances as they presently
exist or can be reasonably foreseen to exist'.5 Restricting risk to foreseeability enabled the
requisite degree of risk to be redefined as 'identifiable rather than speculative'.6
1
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Why retrench?
We might wonder why retrenchment was necessary, as two relevant House of Lords' decisions
already existed in Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Sterilisation),7 and Re F (Mental Patient:
Sterilisation).% Indeed, Re B was based on relatively restricted grounds insofar as the ward
showed normal sexual drive, while possessing no understanding of the causal connection
between intercourse and pregnancy. However, these limits were subsequently eroded by
shifting judicial criteria. In Re F the House of Lords combined welfare with necessity, but
invoked the Bolam standard in determining best interests and, by so doing, ignored the broader
philosophical, social, moral and personal aspects of the decision. The cumulative effect was
thus: (1) to establish a loose formulation of best interests; and (2) to load the best interests
equation with heavy medical bias. Absence of mandatory court involvement simultaneously
relaxed procedural steps.
This facilitated further expansion during the following four years, through to the high water
mark of Re HG (Specific Issue Order: Sterilisation)C This persistent boundary extension
witnessed the downgrading of factual criteria regarding sexual activity (for example Re W
(Mental Patient) (Sterilisation)10 and Re HGU) and supervision (Re HG), together with the
admission of increasingly remote, future-oriented aspects (Re W'2). This factual downgrading
facilitated approval of sterilisation based on best interests. Legal criteria were simultaneously
loosened - moving from necessity and welfare (Re F'3) to vague assessments of 'interests
overall' (Re HGU), and shifting from paramountcy (Re F]5) to taking account of others'
interests (Re HG16). Procedures were relaxed regarding therapeutic sterilisations (Re E (A
Minor) (Medical Treatmentj17 and Re GF (Medical Treatmentj18). The net effect was the
seemingly limitless expansion of lawful boundaries, to the point where even de minimis risk of
pregnancy - where the patient was not, nor would become, sexually active - would translate
into an 'overwhelming' reason for sterilising (see Re HG>9).
Re S has stemmed this tide. Although any right of reproduction was denied - as in Re B and
Re F10 - Johnson J acknowledged the special character of contraceptive sterilisation, together
with dangers inherent in leaving sterilisation decisions to immediate carers. Ultimately, the
abuse issue founded the refusal, Re S being distinguished from Re B2' in terms of S's lack of
sexual awareness. However, Re S represented a turning point in a wider sense, by compelling
courts to focus on risk.
New limits (Re S)
Revising the requisite degree of risk to 'identifiable rather than speculative'22 effectively
resurrects the limits of sterilisation. Indeed, it reflects the language adopted in Re D, where
7
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clearly characterised such sterilisation as violating a woman's right to reproduce. However, unlike S, D was
likely later to develop sufficient intellectual capacity to enable her to make her own choice.
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Heilbron J similarly focused upon the ward's absence of sexual interest, lack of opportunity for
sexual activity and high degree of supervision, in concluding the need for contraception was
'premature'.23 The return by Re S to 'identifiable risk' also corresponds with an earlier Practice
Note of the Official Solicitor,24 requiring a real danger, as opposed to mere chance, of
pregnancy.25 While the decision still clearly (and rightly) depends on factual circumstances,
'identifiable risk' suggests that any purely de minimis degree of risk will not suffice. Hence,
risk has been brought sharply into focus, and into line, with accepted policy approaches to
foreseeability and remoteness.
The motivation for this approach is apparent towards the end of Johnson J's judgment, 'if in
the circumstances of this case the court were to declare sterilisation to be lawful, then it is
difficult to envisage any factual situation in which that relief would be refused'.26 This clearly
indicates judicial discomfort with previous expansiveness, and a perceived need for more
restrictive boundaries. Johnson J, in the final paragraph of his judgment, clearly reserved
responsibility for deciding whether to sterilise to the court, restricting boundaries further by
halting procedural relaxations.
Admittedly, as first instance decisions, both Re S and Re LC could be dismissed as renegade
judgments.27 However, their very unexpectedness - after more than five years of seemingly
unstoppable expansion - suggests that the pendulum is swinging back. There are now limits.
The boundaries have been revised and retrenchment is becoming a reality. In this process the
key factor is risk, and it is to a consideration of its assessment that we now turn.
THE RISK MECHANISM
So, why was retrenchment based on risk? The short answer is that expanded lawful boundaries
meant that risk was the only control factor left open to the court. Determining best interests had
been all but handed to the medical profession so that, once any risk of pregnancy was
identified, sterilisation was lawful wherever a 'responsible body ofmedical opinion' believed it
to be in the patient's best interests. Thus the court could effect a limit only by deeming the risk
unproven. However, Re S (and Re LC) represent a more fundamental shift in how risk, as a
mechanism, is viewed, assessed, and its impact interpreted.
Evaluating 'risk'
Carson, discussing risk assessment within health care generally, advocates a distinction
between two identifiable variables: consequence and likelihood.2S He argues that risk
assessment should consider all relevant factors in terms of both of these variables. In other
words: (!) what will happen if the foreseen risk actually transpires; and (2) what is the
likelihood of that risk occuring? He believes that in assessing risk we are susceptible to
irrationality about both variables, tending to emphasise harm rather than benefit, and
unrealistically anticipating a worst-case scenario as virtually certain.29
On this basis, the expansive sterilisation decisions clearly evidence poor risk assessment in
confusing risk (of pregnancy occurring) with consequence (of resulting trauma). The resulting
approach becomes consequence driven, subjugating particular risks to others. For example, the
psychological harm of sterilisation became less important than the perceived major
psychological harm from pregnancy/birth. It thus becomes compelling to see sterilisation as
'necessary' and clearly in the patient's best interests. In reality, the risk assessment was being
skewed. Focusing predominantly on the ultimate harm of pregnancy/birth trauma obscures a
23
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24
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26
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27
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clear view of the range of relevant risk factors, the harm or benefit accruing from them, and the
likelihood of these harms/benefits actually occurring.
Retrenchment and the 'risk mechanism'
The recent retrenchment shifts this focus. In effect, it deconstructs the existing risk mechanism.
Instead of focusing on ultimate harm/consequence, assessment reconsiders earlier stages to
assess what might be termed intermediate harm, namely the risk of pregnancy occurring in the
first place. This permits clearer perspective, and more accurate evaluation, of factors
cumulatively influencing risk. Thus the courts were able to admit risk factors previously
ignored, such as the risks involved in operating, and so reconstruct a more justifiable risk
assessment.
More importantly, in Re S, the court accepted, for the first time, the significance of the risk
agent. Assessment thereby starts from the first level of the mechanism, by determining the
realistic source of potential risk. This facilitates a broader view of risk factors and injects
likelihood as a vital element. Supporting risk factors, such as degree of care/supervision,
capacity to consent to sexual intercourse, and surgical risks, are also admissible within general
rules of foreseeability. Together they help to determine whether risk of pregnancy is realistic,
or simply too remote to warrant surgical intervention.
This evinces a substantial judicial shift. The risk mechanism is being viewed in a more
complete sense. If the risk of becoming pregnant is virtually nil, then the consequences become
irrelevant. In other words, ultimate harm is irrelevant because the risk of intermediate harm
occurring is non-existent. Furthermore, the court is responsible for determining whether
intermediate harm is a real risk or not.
Staging risk assessment
It is submitted that risk assessment regarding sterilisation of the intellectually disabled should
incorporate two distinct stages:
(1) identifying whether a cumulative30 risk of pregnancy really exists, by determining the
likelihood of a pregnancy occurring, and by which agent; then,
(2) considering the likelihood of further harms/benefits accruing from:
(a) the process of pregnancy/birth/separation/parenting;
(b) surgical sterilisation; and
(c) alternative methods of contraception.
Re S goes part way to promoting this two-stage approach, by distinguishing respective stages
and broadening the range of admissible factors. Effectively, lawful boundaries have been
revised and redrawn using the risk mechanism. However, risk re-evaluation is in its infancy.
While the risk equation is now in better order, the range of relevant factors is far from
complete. English courts still tend to adopt a one-sided perspective regarding certain factors.
For example, the ability of intellectually disabled patients to form relationships is often denied.
Statistical risks, painful side-effects, and the potentially substantial psychological impact (ie
distress and low self-esteem) resulting from surgical sterilisation are often trivialised.
Furthermore, while the patient's personal inviolability is recognised regarding inability to
consent and the need for court involvement, that inviolability is often forgotten regarding both
surgery and sexual assault. This raises questions, respectively, whether the sterilisation would
be performed forcibly in the event of patient objection, and whether vulnerability to sexual
assault is implicitly accepted.
In addition, Carson identifies several difficulties surrounding the sexuality of the
intellectually disabled generally. These include, for example, the difficulty of their securing
30
G. B Little (op cit, n 25. at p 277) also identifies the German legislative approach to sterilisation as requiring
'cumulative' fulfilment. However, those requirements extend beyond assessing risk of a pregnancy occurring and
therefore comprise a different decision-making model than is proposed here.
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privacy in which to develop relationships,31 the particular implications of general social
constructs of male responsibility for contraception, and the additional difficulties in countering
risks of sexually transmitted disease.32 These factors, which surely merit consideration if our
aim is to protect the patient from the potential harms of sexual activity, remain entirely
unconsidered within sterilisation decisions thus far. Furthermore, adopting alternative
communication methods33 and/or developing a patient's social skills may represent important
alternatives prior to resorting to sterilisation. A patient's low IQ is not necessarily
commensurate with an inability to understand enough to consent, and/or cope with
pregnancy.34 However, current legal emphasis upon IQ values tends to preclude realistic
evaluation of a patient's broader social capacity.
One common thread is ascertainable among these unconsidered factors. It pertains to the
intellectually disabled patient's personal non-medical interests including, for example,
sexuality, privacy, bodily integrity and social development. The early expansive sterilisation
decisions failed to consider particular (non-medical) risk factors. Thus, within stage two of
assessment, medical interests predominated. This permitted an unofficial distinction to exist
between medical interests - which weighed heavily - and what Cica terms the patient's 'social
interests'.35 These social (or personal non-medical) interests were too often left aside. In
retrenching on risk, Re S has undoubtedly altered prospective case outcomes — foregone
conclusions are now rendered unpredictable. Furthermore, the court tentatively acknowledged
patient interests in a broader, non-medical sense. However, more substantial recognition of
such interests, and admittance of associated risk factors, remains a matter for speculation.
RISK - CURIOSITY OR CATALYST?
The precedental value of Re S begs the question whether focusing on risk is a catalyst for
change, or merely a curiosity - a very specific exception to the generally expansive rule. Let us
consider each in turn.
Curiosity?
There are a number of reasons why Re S and Re LC may yet prove mere curiosities.30 These
include:
• the status of the retrenchment decisions, in that they are first instance decisions compared
with earlier House of Lords' decisions;
• the particular circumstances of the retrenchment cases, notably the very high degrees of
care or supervision in both Re S and Re LC\
• the intellectually disabled woman's absence of sexual drive, making criminal assault the
only potential risk agent. This could limit the cases to their facts;
• the continuing influence of medical opinion, which could render judicial supervision
insignificant in circumstances not strictly analogous to Re S or Re LC\
• the very limited admission of patient social interests or supporting risk factors.
Catalyst?
These cases do, however, possess potential for catalytic change. The recent retrenchment
effectively protects personal, non-medical interests by the back door. While this currently
D. Carson, 'The sexuality of people with learning difficulties' (1989) Journal ofSocial and Welfare Law 355, at
p 360.
Ibid, at pp 363-364.
For example, see generally J. O'Hara, 'Pregnancy in a severely mentally handicapped adult' (1989) 15 Journal of
Medical Ethics 197, at pp 197-199.
34
Sec op cit, n 31, al pp 367-371. See also J. P. M. Denekens, 11. Nys and 11. Stucr. 'Sterilisation of incompetent
mentally handicapped persons: a model for decision-making' (1999) 25 Journal ofMedical Ethics 237, at p 239.
55
N. Cica, 'Sterilising the Intellectually Disabled: The approach of the High Court of Australia in Department of
Health v JWIi and SMB' (1993) I Medical !mw Review 186, at p 195.
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focuses on protection from sexual assault, the relevant interest is 'bodily integrity'. This
interest could equally apply where a patient is sexually active but risk of pregnancy does not,
on balance, justify invasive surgical sterilisation because of, for example, reduced patient
fertility, or male responsibility for contraception.
This more radical shift towards protecting social interests would require assessing a wider
range of risk factors than traditionally — or even recently - admitted in England. That depends
upon courts accepting the broader personal/social/ethical context of sterilisation decisions.
This, in turn, requires recognition of issues which are still problematic for society, the
legislature and the courts, such as the sexuality of intellectually disabled people, sexually
transmitted disease, male responsibility, and personal development of the intellectually
disabled.
Such changes are not impossible. Society's attitudes do change. The law develops to reflect
appropriate changes. The recent retrenchment recognises that lawful boundaries need revising,
and that a patient's social interests raise factors which ought to be relevant to the decision.
Furthermore, the decisions show judicial desire to reclaim the court's role as final arbiter.
Theoretically this trend could continue to develop. If so, it is to be encouraged. 'Best interests'
surely suggests, to the layman at least, taking an active decision about the procreative welfare
of the intellectually disabled patient - a decision taken in full sight of all factors and
circumstances. Continued development would move closer to this. In its wake it would leave
only a series of decisions by default - predominantly negative decisions based on a limited,
medically oriented agenda and inaccurate risk assessment.
Alternative approaches?
On the face of it, the retrenched position appears now to replicate the Australian approach
accruing from Secretary, Dept ofHealth and Community Services (NT) v JWB and SMB?7 and
Re L & M, Director-General Department of Family Services and Aboriginal and Islander
Affairs?* JWB39 set out the parameters of sterilisation decisions, within which Re L & Af° then
developed guidelines. Similar boundaries in Australia and England seem to result, particularly
comparing Re L & A/" and Re Sn in relation to: parity of language/principle; refusal (to
sterilise) based on insufficient risk; and mutual imposition of court involvement. However, the
means used to arrive at those boundaries creates a significant difference. The logical, traceable
Australian approach remains more accessible to future sterilisation decisions because the
Australian Family Court adopts a wider agenda in terms of: accepting a wider context;
recognising the importance of personal inviolability; and admitting a broad sweep of evidence
regarding both medical and social interests.
Hence, while Australian boundaries are clearly demarcated, courts still have ample room to
manoeuvre. Where future cases raise different issues, the range of risk factors is capable of
developing to encompass them. This perspective engenders highly individualised decisions
within tighter, justifiable boundaries. In contrast, the English High Court was able to retrench
only on narrow grounds pertaining to risk in particular circumstances. Furthermore, the
traditional weight of medical evidence in England may still be overwhelming, once identifiable
risk of pregnancy exists.
37
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38
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Further developments: Re X (Adult Sterilisation)43
The recent decision of Re X serves to indicate the potential limits of Re S. The two cases
display important factual distinctions,44 and X's apparent interest in (and possible history of)
sexual activity effectively shifted her situation across the risk boundary. Thus Holman J agreed
with both the consultant psychiatrist and the Official Solicitor that there existed 'a real risk that
X will have a relationship with a sexual ingredient and may become pregnant'.45 Holman J
clearly delineated relevant issues in addressing a logical series of questions regarding X's
capacity, risk of pregnancy, risk of consequent harm, and risks associated with an alternative
contraceptive method. This delineation, together with willingness to implement a 'real risk'
criterion, suggests that the requirement that a risk be 'identifiable' is tentatively taking root and
a revised approach is being adopted.
However, despite this apparent recognition of boundary changes resulting from Re S, the
Re X judgment ultimately exposes the limits of retrenchment. Once a 'real risk' had been
identified, judicial emphasis turned to focus solidly upon prevention of consequential harm
(from pregnancy), limited evaluation of alternatives, and heavy reliance on medical evidence.
Indeed, in contrast to Re S,46 Holman J drew attention to particular precedental aspects of Re F
regarding the need for care and the lawful acceptability of a responsible body of medical
opinion.47
Hence, in terms of this author's suggested two-stage approach, the first stage (cumulative
risk) was fulfilled by virtue of a foreseeable risk agent (X's male friend), and supporting risk
factors (X's opportunity for, and interest in, sexual activity). The second stage, however,
received only partial consideration in the ReXjudgment, where reliance on medical assessment
of consequential harm, and a limited consideration of alternatives still predominated.48
Imbalance within the harm/benefit perspective49 seems, therefore, to persist. Despite redrawing
certain boundaries, Re S may yet prove a curiosity - its role restricted to initial identification of
the existence of risk. In England any development of the Re S approach beyond this first stage
of risk assessment remains, therefore, a matter for conjecture.50
DEFINING NEW BOUNDARIES
Realistically, sterilisation benefits some intellectually disabled patients, yet is an unnecessary
imposition on others. A more radical overhaul of this area is needed if boundaries are to be
appropriately set. Incompetent patients merit coherent, active decision-making on their behalf,
in full sight of all associated harms and benefits. After all, this is no more than we, as legally
competent decision-makers, would expect in making the 'right' decision for ourselves.
43
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Ibid, at p 1127. The factual differences arising regarding X concerned: her desire for physical contact with men;
Iter potential enjoyment of a sexual relationship; her degree of independence; her friendship with a particular
male, to whom she regarded herself 'engaged'; her previous history of some sexual activity; and her expressed
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Some kind of statutory intervention is probably required for this to be achieved.51 Any
statutory proposal requires certainty of direction. That direction should make it clear that those
new boundaries require:
(1) broader context and range (of relevant risk factors) to be recognised;
(2) acceptance that a more accurate, visible assessment method based on (but not limited to) a
two-stage approach, is warranted; and
(3) that the assessment process should take account of risk agent, relevant primary and
supporting risk factors, and resultant impact on the patient's medical and personal (non¬
medical) interests.
Only then will risk be assessed individually and fully, and the interests of intellectually
disabled patients regarding their sexuality be suitably protected.
Other authors also recognise the need Cor legislation. See, tor example, J. P. M. Denekens et al (op cit, n 34, at
p 240) who, in complete contrast to the present author, adopt a family-based decision-making model.
Interestingly, however, several of the issues perceived as relevant find mutual support, for example
multidisciplinary input, patient involvement, patient fertility, and the need for sexual education and consideration
of alternative contraceptive methods.
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